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ABSTRACT
Since the late 1990s,  governments across the post-Soviet space have redefined 
freedom of conscience as freedom from "non-traditional" religious groups — part 
of a broader effort to recast pluralism as a threat to national sovereignty. This 
dissertation focuses on the Central Asian states of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, 
which  have  restricted  such  groups  as  the  Jehovah's  Witnesses,  the  Ahmadi 
Muslim  community,  and  the  Chinese  spiritual  movement  Falun  Gong.  It 
analyzes why illiberal regimes restrict marginal and apolitical religious groups, 
which  are  often  more  docile  than  the  population  at  large.  Furthermore,  it 
addresses why policies that infringe on civil liberties nevertheless enjoy popular 
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support.
These questions take on greater significance in the midst of the current global 
retreat from democratic values. Yet they cannot be answered by the prevailing 
instrumentalist  perspective  in  political  theory,  which  assumes  that  rational 
citizens  should  seek  to  maximize  individual  liberties.  Popular  support  for 
authoritarian  figures  has  prompted  scholars  to  propose  non-instrumental 
motivations, such as national and religious identity. Rather than treat “identity“ 
as non-instrumental,  I  propose a relational model of identity politics,  wherein 
pluralism and essentialism represent opposing strategies in a competitive political 
field. Drawing from Bourdieu's work on public politics, I argue that essentialist 
claims to authority (e.g. ethnic nationalism, religious populism) appeal to strata 
with  relatively  low  capacity  for  autonomous  political  mobilization.  Illiberal 
regimes propagate essentialist claims on behalf of such strata, and repress even 
benign forms of pluralism as part of this essentialist social contract. 
I  investigate these hypotheses by examining recent discourses on religious 
tradition  in  Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan.  I  employ  a  dataset  of  5,000  public 
documents  (legislation,  court  rulings,  etc.),  which  I  analyze  using  qualitative 
coding. In addition, I draw on interviews with government officials and religious 
leaders collected during fieldwork between 2012 and 2014, and on data from the 
xWorld Values Survey. I find that the political and religious establishments of both 
states are erecting new orthodoxies that consecrate the will of their political bases 
as essential to national self-determination. Thus, illiberal democracies maintain 
popular support by redistributing authority (symbolic capital, per Bourdieu) to 
core constituencies at the expense of peripheral constituencies.
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1INTRODUCTION
The “Mysterious” Popularity of Illiberal Regimes
In the summer of 2010 a group of local men approached a house in Toktogul, 
Kyrgyzstan that served a small congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses. Toktogul 
resembles many small towns in Central Asia — a community of 16,000 people in 
tin-roofed houses,  sitting along an alpine reservoir  that  powers a  Soviet-built 
hydroelectric dam. In such small Kyrgyz towns, everyone is connected within a 
few degrees of separation, and the Jehovah’s Witnesses that lived and gathered at 
the house were undoubtedly family and neighbors to a significant proportion of 
the community. Despite these connections, however, the men looted and set fire 
to  the  house,  burning  most  of  it  to  the  ground.  They  also  assaulted  several 
members of the congregation in the process.1 
When the Jehovah’s Witnesses turned to the local court for justice, they were 
led down a lengthy legal  process that  eventually led to the revocation of  the 
group’s license to meet. The State Commission of Religious Affairs, responsible 
for  licensing  religious  organizations  and  monitoring  interfaith  relations, 
attributed the incident to tensions caused by the Jehovah’s Witness’  presence, 
1 Mushfig Bayram. 2012. “We need to protect the rights of the majority.” Retrieved Feb 2, 2014 
(http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1712).
2and  laid  the  blame  on  them  for  stirring  up  interfaith  strife.  The  Jehovah’s 
Witnesses have fought for the right to reopen this congregation and establish 
more elsewhere in the country, but they, along with many other religious groups, 
face increasingly stringent restrictions that hamper the ability of so-called “non-
traditional” religions to establish and expand their activities in Kyrgyzstan. 
The fate of the Toktogul Jehovah’s Witness community mirrors a tendency 
across  much  of  the  post-Soviet  space  to  redefined  freedom  of  conscience  as 
freedom from "non-traditional"  and “destructive” religious groups.  Restrictive 
religious policies represent part of a broader effort to recast pluralism, an integral 
part  of  democratic  rule,  as a threat to national security,  sovereignty,  and self-
determination.  The  administrations  of  Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,  on  which 
this  dissertation  focuses,  have  drawn  increasingly  rigid  distinctions  between 
“traditional” and “non-traditional” religious groups, and dramatically curtailed 
the  freedom  of  the  latter  to  practice  and  proselytize  their  faith.  The  groups 
affected  primarily  include  marginal  and  apolitical  groups  as  the  Jehovah's 
Witnesses, the Ahmadi Muslim community, and the Chinese spiritual movement 
Falun Gong. Traditional status is primarily received for Sunni Islam of the Hanafi 
school,  to  which  the  titular  Kyrgyz  and  Kazakh  community  of  each  state 
nominally subscribes, as well as for the Russian Orthodox Church that claims 
3“spiritual  jurisdiction” over the sizable Russian communities  residing in each 
country.
Though this shift toward authoritarianism has surprised few observers of the 
region,  scholars  and advocates  for  the  freedom of  conscience  have expressed 
concern over the erosion of religious rights in the region. Local observers have 
expressed particular dismay that more democratic Kyrgyzstan has reproduced 
the policies of its more autocratic neighbors, signaling that it will remain in the 
orbit  of  other  post-Soviet  “illiberal  democracies”  (Zakaria  1997).  But  scholars 
have also puzzled at certain contradictions between the rhetoric of the regimes, 
which claim that such policies defend the cultural and “spiritual” sovereignty of 
the nation, and the outcomes of these policies in practice. Despite the regimes’ 
statements that heterodox groups present a threat to public order and security, 
none of the groups labelled “destructive” represent an demonstrable threat to the 
state or citizenry. Marginal and apolitical religious groups would seem to present 
no challenge to the power of authoritarian regimes, and are often more docile 
than the population at large. And while it might be tempting to attribute these 
policies to banal identity politics, in practice they often do more to undermine 
local traditions than they do to enforce them. 
Rather  than  defend  local  religious  groups  against  foreign  incursions,  the 
4religious policy of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan often do the opposite. In addition 
to targeting global religious groups such as Baptists and Ahmadi Muslims (who 
themselves have a decades-long history of peaceful coexistence in the region), the 
regimes  have  harassed  local  imams  and  proponents  of  genuinely  local  faith 
traditions such as Tengrianism — the animistic beliefs native to the Kyrgyz and 
Kazakh peoples before Islam penetrated the region in the 7th century.  At the 
same time, the ’traditional’ practices of Islam and Russian Orthodoxy bear the 
influence of foreign governments, Islamic foundations from the Middle East, and 
the Moscow Patriarchate. Russia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia all finance mosques, 
churches,  and religious  centers  in  the  region  as  a  form of  soft  power.  These 
religious organizations represent a far greater foreign intervention into public life 
than the grassroots missionary activity of groups such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
or Tablighi Jamaat — an Islamic missionary movement originating in India.
Given  these  puzzling  aspects  of  religious  policy  in  Kazakhstan  and 
Kyrgyzstan, this dissertation will examine two interrelated questions: First, why 
do illiberal democracies restrict seemingly benign religious groups? Second, why 
do such policies often enjoy broad popular support, despite the fact that they 
infringe  on  the  civil  liberties  of  average  citizens?  In  addressing  these  two 
research questions,  I  will  also engage a number of  related questions:  Why in 
5particular has Kyrgyzstan enacted such similar policies to its more authoritarian 
neighbors such as Kazakhstan, given the disparities in regime consolidation and 
the  country’s  reputation  as  an  “island  of  democracy?”  Finally,  given  the 
discrepancies between the official discourse on tradition and the historical record 
in the region, what rationale governs the distinction between “traditional” and 
“non-traditional” religious groups?
I. Research Puzzles and Existing Explanations
The  answer  to  these  questions  initially  seems  inherent  to  the  concept  of 
authoritarianism itself — a form of governance that suppresses the freedoms and 
will of its citizens. In a recent publication on Central Asian “dictators without 
borders,” Cooley and Heathershaw define authoritarianism as a system of rule 
“in which political authority is concentrated in the hands of the few.” Working 
with this definition, authoritarian regimes can be understood to oppress religious 
minorities  and  any  other  social  dissidence  simply  as  part  of  their  efforts  to 
reproduce their power, which inherently comes at the expense of civil liberties 
and  public  input  into  governance.  Such  definitions  assume  a  misalignment 
between regime and popular interests — that the regime concentrates power at 
6the uniform expense of its citizenry. In reality, authoritarian regimes engage the 
social competition among diverse social factions. The alignment between regime 
and population not a constant — a uniform misalignment — but complex and 
variable.2 
In  relation to  pluralism,  autocratic  and absolutist  regimes have frequently 
used  minorities  as  a  means  to  perpetuate  their  rule,  defending  ethnic  and 
religious minorities as bulwarks against  populist  challenges to their  authority 
(Gellner  1983).  Contemporary  authoritarian  regimes  are  not  built  simply  on 
coercive suppression of the public, but on the capacity to monopolize the voice of 
the public. As Chatterjee points out of “popular politics in most of the world,” 
even the  most  autocratic  contemporary regimes  must  claim their  mandate  to 
govern from the people they govern:
There is no question that the legitimacy of the modern state is now clearly 
and  firmly  grounded  in  a  concept  of  popular  sovereignty.  This  is,  of 
course, the basis of modern democratic politics, but the idea of popular 
sovereignty  has  an  influence  that  is  more  universal  than  that  of 
democracy. Even the most undemocratic of modern regimes must claim its 
legitimacy not  from divine right  or  dynastic  succession or  the  right  of 
conquest but from the will of the people, however expressed. Autocrats, 
military dictatorships, one-party regimes — all rule, or so they must say, 
on behalf of the people (Chatterjee 2006:27).
2 Scholars such as Cooley and Heathershaw realize this fact,  of course, and introduce greater 
nuance  when  examining  particular  cases,  but  in  so  doing  they  disconnect  their  empirical 
discussions from their own strong definition of authoritarianism.
7Working  with  Chatterjee’s  conception  of  authoritarianism,  we  can  assume,  a 
priori,  that  actions  taken  by  illiberal  regimes  generally  serve  the  goal  of 
reproducing this monopolistic claim to represent the popular will. Such claims at 
times serve to silence the legitimate interests of the citizenry, undoubtedly, but 
authoritarian rulers  and their  policies  can also enjoy genuine support  among 
broad segments of the population. What’s more, policies that target the rights of 
minorities would seem to be intended to appeal precisely to the political base of 
such  regimes.  Thus,  when  investigating  restrictive  religious  policies  in 
Kyrgyzstan  and  Kazakhstan,  we  must  consider  how  such  policies  appeal  to 
average members of the titular, majority community of each country.
Here  we  encounter  the  second puzzle,  however:  Common citizens  would 
seem to have an inherent interest in opposing policies that infringe on their civil 
liberties.  The  prevailing  institutionalist  perspective  in  contemporary  political 
theory assumes that rational actors desire the freedom and autonomy to pursue 
their  interests  (Pepinsky  2014).  Reasonable  citizens  should  thus  support 
democratic  governance  that  maximizes  their  civil  liberties,  and  thereby 
guarantees them the freedom to pursue their interests in both the public and 
private spheres. Within this instrumentalist perspective, only actors who directly 
participate in an authoritarian regime, or otherwise gain from complicity with 
8the  regime,  would  have  a  rational  incentive  to  support  authoritarian 
accumulation of power. Common citizens with no direct connection to the regime 
would seem to have an inherent interest to oppose such accumulations of power, 
and should therefore  recognize  that  self-determination hinges  on maximizing 
civil liberties. 
This is not what we observe, however. Instead, authoritarian regimes — the 
present cases included — frequently deploy illiberal policies in order to mobilize 
popular support. In Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, large proportions of the titular 
national  communities  have  aligned  themselves  with  the  regimes’  efforts  to 
circumscribe pluralism, religious and otherwise. Rather than unify as multiethnic 
coalitions  to  hold power  in  check,  as  the  instrumentalist  perspective  expects, 
many  common  citizens  support  authoritarian  regimes  and  illiberal  policies 
seemingly at the expense of their own liberties. These common citizens would 
seem to be betraying their manifest interest in liberal democracy for the sake of 
purely symbolic victories offered by banal nationalism (Billig 1995). 
This puzzle takes on greater significance in the midst of the current global 
retreat from democratic values. Entire scholarly literatures have proliferated to 
explain why common citizens support illiberal regimes seemingly against their 
interests.  Scholarship on identity politics (Smith 1991;  Castells  2010),  religious 
9fundamentalism (Huntington 1997), and other non-instrumental political factors 
arose precisely to explain citizens’ seemingly irrational behavior. These theories 
implicitly or explicitly attribute causality to a putative lack of civil, democratic 
values,  especially  across  the  Global  South.  Other  theories  focus  on  the 
charismatic qualities of individual leaders, and their capacity to manipulate the 
masses  through  media  and  cultural  hegemony  (Feldman  1997).  In  all  cases, 
however, these literatures explain popular support for illiberal regimes either by 
treating the population as irrational, or by removing popular agency entirely and 
treating the public as weak and malleable.
The  analysis  I  pursue  in  this  dissertation  thus  offers  a  critique  of  the 
instrumentalist  assumption that  reasonable citizens seek maximum individual 
liberties,  as  well  as  of  the  theories  on  “identity  politics”  and  other  non-
instrumental factors that have arisen as a result of this assumption. This focus 
may seem narrow, but the emphasis on individual liberty and self-determination 
runs through Western political thought back to Plato, and is central to much of 
contemporary  political  theory.  Though  many  scholarly  treatments  of 
authoritarianism avoid reifying strong forms of this instrumentalist assumption, 
including  sensitive  case  studies  of  Central  Asia  and  the  broader  post-Soviet 
space, there remains a significant divide between these nuanced cases studies 
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and  the  prevailing  instrumentalist  perspective  in  political  theory.  This 
dissertation  aims  to  bridge  that  divide  with  a  relational  model  of  populist, 
identity, and authoritarian politics.
II. Argument and Theory
To answer these questions, I propose to turn to the concept of authoritarianism 
itself. Rather than treat authoritarian rule primarily as a concentration of power 
or a form of unfreedom (Sen 2001), I treat authoritarianism as a distinct claim to 
authority  —  a  claim  to  represent  an  essential  popular  will  that  must  be 
“defended”  from  pluralism.  This  definition  requires  that  we  model 
representation  not  as  a  function  of  institutions,  but  rather  as  a  struggle  to 
propagate  such  claims  in  public  life,  in  which  both  public  figures  and  their 
constituents  play  roles.  This  model  I  draw  from  Bourdieu,  who  described 
representation as a mystery of ministry, wherein public figures articulate a unified 
will  in  place  of  the  many  particular  wills  for  which  they  speak:  “When  the 
spokesperson speaks, it is a group that speaks through him, but one that exists as 
a group through that speech and its speaker” (Bourdieu 2004:41). 
From populist upstarts to entrenched dictators, authoritarian figures claim to 
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speak for a sacrosanct will that transcends social differences and stands above 
mundane politics. Such leaders claim privileged authority to enact the “true” will 
of the people (or, perhaps, the will of the “true” people) upon  the population, 
whether they ground that sacrosanct will in ethnic identity, national tradition, 
religious  belief,  or  even  “class  consciousness.”  Furthermore,  illiberal  regimes 
circumvent democratic constraints by denigrating politics as something frivolous 
and petty in comparison to this sacrosanct will. They condemn opposition and 
dissent  as  forms of  false  consciousness  that  lead constituents  astray  from their 
essential values and interests as part of a sacred group.
I argue, therefore, that illiberal democracies restrict marginal and apolitical 
religious groups because even seemingly benign forms of heterodoxy challenge 
their claims to represent an essential and sacrosanct popular will. The distinction 
between orthodoxy and heterodoxy derives its logic not from the doctrines or 
vintage of religious groups, but rather from a regime’s efforts to reproduce its 
authority to speak for the people. To the regimes of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 
it matters not whether a religious group or organization is local or foreign, but 
simply  whether  that  entity  works  in  symbiosis  with  the  establishment  to 
reproduce the regime’s claims to public authority. 
I further argue that illiberal regimes seek to control public life by establishing 
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a system of quasi-ordination that reserves positions of authority for individuals 
who demonstrate their loyalty to established elites. Bourdieu called such control 
the power of nomination, i.e. the power to name people to positions of power. To 
the degree that a regime succeeds in consolidating power, therefore, established 
elites  restrict  all  forms  of  public  authority  to  their  own  agents,  who  have 
demonstrated their loyalty to and utility for the establishment. They then use this 
monopoly of authority to confer legitimacy (symbolic capital, per Bourdieu) on 
those strata who also have a vested interest to reproduce the ruling order, and to 
deny  legitimacy  to  those  strata  who  do  not.  Thus,  authoritarian  claims  and 
authoritarian regimes are analytically distinct, and relate according to how much 
authority a regime has consolidated around a set of claims by monopolizing the 
power of nomination. 
Finally, I argue that these new discourses on national tradition and religious 
orthodoxy enjoy support  among wide segments of  the citizenry because they 
enhance populist  claims to ownership over public life and public institutions. 
Though authoritarian regimes do impinge on the liberty of citizens to associate 
and mobilize  according to  common interests,  autonomous from the  state,  we 
must  acknowledge  that  the  means  to  mobilize  autonomously  are  unevenly 
distributed. Liberal  democracy disproportionately empowers those strata with 
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greater  means  of  autonomous  mobilization  —  greater  volumes  economic, 
cultural, and social capital, in Bourdieu’s theories. The impulse to orthodoxy that 
we observe in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan represents a rational field strategy for 
those  strata  who  are  relatively  poorly  equipped  to  participate  in  public  life 
without the kind of collective voice that religious and political identity confer. I 
argue, therefore, that illiberal democracies propagate essentialist claims on behalf 
of  such  strata,  and  repress  even  benign  forms  of  pluralism  as  part  of  this 
essentialist social contract.
III. Cases, Methods, and Findings
I  investigate  these  hypotheses  by  examining  recent  discourses  on  religious 
tradition  in  Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan,  which  present  a  series  of  key 
similarities and contrasts that make them ideal cases for the relational analysis I 
suggest above. The titular nations of both states share a common linguistic and 
cultural history as semi-nomadic, Turkic peoples of the Central Asian steppe. The 
region’s  nomadic peoples held animistic  and zoroastrian traditions before the 
penetration of Islam, but embraced Islam (at least nominally) starting from the 
7th century. Thereafter, the steppes of Central Asia saw the rise of a number of 
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great powers, such as Timur’s Islamic dynasty. 
Eventually, the Russian Empire expanded into Central Asia and the October 
Revolution brought the Soviet state-building project to the region. Only within 
this  project  were the nomadic  peoples  forcefully  settled and divided into the 
mutually-exclusive nations. Today, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are the two most 
liberal countries in post-Soviet Central Asia, although Kazakhstan’s regime has 
consolidated  far  more  power  than  Kyrgyzstan’s,  allowing  for  important 
comparative analysis.  Though both states  have increasingly targeted religious 
minorities,  neither features the pervasive authoritarianism of more oppressive 
neighbors such as Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan. 
Those  familiar  with  Central  Asia  may  object  to  my  usage  of  the  term 
“authoritarian” in reference to to Kyrgyzstan,  whose government is  generally 
regarded  as  more  “liberal”  than  its  neighbors.  Some may  even  object  to  my 
calling  Kazakhstan  authoritarian,  given  the  popularity  that  President 
Nazarbayev  enjoys.  But  by  treating  authoritarianism  as  a  distinct  claim  to 
authority,  rather  than as  a  series  of  institutions and practices  of  rule,  we can 
navigate the distinction between illiberal  democracy and authoritarian regime 
more easily. All illiberal regimes seek to control who has authority to speak for 
the people — both within the state and beyond — but different regimes succeed 
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in monopolize this authority to varying degrees. 
To  examine  the  evolving  discourses  on  national  and  religious  tradition,  I 
draw from a dataset of 5,000 public documents (legislation, court rulings, policy 
papers,  etc.),  evenly divided between my two national  cases.  When coded in 
MAXQDA using keywords, this dataset yielded over 100,000 coded segments, 
which I navigated using refined coding queries and browsing code matrices. I 
also draw on fieldwork conducted between 2012 and 2014 in Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan,  including  interviews  with  government  officials  and  religious 
leaders,  and  attendance  in  court  cases,  local  conferences  and  workshops  for 
government officials,  and the Kurultai summit through which the Muftiate in 
Kyrgyzstan elects its Head Mufti. I also analyze data from waves four and six of 
the World Values Survey to make comparative and longitudinal observations of 
public attitudes on religion, democracy, and authoritarianism. 
I  find  that  the  political  and  religious  establishments  of  both  states  use 
discourses on tradition to consecrate the will of their bases as essential to national 
self-determination.  The  religious  policies  of  Kyrgyzstan  and  Kazakhstan  are 
couched in such claims. Both regimes link 'traditional' religions to a sacrosanct 
will  that  must  be  preserved  through proper  state  regulation.  The  director  of 
Kyrgyzstan’s State Commission for Religious Affairs, for example, stated in one 
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editorial that:
Islam and Orthodox Christianity from time immemorial  are considered 
traditional  religions [in  the region],  and the sound of  azan [the call  to 
prayer] is as familiar to the population as the bells [of the church] ringing. 
Both religions train their flock with such qualities as: honesty, diligence, 
charity,  striving for peace,  serving the common good, which are also a 
civic duty.3
Top state officials in the Kazakhstan similarly assert that national character is 
“inseparably linked with the Sunni Islam of the Hanafi madkhab [school], which 
determined the  originality  of  the  Kazakh people  and its  value orientations.”4 
Kazakhstani officials have directly invoked this melding of religious belief and 
local custom as “a kind of ’social contract’ among the members of the Muslim 
Ummah  of  Kazakhstan,”5  But  officials  are  careful  to  include  the  Russian 
Orthodox  Church  in  such  discourses  on  tradition,  noting  that  “our  two 
traditional  confessions  —  Islam  and  Orthodoxy  —  despite  their  dogmatic 
differences,  are  united through their  socio-political  similarities,  particularly in 
3 Gennadiy Kholkin, 'The State Concept in the Religious Sphere,' Moya Stolitsa, September 6 2005 
(https://ca-news.info/2005/09/06/31).
4  Magzum  Sultangaliev,  'Islam  is  the  religion  of  unity,  peace  and  kindness,'  Kazakhstanskaya 
Pravda, August 2011. Source: http://www.nomad.su/?a=10-201108110025.
5 Yuldasheva, Nargiza. 2009. “In Kyrgyzstan in 2008 the Court Declared Religious Organizations 
“People’s  Congress  of  Kurdistan”  and  “Jihad  Group”  Terrorist  and  Their  Activities.”  24.kg, 
February  3.  Retrieved  January  9,  2018  (https://24.kg/archive/ru/parlament/
45766-2009/02/03/105193.html/).
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their relation to the institution of the state.”6
Similarly, officials have spoken out forcefully against the expansion of “non-
traditional” religious groups in the region. President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, 
for  example,  stated that  “We must  not  allow our  true  religion,  to  which our 
ancestors held, be divided by divergent tendencies that would knock us off our 
path.”7 This rhetoric applies to heterodox religious groups from various religious 
traditions.  Protestant  denominations  and  groups  like  Scientology,  subsumed 
under  the  label  of  “destructive  sects,”  have  been  referred  to  as  “poisonous 
mushrooms that  appear  at  the roots  of  true religions.”8  Many non-traditional 
groups have been accused in engaging in “destructive” activities, that “subvert 
the natural, harmonious state of the personality — spiritual, psychological, and 
physical — as well as the creative traditions prevailing in the social structures, 
culture,  belief  system  and  society  as  a  whole”  (Galkina  2013:498).  These 
accusations even include purported practices of “mass hypnosis.” One court case 
6 Shlymova G. 'After the adoption of the new law on religion, the country managed to form a new 
legal framework governing the confessional relations,' Director of the Research and Analytical 
Center on Religion of the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Religious Affairs.
7 Meyrambek Baigarin, “President Nazarbayev: The only recognized structure of traditional Islam 
in our country - the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan.”
8 Nam, “New Religious Movements and their Influence on the National and State Identity of 
Modern Kazakhstan,  as  a  means of  manipulating public  consciousness  in  the guise  of  social 
groups,” published online by the Eurasian National University of L.N. Gumilev. Retrieved Nov 
11, 2017 (http://repository.enu.kz/handle/data/12652).
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in  Kazakhstan against  an  evangelical  church alleged that  “during a  so-called 
religious ritual ‘healing’ many religious churches fell into a psychic trance and 
there was a mass psychosis.”9 
Similar  concerns  have  arisen  around  various  forms  of  Islamic  heterodox 
groups, which either deviate from the doctrines of the Muftiate, or simply carry 
out  their  activities  autonomous  from  the  Muftiate  structure.  The  director  of 
Kazakshtan’s State Agency for Religious Affairs has warned against “a wave of 
‘new Islamization,’  in  which part  of  the  Muslim community  actively  absorbs 
radical religious ideas brought in from outside.”10 In the rhetoric of the regime, 
Islamic currents that operate beyond the Muftiate’s purview threaten to subvert 
the solidarity or even the security of the Kazakh nation: 
All  of  the  foregoing  allows  us  to  assert  that  takfirism  [a  form  of 
fundamentalist rhetoric] can deal a serious blow to the psychology and 
mentality of young Kazakhs as representatives of the state-forming ethnos 
[i.e.  the  titular  ethnicity],  awakening  among  current  generations  of 
Kazakhs a  sense of  "shame" for  their  history and for  the  path of  their 
ancestors…  This  guilt  provides  at  least  an  ideological  basis  for  the 
possibility of conducting armed jihad against their fellow citizens.11
Government and religious authorities in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have 
9  Republic  of  Kazakhstan.  2011.  The  Verdict  of  the  Court  No.  2  of  the  City  of  Taraz  from 
September 5, No. 1\812-11. The hearing was declared closed. Presiding Officer Dauylbaev N.A., 
Secretary of the Court Session Uderbayeva N.B.
10 Kairat Lama Sharif, Takfirism is a betrayal of one’s religion and one’s own people, accessed from the 
site “Islam in the CIS.  Retrieved February 10,  2018 (http://www.islamsng.com/kaz/opinion/
6954).
11 Ibid.
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thus enacted a number of measures to counteract groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir 
and Tablighi Jamaat, which, in the words of Kyrgyzstan’s Attorney General in 
2009,  “promote  radical  Islam and the  establishment  of  an  Islamic  state  -  the 
Caliphate.”12
With  such  statements,  state  officials,  religious  leaders,  and  state-aligned 
experts seek to link national sovereignty and self-determination to an essential 
will rooted in national and religious tradition — a discourse on tradition which 
they have the authority to curate. Thus, the political and religious establishments 
of  Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan  maintain  popular  support  by  redistributing 
authority (symbolic capital, per Bourdieu) to core constituencies at the expense of 
peripheral constituencies. Illiberal policies are popular among the titular majority 
in each nation (and among the sizable Russian communities) precisely because 
they consecrate their will as essential to sovereignty and self-determination of the 
nation  as  a  whole.  In  so  doing,  these  policies  not  only  redistribute  symbolic 
capital  away  from  religious  and  other  minorities,  but  generally  away  from 
cosmopolitan, dissident, and opposition groups who seek greater political input 
through civic and deliberative modes of democracy.
Authoritarian regimes do not dispossess their own supporters of their voices, 
12 Yuldasheva, Nargiza. 2009. “In Kyrgyzstan in 2008 the Court Declared Religious Organizations 
“People’s  Congress  of  Kurdistan”  and  “Jihad  Group”  Terrorist  and  Their  Activities.”  24.kg, 
February  3.  Retrieved  January  9,  2018  (https://24.kg/archive/ru/parlament/
45766-2009/02/03/105193.html/).
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therefore, but rather facilitate their supporters’ efforts to dispossess the broader 
population of their plural voices. As my empirical chapters will demonstrate, the 
image or  “effigy” of  the  popular  will  that  the  authorities  of  Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan promote speaks directly to the interests and values of their bases, 
thought they presume to speak for the nation as a whole. The very efforts of 
heterodox religious groups to exercise basic rights and liberties is thus seen as a 
pluralist (and globalist) threat to the sovereignty of the regime’s political base. 
The populist base of such regimes thus support the concentration of authority in 
autocratic  figures,  because  strong  autocrats  more  effectively  execute  this 
redistribution of symbolic capital from peripheral to core constituencies.
IV. Structure of the Dissertation
This  dissertation  explores  these  issues  through  a  series  of  theoretical  and 
empirical chapters. The first chapter introduces the two national cases in greater 
detail, and further establishes the theoretical puzzles that I address. I explore the 
historical  origins of the contemporary nations of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, 
touching  on  influential  periods  such  as  the  introduction  of  Islam  in  the  7th 
century, cultural transformation under Timur’s (Tamerlane) Islamic empire, and 
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the coalescence of the modern nations under Soviet rule. I also discuss factors 
that  contribute  to  the  significant  differences  between  the  political  systems  of 
contemporary Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and examine the impact that these 
differences have had on the religious policy of the two countries. 
Chapter  two  examines  existing  theories  of  authoritarianism  and  religious 
politics, and propose a relational model of populist and identity politics. I show 
that the conventional approach to authoritarianism in the political sociology and 
political science literature betrays a strong instrumentalist bias that focuses on 
rational  actors who seek to maximize their  power (in the case of  regimes) or 
liberties  (in  the  case  of  common citizens)  through struggles  over  institutions. 
While I do not discredit the validity of this approach, I do argue that it prevents 
scholars from explaining satisfactorily the motivations of regimes for targeting 
docile minorities, as well as the motivations of common citizens for supporting 
regimes and policies that infringe on their civil liberties. I address a number of 
scholars  from the  region  to  show that  general  theory  has  lagged behind the 
important  revelations about  authoritarianism that  have been made by careful 
case  studies.  I  then  introduce  Bourdieu’s  later  work  on  public  politics  as  a 
mystery of ministry,  and propose modifications to his theory that make it more 
applicable to a broader range of political systems. I conclude by showing that a 
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relational theory of identity synthesizes the instrumental and identity literatures, 
and  compliments  existing  scholarship  that  this  focused  on  analyzing 
authoritarian institutions.
Chapter three provides an overview of my methodology, focusing primarily 
on my primary dataset of public documents from Kyrgystan and Kazakhstan. I 
explain the methods I used in retrieving these document from public databases, 
my coding strategy, and the analytical tools I used to extract coded segments that 
form  my  empirical  chapters.  I  also  provide  information  on  my  fieldwork 
conducted in  the  region  between 2012  and 2014,  especially  my strategies  for 
accessing  and  interviewing  respondents.  The  remaining  chapters  present  my 
empirical discussion of the cases. Each consecutive pair of chapters draw their 
data  from  a  common  trawl  of  coded  segments.  With  over  100,000  coded 
segments in the overall dataset, I relied on narrow coding queries to extract a 
manageable  number  of  segments  per  chapter.  Even  with  very  focus  queries, 
however, each trawl extracted between 800 and 1,500 segments, which yielded 
sufficient  material  for  two  related  chapters.  Thus,  each  consecutive  pairs  of 
chapters — four and five, six and seven, and eight and nine — draw their data 
from a common coding query.
Chapter  four  examines  the  core  policies  that  structure  state  regulation  of 
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religion  in  Kyrgyzstan  and  Kazakhstan.  It  explores  both  key  legislation  and 
policy documents, as well as public statements in support of these policies on the 
part of ranking government officials. The chapter introduces official narratives 
on “spiritual sovereignty,” “destructive sects,” and the “threat” that pluralism 
presents to national sovereignty. The chapter thus explores the motivations for 
regulating religion, including relatively benign religious groups, in the words of 
the regimes themselves. Chapter five continues this discussion by examining the 
combined  efforts  of  the  political  and  religious  establishment  to  consecrate 
particular narratives of national and religious tradition. It investigates the origins 
of  the official  status as traditional  religions enjoyed by the Muftiates and the 
Russian Orthodox Church in contemporary Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, as well 
as the cooperation of these leadership structures with each other and with the 
state to monopolize authority. Thus, the chapter explores the how the political 
and religious  establishments  consecrate  a  particular  effigy  of  the  popular  will 
through public discourses on national and religious tradition — how they claim a 
mandate  to  speak  for  a  sacrosanct  popular  will  that  transcends  politics  and 
supersedes voices of dissent coming from the actual public.
Chapter six turns the discussion from consecrating orthodoxy to regulating 
heterodoxy. The chapter examines the main techniques used by the governments 
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of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to regulate the activities of heterodox religious 
groups. The chapter first explores the different discourses on threat that the states 
use to distinguish Islamic heterodox groups, which fall under the authority of the 
Muftiate of each country, from all other heterodox groups, which fall under the 
purview of the SCRA and SARA. The chapter then outlines various techniques 
for  regulating  and  restricting  the  activities  of  heterodox  groups,  including 
registration requirements,  forms of  surveillance,  and bureaucratic  obstruction. 
Chapter seven focuses more closely on state responses to “destructive sects” and 
other  heterodox  groups  that  have  no  links  to  Islam  or  the  authority  of  the 
Muftiate. The chapter examines in detail how the regimes work to demonstrate 
the  “destructive”  character  of  these  heterodox  groups,  especially  through 
discourses  on psychological  and moral  harm.  I  examine the  circumstances  of 
three groups in particular — the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Unification Church of 
Sun  Myung  Moon  (commonly  known  as  the  Moonies),  and  the  Church  of 
Scientology — comparing the different fates of these groups in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan.  The  chapter  shows  that  the  overall  goal  of  discourses  on 
“destructive sects” is to assert that national community asserts a quasi-legal form 
of ownership over the individuals whom they claim as constituents.
Chapters  eight  and  nine,  finally,  address  state  discourses  on  Islamic 
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heterodoxy, which themselves fall into two overlapping categories — discourses 
on radicalism and security  threats,  and discourses  on Islamic dissidence as  a 
threat  to  the  authority  of  national  traditions.  Chapter  eight  examines  the 
relationship between these two sets of discourses, and focuses in particular on 
discourses  on  extremism,  terrorism,  and  security.  The  chapter  shows  that 
discourses  on security  and authority  are  not  clearly  delineated,  one from the 
other,  but nevertheless speak to different state strategies in relation to Islamic 
heterodoxy. Discourses on security convey a vague sense of threat that justifies 
state power, and are thus used more extensively by Kazakhstan in relation to the 
regime’s  greater  capacity.  The chapter  examines in particular  the cases of  the 
movement  Hizb  ut-Tahrir,  which  has  been  labelled  an  extremist  and  even 
terrorist organization for its calls to create a single Muslim state or Caliphate. 
Chapter nine demonstrates how the political and religious establishments deploy 
discourses on radicalism to delegitimate dissent and bolster the authority of the 
Muftiate.  It  examines  in  particular  discourses  that  depict  radical  Islam  as  a 
foreign  attack  on  local  traditions.  The  chapter  examines  state  rhetoric  on 
Wahhabism  and  Salafism,  two  fundamentalist  movements  that  the  regimes 
depict  as  a  form  of  conservative  Arab  nationalism  that  is  radicalizing  local 
Muslims. The chapter also examines the Islamic missionary movement Tablighi 
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Jamaat  from  India,  which  has  been  labelled  a  “hidden  threat”  despite  its 
moderate values. The chapter explores the strikingly different careers of Tablighi 
Jamaat in Kazakhstan,  where th group is  banned outright,  vs.  In Kyrgyzstan, 
where the movement has gained increasingly mainstream recognition and even 
penetrated the leadership structure of the Muftiate.
 The  conclusion  revisits  the  central  puzzle  of  the  study,  and  reviews  the 
answers offered in the dissertation. I discuss and synthesize the major themes 
and arguments of the empirical discussion, and reflect on some of the broader 
sociological implications of the analysis presented herein.
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CHAPTER 1 
Cases and Puzzle: Illiberal Democracy in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan
Few observers puzzle that religious minorities are embattled in Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan. Neither country has a strong tradition of pluralist and democratic 
governance, though neither features the pervasive suppression of basic freedoms 
that  neighboring  states  such  as  Uzbekistan  and  Turkmenistan  present. 
Kyrgyzstan in particularly has enjoyed a reputation as an ‘island of democracy’ 
in Central Asia, although this status is less a function of liberal democratic values 
than of a fragmented elite and devolution of power to local government (Siegel 
2016).  Nevertheless,  as  figure  one  below  demonstrates,  both  countries  face 
significant challenges in providing political rights and civil liberties.1
1 All scores drawn from the Freedom House annual Freedom in the World  report,  accessible at 
freedomhouse.org.
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Given  this  legacy,  few  observers  have  puzzled  over  source  of  the  restrictive 
policies that have been passed in relation to religious pluralism in recent years in 
both countries.  While there has been extensive scholarship over the state and 
religion  in  the  region  (Epkinhans  2009;  Low  2007,  2013;  McBrien  2009; 
Montgomery 2007; Rasanayagam 2006), the motivation for such policies seems 
inherent  to  the  nature  of  these  post-Soviet  regimes.  Upon further  inspection, 
however, this crackdown on religious pluralism raises several questions, both in 
terms of  the regimes’  motivations,  and in relation to the popular support  for 
authoritarianism that such policies belie. 
While it might be easy to attribute these policies to regimes that want to force 
an authoritarian agenda on the public, data from the most recent wave of the 
World Values Survey shows significant support for authoritarian leaders. What’s 
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more  the  data  show  greater  support  for  authoritarianism  in  relatively  more 
democratic Kyrgyzstan than in more authoritarian Kazakhstan.2
This  data  contradicts  theories  that  attribute  the  popularity  of  authoritarian 
leaders to elite manipulation or the charismatic persona of the leader. Even after 
deposing  the  widely  disliked  strongman  Bakiev  in  2010,  respondents  to  the 
World  Values  Survey  in  Kyrgyzstan  expressed  a  stronger  preference  for 
authoritarianism  over  democracy  than  respondents  who  have  experienced 
2 The relationships demonstrated in this chart between country and support are significant at the .
001 level; country and support for a strong leader: X2 (3, 3000) = 137.2, p < .001; country and 
support for democracy: X2 (3, 2997) = 140.9, p < .001; data from wave 6 of the World Values 
Survey,  conducted  in  Kyrgyzstan  and  Kazakhstan  in  2011,  available  at 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
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twenty years of stable rule under Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan. 
Part of the problem lies in our definition of authoritarianism itself. Scholars 
tend  to  treat  authoritarianism  as  a  series  of  institutions  that  consolidate  the 
power of an autocrat at the expense of the citizenry. When examining Central 
Asia’s  “dictators  without  borders,”  Cooley  and  Heathershaw  (2016:xi)  define 
authoritarianism as ‘systems in which political authority is concentrated in the 
hands of the few and exercised without effective accountability to parliament, the 
judiciary, civil society or a free press.’ This conception undoubtedly captures a 
core feature of essentialism, but it also draws scholars to an erroneous conclusion 
—  that  common  citizens  have  no  reasonable  motivation  for  supporting 
authoritarian regimes, and that supporters of such leaders are acting against their 
own interests.
This  assumption  does  not  define  all  scholarship  on  authoritarianism,  but 
implicitly runs through the very core of western political philosophy, with its 
emphasis on individual liberties. If we view self-determination and popular rule 
only though an institutional framework,  then authoritarian regimes would be 
seen  to  consolidate  their  power  at  the  expense  of  their  own  constituents. 
Common citizens  would  seem to  have  a  manifest  interest  in  opposing  these 
infringements  on  their  rights,  and  promoting  politics  that  maximize  civil 
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liberties. And yet common citizens often join authoritarian leaders in assailing 
pluralism and liberal democracy as an assault on national self-determination. I 
argue  that  the  literatures  on  identity  politics  and  fundamentalism  that  have 
proliferated in recent years have largely emerged to address this inconsistency by 
proposing  irrational  and  primordial  identities  as  an  explanation  for  why 
common citizens side with authoritarian leaders,  seemingly against their own 
interests.
This dissertation aims to address precisely this assumption — that common 
citizens  have  a  manifest  interest  in  liberal  democracy,  and  that  citizens  who 
support authoritarianism do so against their instrumental interests. So long as we 
treat  authoritarianism  merely  as  a  concentration  of  institutional  power,  we 
cannot  explain  why authoritarian  regimes  repress  religious  groups  and other 
forms of social dissidence that represent no threat to that power. Similarly, if the 
only goal of authoritarian regimes is to consolidate power at the expense of the 
public,  then  we  cannot  explain  the  popularity  of  authoritarian  leaders  and 
policies among large segments of the public. Instead, we find that authoritarian 
regimes as  a  rule  show great  concern with  maintaining a  spectacle  of  public 
legitimacy and popularity (Adams 2009; 2010). 
We  must  therefore  treat  authoritarian  regimes  as  political  enterprises 
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concerned not only with concentrating power in the hands of a few, but also with 
maintaining  legitimate  authority.  Similarly,  we  must  develop  a  model  that 
recognizes  how such  regimes  maintain  popularity  among a  political  base  by 
distributing social power and authority to their constituents in the name of the 
nation, religion, or whatever collective cult the regime invokes. I pursue such a 
model through an analysis of religious policy in order to show how seemingly 
benign and apolitical dissident groups challenge the sense of sovereignty that 
regime and supporters alike are pursuing through identity politics, but without 
ever challenging the institutions of rule. 
I. The Historical Origins of Contemporary Nationalities
Central  Asian  history  and  ethnicity  has  for  centuries  been  shaped  by  both 
symbiosis and antagonism between settled and nomadic peoples, the legacy of 
which  can  still  be  felt  in  the  diverse  cultures  of  the  contemporary  nations. 
Although the region has a continuous history of settlement stretching back to 
antiquity,  the  modern  profile  of  nationalities  and  national  boundaries  was 
shaped  largely  by  two  great  imperial  forces  —  the  conquests  of  Timur 
(Tamerlane), which reconstituted the Mongol Empire under an Islamic banner, 
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and Russian expansion to the south and east, which eventually brought Soviet 
culture,  politics  and  nationalities  policy  to  the  region.  Timur’s  conquests  are 
credited with reshaping the ethnic map and, exterminating great deal of religious 
diversity  among  the  populations  (especially  Buddhism  and  local  animistic 
traditions),  and developing,  expanding  and implanting  Islamic  civilization  in 
Central  Asia.  Soviet  governance,  in  contrast,  brought  to  the  region  an 
unparalleled  zeal  for  social  engineering  along  “scientific”  socialist  models, 
including  the  categorization  of  the  population  into  mutually-exclusive 
nationalities with varying degrees of national autonomy under Stalin’s “national 
in form, socialist in content.” 
Steppe Power and Russian Expansion
The contemporary delimitation of the region into distinct nations represents a 
dramatic simplification of the pre-modern ethnic map, accomplished primarily 
under  Russian  and  Soviet  rule.  The  political-economy  of  Central  Asia  was 
shaped  over  the  centuries  by  overland  trade  between  China  and  the 
Mediterranean. The global significance of this trade reached its peak in the eight 
century at the height of the Silk Road, but its significance for shaping the ethnic 
map of  the  region goes  back  to  the  very  beginnings  of  the  historical  record. 
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Numerous peoples who came to populate Central Asia first entered the region 
through imperial expansion to protect and coordinate long-distance trade. 
Timur’s  conquests  in  the  fourteenth  century  had  a  definitive  impact  on 
Central Asian cultures.  Islamic civilization flourished in the region during his 
rule, and he secured the place of Islam in among the population of the region for 
centuries  to  come.  Timur  constructed  some  of  the  most  renowned  Islamic 
architecture in his capital Samarkand, even as older Islamic cultural centers in 
the Middle East suffered significant declines during his rule. Timur’s diplomatic 
skills in organizing loosely confederated nomadic armies represented the hight of 
steppe power, with historic implications both for the political map of Eurasia and 
for the ethnic composition and arrangement of Central  Asia.  However,  ethnic 
identity remained fluid within Timur’s empire. The link between ethnicity and 
nationality  would  only  begin  to  become clarified  in  Central  Asia  much later 
under Russian rule.
The first  efforts to classify ethnic categories and territories began after the 
Russian Empire expanded into Central Asia in the nineteenth century through 
the military campaigns of Konstantin von Kaufman, the first Governor-General 
of then-called Turkestan.  From the late 1860s to the early 1870s,  von Kaufman 
subjugated the major khanates and emirates of the region as vassals of Russia. In 
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the spirit of the times, however, von Kaufman also exhibited a zeal for studying 
his territories and subjects in the hopes of modernizing the region. He invited 
teams of scientists from various academies to study the physical  and cultural 
diversity of Central Asia in the hopes of clarifying the ethnic map (Brower 1997).
These scientists had difficulty making sense of the diversity of the region. 
Contemporary ethnonyms such as Uzbek and Kyrgyz were used simultaneously 
to denote ancestry and way of life (e.g. a Kyrgyz Uzbek would be a nomadic 
Uzbek). Divisions between settled and nomadic peoples, and between Turkic and 
Persian ethnicities had to be amplified or invented. When the ethnographic map 
proved too complex to yield clear-cut divisions, ethnocultural variation was re-
conceptualized as  a  function of  religion.  Kaufman distinguished the nomadic 
peoples,  whom  he  considered  to  be  only  nominally  Muslim  and  largely 
indifferent in their faith, from the town dwellers, whom he considered to have 
internalized the teachings and identity of Islam (Brower 1997). 
As the autocracy of the Tsarist regime was increasingly challenged in the late 
nineteenth century by calls for reform and liberalization, many national groups 
seized the opportunity to fight for greater national self-determination. In 1905, 
Tsar Nicholas II signed the October Manifesto, establishing a legislative body, the 
Duma, and a council of ministers as his advisors (Seton-Watson 1962). The First 
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and Second Dumas each contained thirty deputies representing various Muslim 
peoples  in  the  empire.  Leaders  from  Turkestan  also  promoted  their  national 
aspirations through the formation of an All-Russian Muslim League, which was 
dominated by Volga Tatars but also gained supporters from “the Crimean and 
Azerbaijan Tatars, Bashkirs, Turkmen, Kazakh, Uzbeks, and Kirghiz” (Von Hagen 
1997:240).  Under the new, more liberal  regime,  these groups made significant 
advances, including the establishment of native language education. Converts to 
Orthodoxy  also  gained  the  right  to  convert  back  to  Islam  without  any 
consequences, and practiced this right en masse (Von Hagen 1997). 
The Soviet Period: Religious, Economic, and Nationalities Policy
It was not until the Soviet era that the ethnic categorization initiated under the 
Tsarist  regime  became  a  permanent,  legal  feature  of  public  life,  and  the 
contemporary boundaries of the Central Asian states were delimited. As with 
other areas of  economic,  political,  and social  reform within the Soviet  Union, 
nationalities policy represented an enthusiastic attempt by the Communist Party 
leadership  and  intellectual  vanguard  to  engineer  away  archaic  folkways  and 
social forms, and introduce modern, progressive institutions. Nationalities policy 
was unique, however,  in that it  specifically addressed the question of how to 
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bring  Soviet  civilization  to  peoples  who  resisted  Russian  rule  and  (in  the 
Bolsheviks’  eyes)  lacked  sufficient  class  consciousness  to  assimilate  the  new, 
revolutionary culture. 
Soviet nationalities policy must therefore be understood as a combination of 
Marxist-Leninist  conjecture  over  how to  elevate  the  consciousness  of  Central 
Asia’s peoples to the level of international communism, and pragmatic policies 
aimed at  a  divide  and rule  strategy  (Brubaker  1994).  Both  of  these  elements 
clearly express themselves in the two pillars of Soviet nation-building: (1) the 
formation of a four tiered hierarchy of national territories with varying degrees 
of autonomy, from all-union republics to local soviets, and (2) the institution of 
individual passport nationality, by which all citizens were assigned an official 
national  label  that  was  transmitted  across  generations  based on the  officially 
recognized nationality of their parents (Brubaker 1996). The level of autonomy 
accorded to each national homeland was ostensibly based on the perceived level 
of consolidated national and class consciousness among its titular nation, but in 
reality the delimitation of Central Asia (and its segregation from the southern 
Urals) was intended to prevent the unification of a single Turkestan that might 
resist Soviet rule from Moscow. 
Five Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR), the highest level of political autonomy 
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accorded within the Soviet Union, were created in Central Asia for titular nations 
that by many measures lacked the national consciousness and solidarity of the 
Tatars, for example, who were incorporated into the Russian Soviet Federated 
Socialist Republic as a semi-autonomous republic. This is especially true of the 
semi-nomadic peoples of the steppe, who had a long history of tribal resistance 
to  Russian  rule,  but  produced  no  initiatives  for  national  unification.  These 
peoples, who frequently identified with individual clans and patriarchal figures 
more than any super-tribal ethnonym, were divided into the Kazakh and Kyrgyz 
nations, and given homelands that roughly divided the steppe ranges from the 
mountain ranges that nomads had long occupied. 
With national  homelands came native-language education,  state  patronage 
for folk arts, and general legitimacy of titular culture in public life. All of this 
patronage operated through the curious form of Soviet mimicry of imperial high 
culture, e.g. training a generation of Kyrgyz elites to both produce and demand 
Kyrgyz-language opera. Such efforts may seem curious, as promoting national 
consciousness, especially in the form of bourgeois high culture, directly clashed 
with orthodox communist ideals of progress as originally formulated by Marx 
and Engels. The reason for such a radical change in ideology within the USSR 
was twofold. First, nationalism was viewed by Lenin and Stalin as an inevitable 
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stage of social evolution through which all peoples must pass on their way to 
proletarian awakening. Second, minority nationalism was viewed as a justifiable 
reaction to Great Russian imperialism and Tsarist oppression, and, so the logic 
went, could be quelled through the granting of national forms and the promotion 
of national cultures. From these principles, the Soviet leadership formulated the 
policy of “national in form, socialist in content (Martin 2001). 
A complex pyramid of diminishing national-territorial units within units was 
constructed with the  goal  of  eliminating national  tensions  and sentiments  by 
seamlessly blending the state structure with the ethnonational identity of every 
soviet  citizen.  However,  nationalist  tensions  between  center  and  periphery 
plagued Soviet governance and society throughout the state’s seventy years. For 
many  individuals,  the  national  labels  assigned  by  the  Soviet  State  had  very 
limited  personal  weight,  as  with  the  significant  population  of  Tajik-speaking 
Uzbeks in Samarkand (Gorenburg 1999). Furthermore, assigning a single titular 
nation to each multiethnic territory was ultimately prompted members of that 
titular  nation  to  view  the  territories  as  theirs  alone,  and  pressure  minority 
communities to assimilate or evacuate. 
This  tension  between  nationalities  did  not  engender  popular  calls  for 
independence, however. When Gorbachev held a referendum for dissolving the 
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Soviet Union in 1991, the population of Central Asia voted overwhelmingly to 
retain the union (Snyder 1997). The leaderships of the respective Central Asian 
SSRs  stood  to  gain  tremendously  from national  independence,  however,  and 
followed Boris Yeltsin’s advice to draw as much power as possible for the SSR 
level  and cripple the central  government.  When independence came not long 
after the referendum decisively spoke against it,  most citizens greeted it  with 
trepidation, aware of the economic and political turmoil that lay ahead.
II. The Contemporary Period
Much  of  the  political  differences  between  contemporary  Kazakhstan  and 
Kyrgyzstan  extends  from  Soviet  industrial  and  nationalities  policy  that  were 
intended to prevent the rise of unified, regional opposition to centralized rule 
from Moscow. Today, Kazakhstan’s larger industrial  base and resource wealth 
has engendered more consolidated rentier politics under President Nazarbayev. 
Resource  poor  and  less  industrialized  Kyrgyzstan,  in  contrast,  features 
fragmented cadre politics that have resulted in two coup d’etats and endemic 
power struggles among regional elites. 
Kazakhstan features a far more robust spectacle of national unity and popular 
41
support (Adams 2010). Kazakhstan’s public politics therefore corresponds more 
closely  to  conventional  depictions  of  authoritarianism,  featuring  strongman 
leadership and manipulation of  the masses through manufactured patriotism. 
Though it may be hard to gauge genuine popular support in a country where 
elections, media coverage, and other potential indicators are compromised, there 
is ample evidence that Nazarbayev’s administration and policies enjoys genuine, 
even fervent support among wide bands of his constituents. Figure 3 below, for 
example,  compares  the  amount  of  trust  expressed  for  Nazarbayev’s 
administration  in  relation  to  trust  expressed  for  the  other  branches  of 
government.
Like Putin, Nazarbayev is revered by many as a strong leader and patron for the 
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nation.  In  Kazakhstan,  as  elsewhere,  certain  strata  of  the  citizenry  genuinely 
embrace  authoritarian  leaders  as  champions  of  the  popular  will,  who  stand 
against  enemies  of  the  people  — both external  and internal.  Furthermore,  as 
Seigel (2016) has shown, citizens of Kazakhstan express far greater confidence in 
their central government in comparison to local government, despite the fact that 
local government officials are in fact appointed by the central government. In 
contrast. Local officials in Kyrgyzstan won battles early on after independence to 
retain autonomy and devolve significant powers from the central government. 
As  a  result,  citizens  in  Kyrgyzstan express  significantly  greater  confidence  in 
local government officials than they to in the central government. 
For  these  and  other  reasons,  Kyrgyzstan  has  no  single  figure  that 
monopolizes public authority as Nazarbayev does in Kazakhstan. There is no 
autocratic  or  charismatic  leader who would benefit  from manipulation of  the 
masses,  and  past  presidents  have  faced  increasing  public  resistance  as  they 
sought to accumulate such power. And yet, as the figure two above indicates, 
popular support for authoritarianism is significantly stronger in more democratic 
Kyrgyzstan than in more authoritarian Kazakhstan. What’s more, this preference 
for authoritarianism has grown over time. The chart below compares the support 
in Kyrgyzstan in 2003 and 2011 for “a democratic political system” vs. “having a 
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strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.”3 In the 
same period of time that Freedom House gauged a general decline in political 
rights and civil freedoms, this chart shows a significant decline in support for 
democracy and a significant increase in support for a strong leader.
Just  the  two  points  mentioned  here  speak  strongly  against  one  prevailing 
conception  of  authoritarianism  —  that  authoritarian  leaders  rise  to  power 
because of  their  individual  charisma,  and maintain popularity  by using their 
consolidated power to manipulate the public. Respondents to the World Values 
3  Year  and support  for  a  strong  leader:  X2 (3,  2497)  =  24.5,  p  <  .001;  year  and support  for 
democracy: X2 (3, 2517) = 164.5, p < .001; data from waves 4 and 6 of the World Values Survey, 
conducted in Kyrgyzstan in 2003 and 2011, respectively.
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Survey expressed relatively greater support for authoritarianism in Kyrgyzstan 
compared to in Kazakhstan, despite there being no charismatic figure to rally 
such  support.  Respondents  from  Kyrgyzstan  further  expressed  increasingly 
strong preference for a strong leader and distaste for democracy as their political 
rights and civil liberties generally expanded in the wake fo two successful coups. 
Before  turning  to  religious  policy,  I  will  discuss  this  period  of  Kyrgyzstan’s 
independent history to give more context to this decline in democratic values.
A Receding Island of Democracy
Kyrgyzstan’s  history  as  an  independent  nation  can  be  traced  symbolically 
according to the three successive monuments that occupied the central square of 
its capital, Bishkek. The people greeted independence from the Soviet Union in 
1991 with a combination of elation and uncertainty. Many were glad to be free of 
the increasingly worn down economic and ideological apparatus of Moscow and 
the  Communist  Party,  but  felt  uncertain  of  what  national  self-determination 
would mean without familiar guiding principles. For more than a decade after 
independence,  the  monument  of  Lenin  thus  stood  on  the  central  square, 
undisturbed. There seemed to be no urgency to replace him, nor any self-evident 
replacement to symbolize an independent Kyrgyzstan. 
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Legend has it that Lenin’s eventual removal (to a neighboring square between 
the Parliament and the national history museum) was sparked by the first state 
visit  from  a  newly  inaugurated  Vladimir  Putin.  The  Russian  head  of  state 
allegedly expressed his surprise to then-President Askar Akaev that Lenin still 
stood on the central square. Regardless of the veracity of this account, Lenin was 
replaced in 2003 by a winged woman that symbolized freedom, holding in her 
outstretched arm a tunduk — the centerpiece of a traditional Kyrgyz yurt ceiling. 
Akaev had cleverly used the tunduk as an inclusive, albeit specifically Kyrgyz 
symbol of civic nationalism. Kyrgyzstan was a “common home” for the roughly 
sixty ethnicities  living in the country,  but  the titular  nation held a  privileged 
position. In particular, this symbol of the Kyrgyz people’s nomadic history subtly 
accorded secondary status the large Uzbek minority in the south of the country, 
who were historically settled and agrarian.
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Akaev  remains  the  only  inaugural  president  of  the  five  former  Soviet 
republics  of  Central  Asia  to  have  been  removed  from  power  in  his  natural 
lifetime. In 2005, he was deposed by an opposition coalition after amending the 
constitution to grant himself more terms. His replacement, Kurmanbek Bakiev, 
quickly  set  about  dismantling the  laissez-faire  institutions  and power-sharing 
arrangements  among  elites  that  had  earned  Kyrgyzstan  a  reputation  as  an 
“island of democracy” and “the Switzerland of Central Asia.” Bakiev’s clan was 
ousted  in  2010  in  a  far  more  bloody  coup,  which  involved  clashes  between 
security  forces  and  armed  protesters  in  the  capital,  and  precipitated  ethnic 
violence  between  Kyrgyz  and  Uzbeks  in  the  South.  As  figure  five  below 
demonstrates, the nation registered a notable exhaustion with the promises of 
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liberal democracy in 2011, and a palpable hunger for social order.4 In August of 
2011, a monument of Manas, the mythical warrior-patron of the Kyrgyz nation, 
was unveiled on the central square of Bishkek to mark the 20th anniversary of 
Kyrgyzstan’s independence from the Soviet Union.
The Freedom monument did not receive the same reverential treatment as Lenin. 
While the Soviet period is remembered by many as a time of national pride and 
heroic transformation,  democracy appeared to have failed in engendering the 
social and economic gains promised by an open society. Rather, democracy had 
4 Year and support for a strong leader: X2 (3, 2538) = 60.6, p < .001; data from waves 4 and 6 of the 
World Values Survey.
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produced quibbling and stalemates among cadres of elites, and had contributed 
to a national indecisiveness that seemed to make Kyrgyzstan weaker than its 
more authoritarian neighbors. The “empty throne” of sovereign Kyrgyzstan was 
easy  for  regional  powers  like  Russia  and  China  to  manipulate,  and  for 
neighboring Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to outmaneuver in regional disputes. In 
contrast to the “afterlife” that Lenin was granted on a lesser square, Erkindik was 
condemned to a kind of monumental purgatory. She lies face-down on a stack of 
pallets near a workshop on the outskirts of Bishkek, in a state of perpetual limbo. 
The symbolism of this succession in monuments was lost on no one. Local 
and international proponents of civil society voiced alarm at the replacement of a 
monument dedicated to freedom with a symbol of national potency, implying 
that  Kyrgyzstan  had  abandoned  efforts  to  build  a  democratic  society. 
Monuments  symbolize  more  than  the  qualities  of  the  regime or  the  national 
mood, however. They symbolize something sacred and immutable, something 
transcendent  that  stands  above  mundane  politics.  They  demarcate  sacrosanct 
ideals and values that are not subject to the profane realm of popular debate, 
negotiation, and compromise. In this regard, the monument that stands on the 
main  square  signals  to  the  people  what  issues  constitute  suitable  subjects  of 
public  deliberation,  and  what  ideals  stand  beyond  the  quibbles  of  mundane 
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politics. 
The monument to Manas asserts that national character and values have been 
elevated to this sacrosanct status, and by extension so have the public figures and 
institutions that  claim the authority (often intrinsic)  to speak for these reified 
values. Indeed, one outcome of rising nationalism has been a crackdown on the 
capacity of  civil  society to challenge this authority.  Foreign organizations and 
local  groups  alike,  most  of  them  politically  benign,  have  come  under  attack 
simply because they do not take their cues directly from the political or religious 
leadership of the country — the two pillars of  a growing consensus on what 
constitutes  “traditional”  Kyrgyz  values.  In  effect,  the  monument  to  Manas 
consecrates national values as a sacred fetish that stands above the commonplace 
concerns of citizens — a sacrosanct essence that at once defines the will of every 
Kyrgyz, and yet can only be divined and executed by the ruling elite.
The motivations of the regime itself are clear: to bolster their hold on power 
by depicting pluralism as a challenge to national self-determination rather than a 
constituent  part  of  the  popular  will.  The  monument’s  popularity  among  the 
titular  Kyrgyz  majority  begs  the  question  of  why  common  citizens  would 
embrace  a  symbol  that  seemingly  excludes  popular  input  —  that  elevates 
national  values  above  the  arena  of  public  deliberation  in  which  they  can 
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participate.  Why  would  common  citizens  endorse  their  leaders’  claims  to 
“defend”  popular  sovereignty  by  constricting  it  —  by  circumscribing  an 
expanding repertoire of culture, values, and interests from the realm of public 
politics? 
The most apparent answer to this question is that the public readily accepts 
any loose symbolism of the nation, even if they are ambivalent about the regimes 
that  erects  such monuments.  However,  if  people  are  so  amenable  to  generic, 
nationalist imagery, why did it take twenty years and two regime changes for 
Kyrgyzstan’s ruling elite to arrive at such an obvious symbol of national strength 
and order? Why did President Akaev not erect Manas or a comparable symbol of 
national  strength  upon  Kyrgyzstan’s  independence  in  1991?  Why  did  he 
calculate in 2003, when he replaced Lenin, that a monument to freedom would 
endear his administration to the public more than a simple, potent symbol of 
national strength? These questions cannot be answered by theories of political 
identity that  assume that  the masses are always eager to embrace essentialist 
symbolism and rhetoric. Strong theories of identity similarly fail to explain the 
popularity of illiberal policies with an ethno-national animus.
Theories of identity must be able to account for how symbols that stand for 
popular inclusion in one period come to represent an establishment that excludes 
51
the  people  in  another.  As  the  Soviet  economy  stagnated,  as  communism’s 
revolutionary vanguard gave way to the conservative stewardship of the Soviet 
nomenklatura, Soviet citizens felt increasingly disenchanted with the symbols of 
Communist Party rule. Lenin no longer seemed to elevate the people, but rather 
excused the regime and its policies from public input or scrutiny. In an instant, 
national  independence  wiped  away  this  entire  apparatus  of  exclusion,  and 
democracy  instituted  new  forms  of  popular  participation  and  inclusion.  A 
monument to the Manas in the context of recent independence would mostly 
have  reproduced  stale  Soviet  nationalities  policy,  which  smothered  claims  to 
popular  input  beneath  hollow  invocations  of  national  consciousness,  and 
ubiquitous ovations to the “friendship of peoples” (Martin 2001). 
President  Akaev  thus  calculated  greater  political  utility  from a  symbol  of 
freedom than from a symbol of national potency. His administration erected a 
monument that expressed an abstract and inclusive concept of liberty, signifying 
both national independence and inalienable rights. Nevertheless, freedom alone 
failed to provide the citizens of Kyrgyzstan with a sense of self-determination. 
Civil  and pluralist politics became themselves a source of exclusion for many 
citizens — a politics championed by western experts that seemed to have greater 
influence over the government than did its own citizens. A mere decade later, 
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therefore,  replacing  the  Erkindik  monument  with  a  statue  of  Manas  seemed 
somehow  necessary  and  urgent.  In  the  same  vein,  restrictions  on  pluralism, 
particularly religious pluralism, also come to seem increasingly urgent to many 
citizens.
Religious Policy
Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan  have  become  host  to  a  diverse  set  of  religious 
organizations,  sects,  and movements  with  an international  reach,  resulting in 
increasingly  strict  laws.  As  table  1  and  figure  six  below  show,  a  greater 
proportion of the population of Kyrgyzstan identifies as belonging to a religious 
group  than  in  Kazakhstan,  and  Kyrgyzstan’s  population  similarly  accords 
relatively greater significance to religion than that of Kazakhstan.5
5 Kazakhstan was only surveyed in wave 6 of the WVS, and this it is not possible to draw similar 
longitudinal comparisons. Relationship between country and importance of religion significant at 
the .001 level; : X2 (3, 3000) = 326.2, p < .001.
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Though  Kazakhstan  was  not  included  in  earlier  waves  of  the  World  Values 
Survey, data from Kyrgyzstan shows significant increases in religiosity between 
2003 and 2011 (presumably continuing a trend since the end of the Soviet period). 
Figure  seven  further  demonstrates  that  this  increase  in  reported  religiosity 
transcends the different denominations that are active in the country.6
6  Relationship  between year  and importance  of  religion across  denominations  in  Kyrgyzstan 
significant at the .001 level: X2 (24, 2527) = 245.3, p < .001.
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Both states maintain an agency dedicated to regulating religious affairs, as well 
as a Muslim board or Muftiate that specifically regulates Islamic teachings and 
activities (with varying degrees of autonomy from the state). Furthermore, the 
security  services  of  each state  view religious activity  as  one of  their  primary 
concerns,  and various state-controlled foundations and research organizations 
contribute  expert  analysis  that  supports  each  state's  policies  toward religious 
regulation.  The  countries  differ,  however,  in  the  timeline  with  which  they 
adopted such restrictions, and the degree of control that the central government 
exerts over their execution.
Kyrgyzstan has maintained a State Commission for Religious Affairs (SCRA 
hereafter) since 2001. The organization has worked to create a consistent policy 
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and legal framework for regulating religious organizations and practices, but its 
criteria for registration have become increasingly strict in recent years. Religious 
pluralism  long  flew  under  the  radar  of  the  Nazarbayev  administration,  but 
Kazakhstan  has  recently  moved  more  aggressively  to  curtail  pluralism. 
Nevertheless, the country has pursued a concerted, albeit more piecemeal, effort 
to  regulate  religion.  Kazakhstan  passed  legislation  strengthening  the  State 
Agency  for  Religious  Affairs  (SARA hereafter)  in  October  of  2011,  and  has 
quickly moved to restrict hundreds of congregations and religious organizations 
within its territory. 
These  restrictive  policies  enjoy  popular  backing  among  the  titular 
populations of both nations, although the restriction of religion in Kyrgyzstan is 
more “hampered” by political  contestation and due process of  law. What can 
explain  this  popularity  among common citizens,  who would seem to  have  a 
manifest  interest  in  supporting  liberal  institutions  that  expand  individual 
freedoms? Before addressing the answers offered by the literature, I will briefly 
address a number of explanations offered by people engaged in these politics 
locally as to why the state expends such effort to restrict marginal and apolitical 
religious groups. 
I already noted that normative applications of “tradition” differs significantly 
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from the historical record, but the people engaged in these politics offer various 
explanations for the underlying meaning of “tradition,” i.e. of what the state is 
defending. First,  “traditional” and “non-traditional” might be euphemisms for 
local  vs.  foreign  groups.  Tradition  might  connote  the  local  and  current 
sensibilities,  which  extends  no  deeper  than  recent  memory,  but  nevertheless 
carries the authority of the status quo. While many respondents have explained 
restrictive policies as efforts to protect local religious groups from recent foreign 
incursions, the policies hardly work to enforce religious autocthony. 
The state and Muftiate have conferred the mantle of tradition on brands of 
Islam  that  are  often  recently  imported  and  sponsored  by  foreign  powers, 
especially Turkey and Saudia Arabia.7 This intervention represents a far greater 
role for foreign powers in the country than does the activities of marginal groups 
such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and yet this imported Islam is popularly viewed 
as contributing to, rather than detracting from, the spiritual self-determination of 
the  Kyrgyz  and Kazakh nations.  Similarly,  the  direct  links  between the  local 
Orthodox patriarchate and the central patriarchate in Russia should be seen as a 
serious intrusion of foreign power. The Russian Orthodox Church represents a 
7 Interview with professor of anthropology specializing in local religious activities, Bishkek, KG, 
June 2014.
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form of soft power from Russia, from an institution with increasingly strong ties 
to the Kremlin. And yet the ROC has never been deemed an agent of foreign 
subversion, and certainly never been in danger of losing its traditional status..
Second, therefore, we might see this “impulse to orthodoxy” stemming from 
anxiety  over  national  self-preservation.  A  Kyrgyz  or  Kazakh  convert  to 
Christianity  has  betrayed  the  nation  because  he  or  she  is  undermining  the 
nation’s cultural distinctiveness. “Traditional“ Islamic practices may be imported 
or innovated, but they still preserve the living legacy of national tradition. Again, 
this  explanation  undoubtedly  finds  support  in  the  rhetoric  of  local  people 
themselves involved in this debate, but it cannot explain why these people see 
the conversion of a relative handful of citizens as a such a threat to the nation’s 
“cultural sovereignty.” How can national self-determination be threatened by the 
private  decision of  a  small  proportion of  the population to  abandon the tidy 
linkages between religious and national identity? More generally, what does it 
mean  when  Russified  government  officials  speak  of  spiritual  and  cultural 
sovereignty, given their love of Italian suits, German automobiles, and the music 
of Boney M? The current generation of elites came of age in the Soviet era and 
often display little regard for their history and culture. Yet they worry about the 
“destructive” influence of non-traditional groups on the nation.
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Finally, we might consider tradition in the Durkheimian sense, as a source of 
solidarity,  social  cohesion,  and  collective  conscience.  Orthodox  religion  may 
feature imported and even “invented traditions” (Hobsbawm 1983), but it sows 
social accord irrespective of its vintage. In contrast heterodoxy sows discord and 
anomie. Again, this line of reasoning is indeed popular among local observers, 
but most religious discord emanates from the regime or from the burgeoning 
religious  orthodoxy  interfering  with  docile  “non-traditional”  groups.  Almost 
without exception, members of heterodox groups go to great lengths to avoid 
religious animosity, and converts often find themselves at pains to demonstrate 
that they still “belong” to their titular nation. 
Thus,  although  these  explanations  perform  important  political  work  in 
context,  they  only  deepen  the  puzzle  once  we  interrogate  them.  In  the  next 
chapter, I turn to the explanations offered by scholarly literature from the region 
and more broadly, before proposing my own model of religious orthodoxy.
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CHAPTER 2
Theory and Literature
Conventional approaches to political behavior assume a misalignment between 
the  interests  of  authoritarian  regimes  and that  of  their  subjects.  Instrumental 
approaches to political behavior work from the assumption that people desire the 
freedom  to  pursue  common  interests  and  articulate  autonomous  political 
programs.  Authoritarian  regimes  constrict  the  latitude  for  such  grassroots 
association and mobilization, and should thus draw opposition from across the 
public. In this perspective, only those who stand to gain instrumentally from the 
concentration of power - primarily the agents of the regime itself and those in 
collusion with them - have a clear rationale for supporting authoritarian politics. 
Conventional accounts of authoritarianism thus frequently depict supporters 
of  autocrats  as  either  complicit  with the  regime,  or  blinded to  their  manifest 
interest in liberal democracy by some primal force. Many scholars seek to explain 
popular support for autocrats through reference to non-instrumental factors such 
as elite manipulation or primordial and reactionary identities, which ostensibly 
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cause people to act against their best instrumental advantage. I will go through a 
number  of  these  perspectives  briefly  before  developing  a  Bourdieusian 
framework for authoritarian and “identity” politics.
I. The Instrumentalist Perspective
The literature on authoritarianism tends to promote a number of key assertions 
that  make  it  difficult  to  explain  the  popularity  of  authoritarian  figures.  First 
many  scholars  treat  authoritarianism  primarily  as  a  concentration  of  regime 
power  at  the  expense  of  the  people,  and  as  a  series  of  strategies  to  prevent 
democratization (Dresden and Howard 2015; Schedler and Hoffman 2015; von 
Soest 2015). Key among these strategies are efforts to suppress the population’s 
right to political input through free elections and free association according to 
shared  interests  in  civil  society.  Thus,  many  scholars  focus  specifically  an 
authoritarian  regime’s  efforts  to  suppress  political  rights  and  civil  liberties 
(Borzel 2015; Moller and Skaapning 2013; Whiting 2017).
Though  these  approaches  are  entirely  valid  and  have  produced  detailed 
accounts  of  the  workings  of  autocratic  power,  this  scholarship  promotes  an 
perspective in which the interests of authoritarian regimes are uniformly aligned 
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against the interests of the citizenry. It therefore becomes difficult to account for 
the popularity of authoritarian regimes. Some scholars of authoritarianism thus 
account for popularity by focusing on elite manipulation of the population. Such 
scholars may devote particular attention to the utility of external threats to the 
goals  authoritarian  leaders,  and  catalogue  autocratic  efforts  to  play  up  such 
threats (Feldman 1997; Gerschewsk 2013). However, this literature often analyzes 
cases retrospectively. Scholars point to cases in which authoritarian leaders were 
able to exploit their constituents’ sense of insecurity, treating discourses of threat 
and stability as causal factors, without accounting for cases when discourses on 
threat failed to be politically salient. 
Scholars  who  have  offered  comparative  analyses  of  authoritarianism 
frequently focus on the institutions of rule. Numerous studies have examined the 
institutional foundation for variation between democratic and authoritarian rule 
(Brancati 2014; Koolner and Kailitz 2013; Levitsky 2014; Simpser 2013). However, 
this  emphasis  on  institutions  only  reproduces  the  dominant  instrumentalist 
perspective within political thought, which assumes that rational actors seek to 
maximize  their  utility  in  relation  to  formal  institutions.  This  emphasis  on 
institutions forces us to assume that authoritarian institutions benefit those who 
directly participate in, or otherwise collude with the regime, at the expense of the 
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broader  population.  The  instrumentalist  perspective  thus  promotes  a  general 
assumption that common citizens would have no interest in supporting regimes 
that  undermine  their  civil  liberties.  Many  scholars  who  try  to  offer  formal, 
institutional models of authoritarianism contribute to this assumption (Gehlback 
et al 2015; Knutsen and Nygard 2015; Pepinsky 2014; Roller 2013).
Even  the  literature  on  populism,  which  emphasizes  the  ways  in  which 
demagogues articulate claims for the public,  tend to fall  into such theoretical 
traps (de la Torre 2014; Grauvogel and von Soest 2014). Though this literature 
acknowledges that populist figures can articulate powerful platforms that appeal 
to marginalized constituents, scholars of populism frequently see these platforms 
as rational only when they articulate class-based platforms, and less so when 
they articulate culture wars or other populist platforms. Thinkers from critical 
and Marxist traditions such as Gramsci and Althusser work with variants of this 
assumption, calling for class liberation and dismissing other political agendas as 
forms of false consciousness. 
Thus,  the  instrumentalist  literature  on  authoritarianism  and  populism 
broadly assume that average citizens who support autocratic leaders do so at the 
expense of their manifest interest in liberal institutions. I do not argue that these 
institutional and critical perspectives are invalid. Indeed, I strongly agree with 
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scholars who have argued that sociology must devote more attention to the state 
as a key set of social institutions (Skocpol 1979; Evans et al 1985; Rueschemeyer 
1992;  Evans  1995).  Nevertheless,  I  argue  that  the  instrumentalist  focus  on 
individual liberties as a function of formal institutions prevents us from fully 
understanding the  behavior  of  authoritarian regimes,  or  the  reasons  for  their 
popularity. I now turn to literatures that have grown in response to this dilemma.
II. Non-Instrumental Explanations
As previously stated, it is difficulty to account for the popularity of authoritarian 
figures if we view authoritarianism as a concentration of power at the expense of 
the public. This conception extends back to the earliest treatises on individual 
liberty Western political philosophy has long treated topics such as freedom of 
conscience, pluralism, and a choice between freedom and unfreedom — between 
institutions  that  either  secure  rights  for  citizens,  or  deny  them.  While  this 
emphasis on civil liberties has provided an invaluable source of moral guidance, 
it  has  also  left  scholars  struggling  to  explain  why reasonable  citizens  would 
support authoritarian policies that attack those liberties, and cheer the leaders 
that enact such policies to consolidate power seemingly at their expense.
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Entire  literatures  have  emerged  to  offer  explanations  for  why citizens  act 
against  their  seemingly  manifest  interest  in  liberal  institutions  that  maximize 
individual freedoms. Wide-ranging scholarship on ‘identity politics’ has sought 
the  answer  to  this  puzzle  in  stronger  and  weaker  models  of  identity. 
Huntington’s  (1997)  similarly  proposes  fundamentalism  as  a  factor  that  can 
explain such political agendas in his much loved and much maligned theory of 
the  'clash  of  civilizations'  (Huntington 1997).  What  all  such theories  share  in 
common,  as  Brubaker  pointed  out  in  his  (2005)  critique  of  the  literature  on 
identity  politics,  is  that  scholars  use  identity  in  a  way  that  connotes  a  non-
instrumental  logic  of  sameness  and  selfhood,  which  supposedly  trumps 
instrumental reasoning and individual motives of self-interest. Strong theories of 
identity politics postulate that people embrace parochial and essential identities 
over  their  own  rational  interest  in  liberal  democracy  —  that  they  embrace 
symbolic  and  cultural  victories  at  the  expense  of  substantive  losses  in 
government  accountability.  Similarly,  scholars  contrast  the  healthy  ‘civic 
nationalism’ of western democracies, from the destructive ‘ethnic nationalism’ of 
struggling democracies (Smith 1991). 
Castells  (2010)  who  seeks  to  produce  a  general  theory  by  grounded  “the 
power  of  identity”  in  rational  motives  for  collective  empowerment.  Castles 
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distinguishes  three  forms  of  identity  according  to  group  relations  to  the 
dominant  institutions  of  society  -  especially  states  and markets.  Legitimizing 
identities  perpetuate  existing  power  relations;  resistance  identities  resist 
domination by those institutions; and project identities seek to subvert existing 
relations of power (Castells 2010:8). This theory does help to incorporate related 
phenomena  that  have  conventionally  been  treated  as  separate  by  theories  of 
pluralism and nationalism. Castells points out nationalism can form the base of a 
legitimizing or resistance identity, for example, and that socialism similarly can 
be the basis of project or legitimizing identities. 
Castells’ model provides some illuminating comparisons by treating power 
relations  as  more  significant  than  the  content  of  particular  group  identities. 
Despite his focus on power relations between groups, however, Castells reifies 
“identities”  as  internally  homogeneous  and  socially  “real.”  He  invokes  a 
universal  urge  for  groundedness  and  meaning  amid  global  processes  of 
economic, political, and cultural integration:
When the world becomes too large to be controlled, social actors aim to 
shrink it back to their size and reach. When networks dissolve time and 
space,  people  anchor  themselves  in  places,  and  recall  their  historic 
memory. When the patriarchal sustainment of personality breaks down, 
people affirm the transcendent value of family and community, as God’s 
will (Castells 2010:69).
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Castells  never  entertains  the  possibility  that  individuals  might  not  see  their 
empowerment and opportunity in terms of shared identities, or feel that these 
identities are delineated in a way that doesn’t serve their interests. He does not 
give a central place in his theory to variation and power relations within ethnic, 
national,  and religious  categories,  but  reifies  images  of  homogeneous  groups 
with unified interests - the primary of which is to work for the preservation and 
benefit of the group itself.
Some literature  on authoritarianism reduces  this  concern to  unsalvageable 
relativism. Scholarship on the “narcissism of minor differences” (Hitchen 2010) 
asserts that people are bound to construct an external enemy - an “other” - no 
matter how minor the discrepancies are between the antagonistic groups. When 
major religious and ethnic cleavages are absent, authoritarianism can make equal 
use  of  smaller  differences  that  gain  greater  salience  simply  by  virtue  of  the 
background homogeneity. 
Theories of ‘identity politics’ appeal to scholars and other observers because 
they allow scholars to explain why many citizens seemingly act against their own 
interests in liberal democracy. Treating ‘identity’ as a causal factor also allows 
scholars  to  draw  directly  from  the  rhetoric  that  political  entrepreneurs 
themselves use. Despite its theoretical and explanatory shortcomings, ‘identity’ 
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provides scholars with a rationale for seemingly irrational behavior. As we have 
seen,  however,  policies  that  ostensible  protect  traditional  religions  from non-
traditional groups in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan do not in practice defend the 
local from the foreign, the familiar from the unfamiliar. Instead, they defend the 
establishment’s monopoly over public authority — it’s ability to reserve public 
authority for loyal agents of the establishment itself. If we wish to explain the 
popularity of restrictive policies, therefore, we must be able to explain why such 
a monopoly of public authority is popular among certain segments of the public.
“Identity” and Non-Instrumental Reasoning 
Fifteen years ago, Rogers Brubaker published a seminal piece on the “identity” 
crisis in the social sciences (2000). He diagnosed two major problems with much 
of the literature that concerns itself with “identity politics.” First, he cautioned 
that references to identity often conflate categories of analysis with categories of 
practice (Brubaker 2004; 2013). Social scientists frequently employ the terms of 
identity  politics  -  ethnicity  and  nationality  -  that  political  “entrepreneurs” 
themselves  utilize,  and  thereby  reproduce  the  notion  that  these  groups  are 
discrete homogeneous and have a unified will. Second, identity connotes a a non-
instrumental logic of sameness and selfhood that supposedly trumps individual 
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motives of self-interest. Here the literature makes implicit distinctions between 
civil  society,  where rational  self-interest  prevails,  and less  civil  polities  where 
primordial sentiments of in-group solidarity and out-group animosity reign. 
Brubaker’s  critique  is  far  ranging.  He  argues  that  rather  than  reifying 
categories of practice, scholarship on “identity politics” should investigate how 
such  categories  are  used  by  political  entrepreneurs  “to  persuade  people  to 
understand themselves, their interests, and their predicaments in certain ways, to 
persuade certain people that they are (for certain purposes) ‘identical’ with one 
another  and  at  the  same  time  different  from  others,  to  organize  and  justify 
collective action along certain lines” (Brubaker 2000:4-5).  Brubaker aimed this 
criticism primarily at the literature on nationalism, which features overly clean 
and global distinctions between civic and ethnic nationalism. It also applies to 
the literature on religious politics, however, where concepts such as pluralism 
and secularism tend to treat religious tension as social regress away from the 
manifest benefits of civility and liberalism (Brubaker 2011; 2012). I will address 
each  of  these  literatures  briefly,  before  turning  to  the  accounts  of  religious 
restriction provided by scholarship on Central Asia.
The literature on nationalism contains a wealth of careful historical studies of 
nation building (Hobsbawm 1983; Gellner 1983; Anderson 1991), and empirical 
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accounts  of  contemporary nationalist  politics  (Kymlicka  1996,  Horowitz  1985, 
Brubaker 1996). In the framing of these studies, scholars of nationalism tend to 
split  the  subject  matter  between  the  growth  of  civic  nationalism  in  Western 
Europe, and the flaring of ethnic and nationalist tensions in contemporary post-
colonial and post-socialist states, i.e. between the instrumental reasoning of civil 
society  and the  reactionary  parochialism of  ethnic  nationalism.  Scholars  who 
have sought to bridge this divide often do so by either drawing our attention to 
the ethnic component of civic nations (Smith 1991), or exploring the prospects of 
civility and pluralism in ethnically-divided states (Kymlicka 2001). Scholars have 
offered few general theories that can account equally for both the tensions and 
the complimentarily of civic and ethnic bases of public authority. While tensions 
arise  in  some  cases  between  inclusive,  civic  and  exclusive,  ethnic  forms  of 
nationalism, the two commonly coincide. Ethnic understandings of nationhood 
also  have  great  utility  for  the  civic,  ostensibly  universal  mode  of  civic 
engagement espoused by liberal democracies and totalitarian regimes alike. 
Religious Belief
Literature on religion and politics has produced similar distinctions between the 
instrumental logic of secular politics and the non-instrumental logic of religious 
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belief.  Scholars  of  religion long held to  a  particular  image of  secularism that 
banished religion to the private sphere in order to preserve an image of rational 
public  politics.  The  resilience  of  religion  in  public  life  has  forced  scholars  to 
abandon such rigid conceptions. Casanova (1994; 2009) distinguishes three forms 
of secularism - institutional differentiation between religious organizations and 
the state, the declining place of religion in public life, and declining religiosity in 
people’s  private lives.  He argues against  assumptions that  the three reinforce 
each other, and suggests that religious organizations have regained a legitimate 
role in public life by acquiescing to institutional secularization - abandoning any 
claims to a monopoly on the souls that populate the public sphere. 
Scholars have rethought the concept of religious pluralism along similar lines. 
James Beckford (2003) distinguishes pluralism as an empirical phenomenon vs. a 
social value. Diversity in religion - whether measured according to number of 
distinct  faiths,  proportions  of  the  population  belonging  to  different  faiths,  or 
processes of denominationalism within faiths - does not necessarily entail public 
acceptance  of  religious  diversity.  Beckford  asserts  that  the  legal  and 
constitutional enshrinement of religious freedom pales in comparison to “subtle 
understandings, conventions and practices that allow some religious groups to 
function  as  the  ‘normal,’  taken  for  granted  point  of  reference”  and  the 
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“willingness  of  'accepted'  or  'recognised'  religious  groups  to  accept  others  as 
worthy partners or competitors in the public sphere” (77).
Demerath (2003) provides one of the most lucid models of religious politics 
by treating the sacred as something that both religion and politics are drawn to, 
but  neither  monopolize.  Durkheim’s  sense  of  sacred groupness  underpins  all 
public  politics  -  a  flame to which the moths of  religion and politics  are both 
drawn in Demerath’s narrative. To obtain power and become an arbiter of the 
sacred, however, is to generate resistance and lose the flame of public support. 
Religious monopolies  are  apt  to  produce disillusionment  and spur secular  or 
pluralist civil society, just as secular governments are apt to produce religious 
bases of civil society, in which the church or mosque becomes a place for people 
to congregate and express their will. Demerath pursues these nuances through an 
array of careful empirical studies, but his Durkheimian foundation prevents him 
from producing a general theory of how religion relates to social power and its 
reproduction.
Although scholars are right to abandon such rigid views of secularism and 
pluralism,  they  have  struggled  to  offer  equally  clear  narratives  that  do  not 
devolve into moral relativism and constructivism, which treat all religious and 
national sentiments as arbitrary and socially constructed. Yang (2011) asserted 
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with regard to China that such regimes have a tacit mistrust for private life and 
free,  interest-based  association,  not  due  to  the  immediate  threat  that  such 
affiliations  pose  to  the  regime,  but  merely  by  virtue  of  the  choice  that  they 
represent to associate freely in venues of private or civic life other than those set 
up by and in support of the regime. Such “deviance” represents a slight toward 
the "civic" apparatus that the regime has developed to compel citizens (especially 
students,  public  servants,  government  officials,  and  other  cadres  directly 
connected to public institutions) to participate in a highly scripted and ritualized 
spectacle of support for the regime, its leadership, and nation for whose benefit 
the regime ostensible serves.The secularization thesis and classic liberal ideals of 
pluralism and civic nationalism present a clear models of public politics precisely 
because  they  place  civic  identity  above  ethnic  and  religious  identities  in  a 
normative hierarchy. Scholars have struggled to retain analytical  power while 
abandoning this moral hierarchy.
In  sum,  these  literatures  present  many  careful  empirical  discussions  of 
religious  politics  and nationalism in  cases  across  the  world,  but  have largely 
failed to produce a general theory of “identity politics” that responds Brubaker’s 
critique without lapsing into moral relativism. The general models that scholars 
have offered either conflate categories of analysis with categories of practice, or 
73
revert to social constructivism. As I will show, the literature on religious politics 
in Central Asia similarly attribute ethnic or religious chauvinism to elites and 
masses who have misrecognized liberalisms’ inherent benefits, allowing the non-
instrumental reasoning of sameness to trump the instrumental reasoning of self-
interest.
III. Accounts from the Region
The literature on post-Soviet  Central  Asia reproduces this  dual  focus on elite 
interests and mass identity with an emphasis on regime strength. Some observers 
emphasize the strength of the regimes and the weakness of civil society in the 
post-Soviet space, while others depict the secular states as weak in comparison to 
the resurgence of public religiosity and potential extremism. Scholars and human 
rights watchdogs (Epkenhans 2009, 2010; Norwegian-Helsinki Committee 2010) 
tend to assert that the attempt to regulate religious belief and expression is at best 
futile, and at worst damaging to regimes’ own security interests. In keeping with 
the view of liberalism as a panacea to all ills facing former socialist states, they 
criticize  these  regimes  for  imagining  a  tradeoff  between  rights  and  security, 
whereas the two reinforce each other. 
It appears that retaining or increasing short to medium term control by 
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governments over independent movements within society is the primary 
aim  of  policies  and  actions  affecting  freedom  of  religion  or  belief. 
(Norwegian-Helsinki Committee 2010:5).
These critics  argue that  rather than keeping religious organizations,  attitudes, 
and practices within the state’s field of view, government restriction forces them 
underground and contributes to further alienation and possible radicalization. 
In  contrast,  McGlinchy  (2009)  sees  the  regulation  of  religion  as  a  state 
response to Islamic revivalism, which he in turn attributes to the failure of these 
transitioning states to hold up their end of the social contract. Olcott (2007, 2012) 
argues that secular governance was never a given in the region from the moment 
of  independence,  and  remains  deeply  threatened  by  Islamic  revivalism.  She 
justifies the state in defending secular politics through any means necessary, so 
long  as  its  policies  are  effective  at  curtailing  extremism  and  do  not 
unintentionally  contribute  to  the  further  alienation  and  radicalization  of  the 
population.
Still other scholars point to regional convergence on a single, illiberal policy 
framework, primarily under the influence of Russia (Roberts 2015; Tolstrup 2015; 
Lankina et al 2016). Omelicheva (2009; 2011) argues that Central Asian states are 
simply replicating the religious and security policies enacted by Russia under a 
policy  of  “sovereign  democracy.”  She  employs  a  reference  group  model  of 
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institutional  convergence  to  show  that  similar  counter-terrorism  policies  are 
emerging across the region through a combination of emulation, initiatives to 
coordinate and harmonize efforts, and coercion by great powers - mostly Russia 
but also China. The states of Central Asia often follow Russia’s lead for the sake 
of  retaining  a  lax  visa  regime  and  being  included  in  multilateral  trade  and 
security agreements. 
This explanation finds ample support in both the influence and the rhetoric 
that Russia wields in Central Asia. In 2005, Russia declared a policy of “sovereign 
democracy” that the other states in Russia’s sphere of influence have adopted 
tacitly or overtly. The main pillars of sovereign democracy are non-intervention 
by foreign powers, and the notion that all states have their own equally-valid 
path toward democracy, which no other state can judge. The regional integration 
perspective  addresses  this  problem  in  part,  but  only  by  stripping  the  local 
regimes of any agency in choosing their policies. The most obvious limitation of 
Omelicheva’s approach is that she never explains why Russia should itself be so 
concerned with marginal religious groups. She shifts the puzzle from the Central 
Asian states to multilateral organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization  that  operates  under  Russia’s  aegis,  but  the  policy  initiatives  of 
Russia are left as a black box. 
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The primary issue with these explanations is that they point alternately to 
regime  strength  and  regime  weakness  as  explanations  for  the  same  policies 
(Dufour 2006;  Myrzabaev 2009;  Bleuer 2012).  Strong regimes like Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, and Russia regulate religion because they can; they are capable of 
and  disposed  to  regulating  every  aspect  of  civic  life.  Weak  regimes  like 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan regulate religion because they are insecure; they feel 
compelled  to  preempt  all  challenges  to  their  tenuous  public  authority.  Both 
explanations  have  their  logic,  but  taken  together  they  explain  a  constant 
phenomenon with  a  variable  one,  indicating a  clear  lack of  consensus  in  the 
literature  on  the  region.  Both  approaches,  moreover,  reproduce  the  broader 
tendency in the literature to uphold liberalism as the clear path to stability and 
security, and explain regime actions in terms of a conscientious rejection of this 
path.
Thus,  despite  the  wealth  of  careful  empirical  work  on  nationalist  and 
religious  politics  (Surucu  2002;  Hayat  2004;  Laurelle  2007;  Guilette  and 
Heathershaw  2010),  there  remains  a  gap  between  nuanced  case  studies  and 
general theory. Nuanced case studies such as those presented above often refer 
back to conventional theory, which tends to place causal weight alternately on 
primordial identities, or on elite interests and manipulation. Again, proponents 
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of both explanations frequently present liberalism as a panacea for challenges to 
stability and prosperity, which leaders and masses reject to their own detriment. 
Neither  explanation  adequately  accounts  for  the  relations  of  power  beneath 
ostensibly rigid categories of ethnicity and race, national and religious belonging.
IV. Representation as a "Mystery of Ministry"
Rather than treating support for authoritarian politics as a result of irrationality 
or  malleability,  we  should  rather  seek  to  explain  the  instrumental  interest  in 
supporting authoritarian policies. Authoritarianism does indeed impinge on the 
liberty of citizens to mobilize according to common interests, autonomous from 
the state, which would seem to undercut the position of common citizens. What 
most scholars fail to acknowledge is that the means to mobilize autonomously 
are  unevenly  distributed.  Liberal  democracy  ideally  expands  the  capacity  of 
individual citizens to organize according to shared political interests. And while 
we certainly should advocate for the freedoms that liberal democracy secures for 
the general public, we must also recognize that not all citizens have equal means 
to mobilize autonomously for their collective interests. 
For this reason, Bourdieu saw democracy as hijacked by those with greater 
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volumes of capital — economic, cultural,  social,  etc.  Bourdieu’s later work on 
public politics treats democracy not as a system of representation, so must as a 
means  of  legitimately  dispossessing  the  masses  of  their  voices.  He  describes 
representation as a form of ministry, in which public figures 'speak for those who 
would  not  speak  unless  someone  spoke  for  them.'  In  Bourdieu’s  analysis, 
democratic  institutions  do  not  simply  aggregate  the  popular  will,  but  rather 
create  constituencies  in  a  process  he  calls  the  mystery  of  ministry:  “When  the 
spokesperson speaks, it is the group who speaks through him, but one that exists 
through the speaker and the speech” (Bourdieu 2004:41).
It  is  no  surprise,  therefore,  that  class  background  strongly  affects  what 
institutions people most trust — those that promote liberal and pluralist ideals, 
vs. those espousing collective identities that ostensibly define the essential will of 
the people. The chart below demonstrates this relationship. Working with data 
from the latest wave in the World Values Survey, I created a composite index of 
socioeconomic status consisting of education, income, kind of occupation, and 
rural vs. urban residence.1 Though Bourdieu’s native France was not included in 
1 I created this SES index from four different measures from wave 6 of the World Values Survey, 
data  from  wave  6  of  the  World  Values  Survey,  accessible  at  www.worldvaluessurvey.org.  I 
retained the same scales and weights used in the original survey. The first three measures are 
class  (on a  scale  of  10  relative  to  each country),  education (on a  scale  of  9),  urban vs.  rural 
residence (on a scale of 8). The fourth measure is itself a composite scale of 10 based on three 
measures of the kind of work done by the respondent currently or in the past if not currently 
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this wave of the World Values Survey, by examining all current EU states that 
were included, we can see a significant relationship between level of SES and 
opinion on issues related to religious tolerance. As we might expect, people with 
relatively higher SES, whom we might expect to be more cosmopolitan are less 
likely to view their religion as the only valid religion, and more likely to view 
members of other religions as being moral.2
employed  —  degree  of  manual  vs.  intellectual,  routine  vs.  non-routine,  and  supervised  vs. 
autonomous,  all  measured  on  a  scale  of  10.  I  broke  the  resulting  index  down  into  textiles, 
representing three equal segments of the sample population.
2 The chart below includes aggregate scores for all current EU states included in wave six of the 
WVS,  including  Estonia,  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Romania,  Spain,  and  Sweden. 
Though the inclusion of some post-Socialist states may introduce greater variation within the 
independent variable, all the relationships demonstrated are still significant at the .001 level; SES 
and agreement that “only my religion is acceptable” significant at the .001 level: X2 (6, 8749) = 
446.8, p < .001;  relationship between SES and agreement that “members of other religions are 
moral” significant at the .001 level: X2 (6, 8617) = 216.7, p < .001.
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The relationship between education, socio-economic status, and identity politics 
is  well-known,  however,  and  scholars  on  identity,  fundamentalism,  and 
populism readily embrace this point to argue that the uneducated masses cling to 
primordial identities. This perspective, however, again relies on the assumption 
that common citizens have a manifest interest to maximize individual liberties. 
The value of Bourdieu’s model is  that it  allows us to understand politics not 
simply as an expression of rights, but as an exchange of symbolic capital — a 
competitive process  in  which multiple  institutions fight  to  redistribute power 
and authority among constituencies. 
Bourdieu saw liberal democracy as one more means whereby the dominant 
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Bourgeois class dispossesses dominated classes of symbolic capital  — of their 
very voices. He did not thoroughly consider the ways in which spokespersons 
can also champion the interests of their supporters and constituents. His model 
can be readily modified, however, by examining how ministries do not merely 
accumulate  symbolic  capital  for  themselves,  but  also  redistribute  symbolic 
capital among the citizenry. Rather than dispossessing their own constituents of 
their  voices,  ministries  propagate  the  voices  of  some  constituents,  and 
marginalize those of others. They consecrate a particular effigy of the popular 
will,  promoting the interests and values of some at the expense of others. All 
ministries can thus be seen as redistributing symbolic capital in a core/periphery 
structure. 
Pluralism and essentialism thus represent distinct political strategies for the 
redistribution of symbolic capital among the population. Liberal or illiberal, all 
public figures propagate the interests and values of certain constituencies at the 
expense of others. By enshrining pluralism, liberal regimes redistribute symbolic 
capital toward those strata with greater means for autonomous mobilization — 
greater means to articulate and promote their politics without apparatuses that 
speak for them. Authoritarian establishments promote a sacrosanct will tailored 
to enfranchise those strata that are relatively poorly endowed for autonomous 
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political mobilization and articulation. Populist leaders may claim to speak in the 
name of the entire collective — the sacrosanct will  of  the people — but they 
formulate  those  values  and  interests  specifically  with  reference  to  stratified 
power  relations  —  particularly  the  stratification  between  those  who  have 
relatively  greater  means  to  formulate  and  promote  their  own  politics  in  a 
competitive public sphere.
The strategy of essentialism thus benefits those who are in relatively greater 
need of party, religious, and other apparatuses to provide them with a collective 
voice.  We  would  thus  expect  individual  preferences  for  democracy  vs. 
authoritarianism to be strongly related to socioeconomic status, and that is what 
we indeed find when examining these preferences in the context of European 
nation-states — the political context in which Bourdieu was primarily writing.3
3 Relationship between SES and support for a “having a strong leader” significant at the .001 
level:  X2  (6,  9015)  =  283.1,  p  <  .001;   relationship  between  SES  and  support  for  “having  a 
democratic system” significant at the .001 level: X2 (6, 9201) = 130.6, p < .001.
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Viewed through this lens, identity politics is not motivated by deep, essential, 
and non-instrumental feelings of sameness, but rather by rational calculations on 
the part  of  such constituencies  within the stratified and competitive  space of 
public politics. One cannot help but feel that this oversight is partially influenced 
by scholars’ own stakes in public politics. Scholars are among the best endowed 
strata  to  pursue  their  political  agendas  through deliberation.  They thus  have 
clear reason to promote Habbermasian ideals of deliberative democracy and to 
deride populist and identity politics as vulgar and irrational.
Authoritarian and essentialist politics can thus provide a crucial facet of self-
determination among those strata that struggle to assert  such ownership in a 
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more cosmopolitan environment — one dominated by deliberative democracy 
and sophisticated status performances. A monopoly over the means of consecration 
ensures that  all  legitimate authority rests  in the name of  the people,  and the 
regime articulates the will of the people in a way that expands the authority of its 
base.  Restrictive  religious  policies  can  thus  enjoy  genuine  popularity  among 
broad segments  of  the  population,  because  the  regime’s  base  recognizes  that 
pluralism is as much a threat to their own public status and authority as it is to 
the regime’s, and that essentialism consecrates and preserves their authority in 
the face of such competition.
Bourdieu was primarily writing of his native France, whose distinctive class 
politics often do not translate well to other cases. Bourdieu also wrote during a 
period of great expansion for globalism, neoliberalism, and the European project; 
he never lived to see fully realized populist backlash against these projects. With 
the modifications I have suggested above, however, his model of the mystery of 
ministry can account for authoritarian and populist politics, and thus for identity 
politics and even fundamentalism. His theories can thus be fully transported to 
the post-Soviet space and other contexts.
Public Politics as a Battle over the Means of Consecration
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I suggest that public politics should be understood as a battle over the means of 
consecration.  I  argue  that  authoritarian  leaders  maintain  popular  support  by 
accumulating sufficient symbolic power to render the interests of their political 
base  sacrosanct,  thereby  placing  those  interests  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of 
mundane politics. Their very mandate is to 'defend' this sacrosanct, quasi-divine 
national  will  from the  realm of  deliberation,  negotiation  and compromise,  in 
which their constituents are at a distinct disadvantage. In former socialist states 
across Eurasia, wide bands of citizens have little access to civic institutions or 
avenues  of  public  engagement  —  aside  from  the  hierarchical  apparatuses  of 
political  parties  and  government  institutions  themselves.  For  such  strata, 
populist rhetoric and identity politics can provide a means to elevate the interests 
of such constituents above politics - to consecrate their values as sacrosanct and 
essential to the very constitution of 'the people.'
Strong discourses of identity result when such public figures obtain a near 
monopoly  over  the  means  of  consecration.  The  values  that  these  leaders 
consecrate, in turn, are not derived from rigid traditions or essential identities, 
but  rather  serve  as  flexible  conceptual  tools  that  adapt  to  the  struggle  for 
authority  within  stratified  power  relations.  Religious  orthodoxy,  ethnic  and 
national  solidarity,  even  ‘class  consciousness’  rely  on  ‘invented 
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traditions’ (Hobsbawm 1983) that can enhance the claims of key strata to greater 
political participation and representation. Per the above discussion, we would 
expect to see a strong relationship between socioeconomic status and support for 
authoritarianism, and indeed we do, but following a strikingly different pattern 
than in EU states.4
In  these  more  authoritarian  regimes,  support  for  “strong  leadership” 
4 Relationship between SES and support for a “having a strong leader” in Kazakhstan significant 
at the .001 level: X2 (6, 1499) = 27.4, p < .001; relationship between SES and support for a “having 
a  strong  leader”  in  Kyrgyzstan  significant  at  the  .001  level:  X2  (6,  1434)  =  26.6,  p  <  .001; 
relationship between SES and support for a “having a strong leader” in aggregated EU states 
significant at the .001 level: X2 (6, 9015) = 283.1, p < .001;  
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unencumbered  by  democratic  constraints  actually  increases  with  SES.  Thus, 
authoritarian and nationalist  discourses serve to reinforce rather than subvert 
elite  domination,  consolidating  a  political  base  among  the  relatively  more 
privileged  classes.  Though  populist  figures  may  articulate  their  political 
programs in terms of sacrosanct values, the popular appeal of these values comes 
from their capacity to redistribute symbolic capital among the population — to 
propagate some voices and marginalize others. 
Similarly,  the  relationship  between  SES  and  support  for  a  “democratic 
system” in Kazakhstan is inverse to the relationship in EU states, with higher 
levels  of  SES  corresponding  to  less  support  democracy.  As  figure  11  shows, 
ambivalence  about  democracy  is  greatest  in  Kyrgyzstan  across  all  strata,  but 
marginally lower among higher SES strata, as in Kazakhstan.5
5  Relationship  between SES and support  for  a  “having a  democratic  system” in  Kazakhstan 
significant at the .01 level: X2 (6, 1499) = 21.3, p = .002; relationship between SES and support for 
a “having a democratic system” in Kyrgyzstan significant at the .001 level: X2 (6, 1431) = 29.4, p 
< .001; relationship between SES and support for a “having a democratic system” in aggregated 
EU states significant at the .001 level: X2 (6, 9201) = 130.6, p < .001.
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As shown in figure 11 below, this support need not be attached to the charisma of 
a  particular  figure  or  the  efforts  of  a  consolidated  regime  to  manipulate  the 
public.  Once  again,  this  chart  demonstrates  significantly  greater  support  for 
order over liberties in Kyrgyzstan than in Kazakhstan, which runs counter to any 
explanations of identity politics that rely on factors such as elite manipulation, 
given the difference in degree of regime consolidation between the two states. By 
comparison, citizens of European Union member states show a much stronger 
preference for  increased participation in government decisions and protecting 
freedom of speech.6 
6 Relationship between SES and preferred political agenda in Kazakhstan significant at the .01 
level: X2 (6, 1499) = 17.2, p = .008; relationship between SES and preferred political agenda in 
Kyrgyzstan significant at the .001 level: X2 (6, 1434) = 48.6, p < .001; relationship between SES and 
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I should note that the differences may be exaggerated in this chart because of the 
events of 2011 in both countries — namely the violent deposition of President 
Bakiev in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, which precipitated ethnic clashes in the south of 
the  country,  and  the  economic  downturn  and  inflation  that  Kazakhstan 
experienced in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis,  which precipitated 
strikes in the state-run energy sector that were violently put down by the regime. 
These recent events were assuredly fresh in the minds of many respondents, but 
as I will show further on, respondents from Kyrgyzstan expressed a preference in 
preferred political agenda in aggregated EU states significant at the .001 level:  X2 (6,  9657) = 
348.8, p < .001.
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2011 not only for “order in the nation,” but also for having a “strong leader” 
unencumbered by democratic constraints.
Policies designed to curtail religious pluralism are popular for precisely these 
reasons. Religious orthodoxy can be seen not as any particular set of doctrines, 
but rather as a series of institutional arrangements that support the authority of a 
sacrosanct  popular  will  —  the  authority  of  an  essential  ‘Kyrgyzness’  of 
‘Kazakhntess’  promoted  by  the  political  and  religious  establishments  of  the 
respective  countries.  This  sacrosanct  will  bolsters  titular  nationals’  sense  of 
ownership over public life and public institutions, but not equally. Once again, 
orthodoxy and the sacrosanct popular will may invoke the name of ‘the people’ 
inclusively,  but  the  values  and  interests  attributed  to  the  people  serve  to 
redistribute symbolic capital — authority and legitimacy — toward the regime’s 
political base. Thus, just as we see class variation in support for authoritarianism, 
we also see class variation in support of religious essentialism.7
7 Relationship between SES and agreement that “the only acceptable religion is my religion” in 
Kazakhstan significant at the .01 level: X2 (6, 1324) = 21.2, p = .002; relationship between SES and 
agreement that “the only acceptable religion is my religion” in Kyrgyzstan significant at the .001 
level:  X2 (6,  1369)  =  26.7,  p  <  .001;  relationship  between SES  and agreement  that  “the  only 
acceptable religion is my religion” in aggregated EU states significant at the .001 level: X2 (6, 
8749) = 446.8, p < .001.
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Interestingly,  support  for  religious  pluralism  in  Kyrgyzstan  and  Kazakhstan 
follow a somewhat similar pattern as in EU states.  Increases in SES generally 
correspond to greater support for religious pluralism, although the effect is not as 
strong as in European states.  These charts would seem to indicate that  while 
higher SES correlates with both democratic and cosmopolitan values in Europe, 
the elites in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are more inclined to authoritarianism 
than lower classes, despite being more cosmopolitan.
The  popular  ownership  over  public  life  that  such  regimes  offer  is  thus 
ephemeral, however. My purpose in articulating this model is not to reify these 
regimes’ own rhetoric and treat them as genuine champions of their constituents’ 
interests. Authoritarian regimes by definition seek to establish themselves as the 
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sole legitimate arbiter of the popular will. Such monopolies can reduce politics to 
a  mere  spectacle  of  popular  participation,  which  “enable[s]  elites  to  close 
opportunities  for  input  from below,  but  without  making  the  masses  feel  left 
out” (Adams 2010:3). As with the values they propagate, populist and autocratic 
leaders  elevate  themselves  above  the  political  arena  as  unimpeachable 
champions of these values, whose very mandate it is to defend the 'true' will of 
the people (or, alternately, the will of the 'true' people) against unruly pluralism. 
In sum, authoritarian leaders articulate a sacrosanct popular will  - a mandate to 
rule  in  the  name  of  a  presumed  constituency  that  is  unencumbered  by 
conventional electoral politics.
Authoritarianism as a form of Ordination
Thus, through discourses on national tradition and religious orthodoxy, state and 
religious officials claim a mandate to defend this sacrosanct popular will from 
heterodox threats,  as  discussed above.  But  simply claiming a  mandate  is  not 
equivalent to exercising it. A full theory of authoritarian rule must account not 
only  for  the  regime’s  claim to  legitimate  authority,  but  also  how the  regime 
consolidates the power to enforce that claim.
This model I also draw from Bourdieu, who spoke of the power of nomination: 
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the power of established elites to nominate others to power. Within the bourgeois 
democracy that Bourdieu was investigating, this power is largely limited to the 
capacity of democratically elected officials to nominate other officials to various 
state functions and supporting roles of governance. In an authoritarian context, 
however,  the  power  of  nomination  takes  on  a  far  greater  role.  Authoritarian 
regimes seek to use this power of nomination to monopolize public authority 
itself.  Under  authoritarian  rule,  established  elites  control  access  to  public 
authority, and nominate to power only on those who have demonstrated their 
loyalty to and utility for the establishment.
Authoritarianism is  thus  a  form of  quasi-ordination,  in  which  established 
elites confer public authority on agents who can be relied on to reproduce the 
established order. Only elect, ordained, loyal representatives of the establishment 
are  given the  authority  to  represent  the  sacrosanct  will  of  the  people.  In  the 
present cases, both states align strongly with the religious hierarchies of the two 
main  ‘traditional’  religions  —  the  Spiritual  Administration  of  Muslims  or 
Muftiate, and the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate. Authoritarian regimes jealously 
guard this monopoly over the power of nomination, and regime consolidation 
can be understood as the degree to which the establishment exerts control over 
these channels of power. This model allows us to account for two puzzles that 
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my cases present:
First, we can explain why authoritarian regimes restrict marginal and benign 
religious groups, and why the discourse on 'tradition' is so misaligned with the 
historical record in Central Asia.  To the establishment,  it  matters not where a 
religious  group comes  from — only  whether  that  group’s  ministry  helps  the 
regime reproduce this monopoly. Thus, groups with a strong local vintage can 
still be considered heterodox if they challenge the regime’s monopoly over public 
authority. Conversely foreign groups can be accepted as orthodox if they help the 
regime reproduce this  monopoly,  as  the Russian Orthodox and many foreign 
Islamic  foundations  do.  All  that  matters  is  which  groups  help  the  regime 
reproduce their presumed mandate to speak for the people, and which groups 
challenge this mandate.
Second, we can account for the reasons why Kyrgyzstan has implemented 
similarly illiberal policies as Kazakhstan, despite being considered an ‘island of 
democracy’ in Central  Asia.  Treating authoritarianism as a claim allows us to 
examine  what  all  illiberal  regimes  share  in  common,  and  does  not  preclude 
discussing  how  such  regimes  consolidate  power.  No  matter  how  secure  or 
tenuous  their  hold  on  power  may  be,  authoritarian  regimes  claim  similar 
mandates  to  enact  the  ‘true’  will  of  the  people.  From  populist  upstarts  to 
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entrenched  dictators,  authoritarian  figures  claim  to  speak  for  a  sacrosanct 
popular will that transcends mundane politics. By treating authoritarianism as a 
system of quasi-ordination, we are able to compare cases according to both the 
claims regimes make to authority, and the degree to which these claims dominate 
within the ranks of the state and the public sphere more broadly. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, I  wish to reassess the concept of the sacred  and its role in self-
determination, in light of the discussion of instrumental and non-instrumental 
reasoning. Durkheim’s discussion of the sacred remains essential to sociological 
discussions of religion, nationalism, and other bases of collective identity (1972). 
While scholarly definitions of the sacred vary, many hew close to Durkheim’s 
classic discussion of religious life. Many scholars note that the sacred consecrates 
our sense of collective belonging, that it is expressed through rituals that elicit 
heightened emotional  commitment to the group, and that it  is  represented in 
symbols and totems that command special  reverence.  Demerath,  for example, 
defines the sacred as “things set apart that inspire special awe and veneration, 
that  excite  moments  of  self-transcendence  and confer  a  measure  of  collective 
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identity,  and that  generally  involve  some form of  ritual  and the  odd leap of 
faith”(2003:6).
But all too often such definitions focus on the social power of the sacred, and 
overlook elements of disaffection and dissent. Scholars such as Castells (2001) 
often focus on the power that the group wields over the individual, especially 
when focusing on non-Western contexts, while downplaying dissent. A definition 
of the sacred that avoids such essentialism must be able to account for individual 
motivations for identifying with the values that are propagated on them in the 
name of sacrosanct groups, as opposed to dissenting from them. 
People invest emotional energy where they expect returns: in identities that 
reward them with a sense of meaning and status. We confer special reverence on 
groups, associations, professions and movements that expand our capacity for 
self-determination. But self-determination often comes at the price of deference 
— to the moral authority of the group, or to the doxa of competitive social fields. 
To  be  part  of  a  group  or  community  is  to  defer  our  individual  will  to  the 
collective will (often to those who simply wield greater authority to define the 
collective will). The sacred derives its power from our need to retain a sense of 
personal meaning and agency, even as we compromise our individual will  to 
structures of power and authority. 
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I therefore define the sacred simply as that to which individuals defer for the 
sake of self-determination. Consecrating the group as sacred provides us with a 
sense  of  collective  self-determination,  even  in  the  act  of  compromising  our 
individual interests. Individual deference becomes a ritual sacrifice for the sake 
of the group. Thus, I argue that the sacred is closely linked to self-determination, 
both individual and collective, because it provides us with a sense of meaning 
and agency even in the act of deference and compromise.
But the returns on deference are never evenly distributed. Individuals face 
different  opportunity  structures  for  self-determination,  and  they  respond  by 
investing emotional energy instrumentally, where they anticipate greater returns. 
Some are accorded greater status by the moral authority of the communities in 
which they live, and thus hold as sacred the symbols of their nation, religious 
community, or other social group. Those who feel disaffected from the collective 
will, in contrast, may divest from the moral authority of the collective, and see 
that sacred will  as a form of domination and dispossession. They thus invest 
themselves in dissident movements and other volitional associations that offer an 
alternate  means  of  self-determination,  separate  from  the  collective  will 
propagated on them by the establishment.
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CHAPTER 3
Data and Methodology
The relational analysis I propose in this dissertation does not examine orthodoxy 
and heterodoxy as  distinct  doctrines,  but  rather  as  contending sets  of  claims 
within a competitive political field. Bourdieu's relational approach starts from the 
proposition that all fields are structured around competition between orthodox 
and heterodox positions  — between dominant  strata  who wish  to  reproduce 
their power, and dominated strata who wish to resist and subvert existing power 
relations. Indeed, one of my major assertions is that claims to authority change 
over time through the shifting dynamics of competition between orthodoxy and 
heterodoxy.  Thus,  the  goal  of  my  analysis  is  neither  to  trace  genealogies  of 
religious thought nor to provide an exhaustive overview of the political rhetoric 
pervading public life in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, but rater to show how a 
particular set of claims can be understood as contributing to strategies pursued 
by actors with determinable interests in a competitive field.
The data for this research draws from a combination of public documents, 
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interviews,  and  primary  observations  of  government  practices.  I  collected 
approximately  5,000  primary  documents  from  two  government  databases  in 
Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan.  I  also  conducted  36  in-depth  interviews  with 
religious  leaders,  practitioners,  government  officials,  and experts  on  religious 
politics  from NGOs and universities.  Finally,  I  directly  observed government 
practices in the religious sphere in Kyrgyzstan, where I was able to gain access to 
a number of court proceedings and government trainings, as well as the Kurultai 
summer in which the Muftiate selected a new head Mufti. I will address each of 
these methods in turn.
I. Primary Dataset
The bulk of the data comes from two databases of public documents — Paragraf 
in Kazakhstan and Toktom in Kyrgyzstan. These databases contain full records of 
all of the legislation and policy enacted by the governments of Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan  extending back  to  independence,  as  well  as  court  rulings,  policy 
recommendations, procedural documents (e.g. forms that religious organizations 
must  fill  out  when  registering),  and  even  select  news  sources.  Paragraf  and 
Toktom are  both proprietary  databases  that  offer  subscribing institutions  and 
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individuals access to the official electronic archives of public documents in their 
respective  states.  I  gained  access  to  Paragraf  and  Toktom  through  research 
appointments  at  the  Department  of  Political  Science  at  the  Kazakhstan 
Institutions of Management in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and the American University 
of Central Asia in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. 
Neither database is designed to allow mass export of documents. Quite the 
opposite, both databases make exporting documents a cumbersome process and 
instead  focus  on  providing  a  powerful  working  environment  within  the 
databases, so as to keep institutions subscribed. I therefore had to improvise a 
manual export workflow in order to collect as much data as possible in limited 
time.  In  the  case  of  Kazakhstan,  I  had to  divide  my limited  time in  Almaty 
between conducting interviews and accessing Paragraf, and extracted the data 
over the course of three intensive days. In Bishkek I was able to access Toktom 
more casually, but still sought to streamline my workflow as much as possible.
I first retrieved documents using keyword searches. Searching for keywords 
individually would have yielded excessive amounts of redundant documents, 
however, so I developed a set of 82 keywords, and used the Boolean operator OR 
to retrieve documents that contained any one of those keywords anywhere in the 
text. These keywords ranged from the names of religious groups such as Baptists 
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or Tablighi Jamaat, to terms such as religious extremism, destructive sect, and 
religious affairs. Being built for the Russian language, both Toktom and Paragraf 
searched for all case declensions of these terms automatically. I used this same set 
of keywords to retrieve documents in each of the major categories separately, i.e. 
legislation containing any of these keywords anywhere in the text, court rulings 
containing any of  the  same terms,  policy  statements  and expert  commentary 
containing these terms, etc.
After  each keyword search,  I  manually exported every document that  the 
system  retrieved  to  a  flash  drive.  Due  to  the  limitations  of  these  databases, 
unfortunately,  this  manual  export  stripped  the  files  of  all  metadata.  All 
publication data was preserved in the headers of the documents themselves, but 
each document  had to  be  saved manually  as  a  generic  RTF file.  Rather  than 
spending excessive time manually copying the title of each document into the file 
name when saving it, I exported the files with generic names into a folder system 
based on the kind of document and the year of publication. Overall, this process 
yielded approximately 5,000 unique documents — 2,497 from Kazakhstan, and 
2,751 from Kyrgyzstan — covering the period between independence in 1991 and 
the summer of 2013.
Before discussing my data analysis strategies, I must make one note on how 
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these sources are cited throughout the dissertation. Post-Soviet statecraft presents 
its own conventions of writing, citing, and presenting publication data. Entire 
books have been written just on the idiom that state officials employ in public 
documents and official press statements (Yurchak 2003; 2006). Suffice it to say 
that the conventions of state apparatchiks often diverge significantly from the 
standards that define clear and cogent scholarly writing. Publication data can be 
similarly ambiguous, in part because my primary sources range from newspaper 
articles to legislation and court rulings, to policy memos intended for internal 
circulation. Some sources are attributed to no author, while others list alongside 
the author’s name his or her full credentials, which in the case of Kazakhstan 
might  even  refer  to  their  service  under  “The  First  President  of  Kazakhstan, 
Nursultan Nazarbayeve, Leader of the Nation.” 
When  translating  and  citing  my  sources,  I  endeavor  to  reproduce  these 
conventions,  rather  than  molding  my  sources  to  match  the  conventions  of 
English-language  scholarship.  My  translations  reproduce  the  long  and  often 
opaque sentences used by officials. I also cite my primary sources in footnotes 
with whatever publication data were preserved by the state archiving services 
and the  proprietary  databases  that  I  used to  access  these  archives.  Wherever 
possible, I have recollected full publication information on each source. Where 
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this was not possible, however, I rely on the authority of the databases and public 
archives from which I drew the sources as a verification of their authenticity.
Although my research yielded a relatively similar number of documents from 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, by sheer coincidence, the proportions of document 
types  varied  greatly  between  the  two.  This  variation  represents  both 
organizational  differences  between  the  two  databases,  as  well  as  different 
governmental  priorities  and approaches  between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan 
over  the  past  two  decades.  For  example  Kyrgyzstan  has  produced  far  more 
legislation than Kazakhstan over the past twenty years, no doubt due to its two 
regime  changes  and  frequent  referendums  that  introduce  sweeping 
constitutional  changes.  Nevertheless,  many of  the  laws passed in  Kyrgyzstan 
simply serve to reintroduce the same language as previous laws that had been 
nullified  by  a  constitutional  referendum.  The  totals  from  each  database  are 
presented in the table below.
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Table 2: Number of documents in dataset by case and document type
 
Document type KG: Toktom 
Database
KZ: Paragraf 
Database
Legislation 1,758 628
Court rulings 107 198
International agreements & treaties 447 117
Policy & expert analysis 286 610
Procedural documents 152 151
News articles Na 793
Total 2,750 2,497
After retrieving these documents, I used an automator script to assign each file a 
unique name according to the kind of document, the date of publication, and the 
keywords  that  appeared  in  the  text  of  the  document.  In  other  words,  a  law 
passed  in  Kyrgyzstan  in  2007  that  contained  the  words  “cult,”  “sect,”  and 
“religious  affairs”  would  be  titled  “KG_Law_2007_cult_sect_religious  affairs.” 
Again, this naming scheme only served to provide each file with a unique name 
that revealed some clues as to the document’s contents. The full publication data 
of each document was preserved in the heading of each document, however, and 
could be accessed once opened.
II. Data Analysis
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For analysis of this dataset, I used MAXQDA, a leading program designed for 
qualitative data analysis in the social sciences. MAXQDA offers a similar feature 
set to NVivo, but offers a number of additional utilities that made it preferable 
when handling  such  a  large  dataset.  After  importing  my data  to  MAXQDA, 
preserving the same folder and file structure that I used when saving the original 
files, I  automatically coded all  files using the same keywords that I  originally 
used to retrieve them from the databases. This involved running lexical searches 
for each keyword separately, and auto-coding every sentence that contained that 
keyword. Due to the intensive computing demands of this task, each keyword 
took about eight hours of processor time to complete, and the entire dataset was 
coded over the course of approximately three months.
This process yielded a total of 95,025 coded segments, and 102,337 total codes. 
Of  these coded segments,  78,482 contain only one code,  while  16,543 contain 
overlapping codes, i.e. contain multiple keywords in the same sentence: 12,020 
segments contain two codes, 2,974 contain three codes, and 1,549 contain four or 
more overlapping codes. The table below breaks down the total count of coded 
segments by document system.
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Table 3: Number of coded segments in dataset by case and document type
 
Document type KG: Toktom 
Database
KZ: Paragraf 
Database
Legislation 19,410 23,359
Court rulings 586 6,174
International agreements & treaties 7645 8174
Policy & expert analysis 3846 18930
Procedural documents 791 1268
News articles Na 12154
Total 32,278 70,059
The most striking feature of this table is the disproportionately greater number of 
codes  in  documents  from  Kazakhstan  as  compared  to  documents  from 
Kyrgyzstan, even if we discount the news sources that Paragraf includes. This 
observation is  especially  true  of  laws,  where  Kazakhstani  legislation contains 
20% more coded segments, despite representing just over a third of the number 
of  documents  that  Kyrgyzstani  legislation  presents.  Court  rulings  and expert 
commentary  from  Kazakhstan  also  contain  nearly  five  times  the  number  of 
coded segments, despite containing only twice the number of documents. 
This variance in number of codes per document can be in part attributed to 
the greater discipline that Nazarbayev’s administration exerts over Kazakhstan’s 
parliament and cadres of government officials. Representatives and officials alike 
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are careful  to  repeat  the language of  Nazarbayev and upper echelon officials 
continually, and refer to key nomenclature and euphemisms when making public 
statements. I observed this discipline first hand when interviewing government 
officials in Almaty and Astana, who were extremely careful to repeat the same 
talking  points,  seemingly  aware  of  how  much  their  position  rested  on  their 
capacity to execute locally the policies that are decided at the upper echelons of 
government.  Kazakhstan’s government also maintains tighter control over the 
media  than  does  Kyrgyzstan’s  and  sponsors  a  wide  network  of  NGOs  that 
reproduce  the  government’s  talking  points  in  the  public  sphere.  All  of  these 
factors lead to greater consistency in the language of public politics, and greater 
repetition of the regime’s key talking points. 
By  contrast,  Kyrgyzstani  government  officials  often  enjoy  a  degree  of 
autonomy  from  the  Presidential  administration,  and  members  of  Parliament 
often  express  outright  antagonism  to  the  politics  of  the  President.  As  David 
Seigal  has  demonstrated in  great  detail,  this  is  in  part  due to  the far  greater 
regional  devolution  of  power  in  Kyrgyzstan  than  in  Kazakhstan.  Although 
Kyrgyzstan  may  not  quite  be  an  “island  of  democracy,”  cronyism  and 
kleptocracy in the country has multiple, competing centers of gravity, leaving far 
more room for debate, disagreement, and input from local government and the 
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courts. As a result, both in legislation and in interviews, sources from Kyrgyzstan 
were far less taken to repeat the sane language and talking points. Table three 
breaks the number of coded segments down by code system.
Table 4: Number of coded segments in dataset by parent code group
 
Parent code group Segments
Religious affairs 5089
Belief/confession 5814
Religious leadership (e.g. priest, imam, muftiate) 6686
Religious entity (e.g. church, mosque, congregation) 6065
Extremism and security 54407
"Non-traditional" religious group (not including the names 
of groups themselves, but terms such as “non-traditional”  
and “destructive sect”)
8058
Islam and islamic groups 11298
Christian denominations 4143
"Eastern" traditions and groups 560
The most striking feature of this table is that just over half of all codes are related 
to religious extremism and security. The term “extremism” occurs nearly 10,000 
times  in  the  dataset,  “terrorism”  occurs  nearly  20,000  times,  and  “security” 
occurs nearly 25,000 times. In terms of coded segments, these three terms alone 
account for 47,099 of the 78,482 segments that contain only one code, and occur 
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in 5,583 of the 16,543 segments that contain overlapping codes. In other words, 
these three terms alone account for 60% of  the coded segments that  occur in 
isolation,  while  they  only  occur  in  one  third  of  the  segments  that  contain 
overlapping  codes.  Just  because  codes  do  not  overlap,  of  course,  does  not 
necessarily mean that they do not occur nearby. With any document,  isolated 
statements on extremism in the abstract may be followed up by more substantial 
comments on whom the state considers extremist. Nevertheless, having explored 
many of these documents first-hand, I can confirm that these numbers speaks to 
officials’ tendency to invoke extremism and security in isolation, often without 
context, corroborating evidence, or even a specific objects of this discourse. 
It  is  easy to understand why the terms extremism, terrorism, and security 
occur so frequently in isolation throughout the dataset. These terms give voice to 
vague  threats  that  legitimate,  even  necessitate  state  power  and  restrictive 
policies. The utility of these terms is not hampered, but rather enhanced by their 
continuous repetition without corroboration or reference to specific groups. For 
the purposes of my research, however, these isolated occurrences of extremism, 
terrorism,  and  security,  offer  less  information  about  the  profile  of  public 
discourses on religious politics than do segments in which these terms co-occur 
with others.  Thus,  by minimizing my attention to isolated occurrences of  the 
110
terms security,  extremism,  and terrorism,  I  was effectively  able  to  reduce the 
number of coded segments I considered in my analysis by half.
Even excluding these terms, however, the dataset still presents a dauntingly 
large quantity  of  coded segments.  Exploring the data  and extracting relevant 
segments  for  the  dissertation  required  a  variety  of  qualitative  analysis 
techniques. I primarily relied on four approaches to data analysis that allowed 
me to find and extract relevant coded segments and their contexts. 
First while developing my theoretical framework and before beginning my 
empirical  chapters,  I  focused  on  densely-coded  documents,  especially  those 
containing more than one hundred coded segments.  More than one hundred 
documents in the dataset contain more than one hundred coded segments, some 
of them more than five hundred. These documents include key laws that lay out 
the  legal  basis  for  state  regulation  of  religion,  rulings  on  cases  in  which  the 
plaintiff or defendant was a “non-traditional” religious organization or an official 
at  such  an  organization,  commentary  on  religious  politics,  or  other  highly 
substantive documents for the dissertation.
Second,  I  browsed  the  dataset  manually  by  calling  up  coded  segments 
according  to  document  and  code  variables.  Like  NVivo,  MAXQDA  allows 
researchers  to  activate  any  combination  of  document  sets  and  code  sets, 
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displaying only relevant coded segments in the code browser. In other words, if I 
wanted to look for Kyrgyz laws on “destructive sects” that were passed only 
since the most recent constitutional referendum, I could activate only the code 
“destructive” and only documents for legislation since 2010. The coded segment 
browser would then display all coded segments that matched these criteria and 
arrange them chronologically and by position within their respective documents. 
By clicking on any segment as I browsed, I could bring up the segment in its 
containing document. This approach helped me to focus my initial explorations 
of the data on specific issues, and allowed me to extract relevant segments for 
incorporation into my empirical chapters.
Third, I made extensive use of MAXQDA’s code relations browser to explore 
the  intersections  of  codes.  MAXQDA allows  users  to  produce  matrices  that 
display  the  number  of  overlapping  segments  between  any  two  codes.  These 
matrices display the selected codes along the x and y axis, and show the number 
of overlapping segments where each row and column meet. By clicking on any 
cell, the user can bring up all of the relevant segments where the codes overlap in 
the  code browser.  Once  again,  the  scope of  these  matrices  can be  limited by 
activating  only  a  limited  set  of  documents  and  codes,  and  clicking  on  any 
segment  in  the  code  browser  will  bring  up  the  segment  in  its  containing 
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document.  The code relations browser  provided both a  useful  visual  tool  for 
seeing which codes tended to overlap,  e.g.  the relative frequency with which 
terms such as “extremism” or “destructive” are invoked in relation to Islamic 
groups as opposed to Christian groups. It also provided an invaluable means to 
immediately access the coded segments that lay at the intersection of these codes, 
allowing for very targeted browsing and extraction of my data.
Finally,  I  used  complex  coding  queries  to  access  segments  that  contained 
three or more overlapping codes. Using the query function, MAXQDA allows 
researchers to retrieve segments that match a a precise set of criteria. Based on 
the code intersections that I observed in the code relations browser, I focused my 
queries on the intersections of certain codes, and reduced the number of results 
by increasing the number of overlapping codes per segment. For example, these 
queries allowed me to limit the results in the code browser to segments in which 
multiple  key  terms  occurred  simultaneously,  such  as  a  more  substantial 
discussion of which religious groups Kazakhstan’s Agency for Religious Affairs 
considers destructive. This approach proved particularly useful when searching 
for segments to include in my empirical chapters, as it allowed me to narrow the 
scope of each search to the codes and documents that were particularly relevant 
for each chapter, and to limit the results further to highly substantial segments 
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where multiple codes occurred in conjunction.
These four qualitative analysis methods allowed me to sift through the nearly 
100,000 coded segments in my dataset and arrive at several thousand segments 
that most substantively depict religious politics and regulation in my two cases. 
These segments form the empirical base of my dissertation, and the bulk of the 
data that I cite in my empirical chapters. But they are nevertheless supplemented 
by  the  data  I  collected  through  interviews  and  direct  observations  of  court 
proceedings and other government activities.
III. Additional Fieldwork
I conducted 36 semi-structured interviews over the course of a second round of 
data collection in the summer of 2014. These interviews involved government 
officials,  leaders  and  members  of  religious  groups,  and  experts  on  religious 
policy from local universities and NGOs. In these interviews, I sought to elicit 
my respondents’ personal experiences and interpretations of religious policy and 
the religious situation in the country. Having a wealth of information on formal 
policy through my primary dataset, I focused these interviews on observations 
and  commentary  that  would  elucidate  how  these  policies  are  executed  in 
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practice. 
While  some  government  officials  deflected  and  deferred  to  government 
talking points, most of my respondents were quite forthcoming, particularly if I 
indicated  sympathy  with  their  position.  Most  heterodox  religious  leaders 
assumed  at  the  outset  of  our  interview  that  I,  as  a  Western  scholar,  was 
sympathetic to their position, and were ready to share their experiences so long 
as  I  guaranteed their  anonymity.  Orthodox religious  leaders  and government 
officials, in contrast, often assumed that I would be critical of the government 
and  religious  establishment,  but  eagerly  shared  their  perspective  when  I 
indicated  openness  to  their  position.  I  enjoyed  very  candid  responses  to  my 
questions from representatives of the SCRA, Kyrgyzstan’s state security services, 
pro-government scholars, and even the head of the Kazakhstan NGO Information 
Center for Religious Questions, which maintains a network of “treatment centers” 
to help those who “suffered” from the activities of destructive cults.
I  made  great  efforts  to  comply  with  the  wishes  of  my  respondents  for 
anonymity  and  confidentiality.  I  presented  each  of  my  respondents  with  an 
informed  consent  form  in  Russian,  but  then  invariably  chose  verbal  consent 
rather than written consent, as they were unnerved by the prospect of personally 
signing off on the contents of the interview. Although respondents appreciated 
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being informed of their rights and being provided with a copy of the informed 
consent form, they generally wished for greater anonymity, some even opting for 
written interviews only and asking that I not record their voices. While in the 
field,  I  stored  all  audio  files  and  interview  transcripts  not  on  my  computer 
directly,  but  rather  on  encrypted  hard  drives,  and  only  later  transcribed  the 
interviews for  importation  into  MAXQDA for  qualitative  analysis.  I  assigned 
monikers  to  all  representatives  of  heterodox  religious  groups  and  other 
respondents who shared confidential  information with me,  but I  use the true 
names of government and other public officials who simply elaborated on the 
same positions that they articulate in public regularly. 
 Finally, I directly observed religious policy in practice in Kyrgyzstan, where 
my contacts in the State Commission for Religious Affairs (as well as the overall 
greater transparency of Kyrgyzstan’s government) afforded me greater access to 
state institutions. I attended four court cases in which the State Commission for 
Religious  Affairs  either  sought  to  deny  registration  to  a  heterodox  religious 
group, or defended its decisions to deny registration. The first case was between 
the  administration  of  Batken  Province  in  the  South  of  Kyrgyzstan  and  a 
congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses that had been denied the right to register 
and practice in the province. The Jehovah’s Witnesses were the plaintiffs in the 
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case,  and  representatives  of  the  SCRA  testified  in  support  of  the  Batken 
government’s position. The court ultimately upheld the government’s position. 
The  second  case  was  between  the  government  of  Chui  Province,  which 
contains the capital city of Bishkek, and the Church of Scientology. In this case, 
the government was the plaintiff, and sought to close down scientology centers 
operating in the province. The case was repeatedly adjourned to allow both sides 
to submit new documents to the judge, and no decision was reached during my 
year of fieldwork. The third case involved the Unification Church of Sun Myung 
Moon, popularly known in the U.S. as the Moonies, which contested the SCRA’s 
decision to deny them registration as a religious organization in Kyrgyzstan. The 
hearing was held in Kyrgyzstan’s highest court, the Constitutional Court, and 
while the panel of judges was highly critical of the SCRA’s authority in the case, 
they ultimately upheld the government’s policy.
The final  case involved a group that  sought to register  Tengrianism as an 
official religious organization. The group had been denied registration repeatedly 
by  the  SCRA,  and  appealed  to  the  regional  court  in  Chui  to  overrule  this 
decision. This case too was repeatedly adjourned for the panel of three judges to 
consider new documents and evidence from both sides, but also led to incredibly 
heated debates in the halls  of  the Pervomajskij  Regional  Court.  Although the 
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court never reached a decision during my year of fieldwork, the case did become 
so hostile that the SCRA official who was representing the government’s position 
eventually resigned after receiving multiple threats to his safety from members of 
the Tengrians and some of their nationalist Allies who saw the government as 
standing in the way of national solidarity and patriotism.
In addition to these court cases, I attended a training conducted by the SCRA 
with officials from the Chui regional governance, at which SCRA officials and 
other experts informed these state officials of the religious “threats” facing their 
populations.  The  training  involved  roughly  one  hundred  officials  from  all 
branches of the regional government and the security services,  and sought to 
coordinate law-enforcement efforts in the sphere of religion. I similarly attended 
two conferences organized by local  universities to discuss similar concerns of 
religious extremism. Although not focused on law-enforcement methods to the 
same degree, these conferences included a combination of government officials 
and  scholars,  all  of  whom  contributed  to  the  discourses  on  extremism  and 
security that legitimate state policy in the religious sphere. 
Finally,  I  attended the  2012  Kurultai  in  Bishkek,  at  which the  Muftiate  of 
Kyrgyzstan  elected  its  head  Mufti.  As  opposed  to  Kurultai  summits  in 
Kazakhstan, which are largely scripted and produce outcomes that are favorable 
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to the government, the Kurultai in Kyrgyzstan is generally independent, highly 
animated,  and  features  legitimate  contestation  between  competing  factions. 
While officials of the SCRA attended the 2012 Kurultai in Bishkek, facilitating my 
own access  to  the  event,  their  presence  and support  of  a  more  conventional 
candidate likely contributed to the victory of a candidate whose base of support 
lay in the Tablighi Jamaat missionary movement, banned in other states of the 
region and embattled even in Kyrgyzstan right up until that moment. Since the 
2012 Kurultai, Tablighi Jamaat has become far more mainstream in Kyrgyzstan, 
and its networks have deeply penetrated the Muftiate structure.
Conclusion
All of these methods in conjunction provided extensive and multi-layered data 
on religious policy and politics in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Furthermore, the 
combinations of sources allowed me to gain strong data on both of my national 
cases. While I had fewer contacts and spent less time conducting interviews in 
Kazakhstan as opposed to Kyrgyzstan, my primary data set returned far more 
coded  segment  for  Kazakhstani  documents  as  opposed  to  Kyrgyzstani 
documents. This circumstance results in my having far more familiarity with the 
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practice of religious policy in Kyrgyzstan, and the formalities of religious policy 
in  Kazakhstan.  Given  the  more  authoritarian  nature  of  Nazarbayev’s 
administration,  however,  the  practice  is  far  closer  to  the  formal  language  of 
policy in Kazakhstan than in Kyrgyzstan.
One final note concerns the use of this data for theory-building vs. theory-
testing. The methodology I employ in this dissertation is not primarily focused 
on theory testing, in that it is not my intention to show that my empirical puzzles 
can only be answered using the analysis I present herein. As I have stated, many 
nuanced  case  studies  have  provided  in-depth  discussions  of  religious  and 
populist politics in Central Asia, as well as of authoritarian and identity politics 
in  other  cases  across  the  globe  and  in  many  different  periods.  This  model 
presented herein in no way is meant to detract from the contributions of this 
existing body of work, but rather to supplement it. Thus, the goal of my data 
analysis is not to engage in testing my theory against alternative explanations or 
counter-factual cases.  Rather,  I  seek to build a theory that can bridge the gap 
between the careful exploration of populist appeals in these case studies, and the 
prevailing instrumentalist perspective in political theory. 
  As a result,  the analysis  presented in this  dissertation may be accused of 
using  data  in  an  uneven  manner,  focusing  only  on  the  statements  that 
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corroborate my argument. Indeed, given the scope of my dataset, consisting of 
thousands  of  documents  and  over  100,000  coded  segments,  it  would  be 
impossible  even  in  a  full  dissertation  to  explore  every  contour  of  the  public 
discussion of religious and national tradition in both of my cases. Returning to 
the point with which I began this chapter, the goal of a relational analysis is not 
to examine religious doctrines or “lived“ religious practices (Ammerman 2006; 
McGuire 2008). Rather, the purpose is to show how competing religious claims 
correspond to orthodox and heterodox positions in the religious field, and how 
these positions themselves reflect uneven relations of power in public life. 
Thus, by focusing on statements that either serve to monopolize authority or 
to contest an existing monopoly, I do not focus only on data that corroborates my 
analysis to the exclusion of other data. Rather, I focus on the major contenting 
positions in this struggle over authority, acknowledging the existence of other 
actors, practices, and attitudes that have less bearing on this struggle. The merits 
of  the  relational  analysis  I  provide rest  on the  cohesion of  the  orthodox and 
heterodox positions revealed by the data. With that final note on the use of my 
data, I now turn to the empirical discussion.
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CHAPTER 4
Religious Policy and the Sacrosanct Popular Will
We must not allow our true religion, to which our ancestors held, 
be divided by divergent tendencies that would knock us off our path.
Nursultan Nazarbayev
President of Kazakhstan
In 2011, scholars, experts, and religious and state officials from across the post-
Soviet space gathered in Moscow for a conference titled “Revival of Traditional 
Islam  -  The  Best  Alternative  to  Religious  Extremism.”  Like  many  such 
gatherings, this conference represented an effort to coordinate regional strategies 
in developing and enforcing religious policy across the successor states to the 
Soviet  Union,  in  this  case  among  states  that  contain  significant  Muslim 
populations. The conference focused on achieving consensus on what constituted 
“traditional Islam” in the region, how it differed from “extremism,” and how the 
authorities might design and implement policies to defend the former from the 
latter.
The conference proceedings point to several “successful examples” that might 
serve as models for other states to follow, including the brutal regime of Islam 
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Karimov,  the  warlord  to  whom  Vladimir  Putin  gave  the  task  of  subduing 
Chechen separatists: 
Successful  examples of  the use of  traditional  Islam in the fight against 
extremism  in  the  territory  of  the  CIS,  including  in  Russian  Northern 
Caucasus, namely in the Chechen Republic, where the leadership, in the 
person of Ramzan Kadyrov, applied the powerful mobilizing potential of 
traditional Sufi Islam for the region, allowing the government to virtually 
nullify Muslim radicalism and drive out alien extremist movements from 
the territory of the republic, in spite of some costs.1
This  precise  passage from the  conference  “resolution” was  quoted in  a  news 
article by Kazakh political scientist Eldar Zhumagaziev, who was in attendance. 
He implored the government of Kazakhstan to modify the law “On Religious 
Freedom” to follow the “more efficient” work of state structures in Russia and 
Turkey.  “In  the  era  of  globalization,  which is  an  inevitable  process,  we must 
actively defend our point of view, our policy in the field of religion if we want to 
preserve our identity. Religion is already beginning to interfere in the affairs of 
the state, and the state can hardly sit on the sidelines.”
Such  conferences  contribute  to  a  concerted,  coordinated  effort  by  regimes 
throughout  the  post-Soviet  space  to  depict  religious  pluralism  as  a  threat  to 
sovereignty and security. Across the post-Soviet space, freedom of conscience is 
1 Sokolov, Andrey. 2011. “Religion should unite and not disconnect the society - Atyrau political 
scientist Eldar Zhumagaziev.” Inform KZ, August 16. Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://inform.kz:
8080/arb/article/2398772).
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being  redefined  as  freedom  from  the  influence  of  “non-traditional  religions,” 
“extremist movements,” and “destructive sects.” As the resolution above attests, 
state  and  religious  officials  alike  actively  promote  “traditional”  religion  as  a 
primary defense against the vague threat of pluralism.
In line with these efforts, the administrations of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
have  drawn  increasingly  rigid  distinctions  between  “traditional”  and  “non-
traditional”  or  “destructive”  religious  groups,  and  dramatically  curtailed  the 
freedom of  the  latter  to  practice  and  proselytize  their  faith.  Kyrgyzstani  law 
speaks of a need to,
…focus the state policy in the field of  religion on countering extremist 
manifestations in this sphere, to ensure effective protection of the secular 
nature of the state enshrined in the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, 
to strengthen interaction with traditional religions in the exercise of the 
citizens' right to freedom of religion.2
In  Kazakhstan,  meanwhile,  religious  experts  advocated  for  passing  a  more 
restrictive law on religion with arguments that, “it is necessary for Kazakhstan 
first  of  all  to  ensure  the  rights  of  citizens,  to  preserve  the  interethnic  and 
interfaith peace, and not to allow deep faults that can split our society.”3
2 Anonymous. 2012. “National security of the Kyrgyz Republic.” Policy Brief approved by Decree 
of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic on June 9, 2012 N 120. Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://
www.vesti.kg/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=13270&Itemid=117).
3  Kusainov,  Dias.  Date  unlisted.  “Dogmatism  and  Religious  Radicalism  Were  Alien  to  the 
Inhabitants  of  the  Great  Steppe,  Receptive  to  New  Ideas  and  Open  to  Free  Intellectual 
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Though this shift toward authoritarianism has surprised few observers of the 
region, scholars have struggled to explain the rationale behind policies that target 
marginal and benign religious groups such as the Jehovah’s witnesses and the 
Islamic missionary movement Tablighi Jamaat. The regimes even chase largely 
illusory “threats,” such as the dissident Chinese movement Falun Gong, which 
has almost no presence in the region, but which the states still list as a banned 
organization in a nod to the religious policy of neighboring China, which wields 
increasing influence in the region. 
Even working from the assumption that authoritarian regimes primarily act 
to reproduce their power, scholars and religious leaders in the region have been 
hard  pressed  to  explain  how  monitoring  and  restricting  “non-traditional” 
religious groups helps to achieve this goal. Despite the regimes’ invocations of 
security threats, none of the groups labelled “destructive” represent an imminent 
threat to the state or citizenry. And while it might be tempting to attribute these 
policies  to  banal  identity  politics,  their  intent  and  outcomes  defy  such 
explanations. 
Rather  than  defend  local  religious  groups  against  foreign  incursions,  the 
Communication.”  Zakon.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?
doc_id=31051649#pos=1;-145).
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religious policy of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan often do the opposite. In addition 
to targeting global religious groups such as Baptists and Ahmadi Muslims (who 
themselves have a decades-long history of peaceful coexistence in the region), the 
regimes have harassed local imams and proponents of truly local faith traditions 
such as Tengrianism — the animistic beliefs native to the Kyrgyz and Kazakh 
peoples before Islam penetrated the region in the 8th century CE. At the same 
time,  the  regimes  recognize  and  tacitly  support  a  public  role  for  Orthodox 
Christianity and brands of Sunni Islam that represent a genuine intervention by 
outside powers. Russia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia all finance religious groups in 
the  region  as  a  form  of  soft  power,  and  even  work  to  create  religious 
environments amenable to that soft power, as the conference proceedings cited 
above demonstrate. [Here a 1-2 sentence example of how they donate to mosque 
construction].  These  religious  organizations  and  the  states  that  back  them 
arguably  represent  a  far  greater  foreign intervention into  public  life  than the 
grassroots missionary activity of marginal Protestant denominations or dissident 
imams. 
I. Spiritual Sovereignty
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Reviewing the puzzle and arguments that guide this dissertation, I once again 
ask:  Why  do  illiberal  democracies  restrict  marginal  and  seemingly  benign 
religious groups? Why in particular has Kyrgyzstan enacted such similar policies 
to  its  more  authoritarian  neighbors  such  as  Kazakhstan,  despite  its  less 
consolidated regime and reputation as “an island of democracy in Central Asia?” 
Finally, given the discrepancies between the official discourse on tradition and 
the historical record in the region, what rationale governs the distinction between 
“traditional” and “non-traditional” religious groups?
To answer these questions, I suggest in this dissertation that we first turn to 
the concept of authoritarianism itself. I propose to treat authoritarianism not as a 
system of rule “in which political authority is concentrated in the hands of the 
few” (Cooley  2016),  but  rather  as  a  distinct  claim to  authority  — a  claim to 
represent  an  essential  popular  will  that  must  be  “defended”  from pluralism. 
From populist  upstarts  to  entrenched dictators,  authoritarian figures  claim to 
speak for a sacrosanct popular will that transcends social differences and stands 
above mundane politics.  Such leaders  claim privileged authority  to  enact  the 
“true” will of the people (or, perhaps, the will of the “true” people), whether they 
ground that sacrosanct will in ethnic identity, national tradition, religious belief, 
or  even  “class  consciousness.”  Furthermore,  illiberal  regimes  circumvent 
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democratic  constraints  by  denigrating  mundane  political  deliberation  as 
something  frivolous  and  petty  in  comparison  to  this  sacrosanct  will,  and  by 
condemning  dissent  as  a  form  of  false  consciousness  that  leads  constituents 
astray from their essential values and interests. 
In short,  authoritarian regimes consecrate a narrow effigy of “the people,” 
and claim a  privileged  mandate  to  defend this  sacrosanct  will  from external 
threats  and  internal  dissidence.  I  argue,  therefore,  that  illiberal  democracies 
restrict marginal and apolitical religious groups because even seemingly benign 
forms of heterodoxy challenge authoritarian claims to represent an essential and 
sacrosanct  popular will.  To develop this  model,  I  draw from Bourdieu’s  later 
work on public politics, in which he treats representation as a form of “ministry” 
whereby public  figures  articulate  a  unified will  that  substitutes  for  the many 
particular wills of their constituents. In other words, regimes, parties and other 
political establishments “speak for people who would not speak if someone did 
not speak for them” (Bourdieu 2004:42-3). Bourdieu sought to show how political 
figures dispossess their own constituents of their voices in democratic societies, 
but his theory is all the more relevant in the case of authoritarian polities.
This approach helps to explain why the discourse on religious “tradition” in 
post-Soviet  Central  Asia  differs  so  sharply  from  the  historical  record.  The 
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distinction  between orthodoxy and heterodoxy derives  its  logic  not  from the 
actual  vintage  of  a  religious  tradition,  but  simply  from  a  regime’s  efforts  to 
reproduce its authority to speak for the people. To the regimes of Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, it matters not whether a religious group or organization is local or 
foreign, old or new, but simply whether that entity works in symbiosis with the 
establishment to reproduce the official effigy of “the people.” I argue, therefore, 
that  the  regimes  of  Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan  label  as  “traditional”  those 
religious organizations that they perceive as contributing to their own authority 
to  speak  for  the  popular  will.  In  contrast,  the  regimes  condemn  as  “non-
traditional” and “destructive” all religious groups that are seen as challenging 
their authority, either by giving voice to dissident attitudes among the public, or 
simply  by  maintaining  autonomy  from  the  regime’s  vertical  structures  of 
ordination.
Those  familiar  with  Central  Asia  may  object  to  my  usage  of  the  term 
“authoritarian”  in  reference  to  Kyrgyzstan,  whose  government  is  generally 
regarded as  more “liberal”  than its  neighbors.  (Some may even object  to  my 
calling  Kazakhstan  authoritarian,  given  the  popularity  that  President 
Nazarbayev  enjoys.)  But  by  treating  authoritarianism  as  a  distinct  claim  to 
authority,  rather  than as  a  series  of  institutions and practices  of  rule,  we can 
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navigate the distinction between illiberal  democracy and authoritarian regime 
more easily. All illiberal regimes seek to control who has authority to speak for 
the people — both within the state and beyond — but different regimes succeed 
in monopolizing this authority to varying degrees. 
I demonstrate in this chapter, therefore, that illiberal regimes seek to control 
public  life  by establishing a system of  “ordination” that  reserves positions of 
authority  for  individuals  who have  demonstrated their  loyalty  to  established 
elites.  Bourdieu called such control the power of nomination,  i.e.  the power to 
name people  to  positions  of  power.  To  the  degree  that  a  regime succeeds  in 
consolidating power, therefore, it restricts all forms of public authority to people 
who have demonstrated their loyalty to and utility for established elites.
The degree to which this power is consolidated varies significantly between 
my two national cases. President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan has far surpassed 
any ruling party or cohort in Kyrgyzstan in consolidating such a system of rule 
and ordination beneath him, in a large part due to the greater energy wealth 
Kazakhstan affords to the state. Kyrgyzstan is considered the most liberal and 
democratic  country  in  Central  Asia  largely  because  of  the  highly  fragmented 
politics  that  divides  elite  cadres.  Local  politicians  have  significantly  greater 
power in relation to the central government in Kyrgyzstan than in Kazakhstan, 
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and they continuously mobilize protest against the central government (Siegel 
2016,  Jones  Luong,  Radnitz).  By  comparing  the  policies  of  Kazakhstan  and 
Kyrgyzstan,  therefore,  I  will  demonstrate  that  consolidated  autocracies  differ 
from illiberal democracies not primarily in the quality of their claims to authority, 
but rather in the degree to which they have consolidated their authority through 
this hierarchical power of ordination.
Propagating a Sacrosanct Will
Official discourses on nationhood in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan intimately link 
sovereignty and religion. Officials in both states credit religious traditions in “the 
formation  of  [national]  psychology,  culture,  and  statehood,”4  and  religious 
leaders in turn support the ruling elite in professing the sanctity of sovereign 
nationhood.  This  reciprocity  is  complicated  by  the  multi-ethnic,  and  multi-
confessional  populations  of  Kyrgyzstan  and  Kazakhstan.  Though  the  titular 
ethnicity of each state constitutes the majority of the population, the significant 
Russian minority commands outsize deference and influence due to the legacy of 
Soviet rule and to Russia’s continued engagement in the region.
4 Satybekov, Erlan. 2007. “Interview with the Director of the State Agency for Religious Affairs, 
Toigonbek  Z.  Kalmatov”  Vecherniy  Bishkek,  N  191  (9363),  October  5.  Retrieved  (http://
members.vb.kg/2007/10/05/linia/1_print.html).
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Orthodoxy  itself  is  multi-confessional  in  Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan. 
Kazakhstan’s law On Religious Activities and Religious Associations, for example, 
“recognizes  the  historical  role  of  Islam  of  the  Hanafi  school,  and  Orthodox 
Christianity in the development of culture and spiritual life of the people.”5 State 
officials  note  that  “our  two  traditional  confessions  -  Islam  and  Orthodoxy  - 
despite  their  dogmatic  differences,  are  united  through  their  socio-political 
similarities, particularly in their relation to the institution of the state.”6 A memo 
from Kyrgyzstan’s State Agency for religious affairs makes the same point more 
artfully, noting that: 
Islam and Orthodox Christianity from time immemorial  are considered 
traditional  religions [in  the region],  and the sound of  azan [the call  to 
prayer] is as familiar to the population as the bells [of the church] ringing. 
Both religions train their flock with such qualities as: honesty, diligence, 
charity,  striving for peace,  serving the common good, which are also a 
civic duty.7
As  the  quote  above  attests,  this  putative  symbiosis  between  Islam  and 
Russian  Orthodoxy  does  not  merely  reflect  current  realities,  however,  but 
5 Dairova, Oksana. 2013. “Based on Traditions and Customs.” Zakon, February 28. Retrieved May 
9, 2017 (https://www.zakon.kz/4544112-osnovyvajas-na-tradicijakh-i-obychajakh.html).
6 Shlymova, Galina. 2013 “After the Adoption of the New Law on Religion, the Country Managed 
to  Form  a  New  Legal  Framework  Governing  the  Confessional  Relations.”  Zakon,  May  24. 
Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (https://www.zakon.kz/4544112-osnovyvajas-na-tradicijakh-i-
obychajakh.html).
7 Osmonaliev, Kanybek. Date Unlisted. “Those with Ears Shall Hear.” MSN,  Retrieved May 9, 
2017 (http://msn.kg/showwin.php?type=newsportal&id=23194).
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extends  back  to  the  very  origins  of  the  contemporary  nations.  State-aligned 
scholars and experts note that, “spiritual consent is necessary, first of all, between 
Islam and Christianity, which represent the creeds of the two super-ethnoses of 
the Eurasian continent: Turkic and Slavic.”8 In the rhetoric of the regime, “these 
traditions can be considered primordially ours… since they have a centuries-old 
history  on  ancient  Kazakh  land,  where  Buddhism,  Islam,  Christianity, 
Tengrianism, Zoroastrianism happily coexisted.”9 
Islam receives particular attention in these discourses, given its significance to 
the  claims  of  the  Kyrgyz  and Kazakh peoples  to  nationhood.  Calling  on  the 
administration to “save spiritual sovereignty,” one Kazakh expert argues that:
For Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the traditional form of Islam is Sunnism 
of the Hanafi mazkhab [school]… as well as the "Turkic" Sufism with its 
tradition of aulie (saints), originating from the sacred relation of the steppe 
people [i.e. nomads] to their ancestors.10 
Top state officials in the sphere of religion similarly assert that national character 
is  “inseparably  linked  with  the  Sunni  Islam  of  the  Hanafi  madhhab,  which 
8  Artem’eva,  Victoria.  2013.  “Victoria”  is  a  Pathway  to  Human  Spirituality  and  Morality.” 
Kazislam,  December  10.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (http://kazislam.kz/ru/dini-radikalizm-
qauipteri/item/849-eislam).
9 Argynov, Bek. Date Unlisted. “Tell Me Who Your Pastor is, and I'll Tell You Who You Are.” Liter. 
Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31056593#pos=1;-145).
10 Smagulov, Amanzhol. 2011. “To Save Spiritual Sovereignty.”Liter, September 14. Retrieved May 
9, 2017 (http://abai.kz/post/10492).
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determined the originality of the Kazakh people and its value orientations.”11 
This melding of religious belief and local custom has even been compared to “a 
kind  of  ‘social  contract’  among  the  members  of  the  Muslim  Ummah  of 
Kazakhstan,”12 Ummah in this case serving to indicate the entire ethnic Kazakh 
population.
Nevertheless,  in an effort  to avoid disparaging Moscow, state officials and 
state-aligned experts are careful to note the ecclesiastic jurisdiction that Orthodox 
Christianity holds over their Russian citizens. In the rhetoric of the regime, social 
order  hinges  on accord and dialogue between Orthodox Christianity  and the 
state-endorsed  brand  of  Hanafi  Islam,  whose  “peaceful  coexistence  is  the 
guarantor of the stability of our social and spiritual life.”13
State officials and establishment scholars even assert that there is a stronger 
affinity between Orthodox Christianity and the uniquely “Eurasian” Islam of the 
post-Soviet  space  than  that  between  Orthodoxy  and  other  branches  of 
11  Baigarin,  Meirambek.  2011.  “Kairat  Lama Sharif:  Kazakh People Can Save their  Unity and 
Peace  Only  by  Following the  Traditional  Religion  of  their  Ancestors.”  Kazinform,  August  10. 
Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (http://www.inform.kz/kz/kazahskiy-narod-mozhet-sohranit-svoyu-
splochennost-soglasie-i-edinstvo-tol-ko-sleduya-obychayam-i-tradicionnoy-religii-svoih-
predkov-kayrat-lama-sharif_a2397785).
12  Amrebaev,  Aidar.  2012.“An Active  Spiritual  Dialogue  is  Being  Conducted in  Kazakhstan.” 
Zakon, June 8. Retrieved May 9, 2017 (https://www.zakon.kz/4495565-v-kazakhstane-vedetsja-
aktivnyjj.html).
13 Republic of Kazakhstan: Religious Affairs and Religious Associations, Public Law of 2011. 253-
III ЗРК (2008).
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Christianity, or between Central Asian Islam and global Islam. It should be noted 
here, that not only the so-called “Eurasianists,” but Vladimir Putin himself stated 
that “for Orthodox, Muslims are closer than Catholics.”14 Similarly, officials in 
Kazakhstan cited a leading state attorney in Moscow when deflecting criticism of 
religious intolerance:
The mentality of  Muslims in this  aspect  is  perhaps much closer  to the 
mentality of the Russian Orthodox than to the mentality of the Protestant 
and  even  Catholic  countries.  Therefore,  it  seems  that  in  this  situation, 
rather than criticize the people [for intolerance toward “non-traditional” 
religions],  it  is  more  useful  to  give  them  such  laws  that  fit  into  the 
"Procrustean bed" of the people's world outlook.15
As I address in the next section, the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
have played an active role in mitigating potential tensions between these two 
orthodox faiths, primarily by supporting the established leadership structure of 
each religion in its claims to represent the ethnically-defined faith communities in 
the state’s jurisdiction. Both states support the Russian Orthodox Church’s claims 
to represent the essential religious values of ethnic Russians living in the region, 
and similarly promote the authority of the Muftiate of each country to speak for 
all “Muslim” peoples in their jurisdiction, which is expressly described in terms 
14 Putin, Vladimir. 2010. “Orthodox Christianity is Closer to Islam than Catholicism.” Retrieved 
May 9, 2017 (https://vk.com/video-4121067_456245751).
15  Kupriyanov,  A.  Date  Unlisted.  “Church Law and its  Reception into  Russian Lawmaking.” 
Duralex. Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://www.duralex.org/tserkovnoe-pravo-i-ego-retseptsiya-v-
rossiyskoe-zakonotvorchestvo/).
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of  citizens’  ethnic  identity  as  opposed  to  their  actual  religious  affiliations  or 
practices.
Instituting an Exclusive Mandate to Represent the Sacrosanct Popular Will
This discourse on traditional religions draws directly on the Soviet-era institution 
of  passport  identity,  which  to  this  day  classifies  all  citizens  into  mutually 
exclusive ethno-national categories at birth in many post-Soviet countries. Under 
the Soviet system, passport nationality assigned the individual irrevocably to a 
particular ethnic category, many of which were linked to a national homeland 
within the federated structure of the Soviet state (Brubaker 1997). This institution 
was so crucial within the vastly multiethnic Soviet state, because it allowed the 
many local branches of the Communist Party to claim a popular mandate from 
their presumed ethno-national constituencies (Martin 2001).
With the end of  Soviet  atheism, religious hierarchies  have reasserted their 
power in mainstream politics and joined party hierarchies in the enterprise of 
appropriating the popular will. By incorporating religion into the discourse on 
national  origins  and consciousness,  state  and religious  authorities  shuffle  the 
various peoples of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan into mutually-exclusive national-
religious  categories,  for  which  they  claim an exclusive  right  to  speak.  Public 
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officials  speak directly to the fact  that  demographic “niches” are reserved for 
traditional  religions  and  that  these  jurisdictions  are  central  to  their  vision  of 
religious accord:
As a result  of  the centuries-old coexistence of  Islam and Orthodoxy in 
Kazakhstan, a certain religious balance of interests and religious balance 
has  formed,  within  which  each  of  the  two  religions  formed  a  niche, 
establishing interfaith dialogue and channels of social interaction.16
Even on the level  of  official  statistics,  both the state  and religious authorities 
automatically assign religious denomination according to ethnicity. Thus, it is not 
uncommon  to  find  statements  that,  “According  to  the  latest  census,  70%  of 
Kazakhstanis profess Islam, 26% - Christianity, 0.09% - Buddhism and 0.03% - 
Judaism.”17  Critics  have  argued that  such  classifications  leave  little  space  for 
substantive secularism, as virtually all citizens are assigned a religious affiliation 
irrespective of their beliefs or practices. The regimes have countered, however, 
that such steps are necessary in order to preserve the secular state, defending 
moderate religious traditions from destructive and extremist religious currents.
The  regime  derives  clear  utility  from  this  close  coupling  of  religion  and 
16 Sharif, Lama. Date unlisted. “The New Law on Religion in Kazakhstan Does Not Violate the 
Equality  of  Religious  Associations.”  Zakon.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (http://online.zakon.kz/
Document/?doc_id=31068523#pos=1;-116).
17  Ivanov,  V.  2010.  “Implementing  Freedom  of  Faith:  20  years  of  Missionary  Movements  in 
Kazakhstan.”  Jurist,  December  12.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (https://journal.zakon.kz/207841-
realizacija-prav-na-svobodu-sovesti-20.html).
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nationhood,  as  well  as  from  the  invocation  of  primordial  origins  for 
contemporary  nations  and  national  consciousness.  Such  essentialism  directly 
serves the regime’s  efforts  to  propagate  an essential  popular  will,  contiguous 
with the contemporary ethnic categories employed by the state.  It  confers on 
state and establishment religious officials the exclusive and sacrosanct authority 
to speak for the will of their presumed constituents. 
With this goal in mind, we can understand the logic and utility of even some 
of the more doctrinally absurd statements made by the regime, such as to the 
effect  that  Orthodox  Christians  (and  by  extension  all  ethnic  Russians)  and 
Central  Asian  Muslims  (Kazakh,  Kyrgyz,  and  minority  communities  such  as 
Uzbeks  and  Uighers)  are  close  in  “mentality.”  Such  rhetoric  establishes  a 
symbiosis between state and religious authorities, who simultaneously propagate 
compatible claims to speak for their overlapping constituencies. Despite religious 
pluralism, the people shares a uniform “mentality,” an essential will that unifies 
them as a nation. Furthermore, this multi-confessional citizenry freely confers a 
unified mandate on the sovereign state by virtue of this essential and sacrosanct 
popular will. Such rhetoric demonstrate unambiguously that religious pluralism 
is tolerable for the political establishment, so long as the leadership structures of 
each religious group contribute to the political establishment’s exclusive claims 
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to speak for the popular will. The leadership structures of “traditional religious 
groups,” i.e. the Muftiate and the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate, each claim a 
mandate to speak for their ethnically-defined faith-groups, but both recognize a 
common “mentality” that unifies their presumed constituencies in civic life, and 
both support the regime’s exclusive authority to speak for this essential will in 
the affairs of the state.
This authority is tantamount to structuring government around the power of 
ordination.  It  lays the groundwork for  cooperation between the state (i.e.  the 
ruling party or cadre that has monopolized much of the state’s power), and the 
hierarchical bodies that govern officially recognized traditional religions. In the 
present  cases,  this  religious  establishment  is  primarily  constituted  by  the 
Muftiate or Muslim Board that governs all officially registered mosques in each 
country, and the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate, which answers both to the state 
as well as to the Moscow Patriarchate. 
These public institutions collectively monopolize the authority to speak for 
the popular will. They create spiritual jurisdictions that divide and encompass 
the entire population of these multiethnic nations, and use that jurisdiction to 
reinforce  the  authority  of  the  state.  The  Muftiate  and  the  Russian  Orthodox 
Church  both  project  essentialized  voices  for  their  presumed constituents  that 
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reinforce  the  popular  mandate  claimed  by  the  regime.  Party,  Church,  and 
Muftiate all reserve the right to confer public authority within their respective 
spheres  onto  chosen  representatives,  and  confer  such  authority  only  on 
individuals  deemed  reliable,  loyal,  useful,  and  interested  in  reproducing  the 
ruling order. As I will show, however, President Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan has 
consolidated this monopoly over the power of ordination to a far greater degree 
than have the successive Presidents of Kyrgyzstan.
II. Traditional Religions and the “Threat” of Pluralism
Any  dissident  religious  and  political  movements  threaten  this  system  of 
ordination.  Irrespective  of  their  character  or  content,  heterodox  ministries 
challenge  the  regime’s  claims  to  speak  for  a  sacrosanct  will  that  defines  the 
essential values and interests of their constituents. Thus, government officials fret 
that there is “an expansion of the influence of non-traditional religious trends,“ 
which may lead to an “intensification of the contradictions between traditional 
and non-traditional  denominations.”18  A government decree on defending the 
18  Golikova,  V.  2011.  “Policy  within  the  Religious  Sphere  of  the  Republic  of  Kazakhstan” 
Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (http://kazislam.kz/ru/dinaralyq-unqatysu/vnutrennie-kategorii/
dinaraly-kelisimni-qazaqstandy-ulgisi/item/2892-politika-respubliki-kazakhstan-v-religioznoj-
sfere).
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freedom of religion in Kazakhstan states that: 
A certain tension in inter-confessional relations is caused by the activation 
of  the  activities  of  non-traditional  religious  associations  aimed  at 
involving citizens of Kazakhstan, especially young people, in their ranks. 
Their social danger lies in the fact that, by proclaiming and realizing their 
goals, they encroach on the freedom of the individual, do not take into 
account the cultural and spiritual traditions that have developed in the 
society, as well as the norms of legislation.19
This decree brings up an issue to which I will return later — treating religious 
pluralism as a threat to citizens’ rights, rather than an expression of the freedom 
of religion. It also demonstrates the threat that the governments of Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan perceive  to  “cultural  and spiritual  traditions” in  the  form of 
heterodox religious groups. The head of Kazakstan’s Agency for Religious Affairs 
asserts in an interview that “the transition of people from traditional confessions 
to non-traditional ones poses a threat to the unity of the nation and the state,”20 
and argues that it is non-traditional religions, rather than the ruling authorities, 
that are rewriting the history of the nation to fit their interests.
According to [Lama Sharif,  head of the SARA],  it  is  already noticeable 
both in Kazakhstan and in some neighboring countries of the region that 
19 Republic of Kazakhstan: Government Decree of approving the Program for Ensuring Freedom 
of Religion and Improving State and Confessional Relations in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 
2007-2009. December 5, 2007 No. 1185.
20 Lama Sharif, Kairat. 2013. “It Is Necessary to Make it So That People Will Not Want to Leave 
the  Largest  Traditional  Confessions.”  Kazinform,  March  19.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (http://
www.inform.kz/ru/nuzhno-sdelat-tak-chtoby-lyudyam-rashotelos-uhodit-iz-krupneyshih-
tradicionnyh-konfessiy-kayrat-lama-sharif_a2543559).
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the supporters of unconventional currents… are engaged in the artificial 
construction and dissemination of alternative versions of  the history of 
countries.”21
Officials  speak  of  these  heterodox  groups  with  great  alarm,  despite  their 
relatively low numbers and marginal  status.  One expert  in Kyrgyzstan noted 
that, “According to the State Agency for Religious Affairs, at present the number 
of Kyrgyz who have chosen non-traditional forms of faith already reached 10-15 
thousand people!”22
Religious heterodoxy raises  two disparate  sets  of  concerns for  the regime, 
which  my  subsequent  chapters  address.  The  first  is  the  threat  to  “spiritual 
sovereignty” that both the states and much of the population of Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan perceive in the conversion of their co-ethnics to “destructive sects,” 
i.e.  small,  congregational  groups.  The  second  concern  is  that  of  Islamic 
radicalization  among  the  nominally  Muslim  majorities  of  these  nations.  The 
leadership of both countries see this latter threat as omnipresent, in part out of a 
genuine  concern with  radicalization,  but  also  as  a  potent  tool  for  addressing 
popular dissent among the titular communities and certain ethnic minorities.
21 Kasymov, Daniyar. 2013. “The Conference on "Freedom of Faith in Kazakhstan” Took Place in 
Astana.”  Zakon,  March  20.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (https://www.zakon.kz/4547516-v-astane-
proshla-konferencija-svoboda.html).
22  Satybekov,  Erlan  and  Bermet  Malikova.  2007.  “The  Government  Official  Closest  to  God.” 
Vecherniy Bishkek, October 5. Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://members.vb.kg/2007/10/05/linia/
1.html).
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A decree  of  Kyrgyzstan’s  government  (on  the  implementation  of  another 
decree  “On  the  religious  situation  in  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  and  the  Task  of 
Authorities to Form a State Policy in the Religious Sphere”) declares that:
A subject of particular concern is Islam and tendencies within the Muslim 
confession of the republic, since more than 80 percent of the population of 
the  republic  traditionally  adheres  to  Islam,  and  Kyrgyzstan  neighbors 
with  states  where  religious  extremism  and  fundamentalist  ideas  are 
widespread. The low level of spiritual education of local Muslim clergy, 
combined with the financial dependence of individual mosques on foreign 
"sponsors and benefactors," creates a fertile ground for the spread of ideas 
of Islamic extremism and fundamentalism.23
Officials  in  Kazakhstan  likewise  assert  that,  “the  Muslim  community  of  the 
country is not consolidated enough: it is undoubtedly dominated by the Sunnism 
of  the  Hanafi  madhhab,  but  there  are  various,  including  radical,  currents."24 
State-aligned imams, meanwhile, warn the population about “the perniciousness 
and danger of unconventional currents, the main goals of which are misting of 
the brain and pumping out of material resources.”25
Experts categorize these threats along numerous lines, but their analyses tend 
23 Kyrgyz Republic: Government Decree “On the Religious Situation in the Kyrgyz Republic and 
the Task of Authorities to Form a State Policy in the Religious Sphere.” January 17, 1997 No. 20.
24 Kosichenko, Anatoliy. 2011. “Feeling of Faith.” Leninksaya Smena, November 17. Retrieved May 
9, 2017 (http://old.express-k.kz/show_article.php?art_id=57015).
25 Musalimova, Gulnara. 2013. “In Aktau, Security Officials Together With Representatives of the 
Mosque Discussed the Problems of Extremism,” Lada, March 12. Retrieved May 9, 2017 (https://
www.lada.kz/aktau_news/society/8508-v-aktau-siloviki-vmeste-s-predstavitelyami-mecheti-
obsudili-problemy-ekstremizma.html).
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to reproduce a single prognosis about heterodox movements within Islam: any 
group that does not present an overt threat to security and stability still hides 
potential threats.
Based on the analysis, the activities of non-traditional Islamic trends can 
be classified into the following types: extreme radicals (the extremist party 
"Hizb at-Tahrir al-Islami"); radicals (jihadists and adherents of "at-Takfir 
val-hijra,”  salafites-orthodoxes…  madhalits,  sururites,  al-banitas);  and 
groups  that  do  not  yet  resort  to  political  actions  but  are  "waiting"  or 
"centrists"  (numerous  Sufi  brotherhoods,  the  Pakistani  missionary 
organization Tablighi Jama'at, etc.).26
In such classifications, the more “radical” groups present a direct threat to the 
state, while the “waiting” groups represent a more indirect threat. Salafi groups, 
for example, are thought to “oppose the secular principles of the state, as well as 
stand against  the  historically  established traditions  of  Sunnism of  the  Hanafi 
madhhab [school],”27 leading experts to conclude that, “If we do not want the 
spread  of  radical  Islam under  the  guise  of  the  Salafis,  then  the  state  should 
openly, actively support the traditional Islam of the Hanafi madhhab.”28
In contrast, authorities see the missionary movement Tablighi Jamaat, which I 
26  Izbairov,  Asylbek.  2011.“Activities  of  non-traditional  Islamist  organizations  and  trends  in 
Kazakhstan.”  Central  Asia,  October  5.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (http://www.centrasia.ru/
news2.php?st=1317759180).
27  Amrebaev,  Aidar.  2011.  "The  Authorities  Have  Gone  on  a  Full  Frontal  Attack,”  Zakon, 
November  14.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (https://www.zakon.kz/4457950-ajjdar-amrebaev-vlast-
poshla-v-lobovuju.html).
28 Tekeeva, Shynar. 2011. “Religion Should Unite and Not Disconnect the Society,” Prikayspiyskaya 
Kommuna, August 7. Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://pricom.kz/?p=5153).
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discuss further in subsequent chapters, as an indirect threat to the state because 
of its grassroots nature. The movement primarily spreads through “davatists” 
who go door-to-door encouraging men to attend prayer and discussion groups at 
the local mosque. Its leaders have not been reticent about their lack of regard for 
the  Muftiate  and establishment  imams,  however,  leading  to  concerns  that  its 
members are “widely circulating in the cities of Kyrgyzstan, [and have] urged 
believers to remove from their posts imams loyal to the authorities, and appoint 
in their place true fighters of Islam.”29 
But Islamic, Protestant, or otherwise, the authorities see the very presence of 
religious  heterodoxy  as  a  sign  of  the  weakness  of  national  traditions  and 
consciousness.  Many  religious  leaders  and  experts  attribute  this  “religious 
illiteracy” to the atheism forced on the region during the Soviet period. Officials 
lament  that  “religious  traditions  were  interrupted in  our  country;  that's  why 
various  unconventional  currents,  not  only  Islamic  ones,  are  so  magnificently 
growing on our "cleansed" religious time.”30 This break in the religious traditions 
leaves the population vulnerable to forms of heterodoxy that “destroy not only 
29 Kyrgyz Republic: Government Decree “On the Religious Situation in the Kyrgyz Republic and 
the Task of Authorities to Form a State Policy in the Religious Sphere.” August 10, 1995 No. 345.
30  Gulnara,  Musalimova.  2013.  “In  Aktau,  Law  Enforcement  and  Mosque  Representatives 
Discussed  Problems  of  Extremism.”  Zakon,  March  12.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (https://
www.zakon.kz/4545922-v-aktau-siloviki-vmeste-s.html).
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the mentality of the Kazakh people, but also the Kazakh mentality, which was 
formed as a result of centuries-old traditions of tolerance and inter-confessional 
tolerance.”31 If Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are to survive as both secular states 
and cultural homelands for their titular nations, they must adjust to this new 
competition from the global religious marketplace:
Our state bodies and power structures need to learn how to work in a 
competitive field, understand the religious space well,  and if  necessary, 
using an extensive scientific and theological apparatus, be able to prove 
the  inconsistency  or  harmfulness  of  certain  beliefs.  It  should  be 
understood that  this  is  not  only  about  Muslim currents,  but  also  non-
traditional Christian sects and churches, some of which are even outlawed 
even in the West.32
Thus, the authorities of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have promoted a policy 
of strengthening traditional religions as one primary answer to the “threat” of 
religious extremism and “destructive sects.” A resolution by the government of 
Kyrgyzstan, for example, states that “the most effective way to confront religious 
extremism and fundamentalism is to strengthen the Muslim faith – to streamline 
and  strengthen  its  structure,  and  coordinate  the  activities  of  the  clergy  and 
31  Turysbekova,  Aigul.  2008  “Religious  Strife  Undermines  State  Foundations.”  Izgilik,  May 9. 
Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://izgilik.blogspot.com/2008/05/1_08.html).
32 Kusainov, Dias. 2011. “Why Salafism Ain’t Our Way?“ Abai, October 14. Retrieved May 9, 2017 
(http://abai.kz/post/10441).
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mosques through local  authorities.”33  A legislative commission in Kazakhstan 
similarly concluded that, 
It is necessary to revise the present tolerant attitude of the state towards 
violations of religious associations; we must take into account the very fact 
of  committing  an  offense,  regardless  of  whether  it  entailed  negative 
consequences… In the fight against extremism, an important role could be 
played by traditional Islam… and therefore there is a need to work out the 
issue of strengthening the role of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims 
of  Kazakhstan,  which  should  become  a  link  between  the  state  and 
religion.34
Such statements  are  predicated on the  idea that  Orthodoxy and “traditional” 
Islam are inherently moderate, and exert a stabilizing influence in society. The 
Russian  Orthodox  bishop  of  Astana,  Kazakhstan’s  capital,  asserted  that 
“Orthodox Christians and Muslims, representatives of traditional confessions in 
the Republic of Kazakhstan, do not tire of calling for peace, harmony, and the 
preservation of moral principles.”35 A priest from the same eparchy warns that 
“if there is no imam or priest teaching the peace-loving traditional religion, there 
33 Kyrgyz Republic: Government Resolution on “The activities of the State Commission Under 
the  Government  Of  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  on  Religious  Affairs  for  the  Development  and 
Implementation of State Policy in the Sphere of Religions.” July 7, 1998 No. 441.
34  Conference Minutes.  2011. The Two-hundred and Fiftieth Meeting of the Interdepartmental 
Commission  on  Legislative  Activity  under  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Kazakhstan. 
August 8, Astana, Kazakhstan.
35 Metropolitan Methodius of Astana and Almaty. 2009. “Crisis Can Be Overcome, if the World 
Turns to Spiritual Traditions that Unite People Around Highest Ideals and the Sacred.” Sermon 
given  on  the  eve  of  the  III  Congress  of  World  and  Traditional  Religions,  June  15.  Astana, 
Kazakhstan.
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is a danger that a virtual mufti or virtual pastor will come to their place and 
teach our teenage children extremism.”36 One expert even invoked Marx when 
discussing  the  positive  aspects  of  traditional  religions  as  an  “opiate  of  the 
masses,”  which “contributes  to  the  consolidation of  religious  cohesion of  the 
population.”37 
Officials and experts argue in particular that the brand of Sunni Islam that 
prevailed  among  Central  Asian  nomads  was  “a  moderate  ideological  trend, 
condemning  religious  radicalism  and  extremism.”38  The  primary  goal  of  the 
state’s  policies  in  relation  to  Islam,  therefore,  is  to  “preserve”  this  ostensible 
history of tolerance as a bulwark against radicalism. To this end, state-aligned 
experts  call  on  the  authorities  to  take  measures  such  as  creating  “a  layer  of 
Muslim intellectuals in Kazakhstan,  combining Islamic and secular education, 
capable  of  equal  discussions  with  religious  extremists  and  winning  in  these 
36 Nurseitova, Torgyn. 2013. “Metropolitan of Astana and Kazakhstan Alexander: There is No 
Need to Protect Schools, Universities, Prisons, Social Institutions From Religion.” ArVedi, June 14. 
Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (http://www.arvedi.kz/main/mitropolit-astanayskiy-i-kazakhstanskiy-
aleksandr-ne-nuzhno-ograzhdat-ot-religii-shkolu-vuzy-tyurmy-.html).
37  Asanbaev, Mukhit.  2008. “Contemporary Religious Situation in Kazakhstan: Risk Factors of 
Religious  Conflict.”Sarap,  September  15.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (http://www.sarap.kz/
index.php/kz/138-sovremennaya-religioznaya-situatsiya-v-kazakhstane-faktory-riska-i-
potentsial-religioznoj-konfliktnosti-chast-1.html?tmpl=component&print=1).
38  Smagulov,  Amanzhol.  2011.  “To  Save  the  Spiritual  Sovereignty.”  Bnews,  September  14. 
Retr ieved  May  9,  2017  (https://bnews.kz/ru/news/obshchestvo/
sohranit_duhovnii_suverenitet).
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discussions.”39  Imams should be  able  to  “explain  in  detail  the  advantages  of 
traditional Islam and the harmful essence of radical Islamic teachings.”40 And 
most  importantly,  this  cadre  of  loyal  Muslim  intellectuals  must  work  “to 
distinguish clearly between the true believers of Kazakhstan, Kazakhs practicing 
the traditional Sunni Islam of the Hanafi Madhab, and those who intend to use 
religion for destructive purposes.”41
Authorities from all spheres of society reiterate this point actively, especially 
in  relation  to  the  youth.  Establishment  imams  encourage  their  followers  “to 
move  from  words  to  actions  in  preaching  Islam  for  the  spiritual  and  moral 
education of the population, especially the youth.”42 The director of the SARA 
advocated for “the introduction of the true [emphasis mine] teachings of Islam in 
the minds of  the Muslim youth of  Kazakhstan.”43  And President Nazarbayev 
39 Nurseitova, Torgyn. 2011. “Political Scientist Timur Kozyrev: Testing with Hijab - A New Test 
for Tolerance?” Islam in SNG,  January 21. Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://www.islamsng.com/
kaz/interviews/995).
40 Baigarin, Meirambek. 2011. “The Calls for “Authentic Islam” Are Inconsistent With National 
Interests of Kazakhstan.” Kazinform, August 16. Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://www.inform.kz/
en/prizyvy-k-chistomu-islamu-protivorechat-nacional-nym-interesam-kazahstana_a2398912).
41 Smailov, Erlan. 2011. The Right Direction: The State Should Keep Control of the Situation in the 
Religious Sphere.”Zona, September 2. Retrieved May 9, 2017 (https://zonakz.net/2011/09/02/
столичные-студенты-могут-занять-мест/).
42  No Author.  2012.  “VKO Discussed Issues of  Interfaith Harmony and Religious Tolerance.” 
Oskemen Info, June 18. Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://oskemen.info/9236-v-vko-obsudili-voprosy-
mezhkonfessionalnogo-soglasiya-i-religioznoy-tolerantnosti.html).
43 Lama Sharif, Kairat. 2012. “In May 2012, Astana Will Host the IV Congress of Leaders of World 
and  Traditional  Religions.”  Caravan,  January  27.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (https://
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asserted that “the servants of mosques [i.e. imams and muftis] should be able to 
work with the population, especially with the youth, in order to correctly explain 
what the various destructive currents are, and what is the traditional direction in 
Islam.”44
III. Core Policies
The governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have implemented a series of 
policies intended to address the “threat” to sovereignty and stability presented 
by religious pluralism. These policies provide a legal  framework both for the 
regulation of “non-traditional” religious groups, as well as an institutional and 
ideological basis for cooperation between the state and the leadership structures 
of  the  two  “traditional”  religions  in  the  region  –  the  Muftiate,  the  Russian 
Orthodox Church. In this section, I will cover some of the key documents that 
establish this policy framework. 
A few main documents structure the deployment of state power in the field of 
religion.  They  define  the  partnership  between  the  state  and  the  leadership 
www.caravan.kz/news/v-mae-2012-goda-v-astane-projjdet-iv-sezd-liderov-mirovykh-i-
tradicionnykh-religijj-306456/).
44 No Author. 2013. “Nazarbayev: Adherence to Islam Should Not be a Tribute to Trends.” Vesti, 
February  21.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (http://www.vesti.kg/index.php?
option=com_k2&view=item&id=18615).
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structures  of  “traditional”  religions,  and  coordinate  the  efforts  of  these 
institutions to monopolize the authority to speak for the popular will. Most of 
these documents are executive orders that do not have the full weight of law, but 
they  refer  extensively  to  legislation  to  bolster  their  authority,  and  often  are 
intended  to  direct  legislation  toward  the  administrations’  goals.  Thus,  these 
executive orders rely heavily on executive control over the legislative and judicial 
branches  of  government  to  avoid extensive challenges  in  the court.  As I  will 
discuss  in  the  subsequent  chapters  on regulating  heterodoxy,  religious  policy 
faces far greater challenges in Kyrgyzstan than in Kazakhstan, due to the greater 
autonomy of the parliament and judiciary in the former case.
In  Kyrgyzstan,  an  administrative  “conception”  of  “State  Policy  in  the 
Religious Sphere” defines both the state’s authority to intervene in the activities 
of religious organizations, as well as the aims of the state in the religious sphere 
and the means it uses to attain these aims. These aims are expressed in a rote list 
that focuses on basic freedoms and the “maintenance of social stability, peaceful 
coexistence of religious associations, promotion of mutual understanding, and 
tolerance  and  respect  among  citizens  of  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  in  matters  of 
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religious  freedom.”45  The  policy  quickly  turns  to  more  concrete  steps  for 
partnering with orthodox religious organizations and regulating heterodoxy.
State Cooperation with Traditional Religious Groups
In terms of cooperation with the orthodox organizations,  government policies 
enshrine a special role for the leadership structures of the two main “traditional” 
religions. A resolution of the government of Kyrgyzstan states that “A special 
role in preventive work among the believing part of the population should be 
played by the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan, the Orthodox Church, 
and the State Commission under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic for 
Religious Affairs.”46  In relation to Islam in particular,  the SCRA should work 
together  with  the  Muftiate  to  “consolidate  the  Islamic  faith,  to  seek  the 
unification  of  efforts  with  the  servants  of  Islam  in  the  prevention  and 
counteraction to religious extremism.”47 The State Agency for Religious Affairs in 
45  Kyrgyz  Republic.  2006.  State  Policy  in  the  Religious  Sphere,  Approved  by  Government 
Decision of the Kyrgyz Republic, May 6, 2006 N 324.
46 Kyrgyz Republic. 2004. State Policy on Countering Religious Extremism in the Kyrgyz Republic 
for 2004-2005, Approved by Government Decision of the Kyrgyz Republic, April 5, 2004 No. 226.
47 Kyrgyz Republic. 2004. Government Decree on the Work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
the  Kyrgyz  Republic,  Local  government  Administrations  and  Local  Self-Government  for  the 
Prevention of Religious Extremism and Ethnic Hatred, Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic. July 20, 2004 
No. 543.
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Kazakhstan is similarly tasked with ”strengthening of the interaction of the state 
with the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Kazakhstan and other faiths.”48
The  same government  order  on  “State  Policy  in  the  Religious  Sphere”  in 
Kyrgyzstan notes that traditional religious organizations “act as a creative and 
unifying spiritual force of society aimed at maintaining peace and stability in the 
Kyrgyz  Republic,”  and  calls  for  the  following  steps  to  expand  cooperation 
between these organizations and the state:
Development  and  implementation  of  state  targeted  programs  in  the 
spheres of education, culture and social services, which provide for the 
possibility of participation by traditional religious organizations in their 
implementation;  implementation  of  information  support  for  the 
implementation of state policy in the sphere of relations between the state 
and  religious  associations,  promoting  the  dissemination  of  knowledge 
about  the  history  and culture  of  the  historically  established traditional 
religions  of  Kyrgyzstan;  cooperation  of  TV  and  radio  broadcasting 
organizations and editorial offices of periodicals, whose founders are state 
authorities, with traditional religious organizations, in the production of 
television  and  radio  programs  covering  the  issues  of  history,  cultural 
heritage, way of life, and the spiritual and moral values of the peoples of 
the Kyrgyz Republic.49
These goals are to be implemented though the combined work of the presidential 
administration,  parliament,  State Agency for Religious Affairs,  and leadership 
48  Kusainov,  Dias.  Date  unlisted.  “Dogmatism  and  Religious  Radicalism  Were  Alien  to  the 
Inhabitants  of  the  Great  Steppe,  Receptive  to  New  Ideas  and  Open  to  Free  Intellectual 
Communication.”  Zakon.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?
doc_id=31051649#pos=1;-145).
49 Ibid.
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structures  of  traditional  religious  organizations,  i.e.  the  Muftiate  and Russian 
Orthodox Patriarchate.
Kazakhstan’s  administration outlines similar  goals  in a  presidential  decree 
“On  the  Approval  of  the  Program  for  Ensuring  Freedom  of  Religion  and 
Improving State and Religious Relations in the Republic of Kazakhstan.” (The 
government frequently packages restrictive measures in legislation and executive 
acts  that  ostensibly  guarantee  freedoms,  likely  a  direct  reflection of  the  more 
centralized  power  of  the  regime  compared  to  Kyrgyzstan).  This  document 
heavily focuses on developing special programs within the ministries of justice, 
culture,  and education,  the  last  of  which should serve  to  raise  the  “religious 
literacy” of both religious leaders and state officials. 
But the decree also calls for more forceful state interventions into the spiritual 
lives of citizens. These steps include “Organizing fifteen agitation-propaganda 
groups to work on questions related to propagating state policy in the area of 
ensuring  the  right  of  citizens  to  freedom  of  religion,”  and  “Intensifying  the 
participation of non-governmental associations in advocacy for the prevention of 
religious extremism.”50 The degree even calls on experts to provide the state with 
50 Republic of Kazakhstan: Government Decree of approving the Program for Ensuring Freedom 
of Religion and Improving State and Confessional Relations in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 
2007-2009. December 5, 2007 No. 1185.
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analyses and “forecasts” of the religious situation in the country by “conducting 
applied  scientific  and  sociological  research  in  the  field  of  religion,  aimed  at 
developing practical recommendations.”51
Such policies  reveal  the greater  material  resources of  Kazakhstan’s  regime 
compared to Kyrgyzstan. Not only does the regime maintain an active and well-
funded propaganda wing,  but,  in  line with the government’s  efforts  to  mask 
regulation  and  propaganda  in  the  guise  of  freedoms  and  rule  of  law,  the 
administration  maintains  a  network  of  state-funded  NGOs  that  promote  the 
government’s interests in civil society.
The Role of the SCRA and SARA
In  addition  to  these  overarching  concepts  of  government  policy,  the 
administrations of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan also issue decrees and decisions 
outlining  the  spheres  of  competency  for  their  respective  institutions  for 
regulating  religion,  and  the  authority  and  jurisdiction  of  the  leaderships  of 
traditional  organizations.  Kyrgyzstan’s  State  Commission of  Religious Affairs, 
for example, is tasked with (among other things):
Suppressing  the  activities  of  religious  organizations  that  damage  or 
51 Ibid.
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threaten  the  health,  morality,  rights  and  legitimate  interests  [emphasis 
mine]  of  citizens,  the  foundations  of  the  constitutional  order,  or  the 
security  of  the  state  in  accordance  with  applicable  law;  developing 
preventive  measures  of  interaction  between  state  bodies  to  prevent 
[redundancy in the original] religious extremism on the territory of the 
republic; developing and implementing programs aimed at strengthening 
the spiritual and moral foundations of society,  preventing conflicts and 
establishing relations of  mutual  tolerance between followers  of  various 
religions and denominations.52
These goals are facilitated by an extensive list of functions and rights born by the 
SCRA,  including  the  right  to  suspend  the  activities  of  “pseudo-religious” 
organizations.
Significantly,  these  decrees  (which  are  revised  periodically)  provide  for  a 
division of labor between the SCRA and the leadership of “traditional religious 
groups.” Addressing the need to “stabilize the situation inside the Muslim faith,” 
one  such  decree  notes  that  “the  Spiritual  Administration  of  Muslims  of 
Kyrgyzstan [SAMK or Muftiate] stands firmly in a position of cooperation with 
state bodies.”53 The decree then authorizes the Muftiate to engage in a series of 
tasks aimed at consolidating its authority, in conjunction with the SCRA. These 
tasks include: 
…completing  the  process  of  certification  for  imams  and  madrasah 
52  Kyrgyz Republic.  2009.  Presidential  Decree  on the State  Commission for  Religious Affairs. 
December 18, 2009 No. 601.
53 Kyrgyz Republic. 2009. Government Decree on Activities of the State Commission under the 
Government  of  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  on  Religious  Affairs  for  the  Development  and 
Implementation of State Policy in the Sphere of Religions. July 7, 1998 No. 441.
156
teachers; conducting a study of the activities and religious education of 
imams,  about  whom rumors circulate  of  adherence to  Wahhabism [the 
highly  conservative  brand of  Sunni  Islam promoted  by  Saudi  Arabia]; 
prohibiting the conduct of religious ceremonies by persons who have not 
been  certified  and  approved  by  the  Spiritual  Board  of  Muslims; 
prohibiting  religious  education  outside  officially  registered  Islamic 
educational  institutions;  prohibiting  the  use  of  Islamic  literature  not 
approved  by  the  Spiritual  Directorate  for  educational  purposes; 
introducing  a  unified  training  program  in  all  Islamic  educational 
institutions;  conducting  constant  monitoring  of  the  situation  in  the 
Muslim community, developing and implementing preventive measures 
to  preempt  religious  extremism  and  fundamentalism,  politicization  of 
Islam.54
Kazakhstan’s administration has articulated a similar division of labor, but 
with a clear emphasis on the supreme power of the sovereign state over religious 
organizations. The state passed a law in 2011 abolishing the State Commission on 
Religious Affairs, which had been incorporated into the Ministry of Culture, and 
transferred its powers to the State Agency of Religious Affairs. This new state 
structure “enters into civil law relations on its own behalf,” answering directly to 
the President, and “carries out its activities in accordance with the Constitution 
and  laws  of  the  Republic  of  Kazakhstan,  acts  of  the  President  and  the 
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, other regulatory legal acts, and this 
Regulation.”55  The  SARA has  an  extensive  list  of  functions  and powers,  and 
54 Ibid.
55 Republic of Kazakhstan. 2011. Presidential Decree on the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
for Religious Affairs. May 18, 2011 No. 84.
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maintains  a  network  of  departments  across  the  expansive  territory  of 
Kazakhstan. 
Conclusion: The Popularity of Authoritarian Policies
Despite such criticism, these religious policies remain broadly popular in both 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, especially among the titular nations and Russian 
populations.  Common  citizens  generally  view  such  policies,  in  line  with  the 
regimes’ assertions, as defending their spiritual sovereignty as a nation, rather 
than infringing on individual  rights  to  freedom of  conscience.  Moreover,  this 
tendency holds true in Kyrgyzstan as well of Kazakhstan. In contrast to theories 
that attribute such “identity politics” to manipulation by a self-interested elite, 
Kyrgyzstan features a similar resurgence of nationalism, even in the absence of a 
strongman  president.  Broad  swaths  of  Kyrgyzstan’s  public  have  grown 
disenchanted  with  democracy,  and  express  a  desire  for  a  similar  strongman 
president who would “defend” national values from pluralism. 
As I noted above, however, this ownership is often ephemeral. Authoritarian 
regimes by definition seek to establish themselves as the sole legitimate arbiter of 
the popular will. Though populist figures may articulate their political programs 
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in terms of sacrosanct values,  the popular appeal of these values comes from 
their capacity to help estranged strata regain ownership over public institutions 
and  public  life.  Such  monopolies  can  reduce  politics  to  a  mere  spectacle  of 
popular  participation,  which “enable[s]  elites  to  close  opportunities  for  input 
from below, but without making the masses feel left out” (Adams 2010:3).  As 
with  the  values  they  propagate,  populist  and  autocratic  leaders  elevate 
themselves  above  the  political  arena  as  unimpeachable  champions  of  these 
values, whose very mandate it is to defend the “true” will of the people. Though 
they may enjoy popular support while initially vanquishing cosmopolitain and 
elite opponents of populism, such regimes inevitably use their authority, once 
consolidated, to pursue their own interests in the name of the people,  and to 
quash  any  dissent  that  comes  from  the  very  people  whose  voices  they 
appropriate.
159
CHAPTER 5
Consecrating Orthodoxy
Islam and Orthodox Christianity from time immemorial are considered traditional 
religions, 
and the sound of azan is as familiar to the population as the bells ringing.
Kanybek Osmonaliev, Director of Kyrgyzstan’s 
State Commission for Religious Affairs 
One  issue  in  particular  stands  out  within  official  discourses  on  traditional 
religion:  the  supposed  tension  between  individual  and  collective  self-
determination. The establishment discourse on national and religious traditions 
treats converts, i.e. individuals who are exercising their freedom of conscience, as 
an  existential  threat  to  the  collective,  particularly  a  threat  to  national  self-
determination.  As  one  human rights  lawyer  noted during our  interview,  this 
treatment of religious heterodoxy as destructive to the nation raises the question 
of who owns the individual — himself, or the community to which he belongs?1 
When the political and religious establishment treats religious conversion as 
an existential threat to the collective, when the regime treats the free choice of the 
1 Interview with Dmitri Kabak, Human Rights Lawyer based in Bishkek, July, 10, 2014.
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individual as a threat to national sovereignty and solidarity, they implicitly assert 
that the collective owns the individual. The discourse on tradition in the post-
Soviet space performs precisely this function. It reifies an essential set of values 
that defines the will of all constituents, and treats individual dissent as a threat to 
this sacrosanct will.  Even the private religious beliefs of  a relative handful of 
citizens become a dangerous and destabilizing form of dissidence. 
As already mentioned, this essentialist  view of the nation extends directly 
from Soviet  nationalities  policy (Brubaker 1996;  Martin 2001).  Through Soviet 
nation-building  practices,  peoples  who  had  previously  had  clan  or  village 
identities  came  to  understand  themselves  as  belonging  to  distinct,  mutually-
exclusive nations, each with a distinct history, origin, and culture. Citizens also 
learned  to  think  of  citizenship  and  civic  life  in  terms  of  the  individual’s 
obligations to these essential categories. For all of its Marxist ideology, the Soviet 
Union imposed a distinctly Durkheimian framework onto society. 
In  this  chapter,  I  will  examine  the  ways  in  which  the  government  and 
religious establishments of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan coordinate to propagate 
this  Durkheimian  framework  onto  their  contemporary  polities.  This 
centralization has occurs primarily through registering and regulating mosques 
and churches, but also involves deeper cooperation with the state in the spheres 
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of education, charitable activities, and even law enforcement. I will examine both 
the institutions that enshrine a privileged position for the two main traditional 
religions,  Hanafi  Islam  and  Russian  Orthodoxy,  as  well  as  the  coordinated 
discourses through which the leadership structures of these religions support the 
regimes’ claims to speak for an essential popular will that transcends social and 
political differences. I will also address points of conflict and competition among 
these distinct establishments over relative autonomy and predominance in public 
life and discussions of national traditions.
I. Coordination between the State and Traditional Religions
At  the  outset  of  independence,  the  Muftiates  of  Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan 
lacked the capacity to exert control over individual mosques, as did the Russian 
Orthodox Patriarchate in relation to churches. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, “of 
the more than 1000 mosques operating at the beginning of 1996, about 70 were 
registered, out of 40 churches and parishes of the Orthodox Church only 15 were 
registered.”2 Even those mosques and churches that did formally register with 
their mandated leadership structures maintained only a weak affiliation with the 
2 Kyrgyz Republic: State Policy on the “Activities of the State Commission under the Government 
of the Kyrgyz Republic on Religious Affairs.” Approved by Decision of the Government of the 
Kyrgyz Republic on July 7, 1998 No. 441.
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central  authorities.  As  the  Prime  Minister  of  Kyrgyzstan  stated  in  a  1995 
governmental declaration, 
The religious centers officially operating in Kyrgyzstan, represented by the 
Spiritual  Directorate  of  Muslims  and  the  Episcopate  of  the  Russian 
Orthodox  Church,  were  not  prepared  either  organizationally,  from  the 
staffing or from the financial point of view, to act in the new capacities 
assigned to them by their own charters. As a result, a significant part of 
the  registered  religious  associations  seemingly  under  their  jurisdiction, 
especially Muslim ones, operate without control and are practically given 
to the local clergymen.3
Similar  problems  presented  themselves  in  Kazakhstan,  where  officials 
complained  that  traditional  religious  communities  maintain  their  own 
management  systems,  which  “are  poorly  consistent  with  the  Kazakh 
legislation.”4
The  Muftiates  of  Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan  faced  particular  challenges 
consolidating  power,  as  they  have  weaker  historical  and  doctrinal  claims  to 
authority than does the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate. As one Kazakh expert 
described the position of the Muftiate, 
The Kazakh Muftiyat needed credibility in the eyes of most believers… In 
Islam, muftis  and imams are only for believers the first  among equals; 
they do not possess any sacred power, unlike, for example, the bishops of 
3 Kyrgyz Republic: Government Decree “On the Religious Situation in the Kyrgyz Republic and 
the Tasks of the Authorities to Formulate State Policy in the Religious Sphere.” Signed by Prime 
Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic A. Djumagulov, August 1995 No. 345.
4 Podoprigora, R. 2005. “Religious Associations as Subjects of Civil Law: History, Modernity and 
Foreign Experience.” Jurist, No 4, Issue 23.
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the  Orthodox  or  Catholic  Church.  Obviously,  to  earn  real  credibility 
Spiritual Management of Muslims of Kazakhstan requires a certain degree 
of freedom of action.5
And this struggle for authority coincided with a period of significant expansion 
in  religiosity  among  the  nominally  Muslim  populations  of  Kazakhstan  and 
Kyrgyzstan. Putting the numbers in perspective, from 1991 to 2008 over 1,500 
mosques were built in Kazakhstan, compared to 170 Orthodox churches.6 The 
number of mosques built over this 17-year period may sound outlandish, but 
such mosques are often small, single-room buildings with a simple tin roof. At 
the time of independence, few people lived in proximity to a local mosque, but 
since  then  mosques  have  proliferated  in  villages,  towns,  and  neighborhoods 
across the country. By comparison, over 1,000 “non-traditional” congregations, 
missions, and other religious organizations were also registered over the same 
period, drawing off both the Kazakh and Russian populations of the country, and 
presenting further challenges to the authority of both.
In response to these challenges the Muftiates of both countries have engaged 
in a campaign of registering mosques, reminiscent of the Soviet state’s efforts to 
5  Nurseitova,  Torgyn.  2012.  “Timur  Kozyrev:  A weak,  ‘pocket’  Muftiate  is  of  No Use  to  the 
Government,”  Zakon.  Retrieved,  May  9,  2017  (http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?
doc_id=31102560#pos=1;-117).
6  Saudabayev,  K.  2008.  “State Press Secretary of  Kazakh Republic  Participated in the Plenary 
Session of the Parliament Assembly of NATO.” Nomad, November 21.  Retrieved May 9,  2017 
(http://www.nomad.su/?a=3-200811210435).
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concentrate  spiritual  authority  in  Central  Asia  in  SADUM  —  the  Spiritual 
Administration  of  the  Muslims  of  Central  Asia  and  Kazakhstan.7  This  effort 
entailed  a  combination  of  both  Muftiate  and  state  authority.  President 
Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan forcefully asserted the authority of the Muftiate, for 
example, stating that: 
We  must  not  allow our  true  religion,  to  which  our  ancestors  held,  be 
divided by divergent tendencies that would knock us off our path. The 
only  recognized  structure  of  traditional  Islam  in  our  country  is  the 
Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan.8
The U.S.  State Department noted such between the State and the Muftiate of 
Kazakhstan  in  2007:  “Although  the  Spiritual  Association  of  Muslims  of 
Kazakhstan  (SAMK),  a  coalition  of  mosques  and  clergy,  is  nominally 
independent and has no official status, there were reports that the government 
attempted to coerce independent mosques and Muslim clergy to affiliate with the 
7 The name of this institution demonstrated the unique conception of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist 
Republic within the USSR as a “bridge” between Russia and it’s “orient,” between the colonizing 
power and its colonial subjects.  As with the rest of Soviet statecraft in Central Asia, SADUM 
represented an effort by the central Soviet authorities to gain greater control over populations 
that they perceived as less patriotic and reliable. Soviet authorities were more than willing to use 
religion  to  achieve  this  goal,  despite  the  nominally  secular  nature  of  the  Soviet  Union,  and 
abandoned the policy of forced atheism in the region for one of forced registration of religious 
organizations.
8 Baigarin, Meyrambek. 2013. “The President: The Only Recognized Structure of Traditional Islam 
in Our Country - the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan.” KazInform, February 
19.  Retrieved  9,  2017  (http://www.inform.kz/ru/prezident-edinstvennaya-priznannaya-
struktura-tradicionnogo-islama-v-nashey-strane-duhovnoe-upravlenie-musul-man-
kazahstana_a2536207).
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group to ensure liturgical orthodoxy.”9 
The registration process was marked by similar collusion between the state 
and the Muftiate in Kyrgyzstan, where the SCRA “studied and assisted in the 
activity  of  the  Spiritual  Board of  Muslims of  Kyrgyzstan in  strengthening its 
relations  with the  regional  Kazyats  [equivalent  to  parishes  or  episcopates].”10 
This assistance included the SCRA “instigating the Spiritual Board of Muslims of 
Kyrgyzstan to conduct certification of mosque imams. Certification covered 1424 
imams, 1202 of whom were certified, 118 were conditionally certified, and 104 
were not  certified.11  By 2012,  these efforts  had led to a  dramatically  different 
picture  in  Kyrgyzstan  than  that  reported  in  1995.  Although  the  number  of 
mosques operating had nearly doubled to 1,900,  1,400 of them were officially 
registered with the state and Muftiate, and 400 or those remaining were currently 
undergoing registration.12 A similar pattern of consolidation could be observed in 
9 Anonymous. 2007. “Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Kazakhstan.” Bureau on 
Issues of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, US Department of State, March 6, 2007. Retrieved 
May 9, 2017 (https://www.usembassy.kz/documents/hrr-2006-kazakhstan-ru.html).
10  Kyrgyz  Republic:  Decree  of  the  President  of  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  "On  Measures  of  the 
Implementation of the Rights of Citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic and Freedom of Faith.” Prime 
Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic K. Bakiev, April 5, 2001 No 155.
11 Ibid.
12 Kyrgyz Republic: Government Decree “On the Implementation of International UN Treaties in 
the Field of Human Rights.” February 20, 2012 No. 485.
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Kazakhstan.13 
Through  this  collusion  of  state  and  ecclesiastic  authority,  the  leadership 
structures of Islam and Orthodoxy have gained more centralized control over 
their  presumed constituents  over  the  past  two  decades.  This  coordination  of 
authority has even involved law enforcement agencies. Kyrgyzstan’s Minister of 
Police, for example, signed an order on “complex reform” of training within the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs that called for the use of the “spiritual, moral and 
cultural potential of traditional confessions (Islam, Christianity) in the effort to 
form a positive image of law enforcement bodies.14 And the State Commission of 
Religious Affairs has created regional departments with the goal of “coordination 
of  the  activities  of  state,  law  enforcement,  religious  and  other  interested 
structures on the prevention of unconventional religious movements of extremist 
persuasion.”15  Below,  I  address  two further  areas  of  cooperation between the 
state  and the  leadership  of  “traditional  religions”  — religious  education  and 
charitable activity.
13 Republic of Kazakhstan: Report on the Situation with Human Rights. Commission on Human 
Rights under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2011.
14 Kyrgyz Republic: Government Order "On the Complex Reform of the Disciplinary Work in the 
Agencies of Internal Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic.” No. 944.
15 Kyrgyz Republic: Decision of State Administration of Ysyk-Kol Region “On the State of the 
Religious Situation on the Territory of Issyk-Kul District.” Karakol, March 13, 2009 No. 61.
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Religious Education
As religious observance increased among the population during the early years 
of independence, officials in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan began to worry about 
the sources and content of the doctrines that imams and priests were sharing. 
Their concerns specifically focused on Islam, as Orthodox Christians were both 
fewer and were more integrated into an established hierarchy of authority seated 
in Moscow, a major strategic partner for both states. In contrast, the authorities 
worried about the education and training that imams were receiving in various 
schools of Islam. Through the Muftiates, therefore, both states sought to exert 
greater control over religious education and accreditation of imams.
While many imams received their training locally, their teachers were often 
educated abroad, in countries ranging from Egypt and Turkey, to Malaysia and 
Pakistan. Kyrgyzstan’s administration fretted in the late 90s that “the low level of 
spiritual education of local Muslim clergy, the financial dependence of individual 
mosques on foreign "sponsors and benefactors" create a fertile ground for the 
spread  of  ideas  of  Islamic  extremism  and  fundamentalism.”16  Kazakhstani 
16 Kyrgyz Republic: Government Decree “On the Religious Situation in the Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tasks Authorities to Form a State Policy in the Religious Sphere.” Bishke, Government House, 
January 17, 1997 No. 20.
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authorities have similarly called on the Muftiate to mitigate “foreign” influences 
by increasing control over religious education. One Almaty judge, for example, 
asserted to the Muftiate that “before the appointment of imams in the mosque, it 
is necessary to conduct preparatory work with them, a kind of specialization, so 
that  they  can  resist  the  activities  of  new  missionaries  from  banned  religious 
parties and trends.”17
The authorities expressed particular concern over perceived fundamentalist 
groups such as Salafi communities,  who clearly placed the authority of Islam 
above the authority of the national community or secular state. One state-aligned 
expert in Kyrgyzstan noted:
Many salafists are known for their harsh intolerance towards those who 
do not follow all their tenets. They are similar to early protestants in that 
way. At the same time, we are against taking punitive measures against 
them. There are very few Salafists. Some of them reside in Bishkek and its 
outskirts and in Tokmok. There is no proof of political manipulation. This 
way [if  we take punitive measures],  it  may lead to persecution of  any 
opponents,  using one or  another  label.  Solving the  problem requires  a 
more concerted and competent spread of traditional Islam, more serious 
work  of  the  state,  the  Muftiate,  and  enlightening  educational 
organizations.18
Once again, the authorities see the solution to this problem primarily in terms 
17 Izbasarov, Azat. 2012. “Under the Cover of Faith.” Zakon, December 14. Retrieved May 9, 2017 
(https://www.zakon.kz/4530718-pod-prikrytiem-very-azat-izbasarov.html).
18  Malikova,  Bermet.  2009.  “Salafism: Latent or Real  Threat?” Vecherniy Bishkek,  December 11. 
Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://members.vb.kg/2009/12/11/svyat/1.html).
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of consolidating control over religious education, and producing cadres of state-
aligned imams that would promote the administration’s politics. The director of 
Kazakhstan’s SARA has spoken of a “dire need for qualified specialists in the 
field  of  traditional  Islam,”  who,  among  other  qualifications,  “have  sufficient 
knowledge of the secular.”19 In response, Kazakhstan’s Supreme Mufti resolved 
to “train 30 - 40 imams every year, in order to ensure that their cadres staff all the 
mosques of the republic.”20
The  government  of  Kyrgyzstan  meanwhile,  has  initiated  programs  in 
conjunction with the Muftiate to address this lack of centralized control in the 
sphere of Islamic education.
From  1997  to  1998,  the  structural  reorganization  of  the  SAMK  [the 
Muftiate] was practically completed; six Kaziats of Muslims were formed 
for the provinces [of Kyrgyzstan]; the imams of mosques and madrasah 
teachers were trained; mosques and madrassas prepared their documents 
for registration [with the Muftiate] and state registration, uniform training 
programs were developed in all Islamic educational institutions.21
19 Anonymous. 2012. “Egyptian University in Almaty ‘Nur-Mubarak’ is Renamed.” Tengri News, 
November  23.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/egipetskiy-
universitet-nur-mubarak-v-almatyi-pereimenovan-224010/).
20 Anonymous. 2011. “Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Kazakhstan Plans to Train 30-40 
Imams Who Work in Mosques of the Republic.” Tengri News, October 15. Retrieved May 9, 2017 
(https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/dumk-namereno-kajdyiy-god-obuchat-30-40-
imamov-mechetey-199232/).
21  Kyrgyz  Republic:  State  Policy  on  the  “Activities  of  the  State  Commission  under  the 
Government  of  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  on  Religious  Affairs.”  Approved  by  Decision  of  the 
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on July 7, 1998 No. 441.
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These  efforts  to  centralize  control  over  religious  education coincided with 
similar  efforts  to  raise  the  religious  “literacy”  or  competence  of  the  broader 
population. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have both sought to achieve this goal 
through  religious  education  in  state  primary  and  secondary  schools,  even 
characterizing religious education as an issue of national security. The head of 
Kazakhstan’s Department for Combating Extremism stated in an interview that 
“it is necessary to conduct preventive work among Kazakhstanis from childhood 
on  the  subject  of  negative  attitudes  towards  various  unconventional  Islamic 
trends.”22 And as recent as 2012, the administration of Kyrgyzstan incorporated 
the following statements into its policy proposal for national security:
At present, due to the decline in the cultural, educational and intellectual 
potential  of  the  population,  the  religious  situation  in  the  republic  is 
characterized  by  a  certain  increase  in  the  influence  of  foreign,  non-
traditional trends of the Islamic and Christian religions over certain areas 
of society.23 
The goals of this religious education were laid out in the executive decree on 
state policy in the religious sphere discussed above. Among other goals, religious 
22  Anonymous.  2013.  “More  Than  40  Residents  of  Zhambyl  Region  Studying  Abroad  are 
Adherents  of  Tabligi  Jamaat.”Tengri  News,  March  29.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (https://
tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/40-obuchayuschihsya-rubejom-jiteley-jambyilskoy-
oblasti-230989/).
23 Kyrgyz Republic: Decree of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic “On the National Security of 
the Kyrgyz Republic.” June 9, 2012 N 120.
171
education and training should:
Secure the secular nature of the activities of state educational institutions 
in  the Kyrgyz Republic;  provide legal  guarantees  for  the realization of 
citizens'  right to religious education; assist  in disseminating knowledge 
about the history of religions in state educational institutions; promote the 
preservation of cultural heritage sites (historical and cultural monuments) 
of  the  religious  purpose  of  the  people  of  Kyrgyzstan,  to  create  an 
atmosphere of respect for cultural values in society; entail cooperation of 
the  state  with  religious  organizations  in  solving  problems  of  spiritual, 
moral,  legal  and  patriotic  education  of  children  and  youth  and  other 
socially significant problems.24
However, these goals for religious education have not progressed significantly 
beyond the level of loose conceptions. The Ministry of Education has yet to create 
a  standardized  curriculum  in  primary  and  secondary  education  that  would 
achieve these  goals,  and the Parliament  noted in  2011 that  “neither  the  State 
Commission  for  Religious  Affairs  of  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  nor  the  Spiritual 
Directorate of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan (SAMK) are working on the development 
of  a  single  educational  standard  for  primary  and  secondary  educational 
institutions.”25
The  administration  of  Kazakhstan  has  gone  even  farther  than  religious 
education in schools, however. As a part of the State’s efforts to “strengthen the 
24 Kyrgyz Republic: Government Decree on State Regulation of Religious Sphere. May 6, 2006 No. 
324.
25  Kyrgyz Republic:  Government Decree “On the State  and Prospects  of  the Development of 
Religious  Education  in  the  Kyrgyz  Republic.”  Jogorku  Kenesh  [Parliament]  of  the  Kyrgyz 
Republic, Bishkek, November 4, 2011 No. 1279.
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requirements for the conduct of religious studies,” the SARA has engaged in an 
extended campaign to monitor and ban religious literature as “a kind of ‘spiritual 
filter’  that  allows us  to  block the entry of  religious literature  of  an extremist 
nature into our country.”26 The state has even mandated religious training for 
civil servants as a part of its broader efforts to incorporate religious authority into 
state authority. The administration’s program for “Ensuring Freedom of Religion 
and  Improving  State  and  Religious  Relations”  states  that  religious  education 
should “start from school and finish with the training of civil servants and highly 
qualified  specialists  in  this  field.”27  The  methods  of  this  continuous  training 
include: 
Publishing  educational  and  methodological  manuals  on  religious  and 
legal education in the state system for training and advanced training of 
civil servants; Organizing regular courses to improve the qualifications of 
public servants and public sector employees who are implementing state 
policy in the field of religious freedom; Disseminating popular scientific 
and  methodical  literature  on  paper  and  electronic  media;  Organizing 
round  tables,  scientific  and  practical  conferences,  seminars,  cycles  of 
educational  radio  and  television  programs,  and  publications  in  the 
media.28
26  Nakipova,  Janna.  2013.  “Lama Sharif:  The  Agency  of  Religious  Affairs  in  the  Republic  of 
Kazakhstan  Conducted  Expert  Analysis  of  Over  Three  Thousand  Religious  Books.”  BNews, 
February  1.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (https://bnews.kz/ru/news/obshchestvo/
agentstvom_rk_po_delam_religii_provedena_ekspertiza_bolee_3_tis_religioznih_knig).
27 Republic of Kazakhstan: Government Decree “On the Approval of the Program for Ensuring 
Freedom of Religion and Improving State and Religious Relations in the Republic of Kazakhstan 
for 2007-2009.” December 5, 2007, No. 1185.
28 Ibid.
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Once again, Kazakhstan’s greater energy wealth facilitates such administrative 
efforts  to  train  and  discipline  state  and  religious  officials  continuously.  As  a 
result,  officials  more  closely  reproduce  the  rhetoric  of  the  President  and  the 
language of his policies in their media statements and in interviews.
Charitable Activity
The state similarly collaborates with the leadership of traditional religions in the 
realm  of  charity  and  social  work.  The  governments  of  Kazakhstan  and 
Kyrgyzstan  have  long  taken  note  of  the  charitable  activities  of  missionary 
organizations, and registered alarm at how these activities serve as a point of 
entry for their citizens into heterodox beliefs. In response, the governments have 
actively  promoted  social  outreach  with  the  cooperation  of  the  Muftiate  and 
Orthodox Church. 
Again,  the  goals  of  Kyrgyzstan’s  administration  for  such  cooperation  are 
outlined in the executive resolution “On State Policy in the Religious Sphere.” 
This resolution calls for state and religious authorities to work with numerous at-
risk populations, but clearly formulates risk in dual terms: the greater risk among 
certain populations of engaging in harmful activities such as drug usage, and the 
concomitant propensity of foreign missionary organizations to minister to these 
174
populations. When discussing the youth for example, the executive resolution 
calls for the urgent development of a “special program for the preservation of 
centuries-old traditions and customs — ethical principles for the formation of the 
moral  education  and  moral  outlook  of  the  younger  generation,  taking  into 
account  age-old  historical  and  cultural  origins.”29  The  resolution  outlines  a 
similar series of goals with reference to other populations, and calls for:
…creating legal conditions conducive to supporting the activities of social 
service  institutions  and  charitable  organizations  set  up  by  religious 
organizations  [understood  in  this  case  as  “traditional  religious 
organizations] in order to assist citizens in difficult life situations, as well 
as activities to prevent child and adolescent crime and neglect, strengthen 
the  institution  of  the  family,  prevent  drug  addiction,  alcoholism,  and 
facilitate social rehabilitation of persons held in places of deprivation of 
liberty [primarily prisons] and those who have served their sentence.30
 
This mandate in the sphere of charity and social work has led to numerous state 
initiatives in Kyrgyzstan, although it is difficult to determine how much farther 
they go beyond symbolic gestures and public outreach designed to counter the 
activity of foreign missionaries. 
For example, both the SCRA and the Muftiate collaborated on a project for 
29 Kyrgyz Republic: State policy in the Religious Sphere. Approved by Government Decision of 
the Kyrgyz Republic, May 6, 2006 N 324.
30 Ibid.
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HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention. The program operated from 2006 to 2010, 
but was formally abolished in 2012.31 The SCRA and Muftiate also collaborated 
with the “Women’s Religious NGO” Mutakalim on a project aimed at "Family 
Planning in the Islamic Heritage.”32 Finally the SCRA, Ministry of Health, and 
Department of Corrections collaborated on inter-faith outreach to prevent drug 
usage in local communities, as well as among prisoners, by “rendering religious, 
charitable, humanitarian, spiritual, cultural and educational assistance to persons 
in custody.”33
The government of  Kazakhstan has engaged in a similar set  of  initiatives, 
boasting “good relations of cooperation between the Spiritual Administration of 
Muslims and the Orthodox Church in the field of social service and charity, joint 
participation in the general civil  projects,  and promotion of moral values and 
interfaith harmony.”34 In the case of Kazakhstan, however, where the ruling party 
31  Kyrgyz  Republic:  Government  Program  “For  the  Prevention  of  HIV/AIDS  and  its  Socio-
Economic Impact in the Kyrgyz Republic for the years 2006-2010.” Approved by the Government 
Decree, July 6, 2006, No. 498.
32  Anonymous.  2006.  “Participation  of  Religious  Associations  and  Leaders  in  the  Program.” 
Report by the Kyrgyz Alliance of Family Planning on the Results of the Project Implemented 
under the Aegis of the United Nations Fund for Population (UNFPA). Retrieved May 9, 2017 
(https://refdb.ru/look/1350335-pall.html).
33 Kyrgyz Republic: Decree of the President on “Countering the Spread of Drug Addiction and 
Drug Trafficking in the Kyrgyz Republic.” December 22, 2004 N 445.
34 Lama Sharif, Kairat. 2012. “The number of Religious Associations Will Decrease by One Third 
After  Re-Registration.”  Spiritual  Portal,  October  25.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (http://bahai.su/
forum/viewtopic.php?t=129&start=45).
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plays  a  much stronger  role  in  public  life,  these  initiatives  often involve  state 
institutions, the Muftiate, the Russian Orthodox Church, and in some cases the 
President’s ruling political party, Nur Otan or "Light of the Fatherland.” In 2013, 
for example,  local affiliates of Nur Otan collaborated with churches,  mosques 
and “community councils for combating corruption” in an initiative to prevent 
crime, alcohol, and drug usage.35
These  charitable  and  social  initiatives  are  targeted  at  similar  “at-risk” 
populations  as  in  Kyrgyzstan.  For  example,  Kazakhstan’s  Committee  of  the 
Penitentiary  System  granted  Muftiate  imams  and  Orthodox  priests  access  to 
prisoners in order to facilitate “moral and spiritual influence on the inmates in 
the prevention of religious extremism among inmates, as an answer to the re-
socialization of individuals serving sentences.”36 However, the administration’s 
greater  resources  also  allow  it  to  pursue  more  blatant  efforts  to  monopolize 
spiritual authority. For example, Kazakhstan maintains a network of “treatment 
centers” for “victims” of destructive cults. These centers ostensibly help converts 
35 Shpekbayev, Alik. No Date. “Act to pre-empt.” Zakon. Retrieved May 9, 2017 (online.zakon.kz/
Document/?doc_id=30167389).
36 Rakhimberdin, K. 2012. Expert Review of the Implementation of the Recommendations by the 
National Human Rights Action Plan in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2009-2012.” prepared by 
the Delegation of the European Union in the Republic of Kazakhstan and Legal Policy Research 
Center  in  the  Kazakhstan  International  Bureau  for  Human  Rights  and  Rule  of  Law.  Zakon. 
Retrieved May 9, 2017 (https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31221190).
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to “totalitarian sects” return to mainstream society, although critics asserted in 
interviews that they primarily attract “patients” by offering room and board to 
homeless persons among whom Christian missionaries and Jehovah’s Witnesses 
had  ministered.37  Even  the  director  of  the  state-funded  NGO  that  ran  these 
treatment centers admitted to me in an interview that the authorities lost interest 
in the project because they were unable to enroll sufficient numbers of clients.38
II. Conflicts over the Autonomy of Leadership Structures
The  prevailing  dynamic  between  the  state  and  the  leadership  structures  of 
“traditional” religions, i.e. the Muftiate and the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate, is 
that of cooperation and coordination in their shared goal of monopolizing the 
authority  to  speak for  their  presumed constituents.  Nevertheless,  tensions  do 
arise between the state and these structures,  as well  as among the leadership 
structures themselves.  These tensions often focus on inevitable struggles over 
autonomy from the state, as well as preeminence among the traditional religions 
in public  life.  In Muftiates  of  Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in particular,  more 
37 Interview with a lead expert at an NGO promoting Human Rights in Kazakhstan, July 17 2014.
38 Interview with Yulia Denisenko, Director of the Information Center for Religious Questions, 
Astana, July 21 2014.
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overtly political elements occasionally push for greater autonomy and a greater 
public  role  for  Islamic  beliefs  in  the  discussion  of  national  identity,  to  the 
exclusion  of  Russian  Orthodoxy  and  Russians  as  an  ethnic  minority.  One 
particularly contentious issue revolves around the financing of mosques and the 
Muftiate,  in  which  the  states  claim  an  interest  due  to  the  potential  for 
manipulation by foreign donors with hidden agendas. 
 These tensions have produced decidedly different outcomes in Kazkhstan vs. 
Kyrgyzstan,  evidencing  the  significantly  greater  control  that  Nazarbayev’s 
administration exerts over the religious sphere than any of the past or current 
Presidents of Kyrgyzstan. Both the Muftiate and the Orthodox Church show far 
greater deference to the authority of  the secular state in Kazakhstan,  and the 
Muftiate in particular has conceded a great deal of autonomy to the President’s 
administration.
Self-Governance
The Muftiates of both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan elect their own leadership 
in regular summits of imams, known as Kurultai,  from across their respective 
countries. The first Kurultai was held in 1996, and led to “election of an Ulema 
Council  of  twenty-five  people  and  a  Head  Mufti,  composing  a  new,  highest 
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governing body of the Muftiate.”39 Since then, the Muftiate of Kyrgyzstan has 
managed to conduct these summits every four years, independent of significant 
state  interference,  to  elect  their  leadership and deliberate  over  various  policy 
matters. I personally attended the Kurultai summit of 2012, at which a leading 
member of the Islamic missionary movement Tablighi Jamaat was elected head 
Mufti. I was privy to the consternation of officials from the State Commission for 
Religious  Affairs,  who  generally  view  this  movement  as  a  form  of  Islamic 
heterodoxy from Pakistan, and had hoped to plant their preferred candidate in 
charge of the Muftiate.
In Kazakhstan, in contrast, the Muftiate serves almost at the pleasure of the 
President’s administration, and conducts its Kurultai elections in a way that suits 
the  administration.  As  one  scholar  of  Islam in  Almaty  revealed  to  me  in  an 
interview,  imams  that  do  not  show  sufficient  regard  for  and  deference  to 
“national  interests,”  are  prevented  from occupying  leadership  positions.  This 
expert recounted a power struggle that had taken place between the Head Mufti 
and  the  Director  of  the  State  Agency  for  Religious  Affairs  before  the  prior 
Kurultai.  Though thoroughly  deferential  to  state  power  and  the  authority  of 
39  Kyrgyz  Republic:  State  Policy  on  the  “Activities  of  the  State  Commission  under  the 
Government  of  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  on  Religious  Affairs.”  Approved  by  Decision  of  the 
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on July 7, 1998 No. 441.
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President  Nazarbayev,  the  Head  Mufti  had  nevertheless  fought  for  greater 
autonomy  for  the  SARA  in  conducting  its  own  affairs  —  particularly  in 
managing its own finances. In the ensuing power struggle, Kairat Lama Sharif, 
head of the SARA, was able to successfully depose the popular Mufti through the 
Kurultai election and install a more loyal replacement.40 In the classic manner of 
singly-party rule, this regime-aligned Mufti was elected by unanimous decision:
In total, the number of Kurultai participants and their guests present at the 
event totaled more than 170 people, among whom were all the regional 
imams, officials of SAMK, and the Agency for Religious Affairs, as well as 
representatives of scholarly intelligentsia of Kazakhstan. The decision in 
favor of the proposed candidate for the post of Grand Mufti was adopted 
unanimously by the participants of the Kurultai.41
Critics have further complained about the secrecy that surrounds such elections, 
which take place without any announcement and are only attended by a handful 
of journalists from the state media.42
Self-Financing
40 Interview with a scholar of Islam based in Almaty, June 16 2013.
41 Anonymous. 2013. “Kurultai of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Kazakhstan: New 
Supreme Muftiy of the Republic of Kazakhstan is Elected.” Azan, February 19. Retrieved May 9, 
2017  (https://azan.kz/ahbar/read/vneocherednoy-kurultay-dumk-izbran-novyiy-verhovnyiy-
muftiy-respubliki-2062).
42 Anonymous. 2010. “Monitoring of violations of freedom of speech in Kazakhstan.” Report by 
the International Foundation for Protection of Freedom of Speech "Adil Soz." Retrieved May 9, 
2017  (http://www.adilsoz.kz/programmems/issledovaniya/situaciya-so-svobodoj-slova-v-
kazaxstane-v-2010-godu-analiticheskij-doklad).
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This  story  engages  the  second major  area  of  struggle  — the  management  of 
Muftiate  finances.  The  Muftiates  of  Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan  have  both 
clashed with  their  respective  states  over  the  handling  of  zakat  — tithes  and 
charities offered by Muslims to mosques and other Islamic organizations and 
missions. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, once again, the Muftiate has managed to 
regain autonomous control of these finances, although it has faced scrutiny from 
the state.  In Kazakhstan,  in  contrast,  the state  has engaged in a  campaign of 
exhorting the  dangers  of  unregulated mosque finances.  A state-committee  on 
anti-money-laundering  measures  warned  of  the  easy  use  of  zakat  to  finance 
terrorist organizations: “Supporters [of radical Islam] transfer money in the form 
of  charitable  donations,  or  “zakat,”  through  mosques,  imams,  or  non-profit 
organizations  that  are  proponents  of  radical  fundamentalism.”43  And  state-
aligned experts have pressed the Muftiate “on questions about the cash flows 
that pass through the SAMK and imams of local mosques.”44
As a result of these efforts, zakat has essentially become state-administered 
43  Anonymous.  2008.  “Committee  of  Experts  on  the  Evaluation  of  Activities  on  Countering 
Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism.” Council of Europe, 27th Plenary Session, July 
7-11.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (http://eurasiangroup.org/files/MONEYVAL_typology_reports/
ML_and_counterfeiting_rus.pdf).
44 Toguzbaev, Kazis. 2010. “Representatives of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims Defend 
the  Honor  of  the  Imams.”  Azzatyq,  September  16.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (https://
rus.azattyq.org/a/religious_board_muslims_kazakhstan_/2158805.html).
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financing for mosques, as my respondent related.45 Collection bins in mosques 
across the country are locked, and opened in a joint procedure involving local 
representatives  of  the SARA and mosque imams.  The finances  are  essentially 
managed by the state,  which provides a cut to the mosque. This control over 
zakat ensures that imams have a strong financial incentive to minister in line 
with the regime’s politics.
One area where the Muftiate of Kyrgyzstan has lost a significant degree of 
autonomous  control  is  the  administration  of  visas  for  the  yearly  hajj,  or 
pilgrimage to Mecca. Saudi Arabia supplies a limited number of visas to nations 
for  participation in the hajj,  leaving it  to the authorities  of  those countries  to 
decide how to  administer  those  visas.  Initially,  the  Muftiate  distributed these 
visas,  but  was  required  to  “submit  to  the  State  Commission  under  the 
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic for Religious Affairs reports on the number 
of groups and their numerical composition.46 After years of criticism for opacity 
and corruption, however, including accusations of rampant bribery, the Muftiate 
of Kyrgyzstan lost the authority to grant hajj visas autonomously. Instead, these 
visas are now administered by a “State Commission for Assistance in Organizing 
45 Interview with a scholar of Islam based in Almaty, June 16 2013.
46 Kyrgyz Republic: Government Decree “On the Organization and Implementation of Pilgrimage 
to Mecca (Hajj, Umrah).”Approved by the Government Kyrgyz Republic, February 19, 1998 N 83.
183
the Pilgrimage to Mecca,” composed of an impressive list of state and religious 
officials:
 The Vice-Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic (committee chairman), 
Director of the State Agency for Religious Affairs under the Government 
of the Kyrgyz Republic (Vice-Chairman of the Committee), Deputy Head 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic,  the Kyrgyz Ministry of Health, 
Ministry of Transport and Communications of the Kyrgyz Republic, the 
State  Committee  of  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  for  National  Security,  State 
Agency for Information Resources and Technologies of the Government of 
the Kyrgyz Republic, the Border Service of the Kyrgyz Republic and the 
Mufti of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan.47
The sheer scope of the government officials mentioned in this list speaks to the 
lucrative nature of the hajj visa lottery. While the list might seem at first glance to 
include representatives of government agencies that can provide technical and 
logistical support to hajj pilgrims, the more likely reality is that the list includes 
officials who receive part of the revenue generated by the distribution of hajj 
visas.
As with the areas of education and charitable activities, the self-governance 
and self-financing of the Russian Orthodox Church presents fewer challenges to 
the state, and is, in turn, less challenged by the state. The finances and property 
47 Kyrgyz Republic: Government Decree “On the Organization and Implementation of Pilgrimage 
Citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic to Mecca (Hajj, Umrah).” Approved by the Government Kyrgyz 
Republic, September 19, 2008 N 521 (As amended by the Decree of the Government on September 
17, 2009 N 584).
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of  the  Russian  Orthodox  Church  are  managed  by  the  central  Moscow 
Patriarchate, with official sanctioning by Russia and the other states in whose 
jurisdiction  the  Church  functions.  Priests  and  local  patriarchs  are  likewise 
appointed  by  the  central  Patriarchate,  with  few  local  conflicts.  One  notable 
conflict  did  arise  in  Kyrgyzstan,  however,  when  the  local  Patriarch  tried  to 
declare the property of the Church sovereign Russian territory. As an official of 
the SCRA explained to me, the patriarch’s primary motive was to import wine 
into  the  country  without  paying  customs  duties.48  In  a  testament  to  the 
integrated power of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian state in the 
region,  the  government  of  Kyrgyzstan  appealed  to  the  Russian  embassy  to 
resolve  the  matter,  rather  than  asserting  direct  sovereign  authority  over  the 
church as  a  religious entity  operating in  its  jurisdiction.  At  the  behest  of  the 
Russian embassy, the Moscow Patriarchate removed the local patriarch from his 
post, and installed a less confrontational figure in his place.
III. Inventing Traditions
“Tradition” is one of the more maligned concepts in the social sciences. Sociology 
48 Interview with the Head Legal Experts at the State Commission for Religious Affairs, Bishkek, 
March 29, 2013.
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in particular established itself as a discipline in part with the mission to unmask 
the authority claimed by religious and other spokespersons for tradition. Thus, 
there is little need to document the many ways in which the origin myths of the 
Kyrgyz  and  Kazakh  nations  are  constructed  and  sanitized  to  match 
contemporary political  realities.  As with all  nations,  the official  history of  the 
Kazakh and Kyrgyz nations amplifies certain voices while marginalizing others, 
endorses certain claims on a shared history while negating others. Nevertheless, 
some efforts to invent tradition (Hobsbawm 1983) shed a particularly clear light 
on precisely how contemporary political interests shape representations of the 
past. 
Two  cases  exemplify  the  regimes’  efforts  to  mold  the  past  in  service  to 
contemporary discourses on tradition. First, the governments of both Kazakhstan 
and  Kyrgyzstan  have  struggled  to  downplay  or  appropriate  the  historic 
significance of Tengrianism – the animistic beliefs of Kyrgyz and Kazakh peoples 
prior to the penetration of Islam in the region. Though both governments distrust 
grassroots activism, neither has quite known how to handle the small, patriotic, 
and  troublesome  groups  that  have  sought  to  raise  the  public  profile  of 
Tengrianism  as  the  original  and  authentic  source  of  sacred  beliefs  for  both 
nations.  Second,  The  Congress  of  World  Historical  Religions  in  Kazakhstan 
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deserves  particular  attention,  as  one  of  the  trophy  projects  that  President 
Nazarbayev has created using Kazakhstan’s oil wealth. Meeting annually in the 
top of a glass pyramid in Astana,  the Congress of  World Historical  Religions 
presents  a  particularly  ambitious  effort  to  manufacture  religious  accord  and 
political authority.
When Tradition is not Traditional: The Case of Tengrianism
Tengrianism refers  to  the  loose  assemblage of  animistic  beliefs  that  prevailed 
among the Turkic and Mongol peoples of Central Asia before the penetration of 
Islam. It derives its name from Tengri, the ruler of a pantheon of folk gods and 
spirits, embodied in the infinite blue sky. Tengrianism had already spread across 
the Eurasian subcontinent at the beginning of the historical record of the region, 
and was later influenced by Zoroastrianism from Persia. The belief system spread 
orally among the semi-nomadic peoples of Central Asia, and thus remained a 
largely unformalized series of beliefs and myths.
Thus,  if  any  belief  system  has  the  right  to  “traditional”  status,  it  is 
Tengrianism. Contemporary Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have seen the rise of 
many popular and intellectual efforts to revive Tengrianism as a spiritual core of 
the  nation.  Anthropologists  and  historians  have  excavated  (literally  and 
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figuratively) minute details from the historical record to place Tengrianism at the 
core of national origin myths. Popular movements have promoted Tengrianism 
as  the  only  authentic  source  of  national  distinctiveness  and  cultural  self-
determination,  and denounced Islam as a foreign import and obstacle to true 
national autonomy. One Kazakh expert, Nurtai Mustafayev, head of the analytic 
center "Nashe Delo" [Our Affairs] went so far as to compare the expansion of 
Islam among Central Asian nomads as a “spiritual genocide.”
The Islamic genocide was a spiritual “Hiroshima” that exploded all the 
national  sacred  objects  of  the  Kazakhs;  The  Arab  Caliphate,  which 
suffered a number of major defeats from the "Kok-Türks" - the Tengrians 
of the Great Turkic Kaganate - finally established itself among the Kazakhs 
through the creeping expansion of trade and financial capital, having won 
its main victory: convincing the naive steppe people to renounce the faith 
of their ancestors, Tengrians, in favor of foreign religion, Islam, as a form 
of Arab chauvinism and Arab expansion!49
Many  commentators  repeat  this  refrain  of  contemporary  support  for  Islam 
representing  a  loss  of  historical  identity,  although  not  always  through  such 
fantastic analogies. As one religious scholar in Kyrgyzstan lamented:
Our  businessmen  contributed  great  sums  to  the  development  of 
Orthodoxy and Islam. However, they contributed one tyiyn [penny] to the 
popularization of the cultural heritage of the Kyrgyz: Tengriansim.50
49 Mustafayev, Nurtai. 2011. “Islamic Dictatorship in Kazakhstan?” Central Asia, November 24. 
Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1322112660).
50  Tuzov,  Alexander  and  Bermet  Malikova.  2009.  “How  to  Preserve  Secular  Kyrgyzstan.” 
Vecherniy Bishkek, November 4, 2009. Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://members.vb.kg/2009/11/04/
polit/1.html).
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Thus, a range of local actors seek formal recognition of Tengrianism’s unique and 
incontrovertible place in local traditions.
And yet, the regimes of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have consistently denied 
these efforts to register Tengrianism as a “traditional religion.” The states have 
sought to keep the profile of Tengrianism limited to a cultural heritage, distinct in 
status  from  formal  religions  such  as  Islam  and  Orthodox  Christianity.  State-
aligned  experts  have  sought  to  discredit  overly-zealous  proponents  of 
Tengrianism,  discrediting  their  ideas  as  loose  assemblages  of  custom  and 
superstition,  rather  than  formal  religious  doctrine.  Political  Scientist  Timur 
Kozyrev  wrote,  “Neo-pagan  ideas  get  ‘thrown  around’  in  public  discourse 
periodically, right down to the preaching of a return to Tengrianism.”51 Agitators 
for Tengrianism have even been depicted as a threat to inter-faith tolerance and 
the “religious literacy” of the population.
Why, and on what grounds have the states denied these efforts to establish 
Tengrianism  as  a  traditional  religion?  Tengrianism  is  not  merely  a  dissident 
group or religious minority, after all. Tengrianism is indeed a point of origin for 
the Kyrgyz and Kazakh nations.  It  is  truly part  of  a  shared past,  even if  the 
51 Nurseitova, Torgyn. 2011. “Political Scientist Timur Kozyrev: Testing with Hijab - A New Test 
for Tolerance?” Islam in SNG,  January 21. Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://www.islamsng.com/
kaz/interviews/995).
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contemporary  beliefs  are  merely  a  reconstruction  of  that  past.  What  can  we 
conclude about the official discourse on tradition, then, when a genuine tradition 
is denied traditional status, and when those agitating for the belief are labelled a 
threat to national stability?
The battle over the status of Tengrianism is nothing short of a battle over who 
has  the  authority  to  speak  for  the  past  in  the  present.  In  a  society  where 
preserving “tradition” is equated with preserving national sovereignty and self-
determination, the authority to speak for the past — for the primordial origins of 
“the people” — becomes an authority to speak for the essential will of the nation 
in the present.  For this reason the regimes have sought to frame Tengrianism 
simply  as  a  local  custom that  has  contributed  to  the  distinctive  character  of 
Central Asian Islam, not as an autonomous spiritual pole of the nation. As one 
government  affiliated  Kazakh  expert  wrote,  defending  the  idea  of  “spiritual 
sovereignty,”
In  the  9th-10th  centuries,  Sufism began  to  spread  in  Central  Asia  and 
Southern Kazakhstan.  Various Sufi schools  and orders  operated on the 
territory  of  the  republic.  Specificity  of  Islamization  of  nomadic  Turks 
consisted in the organic combination of elements of traditional pre-Islamic 
(Tengri and Zoroastrianism) and Sufi ideas.52
52 Smagulov, Amanzhol. 2011. “To Save Spiritual Sovereignty.”Liter, September 14. Retrieved May 
9, 2017 (http://abai.kz/post/10492).
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As we have seen, Islam has already been coopted for this purpose through 
the  advent  of  an institution that  had no precedent  in  Islamic  practice  — the 
Muftiate.  This  hierarchical  body  was  instituted  by  the  Soviet  Union  to  exert 
centralized control over imams and mosques, and thereby promote the authority 
of the Soviet state and Communist Party to speak for the popular will. Even after 
gaining independence,  the  Muftiates  of  Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do what 
religious establishments have always done according to Weber (1978): doggedly 
pursue a monopoly on the authority to speak for the divine. 
Tengrianism lacks any such historical or contemporary institutions, whereby 
the regime might dispossess common people of the authority to speak for the 
sacred — and thereby for the popular will itself. As such, this shared heritage 
represents an extremely problematic heritage for the regimes of Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan.  The  regimes  have  thus  sought  to  appropriate  Tengrianism  by 
treating it as a source of unique national identity — especially of an ostensible 
history of religious moderation and tolerance.
In general,  the Kazakhs were,  at  least  until  the XIX century,  much less 
religious than a number of other Turk-Muslim peoples such as Uzbeks, 
Tatars, Uighurs, Turks, Azerbaijanis, and in the Kazakh culture were very 
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strong Remnants of pre-Islamic beliefs.53
In this discourse, efforts to extricate Tengrianism from Islam as a tradition in its 
own right represent an effort to radicalize the nation, in opposition to its history 
of religious tolerance. Kanat Kanafin, lead expert at the Foundation of  the First 
President, Leader of the Nation, put it this way:
During the one and a half millennia before the advent of Islam, Tengri, 
Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism and Manichaeism developed side by side 
in  Kazakhstan,  and  Christianity  and  Judaism,  recognized  by  Muslim 
theologians  as  religions  of  Scripture,  continued  to  exist  even  after  the 
establishment of Islam. Again,  in the heart  of  Eurasia formed a special 
cultural environment of tolerance. Was it blurred in our time?54
Both states have engaged in concerted efforts to appropriate Tengrianism as 
an  element  of  national  and  spiritual  consciousness,  and  to  marginalize  the 
intellectual and popular movements surrounding Tengrianism that they cannot 
co-opt.  Proponents of  Tengrianism have repeatedly petitioned for the right to 
register their collectives as religious organizations, but have been denied. They 
have  neither  been  granted  status  as  members  of  a  “traditional”  religious 
organization, nor have they been allowed to register under the requirements for 
“non-traditional”  organization  established by the  SCRA in  Kyrgyzstan or  the 
53 Nurseitova, Torgyn. 2011. “Political Scientist Timur Kozyrev: Testing with Hijab - A New Test 
for Tolerance?” Islam in SNG,  January 21. Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://www.islamsng.com/
kaz/interviews/995).
54 Kanafin, Kanat. 2012. “Islam in Kazakhstan: Remedy for Religious Radicalism.” Islam in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, March 5. Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://www.islamsng.com/
kaz/opinion/4271).
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SARA in Kazakhstan. 
One collective of Tengrians in Kyrgyzstan sued for the right to register as a 
traditional  religious  group,  claiming that  the  requirements  established by the 
SARA were unlawful. I attended the proceedings where the representatives of 
the Tengrian group hurled accusations at officials from the SCRA, declaring that 
they were “not  Kyrgyz.”55  Ultimately,  however,  their  petition for  the  right  to 
register was rebuffed by the court.
As  a  result  of  these  struggles,  Tengrianism  has  been  denied  “traditional” 
status in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. While Tengrian customs as a whole 
remain part of the mythology of the nations’ origins and distinctiveness, those 
who promote Tengrianism as a source of national identity in competition with 
Islam are censured as members of “destructive cults” and threats to the stability 
of the nation. The regimes actively work to keep Tengrianism isolated in a proto-
national past, distinct from modern nationhood.
Kazakhstan's Congress of World Historical Religions
Resource wealth has enabled the administration of Kazakhstan not only to assert 
55 Court Case heard in the Chui District Court in Bishkek, August 17 2013.
193
greater control over the leadership structures of traditional religions than that of 
Kyrgyzstan, but has also allowed the regime to spend lavishly on trophy projects 
that exalt the Kazakh nation (and to a lesser degree civic Kazakhstani nation-
state)  and  the  persona  of  President  Nazarbayev,  and  consecrate  a  particular 
effigy of the popular will. Among these projects is the Congress of Leaders of 
World  Historical  Religions  —  an  assembly  of  leaders  from  the  world’s 
“traditional”  religions that  meets  annually to  discuss  matters  of  doctrine and 
prevent interfaith tensions. 
The  institution  is  reminiscent  of  the  Soviet  era  House  of  Cultures,  which 
gathered representatives of the more than 100 ethno-national groups in the Soviet 
Union in a gesture of solidarity and “friendship of peoples.” As with the House 
of Cultures, the Congress of World Religions serves to confer a popular mandate 
on  the  civic  state  that  encompasses  a  multinational  and  multi-confessional 
population.  The  Congress  gathers  presumptive  representatives  of  the  various 
religious groups that compose Kazakhstan’s traditions, including not just Islam 
and Russian Orthodoxy, but also Judaism and Buddhism, which have a historical 
presence in Central Asia. But the Congress also includes leaders from various 
other  world  religions  such  as  Hinduism  and  Catholicism,  conferring  special 
legitimacy on certain other religious traditions.
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At  these  congresses,  delegates  praise  Kazakhstan  as  a  singularly  peaceful 
land and the Kazakh nation as a uniquely tolerant people with a centuries-long 
history and mentality of interfaith moderation and accord. The Patriarch of the 
Russian  Orthodox Church,  for  example,  reflected on Kazakhstan’s  place  as  a 
global leader on religious dialogue at the fourth Congress:
"Kazakhstan and its hospitable capital has for the fourth time served as a 
global platform for discussing problems of a global character on the basis 
of dialogue between religious traditions. One cannot but rejoice that the 
participation  of  the  world’s  government  structures  and  traditional 
religions have here a great opportunity to come together and reflect on 
how  to  respond  to  the  challenges  common  not  only  to  our  religious 
communities, but also for the majority of the peoples of the world.”56
And President Nazarbayev himself categorically asserted at a related assembly 
that  “Kazakhstan  is  the  only  place  in  the  world  where  Muslims,  Orthodox 
Christians, Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists, and Jews live in harmony. This is 
the only place where they can get together and talk about all of their problems. 
We  have  created  the  perfect  model  of  friendship  and  must  protect  it  from 
external threats.”57
Nazarbayev himself is credited with creating this unique forum of interfaith 
56 Anonymous. 2012. “Speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill at the Fourth Congress of Leaders of 
World and Traditional Religions.” Official Website of Moscow Patriarchate, May 30. Retrieved May 9, 
2017 (http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/2255100.html).
57 Speech by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev to the Assembly 
of People of Kazakhstan, Chairman at the XVII session of the ANC (Astana Palace of Peace and 
Accord, April 18, 2011).
195
dialogue.  He  is  particularly  reverenced  for  the  congresses  themselves,  and 
subsequently  for  sustaining  interfaith  accord  in  Kazakhstan.  One  Rabbi  for 
example, a delegate of Judaism at the Congress, remarked that, “when President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev for the first time brought together the heads of different 
faiths, and all sat at the same table at the first Congress of Leaders of World and 
Traditional religions, they did not talk about what separates the representatives 
of  different  religions,  but  of  what  unites  them.”58  And a  state-aligned expert 
wrote  of  the  Congress  and  of  Nazarbayev’s  broader  efforts  in  the  sphere  of 
religion,  “No,  it  is  no  coincidence  that  President  Nazarbayev  placed his  two 
hands on the table of the spiritual leaders of the two main confessions in the 
Muslim and Orthodox country. And the two religions coexist peacefully in the 
country.”59
Thus,  the  administration  of  Kazakhstan  expends  significant  resources  on 
institutions and projects that confer a sacrosanct mandate on the state and on the 
administration of  Nazarbayev.  The regime makes a concerted effort  to ensure 
58 Brusilovskaya, Elena. “Rabbi Yeshayah Cohen: Many Countries Can Follow the Example of 
Kazakhstan.” Zakon, October 6. Retrieved May 9, 2017: (https://www.zakon.kz/4451997-eshaja-
kogen-mnogie-strany-mogut-brat.html).
59  Bondartzova,  Lyudmila.  No  date.  “Leonid  Dyukov:  I  am  an  Incorrigible  Idealist.”  D&K 
Company.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (http://dk.all-docs.ru/index.php?
page=23&vi1=100166.000&tit=Леонид%20Дюков:%20Я%20-%20неисправимый%20идеалист).
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that  state  officials,  religious  leaders,  and  even  rank-and-file  civil  servants 
propagate  a  consistent  message  on  religious  and  national  traditions,  which 
confers authority on established elites and institutions. Anyone hoping to climb 
up  the  ranks  of  state  institutions,  which  are  pervasive,  must  demonstrate  a 
willingness and ability to perpetuate these politics, often including an aptitude 
for suppressing competing claims for representation and recognition from the 
public. 
I  must  note  once  again  that  although  Kazakhstan  more  closely  fits  the 
conventional  model  of  authoritarianism  because  of  this  consolidated  power, 
religious politics and policy in Kyrgyzstan is no less dominated by such claims. 
The state features more fragmented cadre politics among competing sets of elites, 
preventing the consolidation of such a clear hierarchy of authority that might 
project consistent messages downward, but the political and religious elite as a 
whole  claim  a  privileged  mandate  to  represent  the  essential  and  sacrosanct 
values  of  the  people  -values  that  ostensibly  transcend  politics.  Religion 
necessarily plays a strong role in these efforts to consecrate the nation and claim 
a mandate to govern in the name of a sacrosanct popular will.
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IV. Space for Secularism?
Although Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are both secular states, often aggressively 
so, this conflation of faith and nationality has infused the public sphere with a 
religious devotion to the nation — and to the sacrosanct popular will for which 
state  and  religious  officials  presume  to  speak.  Under  such  circumstances, 
religious dissidence becomes tantamount to betrayal of the nation. Despite the 
formal  secularity  of  the  state,  therefore,  Kyrgyzstan  and  Kazakhstan  have 
cracked  down  on  an  increasingly  wide  range  of  dissent  that  is  viewed  as 
“morally harmful” or disrespectful to the sacrosanct values and symbols of the 
nation. 
Advocates for greater separation of church and state have argued that such 
policies essentially undermine the secular nature of the state.  Speaking of the 
tendency to assign religious affiliation according to ethnicity in official statistics, 
one critic states:
According  to  the  2009  Population  Census,  98%  of  Kazakhstanis  are 
believers… Contrary to the declarations of imams and priests about the 
non-ethnic,  but  universal  nature  of  "world  religions,”  the  religious 
hierarchies  of  Islam  and  Christianity  in  Kazakhstan  totally  enroll  all 
believers on ethnic grounds. According to their estimates, it turns out that 
in Kazakhstan, ethnic and religious identity completely coincide.60
60 Mustafayev, Nurtai. 2011. “Islamic Dictatorship in Kazakhstan?” Central Asia, November 24. 
Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1322112660).
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Such conflation of religious and ethnic identity makes it virtually impossible to 
carve  out  a  secular  space  in  the  public  sphere,  as  everywhere  “traditional” 
religious beliefs have a privileged status. Rather than representing the norm in 
public  life,  secularism  and  pluralism  must  be  marked  by  citizens  “who 
consciously  left  [establishment  Islam  and  Orthodox  Christianity]  for  other 
religions, or are ardent atheists, of which we have very few.”61 As I will address 
in  the  chapters  to  follow,  this  compromised  secularism  necessarily  entails  a 
crackdown on the religious freedoms of  minorities,  especially practitioners  of 
“non-traditional” religions.
The regimes have responded to such criticism by asserting that they are in 
fact  defending the  secular  character  of  the  state  and the  rights  of  citizens  to 
freedom of conscience. Key formal goals of Kyrgyzstan’s religious policy include 
“strengthening… respect  for  the  principles  governing  relations  of  the  secular 
state and religious communities,” and “creating conditions for the realization of 
the fundamental rights of citizens to freedom of religion.”62 In Kazakhstan, once 
again, this rhetoric places particular emphasis on the nation’s unique history and 
61 Ibid.
62  Kyrgyz  Republic:  State  Policy  on  the  “Activities  of  the  State  Commission  under  the 
Government  of  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  on  Religious  Affairs.”  Approved  by  Decision  of  the 
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on July 7, 1998 No. 441.
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traditions of tolerance, to which religious extremism represents a grave threat.63 
One  Kazakh  political  scientist  asserted,  for  example,  that  “concerning 
nontraditional cults and currents,  it  is  necessary for Kazakhstan first  of  all  to 
ensure the rights of citizens, to preserve the interethnic and interfaith peace, not 
to allow deep faults that can split our society.”64
State-aligned experts have also been quick to point out the shortcomings in 
religious freedoms in Western democracies:
For  the sake of  Western standards,  we were trying to  comply with all 
applicable laws, even those that even in the West don’t work… We were 
required  to  uphold  absolute  liberalism  with  all  religious  communities. 
Whether it was the spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan — 
with 2500 mosques [covering] 70% of the population — or whether it was 
any  of  the  smallest  communities,  they  had  to  be  absolutely  equal  in 
status… Nowhere in the world is there such an absolute formal equality.65
In  this  rhetoric,  aggressively  secular  and  protectionist  policies  represent  a 
legitimate effort to defend the secular character of the state from “radical and 
non-traditional religious associations” that “contradict national interests in terms 
63 Dairova, Oksana. 2013. “Based on the Traditions and Customs.” Zakon, February 28. Retrieved 
May 9, 2017 (https://www.zakon.kz/4544112-osnovyvajas-na-tradicijakh-i-obychajakh.html).
64  Kusainov,  Dias.  Date  unlisted.  “Dogmatism  and  Religious  Radicalism  Were  Alien  to  the 
Inhabitants  of  the  Great  Steppe,  Receptive  to  New  Ideas  and  Open  to  Free  Intellectual 
Communication.”  Zakon.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?
doc_id=31051649#pos=1;-145).
65  Anonymous.  2011.  “It  Is  Necessary to  Toughen Requirements  for  Registration of  Religious 
Associations  in  Kazakhstan.”  Zakon,  June  2.  Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (http://www.zakon.kz/
217646-neobkhodimo-uzhestochit-trebovanija-k.html).
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of  building a  tolerant  society,  forming a  healthy and competitive  nation,  and 
ensuring  the  sovereign  right  to  strengthen  the  secular  and  democratic 
foundations of the state.”66
Conclusion: Religious Conversion and the Paradox of Self-Determination
Returning to the discussion with which I opened this chapter,  we can further 
elaborate  on  the  Durkheimian  framework  that  these  policies  impose  on  the 
individual, and on the nature of the paradox that they create between individual 
and collective self-determination. The political  and religious establishments in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan view national traditions (or rather, their authority to 
speak  for  national  tradition)  as  essential  to  national  stability  and  self-
determination.  Their  critics,  however,  see  these  regimes  as  appropriating  the 
sacred to legitimate their power. 
Herein  lies  the  supposed trade-off  between individual  and collective  self-
determination  articulated  by  my  respondents.  Disaffected  individuals  divest 
themselves from the cults of the nation propagated by the establishment, and 
pursue  autonomous,  heterodox  paths  of  self-determination.  The  discourse  on 
66  Anonymous.  2013.  “The  Military  of  Kazakhstan  is  Fighting  Extremism.”  Zakon,  March 11. 
Retrieved  May  9,  2017  (https://www.zakon.kz/4545769-voennye-kazakhstana-vedut-borbu-
s.html).
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national  tradition  represents  an  effort  to  contain  such  disaffection  by 
monopolizing the means of consecration — monopolizing the public authority to 
consecrate a collective will that ostensibly encompasses all citizens.
This  dilemma  of  individual  vs.  collective  self-determination  came  up 
repeatedly  in  my interviews,  and is  fundamentally  woven into  the  laws that 
govern  religious  regulation.  Government  officials  spoke  of  the  threats  that 
destructive  sects  represented  to  stability  and  security,  never  doubting  their 
conviction that the security of the regime and the security of the nation are one 
and the same. Converts and pastors spoke of how their practices are singled out 
and  scrutinized  to  demonstrate  their  destructive  character  and  incongruence 
with wholesome national traditions.
It  would  seem  that  authoritarian  regimes  fear  precisely  what  Goffman 
articulated about individualism: Modernity has seen the death of so many gods, 
so many sacred symbols of group solidarity (and bondage), but in their place the 
individual has risen as a “little god” in itself, sacred, sovereign, and “owed due 
ritual respect” (1967:95). Not only did officials describe such individualism as a 
threat;  they  also  consciously  draw  distinctions  between  their  own  political 
establishment  and  the  greater  capacity  for  individual  freedoms  in  Western 
democracies.  Independent  scholars  and  experts  engaged  me  in  theoretical 
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discussions of the greater capacity for individualism in Western societies: “You 
are better equipped to handle individualism in America, but it would undermine 
social stability here in Kyrgyzstan.”67 Individual dissent can be intolerable for 
those whose power is predicated on monopolizing the means of consecration — 
predicated on an essential and sacrosanct popular will. In the chapters to come, I 
will  address  the  various  means  that  the  governments  of  Kyrgyzstan  and 
Kazakhstan have developed for restricting the expression of such dissidence.
67 Interview with Bakyt Sadyrbekovich, Specialist on Religious Affairs in the Bishkek branch of 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization, July 7, 2014.
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CHAPTER 6
State Techniques for Censuring Heterodoxy
What is more important — the spiritual unity of the nation,
 or the individual's right to choose?
Kairat Lama Sharif
Director of Kazakhstan’s
State Agency for Religious Affairs
In the previous chapter,  I  examined how the governments of Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan seek to entrench the authority of “traditional” religions, primarily 
their  respective  Muftiates  and the  Russian Orthodox Church.  But  along with 
these efforts to consecrate an essential and sacrosanct popular will, both states 
have developed an expanding repertoire of restrictions designed to curtail the 
freedoms and activities of “non-traditional” religious groups. Across much of the 
post-Soviet  space,  freedom of  conscience  has  been redefined as  freedom from 
destructive  sects  and  radical  currents.  In  this  logic  of  statecraft,  the  state’s 
commitment to defending religious freedom translates into defending individual 
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citizens  from “various  non-traditional  destructive  religious  trends,  striving  to 
penetrate all spheres of public life.”1 
In  this  chapter,  I  will  explore  the  methods  through  which  various  state 
agencies monitor and regulate the activities of heterodox religious groups. I will 
focus in particular on the activities of Kazakhstan’s State Agency for Religious 
Affairs and Kyrgyzstan’s State Commission for Religious Affairs, but I will also 
engage the coordination between these entities and the other state and non-state 
apparatuses that support this agenda. These supporting institutions include both 
the security and law-enforcement agencies of  the state,  but also the manifold 
institutions that produce the “power-knowledge” that structures and legitimates 
these policies, including intellectuals, the media, and state-aligned NGOs.
I  have argued that  heterodoxy is  understood as such by the regimes,  and 
construed  as  a  threat  to  sovereignty  and  security,  precisely  because  of  the 
autonomy that  heterodox  religious  groups  and movements  exercise  from the 
religious and political establishment. The government of Kazakhstan has noted 
with  alarm  the  expansion  of  religious  movements  that  are  “new  and  non-
traditional,  such as  the  Jehovah's  Witnesses,  Mennonites,  Mormons,  Moonies, 
1  Izbairov,  Asylbek.  2011.  “Activities  of  Non-Traditional  Islamist  Organizations and Trends in 
Kazakhstan.”  Zakon,  November  24.  Retrieved  November  6,  2017  (http://online.zakon.kz/
Document/?doc_id=31085701#pos=0;1).
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Wahhabis, Hare Krishnas, Scientologists, Baha'i, Transcendental Meditation and 
more.”2 Heterodox groups do not threaten the regimes’ hold on power directly 
through political or dissident activity, but the very appeal of autonomous groups 
threatens  the  presumptive  mandate  of  the  regimes  to  speak  for  a  sacrosanct 
popular will — an essential will that ostensibly defines the values and interests of 
all constituents. This concern with autonomous groups extends back to the Soviet 
period. A resolution by the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic from 1987 identified 
a similar series of threatening organizations, including “unregistered associations 
of  Muslims,  supporters  of  the  so-called  council  of  churches  of  Evangelical 
Christians-Baptists,  Pentecostals,  Jehovah's  Witnesses  and others,  unregistered 
self-styled mullahs.”3 
The leadership of contemporary Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan claim a popular 
mandate  to  monitor  all  such  heterodox  religious  groups,  and  restrict  any 
activities deemed damaging to the public, which, by no coincidence, is measured 
according to individual deviance from the ideals of national consciousness and 
2 Republic of Kazakhstan. 2008. Government Decree on the Implementation of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. July 17, 20088 No. 701
3 Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic. 1987. Decision of the Council of Ministers of the Kyrgyz SSR 
on the work of the executive the committees of Tokmok city, Kant, Issyk-Ata and the Moscow 
District  Councils of People's deputies to monitor compliance with the legislation on religious 
cults. December 7, 1987 No. 558.
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patriotism.  In  other  words,  defending  individuals’  freedom  of  conscience 
becomes  tantamount  to  defending  the  sacrosanct  will  for  which  the  regime 
claims the ultimate right to speak. And yet, as I will show in this chapter, there is 
often a wide gap between these official discourses on religious “threats,” and 
actual enforcement practices. This gap results from the sheer disconnect between 
the rhetoric that justifies religious regulation, and the actual religious landscape 
in the region. 
For example, the regimes point to groups such as Hizbut-Tahrir as serious 
security threats, though there is scant evidence that the group has ever engaged 
in  terrorist  or  otherwise  extremist  activities.  Hizbut-Tahrir  simply  serves  the 
regimes  as  an  effective  example  of  the  security  threats  that  pluralism  can 
represent, and the regimes justify this characterization of the group by pointing 
to  the  global  tendency  (including  among  liberal  democracies)  to  securitize 
concerns over radical Islam. The regimes also single out for censure groups such 
as Falun Gong, the Chinese dissident movement with no known presence in the 
region, as a diplomatic nod to China and as evidence of regional cooperation in 
combating “destructive” religious movements. The regimes even draw attention 
to groups such as satanists, again with no genuine presence in the region, simply 
because  of  the  utility  of  satanism  as  a  justification  for  curtailing  religious 
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freedoms  and  according  more  rights  to  “traditional”  groups  than  to  “non-
traditional” groups. One political scientist in Kazakhstan, for example, took issue 
with the fact that small and subversive religious groups should have the same 
formal rights as large traditional religions:
To this day, we have some sort of sect of Satanists from “Jerdingbirjerova,” 
consisting of five people, which is legally equal to the Spiritual Board of 
Muslims  of  Kazakhstan.  Is  this  right?  For  comparison:  in  democratic 
states, all political parties are equal before the law, but in order to get seats 
in the Parliament, they must gain a certain percentage of the votes in the 
elections.4 
Kozyrev undermines his own point, ultimately, which his analogy of democratic 
elections. Indeed, just like marginal political parties, marginal religious groups 
are protected by law, but their social impact is directly limited to the size and 
devotion  of  their  following.  Nevertheless,  this  quote  demonstrates  how  the 
ideological needs of the establishment to attack heterodoxy can at times inflate 
the profile of heterodox groups far beyond their actual social impact. This divide 
between rhetoric  and reality often results  in enforcement practices  that  either 
deviate from official rhetoric in key respects, or hew close to official rhetoric at 
the expense of practical enforcement.
I  will  explore  this  tension  between  the  theory  and  practice  of  religious 
4 Kozyrev, Timur. 2011. “Homeland or God?” Zakon, September 20. Retrieved November 6, 2017 
(https://www.zakon.kz/4449591-timur-kozyrev-rodina-ili-bog.html).
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regulation in this chapter and the chapters that follow. I will first return to the 
two  main  discourses  that  I  identified  earlier  on  the  “threats”  that  religious 
heterodoxy  represents  —  the  distinction  between  “destructive  sects”  and 
“extremist” groups. As I will demonstrate, each of these overarching discourses 
calls forth a different response from the state that engages different governmental 
apparatuses.  I  then  explore  the  primary  methods  through  which  the 
governments  of  Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan  regulate  and  restrict  heterodox 
religious  groups.  These  methods  include  registration  and  monitoring  of 
heterodox groups, but most importantly involves producing the power-knowledge 
that links official policy to the harm that religious heterodoxy ostensibly inflicts 
on the public. I subsequently pursue the discourses on “destructive sects” and 
“extremism” more thoroughly in the two chapters that follow.
I. Defining Heterodox Threats
The primary way in which this divide between theory and practice plays out is in 
the  rationales  for  targeting  particular  religious  groups.  The  regimes  of 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan identify a number of characteristics that distinguish 
religious  heterodoxy  from  orthodoxy  in  general.  These  characteristics  draw 
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particular attention to the supposedly positive impact of traditional religions on 
society vs. the negative impact of non-traditional religious groups. In practice, 
however, local observers frequently distinguish heterodox religious groups from 
orthodoxy  purely  in  terms  of  affiliation.  Mere  association  with  an  already 
established “non-traditional” religious groups serves as a justification in and of 
itself for state and social scrutiny and censure.
Thus,  when  categorizing  active  religious  groups  in  Kazakhstan,  one  local 
scholar  casually  carved  up  the  religious  landscape  into  the  following  three 
mutually-exclusive categories: 
The  religious  associations  operating  in  Kazakhstan  are  conditionally 
divided into three groups. The first is Islam and Orthodox Christianity, the 
main  religions  that  have  existed  for  a  long  time  on  the  territory  of 
Kazakhstan.  The  second  group  is  the  unification  of  Catholic  and 
Protestant  Christianity,  Judaism  and  Buddhism.  The  third  group  is 
represented by new religious trends that appeared in Kazakhstan in the 
early 1990s. Of these, Christians are Jehovah's witnesses, the Holy Spirit 
Association for the unification of world Christianity, and the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.5
Religious policy and enforcement practices may be guided informally by such 
typologies  and the  underlying  prejudices  they  represent,  but  affiliation  alone 
cannot serve as a basis for religious regulation. The governments of Kazakhstan 
5 Gubaydulin,  Oleg. 2008.  “Whom to believe?” Caravan, July 25.  Retrieved November 6,  2017 
(https://www.caravan.kz/gazeta/komu-verit-52048/).
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and Kyrgyzstan are both heavily invested in their image as secular democracies 
and members of the global community, and neither can maintain this image if 
they  nakedly  target  religious  groups  based  purely  on  group  affiliation,  and 
subsequently  according  to  each  affiliation’s  autonomy  from  establishment 
political and religious apparatuses. 
In order to avoid the appearance of religious discrimination, therefore, state 
policies  in  the  religious  sphere  must  distinguish  heterodox  groups  from 
orthodoxy not merely according to their affiliations, but rather on the basis of 
certain determinable qualities.  We have already seen the qualities attributed to 
“traditional”  religious  groups  in  the  previous  chapter.  We  will  now examine 
some of the general  features that  ostensibly distinguish “non-traditional” and 
“destructive” religious groups from orthodoxy. 
These discourses address a wide range of religious groups and movements 
that are not officially registered with either the Muftiate or the Russian Orthodox 
Patriarchate. Before turning to particular methods of regulation, therefore, I wish 
to elaborate on two overarching official discourses about the “threat” of religious 
heterodoxy. As I discussed in chapter three, the regimes divide religious threats 
into two broad categories: 1) proselytism and conversion by “destructive sects,” 
and  2)  radicalization  within  the  recognized  traditional  religions,  especially 
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radical Islam.
Destructive Sects vs. Extremist Groups
First,  the  regimes  speak  of  the  threat  represented  by  citizens  converting  to 
“destructive sects” and “totalitarian cults,” whose proselytizing activities erode 
the essential  link between ethnicity,  religious affiliation,  and nationality:  “The 
transition of people from traditional confessions to non-traditional ones poses a 
threat to the unity of the nation and the state.”6 This language of “destructive 
sects” primarily gets applied to “Protestantism of various persuasions, including 
unconventional and charismatic,” and “neoplasms such as the Baha'is, Krishnas, 
Vaisnavas, Moonies, etc.”7 
By eroding the link that the regime seeks to make between national groups 
and  religious  affiliations,  such  pluralism  “brings  theological  confusion  to 
Kazakhs,” in the words of one pro-government scholar, cutting co-nationals off 
from their ‘rightful’  religious traditions, “which lasted for centuries in human 
6 Bimendin, Askar. 2013. “It Is Necessary to Make it So That People Will not Want to Leave the 
Largest  Traditional  Confessions.”  Zakon,  March  19.  Retrieved  November  6,  2017  (https://
www.zakon.kz/4547349-nuzhno-sdelat-tak-chtoby-ljudjam.html).
7 Burkhanov, K. 2011. “Constructive Dialogue Between Cultures and Civilizations.” Zakon, April 
6.  Retrieved November  6,  2017  (http://www.zakon.kz/208013-konstruktivnost-dialoga-kultur-
i.html).
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history.”8 A parliamentary commission in Kyrgyzstan similarly concluded that 
the proliferation of religious affiliations “complicates the religious situation in the 
republic and requires a serious approach and direct involvement of the state.”9 
The director of Kyrgyzstan’s SCRA noted with dismay, similarly, that:
According to the Constitution, every citizen is free to choose, at his own 
will, which god to pray to. But apostasy is much more complicated than it 
may seem at first glance… There are examples, especially in the south of 
the republic,  when the father and mother of a household are Muslims, 
while the daughter is a Baptist and the son is a Krishna; traditional family 
values are crumbling.10
“Destructive sects” are thus seen as a threat to the cultural coherence on which 
national and “spiritual sovereignty” ostensibly relies. 
If  destructive  sects  blur  religious-national  boundaries,  however,  other 
heterodox groups are feared to sharpen them. A second discourse on heterodoxy 
therefore details the “hidden threat” of extremism within the traditional religions 
that are increasingly central to national identity. In Central Asia, this discourse 
8 Nam, David. 2011. “New Religious Movements and Their Influence on the National and State 
Identity  of  Modern  Kazakhstan.”  Zakon,  March  16.  Retrieved  November  6,  2017  (https://
online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=30951074#pos=1;-117).
9 Kyrgyz Republic. 2008. Decree of the Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic on Formation of the 
Parliamentary Committee on Examining Religious Situation in the Kyrgyz Republic.  May 22, 
2008 No. 409-IV.
10 Benliyan, Amaliya and Azamat Kasybekov. 2008. “God Sees Everything, but Waits.” Interview 
with the Director of the State Agency for Religious Affairs under the government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic Kanybek Osmonaliev. Vecherniy Bishkek, July 11. Retrieved November 6, 2017 (http://
members.vb.kg/2008/07/11/linia/1.html).
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particularly centers on Islam and the threat of radicalization and terrorism. An 
official review of government policies in response to extremism in Kyrgyzstan, 
for  example,  noted  that  “the  measures  taken  by  the  State  Commission  [for 
Religious Affairs] together with the leadership of SAMK [the Muftiate] are aimed 
at preventing the split of the Muslim community and the penetration of "new" 
tendencies such as Wahhabism, Akramia, etc.”11 But officials extend the threat of 
radicalism and fundamentalism to all “traditional” religions.
Here it should be noted that the very concept of "fundamentalism" has the 
same  relation  to  the  distortion  of  Islam,  as  well  as  the  distortion  of 
Christianity  and  Judaism.  Since  fundamentalism  is  inherent  in  every 
religion, we must realize that its danger as an antisocial phenomenon is a 
threat to every society, regardless of its confessional affiliation.12
The  regime  and  media  have  remained  fixated  on  conservative  and 
fundamentalist movements such as Wahabbism and Salafism, which ostensibly 
“call  for  a  caliphate,  a  rejection of  the secular  state,  consistently fight  for  the 
creation of a theocratic state and advocate the introduction of Shariah laws and 
the Shariah court,” and supposedly agitate for achieving such methods through 
11  Kyrgyz  Republic.  1998.  State  Policy  on  the  Activities  of  the  State  Commission  under  the 
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on Religious Affairs. July 7, 1998 No. 441.
12 Anonymous. 2013. “The Military of Kazakhstan is Acting Against Extremism.” Zakon, March 
11.  Retrieved November 6,  2017 (https://www.zakon.kz/4545769-voennye-kazakhstana-vedut-
borbu-s.html).
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“armed jihad.”13 The regimes point to certain perennial threats that have been 
thoroughly  established in  the  minds  of  their  citizenry,  such as  the  ostensibly 
extremist group Hizbut Tahrir. Though this group has never been linked to any 
public protests or social movements, let alone violent activities, it nevertheless 
causes anxiety for the regimes because of its cell-based structure and distribution 
of pamphlets that call for the creation of a single, global caliphate in place of 
nation-states. 
These two discourses thus depict  two qualitatively different  threats  to the 
nation  —  blurring  vs.  sharpening  religious  boundaries.  “Destructive  sects” 
threaten the sovereignty of “the people” by disrupting the contiguity between 
ethno-national  group  and  religious  belief.  “Extremist”  groups,  in  contrast, 
ostensibly  sharpen  these  boundaries  and  escalate  inter-faith  tensions  by 
radicalizing traditional religious groups “from within.”
And  yet,  these  discourses  are  not  mutually-exclusive  in  their  application. 
They represent messy categories of practice more than formally operationalized 
categories of theory. The terms are often used in conjunction, and are regularly 
applied  with  intentional  imprecision  to  implicate  a  wide  range  of  heterodox 
13  Smagulov,  Amanzhol.  2011.  “To Save Spiritual  Sovereignty.” Liter,  September 14.  Retrieved 
May 9, 2017 (http://abai.kz/post/10492).
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groups: 
More  than  80  non-traditional  religious  organizations  operate  on  the 
territory of our state. How to distinguish a true religious association, the 
church, from extremist, totalitarian and destructive? How to classify these 
organizations? The very name - "pseudo-Christianity" speaks to the fact 
that  so-called  new  religious  movements  are  Christian  only  in  word, 
masking their true direction behind the title.14
There is often significant overlap between the two discourses, with groups such 
as Baptists occasionally being called “extremist,” and groups such as Tablighi 
Jamaal  frequently  being  lumped  in  with  western  missionary  movements  as 
“destructive.” 
State Responses
Despite their imprecise and often overlapping application, however, these two 
discourses  retain  a  degree  of  autonomy  from  one  another  as  categories  of 
practice, because they engage distinct mandates of the state. The “threat” posed 
by blurred religious boundaries calls forth different forms of state power than 
that posed by sharpened religious boundaries. I thus compare and contrast these 
two policy discourses below and in the chapters that follow, but not with the 
14  Novikova, G. 2009.  “New Religious Movements of a Pseudo-Christian Orientation.” Zakon, 
April  21.  Retrieved  November  6,  2017  (http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?
doc_id=30406775#pos=1;-107).
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intention  of  reifying  the  regimes’  distinctions  between  destructive  sects  and 
extremist  groups.  Rather,  I  engage  this  distinction  in  order  to  explore  the 
different “governmentalities” associated with each discourse (Foucault 2009). 
Destructive sects  are far  more likely to be invoked as a  threat  to  national 
sovereignty — “spiritual sovereignty” in the words of local actors — and to be 
treated as a matter for civic institutions and legal action. As one observer put it, 
when asking whether “secular Kyrgyzstan” can be saved: 
We on the Kyrgyz "island of democracy" also face a flip side to our healthy 
constitutional  liberalism:  painful  symptoms  in  the  form  of  expanding 
totalitarian  sects  and  proselytism  that  insults  the  so-called  traditional 
denominations  -  when  some overly  active,  more  or  less  new religions 
shamelessly recruit people into their ranks.15
In this view, destructive sects may appear outwardly docile and law-abiding, but 
they represent a grave existential threat to the nation. Even as they defer to the 
laws of the sovereign state, destructive sects can take advantage of overly liberal 
laws to subvert the sovereignty of “the people’ themselves. As the director of 
Kazakhstan’s  SARA, Lama Sharif,  put  it,  destructive sects  “actively  penetrate 
into  the  secular  and  state  institutions  of  the  country,  into  the  education  and 
15  Tuzov,  Alexander  and  Bermet  Malikova.  2009.  “How  Can  We  Save  Secular  Kyrgyzstan?” 
Vecherniy  Bishkek,  November  4.  Retrieved  November  6,  2017  (http://members.vb.kg/
2009/11/04/polit/1.html).
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culture systems.”16 Efforts to contain destructive sects are thus often depicted as 
a battle for national survival in the face of globalization, but a battle to be fought 
in the courts, in the government house, and in the other civic institutions that are 
meant  to  secure  sovereign nationhood from Western  hegemony — economic, 
intellectual, military, and spiritual.
Islamic  extremism,  in  contrast,  is  often  depicted  as  a  direct  threat  to  the 
security  of  the  population  and the  regime,  which  must  be  addressed  by  the 
security apparatus of the state. A resolution by Kyrgyzstan’s ministry of internal 
affairs, for example, stated that:
Among  the  religious  movements  and  organizations  to  date,  the  most 
dangerous security threat to the Kyrgyz Republic is the religious extremist 
party Hizbut-Tahrir, which since 1995 has transferred its activities to the 
territory of Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan.17
This discourse draws its legitimacy not only from the ongoing war on terror, 
but from the deeper history of political and radical Islam in Muslim majority 
countries. Revolutionary groups have succeeded in winning popular support in 
16  Tynyshbaeva,  Ayman. 2011.  “Religion Requires Constant Attention and Painstaking Work.” 
Interview with Lama Sharif,  Chairman of the Agency of Religious Affairs in the Republic Of 
Kazakhstan.  Bnews,  November 15.  Retrieved November 6,  2017 (https://bnews.kz/ru/news/
o b s h c h e s t v o / k a i r a t _ l a m a _ s h a r i f _ r e l i g i y a _ t r e b u e t _ p o s t o y a n n o g o _ v n i m a n . 
iya_i_kropotlivoi_raboti).
17 Kyrgyz Republic. 2004. Government Decree on the Work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
the  Kyrgyz  Republic,  Local  government  Administrations  and  Local  Self-Government  for  the 
Prevention of Religious Extremism and Ethnic Hatred, Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic. July 20, 2004 
No. 543.
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many nations using Islam as a populist front. “Extremist” groups can similarly 
win hearts and minds within mainstream Islam in their own nations, officials 
fear,  radicalizing the population from within the ascribed traditional religious 
categories.  Indeed,  members  of  the  establishment  are  not  entirely  wrong  to 
conceive  of  these  groups  as  a  threat  to  their  security,  given  the  capacity  of 
autonomous discourses on Islam to strip the regime of moral authority in the 
eyes  of  the  majority.  Therefore,  populist  and  even  radical  Islam  can  directly 
undermine  the  security  of  the  regime.  In  a  classic  act  of  symbolic  violence, 
however, the regimes transform this concern with their power into an ostensible 
concern with  the  physical  security  of  their  populations  in  the  face  of  violent 
extremist threats.
The distinction between destructive sects and extremist groups thus provides 
two  overarching  narratives  of  the  “threat”  posed  by  heterodoxy  to  national 
traditions and to spiritual sovereignty. In the sections and chapters that follow, I 
will  examine  how  these  discourses  translate  into  policies  and  practices  of 
regulation.  I  treat  these  two  discourses  critically,  however,  bearing  in  mind 
Brubaker’s (2000) admonition that social scientists should not reproduce the very 
categories of practice that we analyze. Initially, I sought to explain these regimes’ 
aversion  to  heterodox  groups  according  to  the  doctrine  and  organizational 
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dynamics of the groups themselves. I compared groups that had received more 
and  less  scrutiny  from  the  regimes,  hoping  to  determine  what,  if  any 
determinable characteristics of heterodox groups brought greater pressure and 
censure  from  the  state.  By  comparing  dozens  of  religious  affiliations  and 
hundreds of individual organizations, I hoped to test the link between the states’ 
formal  rationale  for  restricting  particular  groups,  and  the  actual  qualities  of 
religious groups that seemed to trigger state attention and action. 
Searching  for  causal  factors  in  the  religious  groups  themselves  proved 
problematic,  however,  both  empirically  and  ethically.  Empirically,  I  quickly 
discovered that  the regimes applied these discourses on “threat” and “harm” 
without  particular  regard  for  careful  or  consistent  observation  of  the  actual 
beliefs or practices of heterodox groups. Rather than linking these discourses to 
actual  practices,  authorities  used them as  justifications for  the deployment  of 
particular forms of state power in the religious sphere and civil society. Official 
policy in the religious sphere is both created and enforced in an ad hoc manner, 
often focusing more on expedience and symbolic enforcement than on consistent 
governance  of  religious  groups.  Ethically,  focusing  on  the  characteristics  of 
religious groups themselves served to turn the lens of my research and scrutiny 
on the religious groups that frequently suffer harassment from the state. Were I to 
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pursue this approach, my analysis would implicitly argue that heterodox groups’ 
own beliefs and practices were responsible for the pressure and harassment they 
received from the state and society. For these reasons, I have chosen to devote 
most of my analysis to the state itself, examining the rationale of authority that 
has conditioned such policies.
These  two  relatively  distinct  discourses  —  on  destructive  and  extremist 
groups — are articulated in a way that maximizes the government and religious 
establishments’  mandate  to  speak  for  a  sacrosanct  popular  will.  When  state 
officials  distinguish the threat  of  religious extremism from that  of  destructive 
sects, they assert the contiguity of ethnic and religious identity: Citizens convert 
to  destructive  sects  such  as  Scientology  or  the  Jehovah’s  Witnesses,  but  are 
radicalized  “from  within”  by  extremist  groups  such  as  Hizbut  Tahrir.  The 
separation of these two discourses only makes sense within the establishment 
discourse on religious tradition, which promotes the jurisdiction of the Muftiate 
and Orthodox Church to speak for entire ethno-national groups. I will therefore 
address the many overlaps and ambiguities between these two discourses, which 
call  into  question  the  validity  of  the  regimes’  claims  to  be  defending  their 
populations from distinct and determinable threats.
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II. Methods of Regulation
Against these “threats,” the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have 
deployed a variety of regulations and other methods of obstruction. These vary 
from  formal  requirements  such  as  registration  and  compliance  with  often 
burdensome policies, to less formal obstacles such as opaque bureaucracy and a 
lack of government enthusiasm for protecting the rights of heterodox religious 
groups.  The  primary  means  by  which  the  states  regulate  heterodox religious 
groups,  however,  is  through  the  registration  requirements  and  through 
continuous monitoring by their respective agencies for religious affairs, and by 
other security and law-enforcement apparatuses.
In some respects, registering and monitoring non-traditional religious groups 
simply  reproduces  the  oversight  that  the  traditional  religious  establishments 
exercise  over  the  mosques,  churches,  and  other  organizations  under  their 
jurisdiction. “Traditional” religious organizations register with the Muftiate and 
Russian  Orthodox  Church,  respectively,  while  non-traditional  groups  register 
with the SARA and SCRA. The state’s efforts to monitor heterodox groups in 
many ways duplicates the oversight that the Muftiate and Orthodox Patriarchate 
exert over the doctrines and activities of their member congregations. But while 
these two governing bodies have direct (if imperfect) control over the doctrines 
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and practices propagated within their jurisdiction, the SARA and SCRA claim a 
mandate to monitor religious groups in defense of the principles of secularism 
and  freedom  of  conscience.  In  practice,  these  agencies  devote  a  significant 
amount  of  their  activity  producing  and  defending  the  technical  criteria  that 
justify these distinct religious jurisdictions. 
Thus,  the  state  essentially  maintains  two  sovereign  jurisdictions  for 
traditional and non-traditional religious groups. As a point of design, the criteria 
for  registration  become  self-legitimating.  Heterodox  groups  are  required  to 
submit their doctrinal texts and supporting materials to the agencies for analysis, 
resulting in policies that highlight and even inflate the deviations of these “non-
traditional” groups from “traditional” religions. These policies in turn reinforce 
the need for such scrutiny of heterodox religious groups, and provide technical 
justifications  for  specific  methods  of  regulation.  Just  as  the  justification  for 
religious regulation masks discrimination based purely on affiliation, so too the 
methods of  regulation are  designed to  obscure  the  regimes’  ultimate  concern 
with preserving their authority to speak for a sacrosanct popular will. 
In the sections below, I will focus on the two primary means by which the 
SCRA  and  SARA  regulate  the  activities  of  heterodox  religious  groups: 
registration requirements and monitoring religious activities. I will also examine 
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a  number  of  informal  means  whereby  the  state  obstructs  the  practices  of 
heterodox groups. 
Registration
The governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan restrict heterodoxy by requiring 
all  religious groups not  under the purview of  the Muftiate  or  Patriarchate to 
apply for registration with the SARA and SCRA, respectively. In the early 1990s, 
both  states  had  a  more  laissez  faire  attitude  toward  religion,  leading  to  lax 
enforcement  of  these  requirements.  In  the  mid-late  90s,  however,  both 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan became increasingly alarmed by the proliferation of 
unregistered  and  unmonitored  religious  groups  —  Muslim,  Christian,  and 
otherwise. A resolution of Kyrgyzstan’s government from 1997 notes: 
For example, in Osh Province there are about 600 mosques, of which only 
60 are registered; in Jalal-Abad Oblast only 68 out of 157 active mosques 
are registered; not a single mosque in Naryn oblast is registered, and there 
are  more  than  10  churches  of  the  Union  of  Churches  of  Evangelical 
Baptists of Kyrgyzstan that operate without registration, as well as more 
than 15 churches of Seventh-day Adventists.18
As a result, registration requirements have become increasingly strict over the 
years.  Both  states  have  sought  legislative  means  to  prevent  non-traditional 
18 Kyrgyz Republic: Government Decree “On the Religious Situation in the Kyrgyz Republic and 
the Task of Authorities to Form a State Policy in the Religious Sphere.” August 10, 1995 No. 345.
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groups  from starting  new congregations,  and even to  prevent  them from re-
registering existing ones. 
Religious organizations that wish to register with the SCRA and SARA must 
submit their charters and core religious texts for analysis,  along with a list of 
their founding members.19 “Founders” are understood as the initial members of 
the group, including the leadership and the members that confer authority on 
that leadership. This list must include each members’ full address of permanent 
residence, proving that they reside in the locality where the organization is to be 
established.  Religious  organizations  must  further  provide  updated  rosters  of 
their broader membership to the state regularly. 
Some religious organizations face difficulty registering because of the content 
of their core religious texts. The Church of Scientology, for example, came under 
scrutiny in Kazakhstan when its literature was examined by the court and SARA 
officials, who “conducted the expertise analysis of the package of documents of 
the religious association Church of Scientology, Pavlodar Dianetics Center, and 
came to the conclusion that these documents do not meet the requirements of the 
19 Ibid.
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law.”20  However,  Kyrgyzstan  and  Kazakhstan  have  increasingly  relied  on 
membership quotas to tighten regulations,  increasing the number of founders 
and members required for a religious group to register.  As opposed to labor-
intensive processes like inspecting charters and core religious texts, quotas for 
founders are easy to implement, and place the membership of the organizations 
under surveillance.
Quotas  for  minimum number  of  members  have  thus  become increasingly 
difficult to obtain. In 2001, for example Kyrgyzstan dramatically increased the 
number of founders and members necessary for registering a congregation as 
part  of  a  denomination.  Initially,  congregations  required  a  minimum  of  ten 
founders  and  fifty  members  in  the  district  in  which  the  groups  sought 
registration.21 Under the law passed in 2001 and further tightened in 2012, this 
requirement shifted to fifty founders per congregation (who must be citizens) 
and 200 members country-wide in affiliated congregations:
20 Republic of Kazakhstan. 2002. Court ruling of the Pavlodar regional court refusing a religious 
association  "Mission  of  the  Church  of  Scientology -  Pavlodar  Center"  Dianetics"  the  right  to 
register. September 20, 2002 No. 3-1-2-2002.
21 The older, more lenient provisions can be found in the 2012 Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on the 
Freedom  of  Conscience  and  Religious  Organization,  and  the  identically  named  law  of 
Kazakhstan from 1992.  Both  laws are  undergoing revision,  and pastors  of  several  Protestant 
congregations in Bishkek, KG, Almaty, KZ, and Astana, KZ attested to greater restriction on their 
capacity to register even as the stricter provisions work their way through various drafts on their 
way to ratification.
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The  new  standard  requires  no  less  than  200  signatures  [to  found  a 
religious organization], whereas current legislation requires only ten. This 
is quite a strict measure, but, in my view, this approach will protect our 
citizens from the active expansion of destructive, totalitarian dogmas and 
the ruinous interaction of different occult, quasi-religious sects.22
Officials  have  openly  stated  that  the  goals  of  such  changes  are  to  decrease 
religious pluralism. They noted that the initial requirements allowed too many 
small  religious groups to  register  and practice  with ease.  In  their  rhetoric,  of 
course, small groups are not benign, however. Rather small religious groups are 
viewed as fringe and radical. 
The former law allowed such religious organizations to go through the 
registration process without hindrance and conduct further activities:  it 
was  enough  to  gather  10  like-minded  people.  Take  such  groups  as 
Satanists, Baha'is and others. After the new law is put into effect, they will 
fall out of the legal field. The organizations that the law allows to register 
on the territory of the republic will have to bring their charters in line with 
the national legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic.23
In this rhetoric, small religious groups are small because they could not gain the 
support and consensus of larger numbers of people. Their beliefs and practices, 
therefore, must be extreme and destructive. In this view, increasing the quotas for 
registration provides an effective means of reducing the threat that fringe and 
22 Benliyan, Amaliya and Azamat Kasybekov. 2008. “God Sees Everything, but Waits.” Interview 
with the Director of the State Agency for Religious Affairs under the government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic Kanybek Osmonaliev. Vecherniy Bishkek, July 11. Retrieved November 6, 2017 (http://
members.vb.kg/2008/07/11/linia/1.html).
23 Pavlovich, Lyudmila. 2009. “Separate the Wheat From the Chaff.” Interview with the Director 
of the State Agency for Religious Affairs Kanybek Osmonaliev. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, March 20, No. 
29.
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radical religious groups represent to the population.
Given the political  environment in which heterodox organizations operate, 
these quotas represent a significant source of anxiety and intimidation for the 
members of heterodox groups. Congregation members are increasingly loathe to 
submit  their  personal  information  to  the  government  in  order  to  help  their 
congregation meet the registration quota,  for fear of  persecution or of  simply 
being  on  the  government’s  radar.  Those  who  list  themselves  as  founding 
members  have  legitimate  reason  to  anticipate  harassment  by  state  officials, 
especially if they are known to engage in proselytizing activity. For this reason, 
some congregations and missionary groups refuse registration: 
For  many  years  the  community  of  Evangelical  Baptist  Christians  of 
Aktobe  and  Alga  of  Alginsky  region  have  categorically  refused  state 
registration,  referring  to  the  fact  that  this  contradicts  their  doctrine. 
Leaders and members of the community have categorically refused offers 
of  registration,  demonstrating  their  inherent  religious  fanaticism  and 
intolerance to others’ opinions.24
This pressure to register applies not simply to “destructive” Christian sects, but 
also extends to unregistered mosques, which have refused to register with the 
Muftiate. Such mosques come under similar pressure to register and disclose lists 
of their founders and members. Thus, registration serves not only to limit the 
24  Turganbaev,  Aidyn.  2008.  “Fines  Do  Not  Scare  Missionaries.”Zakon,  July  27.  Retrieved 
November 6, 2017 (https://www.zakon.kz/119093-shtrafy-missionerov-ne-pugajut.html).
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ability of marginal and “non-traditional” religious groups to attain legal status 
and practice freely, but also serves to put the groups and their members under 
state surveillance.
Monitoring
The SARA and SCRA also monitor religious activity throughout their respective 
countries, and provide vital statistics and forecasts to the administration to guide 
religious policy. These activities are frequently undertaken in conjunction with 
the  law  enforcement  and  security  apparatuses  of  the  state,  as  well  as  in 
partnership with the Muftiates of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which actively 
monitor the mosques and imams under their jurisdiction. 
Monitoring is  not  merely seen as a passive activity,  however,  but rather a 
means of direct intervention in the religious field, as one proponent asserted: 
How can we resist the aggressive policy of missionaries, the dangerous 
doctrine of destructive sects and totalitarian cults, their elaborate methods 
of myth-making? The only way out is to analyze their activities, study the 
internal documents, dogmas and policy statements of their leaders.25 
Thus, in Kyrgyzstan, the SARA and the government more broadly has used its 
25  Sakenova,  Asem.  2013.  “Mechanisms  of  Predicting  Risk.”  Zakon,  January  21.  Retrieved 
November  6,  2017  (https://www.zakon.kz/4536601-mekhanizmy-prognoziruemosti-
riskov..html).
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mandate to monitor as a means to engage in contentious political issues such as 
women’s rights:
The State Commission under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic for 
Religious  Affairs  shall  organize  monitoring  of  the  religious  situation 
among women by region, in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice of the 
Kyrgyz Republic, to take legislative measures to regulate the missionary 
activities of various faiths.26 
This ostensible concern with women’s rights thus provides the state with a broad 
mandate  to  interfere  in  Islamic  missionary  movements  that  promote  more 
“traditional” gender roles. Such conflict between two discourses on tradition — 
national  traditions  and  ostensibly  more  conservative  Muslim  traditions  for 
women — provides a prime example of how officials understand radicalization 
“from within” traditional religion.
Even  more  brazen,  following  a  2010  coup  d’etat  that  ousted  President 
Kurmanbek Bakiev, which was accompanied by inter-ethnic violence in the south 
of the country, the Kyrgyz government appointed a commission to investigate 
the role of religious extremism in inciting ethnic violence between Kyrgyz and 
Uzbeks. The cause of the violence was an extremely sensitive issue at the time. 
The Kyrgyz majority simply wanted to lay the blame at the feet of a “belligerent” 
26 Kyrgyz Republic. 1996. Government Decree on the Situation of Women in the Kyrgyz Republic 
and Measures of Assistance in the Transition Period. May 13, 1996 No. 212.
230
Uzbek minority, but independent observers generally concluded that the ousted 
Bakiev, who took refuge in his southern home district, fomented enmity between 
Kyrgyz  and Uzbeks  to  shore  up  his  base  of  support  among southern  ethnic 
Kyrgyz. 
The  riots  that  resulted  brought  death  and  dispossession  to  Uzbek 
communities  across the South at  the hands of  the state  and the local  Kyrgyz 
population.  But  the  commission concluded that,  “The State  National  Security 
Committee,  the  Ministry  of  Internal  Affairs,  the  Ministry  of  Education  and 
Science, and the State Commission for Religious Affairs, [should] intensify their 
explanatory  work  on  the  activities  of  Hizbut-Tahrir,  and  the  Islamic  radical 
groups Ahmadiya and Salafiya.”27 This conclusion represents a clear agenda to 
blame the violence on Uzbeks, who are considered generally more religious than 
Kyrgyz. Terms such as “Salafiya” and “Ahmadiya” can be used as euphemisms 
for the “foreign” form of Islam followed by Uzbeks, as opposed to the moderate 
form of Islam native to ethnic Kyrgyz.
Kazakhstan’s  SARA expends  significantly  greater  resources  on  monitoring 
the activities of religious groups — both “traditional” groups such as mosques 
27 Report of the National Committee on Comprehensive Examination of Causes, Consequences 
and Recommendations for the Tragic Events in the South of the Republic in June 2010. 2011. Belyi 
Parus, January 20. Retrieved November 6, 2017 (http://www.paruskg.info/2011/01/20/38564).
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and churches under the purview of the Muftiate and Orthodox Church, and non-
traditional  groups.  Routine  checks  of  registered  religious  organizations 
frequently find “violations” of the religious law:
Violations  of  the  law  were  also  found  during  the  investigation  of  the 
activities  of  the religious association "Evangelical  Christian Baptists."  It 
was verified that the leader organized the work of his community in a 
private house without registering a religious association. In addition, he 
opened a prayer house at this address, where he conducted a sermon and 
gathered parishioners three times a week. The total number of members of 
this  religious  association  is  approximately  30-35  people,  "M.  Turubaev 
said.28
Kazakhstan’s  government  not  only  monitors  activities  of  registered 
organizations,  but  also  uses  its  considerably  greater  resources  to  scan  for 
evidence  of  underground  congregations.  Authorities  have  even  targeted 
individuals  who  have  shared  their  religious  beliefs  or  attended  religious 
gatherings,  charging  them  with  violating  the  rules  governing  religious 
proselytization:
Investigators  stated  that  the  activities  of  foreign  missionaries  were  in 
violation of the provisions of the Criminal Code and the National Security 
Law,  directed  against  the  threat  to  the  state  constitutional  system.  In 
September, authorities detained and issued warrants for the deportation 
of six non-accredited Muslim missionaries from Pakistan, who intended to 
28  Anonymous.  2007.  “Since  the  Beginning  of  the  Year  Three  Religious  Associations  Were 
Revealed in Semei Operating Without Official Registration.” Semipalatinsk, August 21. Retrieved 
November 6, 2017 (http://www.semsk.kz/archive/2007/relig.htm).
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attend a religious conference in Zhambyl.29
The  government  has  even  been  known  to  conduct  raids.  In  the  case  of 
Scientology, a raid by the SARA in conjunction with law enforcement officials led 
to the confiscation of the confession files that the center kept on its members:
"More than 300 complaints were filed by parishioners of the Church of 
Scientology in the prosecutor's office and the KNB [the National Security 
Service, successor to the KGB or State Security Service] about the return of 
materials previously removed from the church. The parishioners demand 
immediately to return the files with confessions and insist that the KNB 
keep the secret of confession for the faithful of all religions, "it was written 
in  the  message  of  the  church…  In  addition  to  confession  materials, 
officials  also  confiscated  books,  religious  tools  and  artifacts  containing 
Scientology writings, and other items without which parishioners of the 
church  are  unable  to  continue  to  confess  or  study  the  writing  of 
Scientology.30
In some cases, these raids are also conducted in coordination with regional 
organizations  such  as  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  and  the 
Collective  Security  Treaty  Organizations  —  two  entities  that  arose  after  the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union to preserve elements of economic and defense 
coordination:
In February, the authorities of the North-Kazakhstan region conducted a 
preventive  action  called  "Operation  of  religious  extremism",  which 
resulted in  the  arrest  of  eight  pastors  and church leaders  for  violating 
29 Report on the Situation with Human Rights in Kazakhstan for 1998. 1999. Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor, US Department of State.
30 Anonymous. 2009. An Open Letter to the Head of State from the Leadership of the Church of 
Scientology in  the  City  of  Almaty.  Zakon,  February 16.  Retrieved November  6,  2017 (http://
www.zakon.kz/133481-rukovodstvo-cerkov-sajjentologii-goroda.html).
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legislation on the registration of religious associations. The authorities said 
that  this  operation was part  of  a  wider program conducted within the 
framework  of  the  CIS  aimed  at  combating  terrorism  and  violent 
extremism.  In  most  cases,  church leaders  of  the  Baptists  and Christian 
Evangelicals were fined.31
The SARA and SCRA are also tasked with resolving interfaith disputes, which 
in practice comes down to mediating disputes between non-traditional religion 
and the local populations that take issue with their activities. One of the most 
frequent disputes has been over burial rights in rural areas. Villages often take 
exception if a convert to a religion such as Baptism is to be buried in the local 
cemetery, which suddenly transforms in status from the village cemetery to a 
Muslim cemetery.32 Other disputes involve local imams taking issues with non-
traditional congregations and activities.33 Almost invariably, the agencies seek to 
resolve these conflicts in favor of the traditional religion.
Finally,  if  such complaints go to court,  experts from the agency frequently 
testify  in  support  of  the  government’s  position.  Court  cases  are  frequently 
brought by non-traditional religious groups as well, who wish to appeal rejected 
31 Report on the Situation with Human Rights in Kazakhstan for 2007. 2008. Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor. Retrieved November 6, 2017 (https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2007/100615.htm).
32  Interview with the director of a human rights NGO specializing in freedom of conscience, 
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, July 2014.
33  Interview with professor  of  anthropology specializing in  local  religious  activities,  Bishkek, 
Kyrgyzstan, June 2014.
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applications  to  register  as  an  organization or  establish  a  new branch.  In  this 
respect,  the  application  of  religious  policy  differs  dramatically  between 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s legal system is far more dependent on 
and  loyal  to  the  administration  than  Kyrgyzstan’s,  resulting  in  expedited 
decisions in favor of the government’s position.34 Courts in Kyrgyzstan have a 
modicum  of  political  autonomy,  although  judges  tend  to  be  conservative  to 
national  and  even  Soviet  ideals.  Nevertheless,  in  the  cases  that  I  attended  - 
appeals  for  registration  brought  by  the  Unification  Church  of  Sun  Myung 
Moon,35  Jehovah’s  Witnesses,36  Scientology,37  and  even  Tengrians38  -  it  was 
common for judges to question the legality of government policies, and even the 
expertise and qualifications of officials from the State Commission for Religious 
Affairs.
Bureaucratic Obstruction
34 Interview with representative of the Kazakh Human Rights Council, Almaty, KZ, July 2014.
35 Kyrgyz Republic. 2013. Court hearing about the appeal to the Supreme Court of Kyrgyzstan by 
the representatives of the Unification Church of Sun Myung Moon, July 24, 2013.
36 Kyrgyz Republic. 2012. Court hearing about the appeal to the Supreme Court of Kyrgyzstan by 
the representatives of Jehova’s Witnesses, November 18, 2012.
37 Kyrgyz Republic. 2013. Court hearing about the appeal to the Pervomaysk Regional Court by the 
representatives of the Church of Scientology, July 19, 2013.
38 Kyrgyz Republic. 2013. Court hearing about the appeal to the Pervomaysk Regional Court by the 
representatives of Tengrians, August 17, 2013.
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Possibly none of these formal methods is as onerous, though, as the multitude of 
informal  means  whereby  the  governments  and  peoples  of  Kyrgyzstan  and 
Kazakhstan  obstruct  the  practices  and  circumscribe  the  rights  of  heterodox 
religious groups. These methods, known to all authoritarian regimes, exploit the 
mercurial relations between state and society, regime and supporters. The state 
exerts concerted pressure on dissident groups at certain moments, and obscures 
or deflects all traces of such coordination at other moments. State authority can 
appear menacingly, and vanish just as quickly without a single, culpable trace. 
Possibly the most formidable weapon in the state’s arsenal of obstruction is 
simple bureaucratic procedure. Of the registration process, for example, a 2001 
State  Department  report  on  Kazakhstan  noted,  “Usually  this  is  a  quick  and 
simple process. However, some religious sects had difficulties registering in some 
instances. These are the sects of Jehovah's Witnesses, some Protestant sects, as 
well  as  Muslim  sects,  independent  of  the  spiritual  leader  of  the  Mufti 
Muslims.”39 The report went on to mention several technical hurdles that tend to 
impede the registration of heterodox groups, including special requirements for 
any form of religious education:
39 Report on the Situation with Human Rights in Kazakhstan for 2001. 2002. Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor, US Department of State.
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One human rights activist reported that the government usually refuses to 
appeal  allegedly  because  the  statutes  of  religious  organizations  are 
inconsistent with the law. For example, the law does not allow religious 
sects to engage in the education of children without the consent of the 
Ministry of Education, and many religious sects include education in their 
statutes.40
Representatives of Scientology were blocked from establishing a dianetics center 
in  Almaty  due  to  such  provisions.  Scientology’s  practices  were  deemed 
educational in character, subjecting the church to a series of onerous regulations:
Article 7 of the same Law provides that only religious departments and 
associations operating in the territory of two or more oblasts [provinces] 
of  the  Republic  have  the  right  to  establish  religious  educational 
institutions;  therefore,  this  association  can  not  engage  in  educational 
activities.41
When challenged by religious groups and rights watchdogs on the intentional, 
coordinated, and targeted application of such requirements to specific groups, 
the regimes easily deflect and present themselves as a moderating influence on 
inter-faith relations. This tactic can even incorporate media campaigns against 
heterodox groups.
In the case of a Hare Krishna commune in southern Kazakhstan, for example, 
local authorities baited popular disapproval of the group in order to justify the 
40 Ibid.
41 Republic of Kazakhstan. 2002. Court ruling of the Pavlodar regional court refusing a religious 
association  "Mission  of  the  Church  of  Scientology -  Pavlodar  Center"  Dianetics"  the  right  to 
register. September 20, 2002 No. 3-1-2-2002.
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wholesale demolition of the community.  The leader of the commune “alleged 
that the authorities arrived for the April inspection with television camera crews 
and then ordered the stations to report on the raid. In one television report, the 
Krishnas  were  described  as  extremists  and  criminals.”42  The  commune  was 
subsequently  ordered  to  be  demolished,  with  some  claiming  that  the  local 
government was simply trying to clear the land for an opaque deal with a local 
business. Demolition began even as the Krishna commune appealed the decision, 
but encountered a smokescreen of diffuse bureaucratic authority. 
When the Krishna commune appealed to the (at  that time) Committee for 
Religious Affairs,  “the Committee recommended that the "Society for Krishna 
Consciousness", in accordance with the procedure established by law, apply to 
the local executive bodies of the Karasai District.”43 When the leadership then 
appealed to the Akimat  or district government, “the Akimats of Almaty oblast 
and Karasai district assured the representative of the Committee on Religious 
Affairs  that  they  do not  have  information about  who gave  the  order  for  the 
42 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.  2003. Bureau of  Democracy,  Human Rights,  and 
Labor, U.S. Department of State. Retrieved November 6, 2017 (https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2002/18373.htm).
43 Anonymous. 2007. “The Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan Summarized the 
Work of the Committee on Issues Related to Land Disputes of Individual Members of the Society 
for  Krishna  Consciousness.”  Zakon,  January  5.  Retrieved  November  6,  2017  (http://
online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=30083020#pos=1;-117).
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demolition of the houses of the Hare Krishnas.”44 Despite this supposed lack of 
clarity  about  who  gave  the  order  for  demolition  and  on  what  authority,  the 
demolition was carried out,  and the Hare Krishna community entered into a 
protracted legal battle for compensation, monetary or in the form of a new plot of 
land,  during  which  their  capacity  to  practice  their  faith  was  dramatically 
curtailed. 
Such informal  uses (and abstentions from use)  of  state  authority can thus 
present  far  more  onerous  burdens  on  the  free  practice  of  religions  and  the 
exercise of religious rights than do formal regulations. Of course, there need not 
be  any  tradeoff  between  formal  and  informal  obstacles;  both  levels  of  state 
authority and discretion can and do reinforce each other. This point especially 
holds true when policy goals extend beyond the limits of state capacity for policy 
enforcement. I explore this point more thoroughly in the following section.
III. State Weakness and Informal Enforcement Practices
Despite the increasingly restrictive stance that the governments of Kazakhstan 
and  Kyrgyzstan  have  taken  in  regard  to  religious  heterodoxy,  state  practices 
44  Anonymous.  2007.  “Demolition  of  Hare  Krishna  Houses  in  Almaty  Region  is 
Suspended.”  Zakon,  May 7.  Retrieved November  6,  2017 (https://www.zakon.kz/86847-snos-
domov-krishnaitov-v-almatinskojj.html).
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betray a more piecemeal approach to enforcement. The very policies designed to 
make religion legible (Ferguson 1994; Scott 1998) to the state also establish formal 
standards  that  would be  cumbersome and prohibitively  expensive  to  enforce 
consistently.  Furthermore,  the  various  state  structures  tasked  with  enforcing 
these policies make little effort to coordinate their efforts. Officials often seem 
more concerned with ensuring that the state’s authority is felt in the religious 
sphere than with enforcing religious policy consistently. 
The result is that religious policies tend to be enforced in an ad hoc manner, to 
cases  that  come  into  the  authorities’  field  of  view.  The  political  will  for 
enforcement comes and goes, and with it the resources for enforcement. Even in 
the better funded SARA of Kazakhstan, an official admitted in an interview that 
they monitor heterodox groups actively only when funds allow, and otherwise sit 
in  their  offices  analyzing broader  trends.  Their  capacity  to  monitor  primarily 
depends  on  religious  groups  complying  with  the  law  and  applying  for 
registration, which most groups do voluntarily in order to avoid scrutiny from 
the state security services.45 
Thus, despite the state’s awesome authority over the fate of any particular 
religious group, the state is also quite weak in many ways, and must rely on 
45 Interview with official in the Analytics Department of the SARA, Astana, August 11th 2014.
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enforcement mechanisms that emphasize authority over capacity. In this section, 
I will examine many of the limitations of policy enforcement, and examine two 
mechanisms  that  the  states  employ  to  make  up  for  these  limitations:  token 
enforcement  and  promoting  a  common  language  of  state  authority  over 
coordinated practices of enforcement. 
The Limits of Enforcement Capacity
State  officials  and  orthodox  religious  leaders  frequently  complain  about  the 
limitations of religious policy and enforcement strategies. The primary complaint 
is the limitations placed on the state by “overly-liberal” religious laws. Thus, one 
Kazakh political scientist noted that, ”our legislation is some of the most liberal 
in the world, [which…] sometimes gives rise to unexpected effects, such as the 
uncontrolled  penetration  of  missionaries  of  other  faiths  into  the  Kazakhstan 
‘religious  market.’”46  An  expert  on  religious  affairs  in  Kyrgyzstan  similarly 
lamented that, ”Scientologists are banned in Russia and other countries, while 
their  churches  openly  work  in  the  Kyrgyz  Republic.  [Meanwhile]  there  are 
twelve Turkish lyceums in the country, which divorce our children from their 
46 Nurseitova, Torgyn. 2011. “Political Scientist Timur Kozyrev: Testing with Hijab - A New Test 
for  Tolerance?”  Islam  in  SNG,  January  21.  Retrieved  November  6,  2017  (http://
www.islamsng.com/kaz/interviews/995).
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national cultural heritage.”47
Even when laws introduce greater restrictions on religious freedoms, these 
laws  are  often  poorly  written,  incompatible  with  existing  laws  that  defend 
religious  freedoms,  and  face  significant  obstacles  to  implementation  and 
enforcement. One exasperated legal expert noted of Kyrgyzstan’s 2012 law on 
religious freedom that:
Despite the fact that the law has been in force for more than five months, 
there  are  still  no  by-laws  regulating  the  procedure  for  re-registration, 
evaluation of literature, etc. According to many interviewers [of religious 
organizations],  this  further  aggravates  the  general  mood  of  anxiety. 
However, even when all the papers are aligned, it is naive to hope for the 
opportunity to legislatively solve the problems associated with the growth 
of religious extremism, proselytism and religious expansion.48
Thus,  the  legislation  governing  religious  activities  reveals  numerous 
shortcomings and sources of state weakness.
A second weakness involves limitations on monitoring the activity of groups 
deemed non-traditional and threatening. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan both have 
many  remote  areas  to  cover,  and  each  state  has  outlined  a  wide  variety  of 
activities  to  police  in  relation  to  religious  groups.  With  respect  to  the  first 
47 Shvets, Sergey and Bermet Malikova. 2010. “Terror for Terror! And Not Otherwise” Vechernyi 
Bishkek,  December  15.  Retrieved  November  6,  2017  (http://members.vb.kg/2010/12/15/
oboron/1.html).
48 Grebenyuk, Olga. 2012. “About Religions and Laws” Zakon, March 13. Retrieved November 6, 
2017 (https://www.zakon.kz/4479198-o-religijakh-i-zakonakh-o.-grebenjuk.html).
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challenge, both countries have set up local offices to assist local government in 
implementing  religious  policy.  Kyrgyzstan’s  government  established  a 
Coordination Council for Combating Religious Extremism in Issyk-kul province, 
for  example,  to  “create  and  implement  state  policy  in  the  field,  countering 
religious  extremism  and  fundamentalism,  destructive  and  totalitarian  groups 
and organizations, as well as preventing conflict on a religious basis.”49 
Such offices have limited capacity to monitor the activities of local religious 
groups however, and do little to allay the broader concern with the proliferation 
of “destructive” and “extremist” practices. One report noted, for example, that 
even so common an activity  as  tithing can directly  support  radical  and even 
terrorist causes:
The supporter transfers money in the form of a charitable donation, or 
"zakat"  (a  form of  tithe  based on a  religious  commitment  in  Islam)  to 
mosques,  imams  or  non-profit  organizations,  which  in  turn  support 
radical fundamentalism.50
As I discuss below, this concern is even more acute in relation to the distribution 
of “extremist” religious content online.
Finally,  state  officials  express  frustration  with  the  limitations  placed  on 
49 Kyrgyz Republic. 2003. Ysyk-Kul State Administration Decree on the State and Measures for 
the Prevention of Delinquency. May 12, 2003 No. 4.
50  Anonymous.  2008.  Moneyval:  Counteracting  Money  Laundering  and  Financing  Terrorism. 
Council  of  Europe,  July  7-11.  Retrieved  November  6,  2017  (http://www.cbr.ru/today/
anti_legalisation/ec/ML_and_counterfeiting_rus.pdf).
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enforcement by the rule of law — by the capacity of religious organizations to 
fight back through the courts. One proponent of greater freedom of religion in 
Kazakhstan spoke candidly of this limitation:
I  would  like  to  note  that  the  religious  associations  and  groups  of  the 
Protestant movement have adapted quite well to the strict requirements of 
the authorities,  and have learned to counteract  them in the legal  field. 
They have learned to circumvent  the absurd illegal  demands skillfully. 
That  is,  they  have  the  most  experience  in  protecting  their  rights.  For 
example,  Jehovah's  Witnesses  hold an experienced lawyer  among their 
adherents,  who successfully  provides  legal  assistance  to  their  religious 
association.51
Such experience in fighting for religious rights produces victories for heterodox 
groups  on  some  occasions,  to  the  chagrin  of  the  political  and  religious 
establishment:
In  May,  the  Taraz  City  Court  dismissed  the  appeal  of  the  town's 
prosecutor  demanding  to  revoke  the  registration  and  suspend  the 
activities of one of the congregations of Jehovah's Witnesses operating in 
Taraz. This appeal, directed against only one of the seven congregations 
operating  in  the  area,  claims  that  Jehovah's  Witnesses  violate  the 
constitution by their actions, urging their members to renounce military 
service [still required of young men in most post-Soviet countries].52
Precisely this opposition to military service led to the official disbanding of the 
51  Nurseitova,  Torgyn.  2012.  “In  Kazakhstan,  Radical  Islam  Has  Formed  Underground.” 
Interview with an independent  lawyer  Zhangazy Kunserkin.  Military  Magazine  of  Kazakhstan, 
May  30.  Retrieved  November  6,  2017  (http://military-kz.ucoz.org/news/
zhangazy_kunserkin_v_kazakhstane_sformirovalsja_podpolnyj_islam_radikalnogo_tolka/
2012-05-30-2559).
52 Report on the Situation with Human Rights in Kazakhstan for 2001. 2002. Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor.
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Jehovah’s Witnesses throughout the whole of the Russian Federation in 2017 and 
the seizing of property.53 In this case, however, a congregation was able to enact 
their  rights  through  the  courts,  placing  a  direct  limit  on  local  government’s 
capacity to restrict their activities.
Token Enforcement
These  instances  of  state  weakness  lead to  a  series  of  strategies  that  focus  on 
projecting  enforcement.  State  officials  are  often  far  more  concerned  with 
addressing  symbolic  challenges  to  the  regime  than  with  actually  governing 
individual  conduct.  For  example,  the  governments  of  both  Kazakhstan  and 
Kyrgyzstan initiated special legislation and litigation to ban the 2012 film The 
Innocence of Muslims, which drew global criticism for slandering the name and 
life  of  Muhammad.  This  obscure  film,  posted to  youtube,  received a  level  of 
attention that  was in absurd disproportion to its  amateurish production.  And 
though the film was produced in the U.S.  for no particular audience,  lacking 
even an official translation into Russian, its notoriety alone sufficed for concerted 
attention from the highest levels of government in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
53 Higgins, Andrew. 2017. “Russia Bans Jehovah’s Witnesses, Calling It an Extremist Group.” New 
York  Times,  April  21.  Retrieved  November  6,  2017  (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/
world/europe/russia-bans-jehovahs-witnesses.html?mcubz=1&_r=0).
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The  parliament  of  Kyrgyzstan,  for  example,  approved  a  declaration 
condemning the film as an effort “to stir up interfaith hatred, enmity and Clashes 
of  civilizations,”  and  directing  the  Prosecutors  office  to  “take  measures  to 
prohibit the access and distribution of the film "Innocence of Muslims", including 
in the Internet space.”54 The prosecutors in Kazakhstan similarly petitioned the 
court to ban multiple internet domains where the film could be watched, citing 
the film’s “extremist” content,  which "offends the religious feelings of  people 
professing Islam, and is aimed at inciting religious hatred and discord.”55
Presumably, even the authorities were aware that this attention to one film 
would  do  nothing  to  restrict  their  citizens’  access  to  countless  other  online 
sources of “extremist” content. The court ruling in Kazakhstan lists half a dozen 
URLs where the film can be watched, attesting to state officials’ recognition that 
litigation can hardly keep pace with distribution online. The film was already 
available at dozens of other URLs by the time the court had ruled on the matter. 
And yet, despite these clear limitations in the efficacy of legislation and litigation, 
the governments of both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan felt compelled to ban The 
54 Kyrgyz Republic. 2012. Court Ruling About the Film “Innocence of Muslims.” September 20, 
2012. The judge cites the relevant statement from the Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic.
55  Republic  of  Kazakhstan.  2012.  Court  Ruling of  the Saryarka District  Court  of  Astana City, 
October 4, 2012 No. 2-6251/12.
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Innocence of Muslims as a particularly egregious form of “extremism.”
What  logic  guides  such  enforcement  strategies?  What  is  the  purpose  of 
policies that make religious dissidence legible to the state, if they defy consistent 
enforcement? To answer these questions, I turn to one more example.
Coordinated Language of Enforcement
This disconnect between formal and informal politics — and the utility of largely 
symbolic  formal  policies  —  becomes  more  clear  if  we  again  make  use  of 
Bourdieu’s model of representation as a mystery of ministry. It would be an over 
simplification to treat the ruling party in a given polity as a single ministry — a 
single voice that  substitutes for  the voices of  all  its  constituents.  Even highly 
unified and disciplined parties  struggle  to  coordinate  their  outward message, 
and at best represent a messy assemblage of symbiotic ministries. Single-party 
rule,  as  in  Kazakhstan,  makes  such  coordination  even  more  complex,  as  the 
messages propagated at the top must be translated across numerous functional 
divisions  within  the  government  —  diverse  sets  of  officials  who  propagate 
variations on the core ministry when interacting with the public in their own 
spheres of competence. 
This process is made significantly easier by coordinating around a particular 
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effigy of “the people.” Regimes — i.e. the multitude of ministries that constitute a 
regime — need not coordinate every facet of their message, so long as they can 
lay out certain consistent signposts to demarcate who “the people” are, what the 
popular will is, and who has authority to speak for that will. Even inconsistently 
enforced policies can thus be useful, so long as they assist state officials (as well 
as state-aligned public figures in the religious and other spheres) to coordinate 
their ministries in a consistent effort to appropriate the voice of the people. They 
serve  as  signposts  of  the  collective  consciousness  to  both  the  public  and the 
agents of the regime itself.
This  function  was  vividly  displayed  at  government  trainings  on  religious 
extremism.  At  the  trainings  I  attended  in  Kyrgyzstan,  the  SCRA presented 
analyses of  the latest  tendencies in the religious sphere to agents of  the state 
security  services,  local  government  and  law-enforcement  officials,  local 
prosecutors, academics, and various other experts. However, the presentations 
and  accompanying  conversations  were  minimally  devoted  to  coordinating 
enforcement strategies. Rather, they primarily served to ensure that all officials in 
the room spoke a single idiom of governance. 
SCRA officials  provided textbook definitions of  extremism and radicalism, 
and  connected  them  to  perceived  threats.  They  recounted  the  numbers  of 
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mosques and madrassas in the country, expressing concern over the perceived 
growth  in  unregistered  entities.  They  made  frequent  reference  to  perennial 
boogeymen such as Hizbut Tahrir and Tablighi Jammat, recounting the list  of 
known  and  suspected  chapters  of  these  organizations  and  their  sources  of 
funding. They listed the number of Protestant churches operating in the country, 
and  spoke  of  the  great  potential  these  congregations  presented  for  interfaith 
conflict. Particular attention was devoted to the “destructive” methods employed 
by  Scientology  and  the  Jehovah’s  witnesses.  After  half  a  dozen  such 
presentations,  the  organizers  noted  that  the  combined  efforts  of  those  in 
attendance had managed to keep the religious situation under control over the 
previous three years, and concluded by encouraging continued vigilance.
All  of  this  served  to  ensure  that  local  branches  of  government  and  law 
enforcement use, in the words of Gellner, a unitary conceptual currency to enact 
their public mandate in the religious sphere (Gellner 1983:21). Few of the officials 
that  attended  were  likely  to  encounter  the  religious  organizations  that  they 
discussed in the daily course of discharging their duties, and yet they diligently 
noted the concepts and rhetoric that define the official politics in the religious 
sphere. Such activities constitute most of the business of governance 
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Conclusion: “Defending” Secularism
The sum total of the policies covered in this chapter is to redefine freedom of 
conscience  as  freedom  from  non-traditional  religious  groups.  Through  these 
policies, and the various discourses that inform and legitimate them, the regimes 
seek to depict certain expressions of religious freedom as an attack on the rights 
of citizens, and present the state’s authority to defend rights as a mandate to 
defend the citizenry from these destructive sects and extremist groups. In such a 
context, authorities speak frankly and without any irony of the ways in which 
heterodox groups “violate” the freedom of religions:
We found twenty-seven violations of the law “On Freedom of Conscience 
and Religious Associations” on the part of leaders and adherents of non-
traditional  religious  associations.  We  confiscated  materials  propagating 
radical religious ideas, as well as the creeds of non-traditional religious 
associations. Alongside [the doctrines of] the Spiritual Administration of 
Muslims, jihadism is being propagated among the believing part of the 
population  through  active  use  of  visual  agitation,  speeches  and 
sermons.56 
The “qualities”  of  heterodox groups  that  I  have  identified in  this  chapter 
contribute to this argument that non-traditional religious groups impinge on the 
rights  of  citizens,  harming  both  the  individual  and  society.  Thus,  the  chief 
56 Anonymous. 2008. “Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan Will Submit a Report on 
All  Religious  Associations  and  Small  Religious  Groups  of  the  Country.”  Caravan,  July  29. 
Retrieved November 6,  2017 (https://www.caravan.kz/news/minyust-rk-predstavit-otchet-ob-
izuchenii-vsekh-religioznykh-obedinenijj-i-malochislennykh-religioznykh-grupp-strany-
balieva-242420/).
250
researcher officer at the Research and Analytical Center for Religious Affairs in 
Kazskhtan’s Ministry of Justice, asserted that “among a multitude of religious 
associations,  churches,  and  missions,  a  number  of  such  organizations  have 
appeared,  whose  activities  run  counter  to  the  secular  laws  of  our  state,  the 
doctrines of which directly or indirectly call for violence (physical or spiritual) 
over people who are not in their organization.”57 Law enforcement agencies “pay 
special  attention  to  religious  associations  with  sectarian  content  that  do  not 
recognize  traditional  religions  and  whose  activities  violate  various  rights  of 
citizens, including health and religious freedom.”58 And criminal cases are even 
brought  against  missionaries  and  pastors  for  promoting  “religious 
discrimination” when they preach their beliefs. One member of the Unification 
Church, for example, was charged “for propagating the superiority of one group 
of citizens over others on religious grounds”59 after delivering religious lectures 
in Almaty, Kazakstan. 
Again, these overarching discourses are applied to both “destructive sects” 
57  Novikova, G. 2009.  “New Religious Movements of a Pseudo-Christian Orientation.” Zakon, 
April  21.  Retrieved  November  6,  2017  (http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?
doc_id=30406775#pos=1;-107).
58 Anonymous. 2009. “In Almaty Law Enforcement Agencies Actively Suppress the Activities of 
Destructive  Religious  Sects.”  Zakon,  5  June.  Retrieved  November  6,  2017  (https://
www.zakon.kz/139985-v-almaty-pravookhranitelnye-organy.html).
59 Report on the Situation with Human Rights in Kazakhstan for 2008. 2009. Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor.
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and “extremist groups,” and transcend the myriad state and religious institutions 
that seek to reign in religious pluralism. In the chapters that follow, I will pursue 
each of these two main discourses on the “threat” of pluralism in more depth — 
destructive sects that ostensibly erode the link between national and religious 
boundaries, and extremist groups ostensibly that sharpen these boundaries and 
threaten  to  radicalize  the  population  within  them.  The  methods  that  I  have 
discussed in this chapter contribute variously to each of these broader discourses, 
and I will explore them through more cases as I examine separate state responses 
to “destructive sects” and “extremist groups.”
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CHAPTER 7
Destructive Sects and Totalitarian Cults
Heretic and sectarian movements are like poisonous mushrooms 
that appear at the roots of true religions. 
Nam, “New Religious Movements and their Influence on the 
National and State Identity of Modern Kazakhstan”
“It  goes without saying that if  a religious group is ‘non-traditional,’  it  is  also 
destructive.”1  That  is  how the pastor  of  one Protestant  church in Kazakhstan 
described  the  regime’s  attitude  toward  “destructive  sects.”  The  church  had 
already seen its former pastor placed under house arrest, ostensibly for rendering 
spiritual and psychological harm to one of its members. During my interview, 
the  current  pastor,  whom  I  call  Daniyar,  made  clear  that  any  activity  that 
heterodox religious groups engage in can be labelled destructive, simply because 
that activity is performed by groups that operate independently of traditional 
affiliations. 
Even  the  simple  act  of  prayer,  considered  traditional  and  healthy  when 
1 Interview with a pastor of a Presbyterian church in Astana, July 22, 2014.
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performed by members of orthodox religions, is portrayed as destructive when 
practiced by heterodox groups.
The  key  term  is  “destroy  [razrushit’].”  Anything  destructive  sects  do 
destroys  traditions.  This  includes  praying,  singing,  anything.  [The 
authorities say] “They destroy traditions.” If we pray for a person, and 
that person accepts God, they say, “You see, they prayed for that person. 
They influenced him.” Anything that a traditional religious group might 
do without earning criticism, it all gets explained in negative terms when 
done by “destructive sects.”2
And Daniyar was quick to point out that these discourses converge in the pro-
government and pro-Russia media outlets that dominate the region, which seek 
to paint a vivid picture of the destabilizing effect of “destructive sects” on society.
Two  days  ago,  there  was  a  prayer  on  the  main  square  of  Kiev  by 
Christians of all denominations [during the 2014 Maidan square protests, 
which eventually led to Ukraine’s regime change and ongoing civil war] 
to  pray  for  the  current  situation.  There  were  Orthodox  Christians, 
Catholics,  Protestants  from  various  denominations.  Our  media  outlets 
specifically covered the Protestant worshippers, and said, “You see, those 
Protestants,  they  are  fueling  national  conflict.  They  are  the  ones 
responsible for the situation in Ukraine.”3
Thus, Daniyar saw the terms “non-traditional religious group” and “destructive 
sect” as interchangeable. At the same tame, he also saw the label “destructive” as 
politically motivated, serving to associate religious heterodoxy with other forms 
of  dissent  and  dissidence  that  the  Kazakhstan’s  regime  sought  to  demonize. 
2 Interview with a pastor of a Presbyterian church in Astana, July 22, 2014.
3 Ibid.
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Thus,  he  tacitly  recognized  a  distinct  discourse  on  “destructive”  religious 
activities  that  served to  distinguish certain  forms of  heterodoxy as  deserving 
particular state scrutiny.
In this chapter, I examine the rationale and strategies of power that determine 
how and  where  the  state  employs  the  discourses  on  “destructive  sects”  and 
“totalitarian  cults.”  I  argue  that  the  religious  and  political  establishments  of 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan deploy these discourses strategically, if not always 
consistently. Distinguishing destructive sects from other non-traditional groups 
serves to make the heterodoxy more legible (Scott 1998) to both the state and the 
public. 
As I will show in this chapter, the labels “destructive,” “totalitarian,” “sect,” 
and  “cult”  are  not  used  as  precise  and  mutually-exclusive  categories,  which 
apply  to  some groups  and not  others  based on technical  criteria.  Rather,  the 
terms are  used as  moral  injunctions  that  police  the  boundaries  of  acceptable 
religious  heterodoxy.  The  labels  can  be  applied  and  rescinded  in  order  to 
discipline  heterodox  religious  groups.  In  addition,  distinguishing  particularly 
malevolent  forms of  religious  heterodoxy serves  to  make arbitrary  and often 
erratic uses of state power appear as consistent enforcement strategies.
 In  a  context  where  states  have  limited  capacity  to  regulate  all  forms  of 
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religious  heterodoxy,  distinguishing  various  grades  of  heterodoxy  gives  the 
appearance as  though state  actions in the religious sphere are calibrated to a 
determinable metric of threat. Terms such as destructive sect and totalitarian cult 
(as well as extremism and terrorism, which I address in the subsequent chapter) 
serve  to  establish  this  metric  symbolically,  even  if  they  are  applied  without 
particular concern for consistency. As I will show, clamping down on dissidence 
is more a form of public theater than it is a consistent practice of governance. I 
will first examine how the discourses on destructive sects and totalitarian cults 
serves to make both religious heterodoxy and religious policy more legible, and 
then I will turn to various cases and enforcement strategies that bear out these 
discourses.
I. Making the “Destructive” Character of Sects Legible
The terms “destructive sect” and “totalitarian cult” have no precise definition in 
the rhetoric of the regime, but rather vaguely connote the pernicious role that 
such  sects  ostensibly  play  in  society.  Some  definitions  have  been  offered  by 
experts  in  support  of  religious  policy,  but  there  has  been  little  interest  in 
establishing a single, conventional definition for either label. These terms do not 
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derive their utility from their technical precision, after all, but rather from their 
connotations and associations.  And as  Pastror  Daniyar  pointed out,  any non-
traditional  religious  group  can  be  labelled  “destructive,”  according  to  the 
circumstances. 
Nevertheless, two common features define destructive sects in the rhetoric of 
the regimes: First,  they are destructive,  i.e.  they have a negative impact on the 
well-being of  their  followers.  Second,  they are  duplicitous,  i.e.  they  only  use 
religion as a facade for ulterior motives.
First, I will address the supposedly destructive nature of sects and cults. One 
scholar  of  religion  in  Kyrgyzstan  defined  destructive  sects  in  the  following 
manner:
Destructive Sect: A variety of cults that subvert the natural, harmonious 
state of the personality - spiritual, psychological, and physical — as well 
as the creative traditions prevailing in the social structures, culture, belief 
system and society as a whole. By their nature, destructive sects oppose 
traditional  creeds,  although  they  frequently  bear  certain  outward 
similarities with them (Galkina 2013:498).
This definition offers a Durkheimian analysis of religion, in which individuals 
are social  atoms that  can either bond harmoniously with each other,  or  repel 
chaotically.  It  contrasts  creative  religious  traditions  from  destructive  sects 
precisely  according  to  this  atomistic  understanding  of  individuals  in  society. 
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Traditional religions are presented as those that encourage individuals to bond 
together  in  a  coherent  and  harmonious  social  whole  (a  social  whole  that 
conveniently  submits  to  the  ruling  order).  Destructive  sects,  in  contrast, 
“fundamentally  oppose”  tradition,  and by  extension oppose  social  order  and 
stability.
Thus, while non-traditional religions are not traditional to the region, they are 
traditional somewhere. In the rhetoric of the regime, they play a valid, “creative” 
and stabilizing  role  in  other  societies,  but  simply  demand special  safeguards 
when imported to new regions. (Although as I noted in previous chapters, the 
distinction between traditional and non-traditional cannot be understood as a 
euphemism for native vs. foreign, despite the regimes’ rhetoric). Destructive sects, 
in  contrast,  are  regarded as  fundamentally  pernicious.  They are  portrayed as 
playing  no  virtuous  role  in  any  society,  and  thought  to  prey  off  traditional 
religions. 
The  concept  of  a  totalitarian  cult,  meanwhile,  implies  a  closed  religious 
organization  that  regulates  all  aspects  of  its  members’  lives.  For  example,  in 
discussing  one  such  cult,  Allya  Ayat,  one  expert  described  the  group  in  the 
following terms:
By  its  structure,  this  organization  is  a  totalitarian  sect,  completely 
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subordinating  its  followers  to  the  leadership.  Allya  Ayat  lacks  official 
registration as a religious organization, and thus all activities carried out 
by the organization's supporters are illegal. In this sect, parishioners are 
subjected to psychological treatment,  as a result of which they fall  into 
psychological dependence on their leaders.4
Totalitarian cults are portrayed as exerting especially thorough control over their 
membership, requiring in particular that members cut all ties with friends and 
family beyond the group and restrict their social world to the membership of the 
group. The term totalitarian cult can thus be applied to any group that is seen as 
particularly insular and controlling of its members. 
The Allya Ayat cult, incidentally, represents one of the few “homegrown” cults 
in Kazakhstan, started in a rural area of East Kazakhstan by a simple farm hand 
who “imagined himself nearly equal with the Almighty.”5 The founder of Allya 
Ayat supposedly called for “the burning of the Koran and the radical rejection of 
both  Islam  and  Christianity.”6  The  group  was  quickly  outlawed  by  the 
authorities, and the leader died within two years of the group’s establishment, 
but the cult has apparently survived his death and continues to operate under 
4 Anonymous. 2008. “Sects in the Big City-2.” Zakon, July 3. Retrieved December 2, 2017 (https://
www.zakon.kz/106355-sekty-v-bolshom-gorode-2.html).
5  Gorbunov,  Sergey.  2010.  “We  Have  to  Help  People  Orient  Themselves  in  Confessional 
Diversity.”  Interview  with  Daulet  Zakaryanov,  Deputy  Head  of  the  regional  Department  of 
Internal  Policy.  Zakon,  July 9.  Retrieved December 2,  2017 (https://www.zakon.kz/177719-d.-
zakarjanov-nuzhno-gotovit-ljudejj-k.html).
6 Anonymous. 2008. “Sects in the Big City-2.” Zakon, July 3. Retrieved December 2, 2017 (https://
www.zakon.kz/106355-sekty-v-bolshom-gorode-2.html).
259
new names.
The  second  common  thread  running  through  official  discourses  on 
destructive sects and totalitarian cults is  their supposed duplicitous character. 
Whereas  non-traditional  religions  may  challenge  the  authority  of  traditional 
religious groups, the veracity of their faith is seldom questioned. The leadership 
of sects and cults,  in contrast,  are often presented as merely using a religious 
guise  to  pursue  ulterior  motives.  As  the  Russian  Orthodox  Patriarch  from 
MoscowBishop of  Astana  in  Kazakhstan  argued in  a  speech  to  Kazakhstan’s 
Congress of World Religions: 
Sects are a disease to society.  Under the mask of religion, activities are 
carried out that often stray far from religious goals and principles. There 
are sects that forbid injecting sick children [with medicine]; others do not 
let  young  people  serve  in  the  army.  These  are  anti-civil,  destructive 
manifestations. Throughout the world, ‘Christianity’ customarily refers to 
representatives  of  traditional  religions  —  Catholics,  Orthodox  and 
Lutherans; the [other denominations] we refer to as sects.7
Destructive sects and totalitarian cults are seen as lacking genuine religious 
dogmas  and  principles,  and  instead  follow  fabricated  dogmas  intended  to 
defraud  their  followers  or  otherwise  render  social  and  psychological  harm. 
Experts  have  declared that  “faiths  as  Jehovah's  Witnesses,  the  Church  of  the 
7  Il’inskaya,  Elena.  2011.  “Since  Independence  in  Kazakhstan,  Friendship and Understanding 
Between People of Different Faiths and Nationalities Have Formed.” Interview with Aleksandr, 
the  Bishop  of  Astana  in  Kazakhstan.  Inform,  April  27.  Retrieved  December  2,  2017  (http://
www.inform.kz/arb/article/2375192).
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Reverend Moon, the Church of Scientology…create transnational empires and 
manage very large finances and means of psychological influence.”8 Members of 
Grace Presbyterian Church in Astana have even been accused of “spying for the 
benefit of other states,” which according to Kazakhstan’s security officials is “not 
a unique case” among Protestant churches.9 Thus, destructive sects are depicted 
as having a variety of motivations for propagating their ministry in the region, 
but none of them related to the genuine practice of their beliefs.
When attempting to distinguish totalitarian cults from destructive sects, one 
Kazakh  expert  defined  the  two  concepts  precisely  in  relation  to  the  kind  of 
ulterior motives that guide their activities: 
I would like to dwell on the definitions of the concepts "totalitarian sect" 
and  "destructive  cult.”  To  put  it  briefly,  the  totalitarian  sect  is  an 
organization that has two goals - power and money. A destructive cult is 
understood  as  an  organization  that  destroys  the  personality,  family, 
society and state.10
In  both  common  usage  and  application,  however,  the  terms  “non-traditional 
8  Tuzov,  Alexander  and  Bermet  Malikova.  2009.  “How  Can  We  Save  Secular  Kyrgyzstan?” 
Vecherniy Bishkek, November 4. Retrieved December 2, 2017 (http://members.vb.kg/2009/11/04/
polit/1.html).
9  Djaldinov,  Askar.  2008.  “Deceptive  ‘Grace.’  Foreign  Spies  Worked  Under  the  Roof  of  the 
Church.”  Zakon,  January  29.  Retrieved  December  2,  2017  (https://www.zakon.kz/102922-
obmanchivaja-blagodat.-pod-kryshejj.html).
10 Nurseitova, Torgyn. 2012. “The New Law Has Positively Influenced the Religious Situation in 
the Country. Interview Kairat Lama Sharif, Chairman of the Agency of Religious Affairs in the 
Republic  of  Kazakhstan.   Zakon,  October  22.  Retrieved  December  2,  2017  (https://
online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31276559#pos=3;73).
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religion,” “destructive cult,” and “totalitarian sect” overlap heavily. And as the 
quote above demonstrates,  the terms “sect” and “cult” in particular  are used 
interchangeably,  so  that  officials  also  speak  of  “destructive  cults”  and 
“totalitarian sects.”
Galkina’s  definition  of  destructive  sects  above  even  acknowledges  that 
“destructive  sects”  may  share  “certain  outward  similarities”  with  traditional 
religions. In keeping with Pastor Daniyar’s observations, this contrast between 
outward appearance and underlying motivation gives the authorities sufficient 
leeway to  label  any activities  as  “destructive,”  depending on which religious 
group is performing them. As I will show, nevertheless, there is a rationale to the 
application of  the labels  “destructive sect” and “totalitarian cult,”  even if  the 
terms  do  not  constitute  logically-delineated,  mutually-exclusive  categories 
within the broader set of non-traditional religions. 
The Logic of Labels
Distinguishing between various grades of heterodoxy can help the state to signal 
its  enforcement  priorities,  and  make  its  enforcement  strategies  appear  more 
consistent. The label “destructive” can be applied to any religious group that has 
has drawn particular state scrutiny and censure, presenting these often arbitrary 
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enforcement strategies as calculated responses to the most significant risks to the 
public. Furthermore, the state can signal to heterodox groups the boundary of 
what behavior is permitted and what behavior is forbidden by publicly applying 
and rescinding these labels in response to the ever-evolving dynamic between 
orthodox and heterodox religious groups.
Thus, the labels “destructive,” “totalitarian,” “sect,” and “cult” represent a 
mix between arbitrary and calculated uses of state authority, calibrated to both 
technical criteria and pure discrimination. In this respect, the distinction between 
non-traditional religion and destructive sect harkens back to the rhetoric used by 
the Soviet security services during the Stalinist purges. As Solzhenitsyn pointed 
out so vividly, the regime used various euphemisms and labels to distinguished 
between  several  grades  of  dissidents,  but  applied  the  labels  without  great 
concern for logic or consistency:
Of  course,  the  OSO  [review  boards  that  levied  sentences  on  political 
prisoners]  itself  also  needed for  convenience  some kind of  operational 
shorthand, but for that purpose it worked out on its own a dozen "letter" 
articles which made operations very much simpler.  It  wasn't  necessary, 
when they were used, to cudgel your brains trying to make things fit the 
formulations  of  the  Code.  And  they  were  few  enough  to  be  easily 
remembered by a child. Some of them we have already described: ASA — 
Anti-Soviet Agitation; KRD — Counter-Revolutionary Activity; KRTD — 
Counter-Revolutionary Trotskyite Activity (And that "T" made the life of a 
zek [prisoner] in camp much harder) (Solzhenitsyn 2003).
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As Solzhenitsyn recounts, incurring the “T” had less to do with the underlying 
nature  of  one’s  “counter-revolutionary  activities.”  Famously,  such  convictions 
had little to do with loyalty to the state at all, but more to do with the young 
Soviet  state’s  need  to  purge  all  autonomous  centers  of  civic  association  and 
authority from society. And to this end, the state needed to publicly demonstrate 
the many gradations of “enemies of the state.”
For  the  Soviet  authorities,  Trotsky  embodied  the  highest  grade  of  public 
enemy.  Couched  in  a  history  of  populist  anti-Semitism,  Trotsky  served  as  a 
magical fetish for the Soviet regime to denote who deserved the greatest wrath of 
the regime. Historians would never be able to make sense of the label if they 
sought to link it  to Trotsky or his ideas. Rather, Trotskyites were meant to be 
pariahs  even  among  prisoners,  thus  ensuring  discipline  among  those  with 
seemingly nothing left to lose. The “T” showed that there is always more to lose, 
and could be incurred simply by annoying one’s  prosecutors,  especially with 
claims to rights and due process.
Although  the  contemporary  regimes  of  Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan  have 
little  need  for  or  interest  in  purges  and  repression  comparable  to  those 
propagated by Stalin, they do continue a direct lineage of Soviet statecraft that 
makes particular utility of labels for dissidence. The contemporary regimes have 
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their  own  shorthand  for  varieties  of  religious  heterodoxy:  “non-traditional 
religion,” “destructive sect,” “totalitarian cult.” As with the distinction between 
Counter-Revolutionary  Activity  and Counter-Revolutionary  Trotskyite  Activity, 
the distinction between non-traditional religions and destructive sects serves to 
distinguish  fine  gradations  of  dissidence  —  not  in  the  actual  quality  of  a 
particular  religious  belief,  practice,  or  ministry,  but  in  the  degree  to  which 
officials wish to present that religious group as an enemy of the state and the 
public. 
“Destructive  sects”  are  not  merely  presented  as  a  form  of  religious 
heterodoxy that requires regulation and due diligence. In the discourse of the 
establishment, destructive sects destroy the very fabric of society, as well as the 
psyches of their individual members. Destructive sects are more closely invoked 
in proximity to extremism, fundamentalism, and even terrorism, even if they are 
not directly accused of terrorist activities. Policy documents assert, for example, 
that  “there  is  increasing  alarm  over  the  propagation  of  extremist  and 
fundamentalist  ideas,  expanding the  activity  of  different  destructive  religious 
and  terrorist  groups.”11  And  as  with  Islamic  extremism,  the  regimes  express 
11 Kyrgyz Republic: Government Decree on State Regulation of Religious Sphere. May 6, 2006 No. 
324.
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concern over  the perceived vulnerability  of  youth to  influence by destructive 
sects.
As a result the government’s passive attitude toward this problem in the 
first years of the formation of an independent republic,  in combination 
with insufficient religious literacy of population, many of the citizens of 
Kazakhstan,  especially the representatives of  the young generation,  fell 
under the influence of destructive religious forces.12
Both states have thus designed special programs to combat “manifestations of 
religious extremism, fundamentalism and to the destructive flows of religions.”13 
I will discuss the nature of such programs further in the chapter.
Government officials in Kyrgyzstan invoked the threat of destructive sects to 
justify stricter registration requirements for all non-traditional religious groups. 
In the run up to passing a new law on religious organizations, officials from the 
SARA  explained  the  motivations  for  stricter  registration  requirements  in 
numerous interviews and public statements: 
The new standard requires  not  less  than 200 signatures;  in  the current 
legislation, only ten are needed. This is a very strict measure, but, in my 
view, this approach will protect our citizens from the active expansion of 
destructive,  totalitarian dogmas and the ruinous interaction of different 
occult and quasi-religious sects.14
12 Anonymous. Dossier on the Draft Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On Religious Activities 
and Religious Associations.” September 1, 2011.
13 Kyrgyz Republic: Government Decree on State Regulation of Religious Sphere. May 6, 2006 No. 
324.
14 Benliyan, Amaliya and Azamat Kasybekov. 2008. “God Sees Everything, but Waits.” Interview 
with the Director of the State Agency for Religious Affairs under the government of the Kyrgyz 
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Such statements draw tacit distinctions between non-traditional religious groups 
and destructive sects, but still invoke the threat presented by the latter to justify 
blanket policies that impact the former.
While the discourse on “destructive sects” is often left in the abstract, it also 
has  concrete  applications,  denoting  groups  or  activities  that  have  aroused 
particular ire in the authorities. The label may be incurred due to the methods of 
recruitment or proselytizing that a group employs, to an especially rapid pace of 
growth,  or  simply  due  to  a  lack  of  sufficient  deference  and  docility  when 
interacting with the state. And as with the Soviet state, officials in the SCRA and 
SARA  have  wide  latitude  when  employing  the  term  “destructive.”  The 
application of these distinctions need not follow any clear logic, nor are the labels 
permanent  and  binding.  Nevertheless,  the  regime  consistently  points  to 
particular groups as exemplars of destructive sects and totalitarian cults. Below, I 
briefly address one such group, which has come to represent the quintessential 
“destructive sect” in the rhetoric of the regimes – the Jehovah’s Witnesses.
The Jehovah’s Witnesses: Archetype of a Destructive Sect
Republic  Kanybek  Osmonaliev.  Vecherniy  Bishkek,  July  11.  Retrieved  December,  2017  (http://
members.vb.kg/2008/07/11/linia/1.html).
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The Jehovah’s Witnesses established themselves in the region already during the 
Soviet period, and have long been a target of religious animosity and oppression. 
Whereas  many  of  the  religious  organizations  that  began  to  grow  after 
independence enjoyed a grace period of limited regime scrutiny, the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses already faced a legacy of pressure from the Soviet state.  Individual 
congregations  face  pressure  from  local  authorities  due  to  their  door-to-door 
proselytizing and communal housing for some members, and some states have 
introduced legislation  that  specifically  targets  the  religion as  a  whole.  Russia 
finally banned the Jehovah’s Witnesses outright in April of 2017 as an “extremist” 
organization,  and  began  expropriating  property  that  belonged  to  individual 
congregations.15 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan both saw a great increase in Jehovah’s Witness 
congregations in the early years of independence. According to one member of a 
such a congregation in Almaty, the group boasts over 30,000 members across all 
of Kazakhstan.16 Due to such large numbers neither state has been able to deny 
the  Jehovah’s  Witnesses  registration  based  on  membership  criteria,  and  the 
15 Higgins, Andrew. 2017. “Russia Bans Jehovah’s Witnesses, Calling It an Extremist Group.” New 
York Times, April 20. Retrieved October 25, 2017 (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/world/
europe/russia-bans-jehovahs-witnesses.html?_r=0).
16 Interview with member of the Almaty Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, July 17, 2014.
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group is even growing in both countries. Nevertheless, both states have sought to 
hamper such growth by other means.
In  Kyrgyzstan,  the  state  has  largely  pursued  the  Jehovah’s  Witnesses 
financially,  as  revealed  in  both  court  documents  and  in  an  interview with  a 
member of the Bishkek congregation’s leadership. In 2011, the state deemed the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses an employer of their clergy, and therefore subject to paying 
taxes on all  revenue to state medical insurance programs and the social  fund 
[social  security].  The  court  ruled  that  the  Jehovah’s  Witnesses  owed  the 
government  614,718  som  (approximately  170,000  USD  at  the  time)  and  back 
payments on that amount totaling 388,2017 som (around 86,000 USD).17 
In  an  interview however,  a  leader  in  the  Bishkek  congregation  attributed 
these  fines  to  the  state’s  unease  with  two  characteristics  of  the  Jehovah’s 
Witnesses: their unwillingness to engage in military service, and the communal 
housing  they  offer  to  members  of  their  congregation.18  Following  Soviet 
conscription practices,  all  young men must serve two years in the military in 
both  Kyrgyzstan  and  Kazakhstan,  or  seek  alternative  forms  of  service.  The 
17 Kyrgyz Republic. 2011. The Verdict of the Judicial College on Administrative and Economic 
Affairs of the Supreme Court. December 13, No. ED-700/10MB N/P N 6-195/11 ED. Presiding 
judge Alybaeva N.A., judges Arapbaeva N.M., Osmonalieva K.T. and the secretary of the court 
session: Bekenov T.
18 Interview with leader of the Bishkek Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, July 8, 2014.
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Jehovah’s Witnesses have been subject to great harassment from the state because 
of  their  principled  opposition  to  such  service.  Furthermore,  the  Jehovah’s 
Witnesses offer a limited amount of housing in dormitories and small units for 
families. This communal housing arrangement has fueled state scrutiny of the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses as a destructive cult.
The same factors have led to state scrutiny in Kazakhstan, but members of the 
congregation  in  Almaty  placed  more  emphasized  on  their  distribution  of 
literature and door-to-door proselytizing as reasons for pressure from the state. 
Local  observers  have  depicted  such  active  proselytizing  methods,  and  the 
success they breed, as evidence of the group’s destructive character:
The "Jehovah's Witnesses" are listed by the Russian Orthodox Church as a 
totalitarian  and  very  dangerous  sect,  and  are  currently  banned  in 
Moscow… Approximately 700 centers have been established in various 
countries  around the  world  in  order  to  monitor  the  activities  of  sects, 
which are very harmful to the psychological health of their citizens. This 
sect  has firmly established itself  in Kazakhstan,  and intends to build a 
huge center in Esik city near Almaty, including all the services necessary 
for successful expansion.19
My respondent in the Almaty congregation depicted state enforcement strategies 
as  mostly  seeking  to  dissuade  Jehovah’s  Witness  congregations  from  active 
19 Sapar Ali, B and Eldesbay T. 2010. “Religious Situation in Kazakhstan. Structural Reform of the 
Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Kazakhstan Cannot be Delayed.” Central Asia, March 15. 
Retrieved December 2, 2017 (http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1268604000).
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proselytizing, and less interested in banning the group outright. 
Finally,  my  respondent  noted  that  the  Kazakhstani  state  has  viewed  the 
group’s very professionalism as evidence of it’s subversive nature. The Almaty 
congregation  maintains  a  legal  office  that  monitors  changes  in  the  legal  and 
policy environment, and studies ways to expedite registration of new Jehovah’s 
Witness  congregations  across  the  country.20  The  very  presence  of  such  a 
dedicated office, which in principle is intended to keep the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
within the bounds of the law, is perceived with suspicion by the state. In this 
respect  as  in  many  others,  the  very  features  that  have  made  the  Jehovah’s 
Witnesses  a  strong  and  resilient  heterodox  movement  have  also  lead  to  a 
reputation as the quintessential destructive sect.
II. The Rule of Law vs. the Rule of Rulers
The governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan tend to treat “destructive sects” 
not as a direct security threat, but rather as a covert threat that merely appears 
outwardly docile. The regimes frequently present such groups as using religion 
as a means to subvert national traditions and “spiritual sovereignty,” but within 
20 Interview with member of the Almaty Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, July 7, 2014.
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the bounds of law. As I have noted throughout, state officials see “destructive 
sects”  as  taking  advantage  of  overly-liberal  religious  policies  to  propagate 
subversive ministries:
The liberal legislation of Kazakhstan today does not actually regulate the 
activities of totalitarian sects, followers of neopaganism, esoteric, pseudo-
medical teachings with elements of mysticism and occultism. This sphere 
of spiritual life falls out of the state's field of vision. Is it for this reason that 
new messiahs slowly but surely appear within Kazakhstan's "market of 
revolting  souls,"  introducing  and  honing  their  own  philosophies  and 
worldviews into the minds of people almost unhindered. And they act 
often legally, under the guise of various kinds of public associations.21
In the view of these officials, it should not be so easy for formally law-abiding 
organizations to engage in “destructive” activities. If heterodox sects are able to 
undermine “spiritual sovereignty” entirely within the bounds of law, then clearly 
the law itself has failed in its public mandate, and must be strengthened. 
Both states have thus responded to this “nascent threat” through legislation 
and litigation intended to bring the rule of law more in line with the populist 
mandate of the ruling elite. Through the court, the governments of Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan claim their mandate to protect the rights and well-being of their 
citizens, plaintiffs come forward with claims of harm at the hands of religious 
21 Kuryatov, Vladimir. 2008. “Sleep of Reason, or Awakening of Monsters. Liberal Legislation Left 
Kazakhstan to the Mercy of Sectarians of all Stripes.” Central Asia, June 16. Retrieved December 2, 
2017 (http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1216204020).
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groups, as well as at the hands of the state. In this effort as in others, however, 
President  Nazarbayev’s  regime  has  consolidated  far  greater  control  over 
Kazakhstan’s  legal  branch  of  government  than  has  any  presidential 
administration in  Kyrgyzstan.  Below,  I  will  first  examine Kazakhstan’s  recent 
campaign  of  litigation  against  Evangelical  Churches,  and  then  contrast  two 
different cases against the Unification Church of Sun Myung Moon (a.k.a. the 
Moonies)  in  Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan,  the  latter  of  which  I  attended 
personally in the summer of 2014.
Evangelical Churches
The primary front in legal battles is that of registration. In both Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan,  the  state  and  religious  groups  alike  have  used  the  courts  to 
challenge the legal status of congregations and denominations. Groups that have 
been denied the right to register through the SARA or SCRA appeal that decision 
through the courts, or contest the very legality of the need to register, while the 
state at times builds cases to void the registration of active religious groups. All 
heterodox groups are required to renew their registration at regular intervals, but 
at times the state may choose to void a particular group’s registration early based 
on real or manufactured violations of the laws governing religious freedom. 
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While the struggle over registration encompasses a wide range of religious 
groups,  I  will  focus  in  particular  on  evangelical  churches,  which  have  been 
singled out among other Protestant denominations as “destructive sects” in the 
region. Evangelical groups range in scope from small prayer groups that meet in 
private homes (but are deemed congregations by the authorities because of their 
religious activities, and thus require registration) to large congregations. While 
many  evangelical  churches  are  unaffiliated,  the  regime  frequently  targets 
evangelical  Baptist  groups,  drawing  off  a  longstanding  animosity  toward 
Baptists during the Soviet period.
The  governments  of  both  Kyrgyzstan  and  Kazakhstan  have  used  various 
legal means to suspend the activities of religious groups. In most cases, religious 
groups simply fail  to meet the registration criteria,  particularly the mandated 
number of  followers.  In other cases,  however,  the state may draw on diverse 
reasons to initiate litigation against registered groups. In Shymkent, Kazakhstan, 
for  example,  one  congregation  was  ordered  to  suspend  services  because  of 
insufficient fire prevention systems.22 While this may seem a perfectly reasonable 
requirement,  it  can  only  be  understood as  politically  motivated  in  a  country 
22 Republic of Kazakhstan. 2012. Decision of the Specialized Inter-District Economic Court of the 
South-Kazakhstan region. June 21, No. 2e-2716/12. Presiding judge Klyshbaeva   Z., secretary of 
the court session Umarov N.K.
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where  a  major  proportion  (quite  possibly  the  majority)  of  residential  and 
commercial  buildings  fail  to  meet  formal  building  codes.  Non-Traditional 
religious groups have also been brought to court for taxes owed to the state,23 as 
well  as  for  allowing  minors  to  attend  services  without  the  direct  written 
permission of both parents.24 When the religious organization or individuals are 
found guilty in such cases, the most common punishment is fines rather than 
criminal prosecution for wrong doing.
Legal  battles  over  registration play out  differently  from case  to  case  even 
among evangelical Christians, especially when comparing cases in Kazakhstan to 
those  in  Kyrgyzstan.  In  Kazakhstan,  a  number  of  Evangelical  churches  have 
refused  to  seek  registration  out  of  principle,  possibly  recognizing  that  their 
requests will be denied, and that even attempting to register will only serve to 
lend legitimacy to the government’s religious policies. In one such case, a small 
congregation that met in a private home refused to seek registration with the 
state, arguing that, “registration of the church is contrary to the principles of their 
23 Republic of Kazakhstan. 2002. Resolution of the Supervisory Board of the South Kazakhstan 
Regional Court.  March 21.  Presiding officer Nurbekov M.N.,  judges of the supervisory board 
Agadilova G., Kaldarova A.B., Kayypzhanov N.U., Rysbekov T.P., Sambetova G.K. and Yuzkov 
V.A.
24 Republic of Kazakhstan. 2010. The decision of the Court of the North-Kazakhstan region on the 
Case of an Administrative Offence. January 20, No. 3-28. Presiding judge Izmukhamedova O.A., 
assistant to the district prosecutor Baitusova I.E.
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faith, since the church is separate from the state.”25 The owner of the home was 
brought to court for carrying out religious activities without registration. Despite 
his adamant claims that he was not a pastor, but merely a member of a faith 
group, the court fined him, stating that “no one has the right to refuse to fulfill 
civil duties on grounds of his religious beliefs, except for cases provided for by 
law.”26
In  Kyrgyzstan,  in  contrast,  most  Evangelical  churches  have  sought 
registration,  and have  sued the  state  to  contest  the  SCRA’s  decision  in  cases 
where they were denied, based on requirements such as a minimum number of 
founders.  The courts  are  far  more politically  autonomous in Kyrgyzstan,  and 
have thus offered heterodox groups a means of recourse when they have been 
denied  registration.  The  evangelical  group  Tynchtyk  Tuzuuculor  for  example, 
successfully  sued  for  registration  when  the  SCRA  refused  to  process  its 
application. The court ruled that actions of the SCRA were illegal, and that “the 
state body had an obligation to register the Association of Evangelical Religious 
25 Republic of Kazakhstan. 2011. Decision of the Specialized Administrative Court of Temirtau 
city of Karaganda region on Administrative Violations Against Yantzen Ivan Isakovich. December 
21, No. 3-2197/2011. Judge of the Specialized Administrative Court of Temirtau, Kirillova E.A., 
prosecutor Rakhimbekova D.T.
26 Ibid.
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Organizations Tynchtyk Tuzuuculor Alliances.”27 Needless to say, the courts do not 
always rule in favor of  religious groups in such cases,  but such examples do 
serve to demonstrate the greater autonomy of the legal system in Kyrgyzstan.
Individual Baptists in Kyrgyzstan have also successfully used the courts to 
fight for the right to bury their relatives in village cemeteries. A number of high 
profile  cases  emerged in  rural  regions,  in  which  villagers  refused  to  allow a 
convert  to  Christianity  to  be  buried  in  the  village  cemetery,  which  suddenly 
became a “Muslim” cemetery by virtue of the very prospect that a Baptist might 
be  buried  there.  In  one  case,  residents  even  exhumed  the  body  of  a  Baptist 
villager, incited by local imams.28 The family of the deceased Baptist turned to 
the courts for justice, but was awarded only a partial victory. Though the body of 
the deceased had gone permanently missing, the presiding judge handed down 
only a commuted sentence to the men charged in the case.29
27 Kyrgyz Republic. 2007. The Verdict of the Judicial College on Administrative and Economic 
Affairs  of  the  Supreme  Court.  November  1,  Case  No.  AD-000081/07MO.  Presiding  judge 
Davletov A., and judges Alpieva A. and Mukhamedzhanov A.
28 Bayram, Mushfig. 2016. “Kyrgyzstan: Mobs Twice Exhume Body – With Impunity?” Forum 18, 
October  20.  Retrieved  December  2,  2017  (http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?
article_id=2226).
29 Bayram, Mushfig. 2017. “Kyrgyzstan: No Effective Punishment for Body Snatching” Forum 18, 
January 20. Retrieved December 2, 2017 (http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2248).
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The Unification Church of Sun Myung Moon
Two cases involving the Unification Church serve to demonstrate the different 
degree  to  which  the  government  of  Kazakhstan  seeks  to  use  the  courts  as  a 
political tool, versus the government of Kyrgyzstan. Both cases represent appeals 
of earlier decisions, in which the plaintiffs were representatives of the Unification 
Church  of  Sun  Myung  Moon  (commonly  known  as  the  Moonies),  who  had 
previously been ruled against in lower courts. The charges in each case, however, 
were quite different. 
In  Kyrgyzstan,  the  State  Commission  for  Religious  Affairs,  in  conjunction 
with local  government officials,  had initiated proceedings against  a charitable 
organization that they claimed was a front for the Unification Church. The goal 
of  their  case  was  to  force  the  organization to  seek  registration  as  a  religious 
group.  A lower  court  had  ruled  in  favor  of  the  government’s  position,  and 
members of the charitable organization appealed that decision. I attended this 
appeal on July 24th, 2013.
In Kazakhstan, the state also brought charges against what they claimed was 
a covert Moonie church, but the officials charged the leader of this group with 
inciting religious animosity. A lower court had already ruled that the plaintiff, 
Ms. Drenicheva, had violated the law on religious freedom, which “prohibits the 
278
propaganda of inferiority of citizens on the basis of their attitude to class and 
clan membership, deliberately, by engaging in public lectures that promoted the 
inferiority of citizens on the basis of their clan and class.”30 In other words, the 
plaintiff  had  been  found  guilty  of  propagating  the  superiority  of  one  set  of 
religious beliefs over others by virtue of speaking of her faith. She appealed that 
decision on January 9th, 2009.
The difference of tone in the two court proceedings is striking. In Kazakhstan, 
the more tightly controlled prosecutors office sought to use the laws and the 
courts to attack heterodox religious ideas directly, declaring them in violation of 
the nation’s values and legal principles. A special witness brought in to testify 
against Drenicheva stated that the ideas of the Unification Church "are in clear 
contradiction with the official state policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the 
need  to  cultivate  the  social  ideal  of  responsible,  active  citizens,  actively 
participating  in  the  creation  of  their  own  destiny,  and  complying  with 
Kazakhstan’s  legal  and moral  norms.”31  A witness  also  confessed that  in  the 
previous  case,  he  had been pressured into  giving false  testimony against  the 
30 Republic of Kazakhstan. 2009. The verdict of Almaty Almalinsky District Court on the Case of 
Elizaveta Drenicheva. January 9. Presiding judge Keikibasova Z.B., secretary of the court session 
Muhamet A.M., and the state prosecutor Mambetbaeva N.N.
31 Ibid.
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plaintiff, declaring that “he was allegedly humiliated while listening to a lecture 
[by Drenicheva], which allegedly belittled his parents' dignity.”32 
Finally,  in  a  moment  of  exceedingly  dense  and  ironic  testimony,  the 
government’s  expert  witness  spoke  at  length  on  the  fabricated  nature  of  the 
Unification  Church’s  doctrines,  by  virtue  of  their  deviation  from  traditional 
Christian doctrines:
 In fact, under the reproduction of fragmentary biblical episodes, which 
were voiced by the lecturer arbitrarily, with reference to the interpretation 
of  the  canvas  and  the  causes  of  the  actions  of  pseudo-historical 
(mythological)  heroes (God,  Adam, Eve,  the snake tempter,  archangels, 
Jesus and his disciples, Satan, etc.) and in modernized terminology (often 
of  the  slang  type),  as  well  as  in  drawing  parallels  between  biblical 
episodes and examples from everyday modern life, the lecturer pursued 
the  goal  of  bringing  the  listeners'  understanding  in  line  with  her 
artificially-constructed mythology, substituting meanings, false analogies, 
logical  manipulation  of  cause-and-effect  dependencies  on  the 
understanding  of  the  nature  and  essence  of  a  person,  the  nature  and 
content of the relationship between the sexes (male and female), and of 
relations in the family — between husband and wife and between parents 
and children.33 
The case in Kyrgyzstan also delved into broader arguments on the destructive 
nature of the Unification Church, but the state primarily sought to argue that the 
charitable  foundation  is  a  front  for  Unification  Church,  and  therefore  must 
register as religious organization. The judges requested clarification from officials 
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
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of the SCRA as to precisely what destructive activities the Moonies engage in, 
and the officials obliged by mentioning the notorious Moonie mass marriages, 
and asserting that many young girls had been forced into marriage through this 
practice.  The  case  even  took  on  an  ethnic  character,  with  the  judges  asking 
whether  such  practices  were  limited  to  the  (small  but  significant)  Korean 
minority in Kyrgyzstan, and SCRA officials declaring that it was in fact young 
Kyrgyz girls who were being married off to Korean men.34 
In general, however, the panel of three female judges that presided in the case 
pushed back heavily against any uncorroborated claims by the SCRA or other 
state officials, and even peppered SCRA officials with questions as to the nature 
of their expertise. One judge aggressively questioned an official from the SCRA 
over  his  qualifications,  asking  “What  is  your  educational  background?  What 
qualifications do you have to render such expert analysis in this case?”35 Outside 
of the court room, the SCRA officials griped that such scrutiny from the judges 
may be a sign that the Moonies had paid off the judges in advance, hoping for a 
favorable decision.
34 I personally attended this case at the Pervomayskiy Regional Court on July 24, 2013. The case 
was an appeal by the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification of a ruling to ban all 
organizations  associated with  the  Unification  Church of  Sun Myung Moon,  rendered by  the 
Sverlovskiy District Court on February 22nd 2012.
35 Ibid.
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These cases exemplify a broader tendency in the how the governments of 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan seek to use the courts in their  efforts to regulate 
religious heterodoxy. Whereas the government of Kazakhstan tends to pursue 
dissident  groups  and  individuals  through  the  courts,  charging  them  with 
violating  the  law,  Kyrgyzstan’s  government  tends  to  avoid  such  litigation, 
relying  on  the  courts  primarily  to  defend  its  policies  and  decisions  when 
challenged  by  heterodox  groups.  Neither  strategy  guarantees  that  the 
government will prevail in such cases. Ultimately, the case in Kazakhstan was 
ruled in favor of the plaintiff, i.e. in favor of the Unification Church, while the 
case in Kyrgyzstan was ruled in favor of the state. The Kazakhstani government’s 
case  was  undone  by  its  own  efforts  to  manipulate  the  court  proceedings, 
pressuring witnesses to give false testimony and relying on expert testimony that 
treated the “destructive” nature of Unification Church doctrine as self-evident. In 
contrast, the state prevailed in the case in Kyrgyzstan, in part due to its more 
modest  ambitions.  The charitable fund in question would be allowed to seek 
registration  as  a  religious  organization  (although  there  was  no  guarantee  it 
would be granted registration), but it could not continue to operate without such 
registration.  These  outcomes  demonstrate  that  the  courts  retain  a  degree  of 
political autonomy in both states, but nevertheless demonstrate the somewhat 
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different  role  that  the  courts  play  in  enforcing  the  religious  policies  of  both 
countries.
III. Brainwashing by Other Names: Discourses on Religious Heterodoxy as a 
Form of Psychological and Moral Harm
Both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have employed psychological  discourses  to 
crack down on the activities of certain “destructive sects.” These discourses claim 
that converts have been subjected to various forms of psychological influence, 
which  they  typically  refer  to  as  hypnosis  or  the  more  elaborate  term  neuro-
linguisitic programming (or NLP). As one pastor asserted, both of these terms are 
used  to  shed  a  nefarious  light  on  otherwise  ordinary  religious  acts  such  as 
prayer:  “We  speak;  my  words  have  an  influence  on  you;  therefore  I  have 
reprogrammed you with my words.”36 Nevertheless, both regimes have actively 
propagated psychological discourses on religious activity in order to erode the 
legal standing of both heterodox groups and their members.
Kyrgyzstan’s 2012 law on religious freedom allows for the ban or religious 
organizations that are found to use of hypnosis, psychotropic drugs, and other 
acts “deemed damaging to the morals and health of citizens”: 
36 Interview with a pastor of a Presbyterian church in Astana, July 22, 2014.
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Grounds for the liquidation or ban of a religious organization or mission 
in court include: 1) the violation of public security and public order, or 
undermining  the  security  of  the  state;  2)  actions  aimed at  the  forcible 
change of the constitutional order and the violation of the integrity of the 
Kyrgyz Republic; 3) the creation of armed formations; 4) actions that, in 
accordance with the law, are deemed damaging to the morals and health 
of citizens, including the use in connection with their religious activities of 
narcotic  and psychotropic  drugs,  hypnosis,  indecent  or  other  unlawful 
acts.37
This article in the religious law enshrines “psychological harm” as a high-level 
religious offense, placing such activities on the same level of offense as forming 
an armed militia. 
A similar law in Kazakhstan has led to direct litigation on several occasions. 
One case was brought against an unaffiliated evangelical church named New Life 
in the city of Taraz. The pastor was charged with engaging in a practice of “mass 
hypnosis” during a healing ceremony. Court documents state that “during the 
so-called religious  ritual  ‘healing’  many religious  churches  fell  into  a  psychic 
trance and there was a mass psychosis.”38 State security services subsequently 
conducted a search of the pastor’s home, and claim to have found a book titled 
Modern Hypnosis, which the pastor and his wife both claim was planted by the 
37  Kyrgyz  Republic.  2012.  Law  On  Freedom  of  Religion  and  Religious  Organizations  in  the 
Kyrgyz Republic. 7 December 2012 No. 196 (Revised from Law No. 282 from December 31, 2008).
38  Republic  of  Kazakhstan.  2011.  The  Verdict  of  the  Court  No.  2  of  the  City  of  Taraz  from 
September 5, No. 1\812-11. The hearing was declared closed. Presiding Officer Dauylbaev N.A., 
Secretary of the Court Session Uderbayeva N.B.
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officials:  “And here at  our house,  the KNB [Committee for  National  Security, 
offspring of the Soviet KGB] officers searched and planted the book "Modern 
Hypnosis." We never had such a book. On the contrary, the church teaches that 
one should not engage in hypnosis; it is a sin.”39 
During the case that followed, one particular plaintiff was brought forward to 
testify to the psychological harm rendered by the pastor of New Life Church. The 
prosecution  drew  off  both  the  plaintiff’s  testimony,  as  well  as  psychological 
analyses conducted by officials:
Also  during  the  judicial  investigation,  interrogated  experts  forensic 
medical  examination  Mashanlo  PP  and  Akhmetov  B.K.  Showed  that 
Kireyev A. Yu. revealed signs of a mental disorder, namely, a disease in the 
form  of  "obsessive-compulsive  disorder,”  which  arose  as  a  result  of 
external  mental  and  psychological  impact  using  neurolinguistic 
programming (NLP), and [hypnotic] suggestion. In view of the absence of 
any chronic diseases on the part of Kireyev A. Yu prior to the visit to the 
religious organization "Church of the Full Gospel New Life,” it is possible 
to  conclude  a  direct  cause-effect  relationship  between  the  onset  of  a 
mental disorder and the visit of Kireyev A. Yu to the "Church of the Full 
Gospel New Life." This disorder caused a "serious" injury to health.40
Although the pastor managed to avoid conviction on criminal charges, the case 
led the way for a series of burdensome fines placed on the church, its leadership, 
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
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and even simple church members.41
The  purpose  of  these  psychological  discourses  is  to  portray  converts  to 
heterodox groups as victims of powerful forms of suggestion, thereby absolving 
the state of its legal obligations to respect individual freedom, choice, and rights. 
By drawing off precedents in mental health, the state is able to curtail the rights 
of  its  citizens  and designate  itself  (or  relatives)  the  proper  wardens  of  those 
rights.  “Victims  of  destructive  sects”  are  depicted  as  incapable  of  taking 
responsibility for their own actions, and therefore unfit to bear civil rights and 
fully participate in public life. 
In  the  case  against  Grace  Presbyterian  Church,  mentioned  previously  in 
connection  with  alleged  espionage  activities,  the  pastor  was  accused  of 
overseeing activities such as laying on of hands, fraternal kisses,  [speaking in 
tongues],  hymns,  prayers,  cries  and  other  NLP  techniques.42  Charges  were 
brought forward in the name of one member of Grace Church, whose mother 
and sister complained that their relationship with their daughter/sister had been 
41  Corley,  Felix.  2013.  “Kazakhstan:  At  Least  153  Fines  in  2013  and  Counting.”  Forum  18, 
November  18.  Retrieved  December  2,  2017  (http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?
article_id=1895).
42 Republic of Kazakhstan. 2010. The Verdict of the Court on the Case of Kim Visa Andreevich, the 
Head of the Religious Association “Grace – the Love of Light.” April 1. Presiding judge Tlepov, 
A.S., Secretary of the court hearing Ilyasov E., and the state Prosecutor Baymoldaev S.
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harmed by her participation in the church. Yet during the trial that handed the 
pastor a commuted, four-year prison sentence, this supposed plaintiff was not 
allowed to testify in defense of her pastor. Instead, the “plaintiff’s” mother and 
sister  testified  on  her  behalf  that  she  had  been  brainwashed,  and 
“reprogrammed” by the prayer and worship services at the church.43 In this way, 
psychological discourses provide a powerful weapon for suspending the rights 
of  both  heterodox  religious  groups  and  individual  citizens  who  choose  to 
participate in them.
Psychological discourses also allow the authorities to portray these “victims” 
as  not  guilty  of  their  trespasses  against  the  nation.  Informally,  converts  have 
committed a spiritual  offense against  national  traditions by participating in a 
non-traditional faith. Rather than judge converts for their actions, however, they 
are portrayed as having acted under the hypnotic suggestion of a destructive 
religious group. Guilt lies not with the victim, therefore, who must be restored to 
the  nation  through  treatment,  but  rather  with  the  destructive  sect.  For  these 
reasons,  mental  health  discourses  were  used  throughout  the  Soviet  period 
against all manner of political dissidents — questioning the establishment could 
43 Corley, Felix. 2014. “Kazakhstan: Criminal Conviction, Large “Moral Damages” – and New 
Crominal Case?” Forum 18, February 17. Retrieved December 2, 2017 (http://www.forum18.org/
archive.php?article_id=1929).
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very  well  bring  one’s  own  mental  state  into  question.  In  contemporary 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,  however,  mental  health discourses  are  primarily 
applied  to  cases  of  “brainwashing”  by  sects  and  cults,  allowing  the  state  to 
suspend the rights of both religious groups and its own citizens.
Scientology and Psychological Harm
These psychological  discourses on “Destructive Sects” and “totalitarian cults” 
emerged in  particular  from the  work of  Alexander  Dvorkin,  President  of  the 
Russian Association of Centers for the Study of Religions and Cults. Dvorkin’s 
work  has  had  a  large  influence  on  the  religious  policy  of  Kazakhstan  and 
Kyrgyzstan,  particularly  in  the  use  of  psychological  discourses  to  discuss 
heterodox  sects.  Followers  of  Dvorkin  have  spearheaded  the  effort  to  treat 
conversion and participation in such sects as a form of psycho-social illness, to be 
viewed through a psychological perspective. 
Dvorkin defines destructive sects as religious groups that seek to destroy any 
individual identity by severing all ties between the individual and the broader 
society. Recounting the complaints of those whose family members have joined 
such cults, he states:
They  all  say  the  same  thing:  my  son,  my  daughter,  my  husband,  my 
288
mother was replaced, as if he has become a completely different person. 
He had one disposition, but now he has another; he loved whom he now 
hates, and so on. There are some phone calls; money goes missing; things 
are disappearing from home, etc. These are signs that a person has fallen 
into a sect… When we talk about the most influential sects, there are but a 
few.  The first  among them is  Scientology — one of  the most  stringent 
international  totalitarian sects… They climb into all  cracks;  they collect 
dirt on famous people.44
In this excerpt, Dvorkin accomplishes two goals. First he treats totalitarian cults 
as  a  psychological  and  social  malady  similar  to  drug  addiction.  He 
conscientiously draws parallels between membership in such cults and behaviors 
associated  with  “losing”  a  loved  one  to  drug  addiction,  including  dramatic 
changes  in  the  personality,  phone  calls  to  the  loved  one  from  strange  new 
associates, and even the disappearance of money and valuables. 
Second, Dvorkin identifies the Church of Scientology as a poster child for 
destructive sects that render significant psychological harm. In interviews and in 
official  documents,  Scientology  was  consistently  mentioned  as  an  archetypal 
totalitarian cult that exerts “serious psychological power” on its followers.45 This 
perception extends in part from Scientology’s own self-styling as both a church 
44 Moskalenko, Danil. 2009. “Non-Traditional Religions and Sects – Methods of Resisting Modern 
Society.” Interview with Alexander Dvorkin, President of the Russian Association of Centers for 
the  Study  of  Religions  and  Cults.  Zakon,  March  17.  Retrieved  December  2,  2017  (https://
www.zakon.kz/135733-netradicionnye-religii-i-sekty-metody.html).
45  Interview with  Aman Saliev,  faculty  member  of  the  Political  Science  department  at  Slavic 
University in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, July 8, 2014.
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and a scientific practice for addressing spiritual needs. This double mission as 
both a faith and a “treatment plan” of sorts has earned Scientology a reputation 
as  a  particularly  unabashed  form  of  charlatanry  in  both  Kyrgyzstan  and 
Kazakhstan.
Totalitarian sects and religious extremist organizations are a sad reality 
that  many states  have to  face.  At  the  same time,  some attempt  to  use 
religion for more pragmatic goals,  including not only commerce,  when 
someone is  enriched at the expense of those who are involved in their 
sphere of influence, but also political goals. For example, we in Pavlodar 
had a public association "Narconon", which dealt with the treatment of 
drug addicts. I will not speak about the effectiveness of their efforts; I will 
only  say:  it  was  not  a  secret  to  anyone  that  Narconon  is  one  of  the 
structures of the Church of Scientology.46
Indeed,  Scientology  has  drawn  particular  scrutiny  from  the  state  as  a 
psychologically harmful religion in part because of its self-styling as a form of 
spiritual  treatment  that  can  address  psychological  problems,  including  drug 
addiction.  The  parallels  that  Dvorkin  draws  between  drug  addiction  and 
participation in Scientology thus carry a particular irony.
Scientology  is  certainly  not  the  only  group  to  be  depicted  as  rendering 
psychological harm to its followers, but it is unique in terms of how visceral a 
reaction it has drawn from the leaderships of orthodox religions — the Muftiate 
46  Gorbunov,  Sergey.  2010.  “We  Have  to  Help  People  Orient  Themselves  in  Confessional 
Diversity.”  Interview  with  Daulet  Zakaryanov,  Deputy  Head  of  the  regional  Department  of 
Internal  Policy.  Zakon,  July 9.  Retrieved December 2,  2017 (https://www.zakon.kz/177719-d.-
zakarjanov-nuzhno-gotovit-ljudejj-k.html).
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and  the  Russian  Orthodox  Patriarchate.  Archpriest  Alexander  Ievlev  of  the 
Astana and Almaty diocese of  the Russian Orthodox Church declared in one 
interview that, “The organization calling itself the Church of Scientology is one 
of the most aggressive totalitarian sects whose activities are aimed at destroying 
traditional society and traditional relations.”47 He also stated that Scientology has 
been known to engage in espionage, noting that, “it is not surprising that the 
activities  of  Scientologists  often fall  into the sphere of  interests  of  the special 
services."48 This reaction is again at least partially conditioned by Scientology’s 
overt mixing of sacred belief with pseudo-psychological and medical knowledge. 
While all heterodox groups challenge the authority of orthodoxy, Scientology in 
particular presents a challenge to the very nature of religious authority based on 
received  wisdom  and  prophesy,  in  favor  of  a  pseudo-scientific  approach  to 
spiritual needs.
Interestingly, neither Kazakhstan nor Kyrgyzstan sought to deny registration 
based  on  psychological  harm.  Possibly  this  can  be  explained  because  of  a 
political calculus to follow the precedent of European democracies, which have 
47  Anonymous.  2009.  “The  Leadership  of  the  Church  of  Scientology  of  the  City  of  Almaty 
addressed an Open Letter to the Head of State.” Zakon, February 16. Retrieved December 2, 2017 
(http://www.zakon.kz/133481-rukovodstvo-cerkov-sajjentologii-goroda.html).
48 Ibid.
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sought  to  withhold tax-free religious status from scientology,  rather  than ban 
them  outright.  Whatever  the  reason,  scientology  currently  operates  in  both 
countries,  and  has  primarily  been  pursued  by  the  states  as  a  for-profit 
commercial entity masquerading as a religious group. 
Treatment Centers for “Victims” of Destructive Sects
The government of Kazakhstan has made particularly active use of this discourse 
on psychological harm to justify intervention into the religious sphere. Not only 
has the state engaged in litigation, but it has also funded a series of NGOs and 
“treatment centers” targeted at the “victims” of destructive sects. Making full use 
of  the  state’s  greater  resources,  the  Kazakhstani  government  publicized these 
treatments  centers  as  a  signature  initiative  in  the  battle  against  “destructive 
sects.” These centers were overseen by Yulia Denisenko, a mentee of Dvorkin 
who rose to a prominent position within Kazakhstan’s State Agency for Religious 
Affairs before moving into the pro-government non-government sector. 
Through contacts, I was able to interview Denisenko in Kazakhstan’s capital, 
Astana,  in  the  summer  of  2014.  By  that  time,  the  state  had  already  stopped 
funding  these  treatment  centers,  and  Denisenko  was  instead  heading  a  pro-
government  NGO  named  the  Information  Center  for  Religious  Questions. 
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Nevertheless,  Denisenko  freely  recounted  the  mission  and  activities  of  these 
treatment centers,  maintaining the importance of the service they rendered to 
society.  When questioned in  particular  the  about  techniques  of  brainwashing 
used by destructive sects, she asserted that the state had uncovered a real case in 
which a pastor administered psychotropic drugs: 
You’re  probably  referring  to  the  case  of  Pastor  Kashkumbaev.  Three 
members of his congregation noticed that he was adding some substance 
to the hibiscus tea that  he offered people.  When it  was brought to the 
attention  of  the  authorities,  tests  showed  that  there  was  indeed  some 
substance  there.  It  was  all  demonstrated  by  experts  in  court,  and 
Kashkumbaev was force to pay moral compensation to the victims.49
In  Denisenko’s  words,  the  state  never  initiated  legal  or  treatment  action 
against members of heterodox groups without the express request of the injured 
party. ”Out of principle, I never consult a person without their agreement. You 
can read our code of ethics if you wish, where it is stated that it is forbidden to 
force our consultation on anyone.”50 Furthermore, she maintained that both the 
treatment centers and her current NGO always advised concerned families to 
distinguish between actual harm that religious groups may be rendering to their 
loved ones,  and mere family tensions and misunderstandings that may result 
49 Interview with Yulia Denisenko at the Information Center for Religious Questions, July 21, 
2014.
50 Ibid.
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from their  loved  ones’  choices  to  participate  in  a  non-traditional  sect.  ”Most 
conflicts start with relatives. Rather than supporting [their loved one], trying to 
attract him to their side, they start by saying ’you’ve done this and that;’ they 
contribute to the misunderstanding and mistrust, until the person leaves home; 
they lose  him.51  She also claimed that  the treatment  centers  never  advertised 
themselves  as  a  “cure”  for  religious  dissidence  that  could  change  a  person’s 
mind, but merely offered assistance to those desiring it. ”They think they can just 
bring us a sick person, and we will return him in full health. ‘Here you go.’ As 
though it can be done in an hour.”52 
However, other respondents sharply critiqued Denisenko’s account of these 
treatment centers. One respondent who desired anonymity described Denisenko 
as playing a very active role in manufacturing charges against non-traditional 
religious groups, both testifying in court to their destructive nature and coaching 
relatives  on  how  to  testify.53  As  to  the  methods  employed  by  the  treatment 
centers themselves, one expert at the independent NGO Kazakhstan International 
Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law stated that these treatment centers 
were known to fill their beds with homeless people. In the words of this expert, 
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Interview with member of a Protestant Church, July 22, 14.
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these homeless people,  many of whom may well  have been ministered to by 
various Protestant  and other groups,  claimed to be the victims of  destructive 
sects in exchange for the room and board provided by the state.54 While I could 
not independently verify this account, Denisenko did admit that these treatment 
centers eventually closed due to a lack of consistent demand from the public. 
This  admission  adds  credence  to  the  KIBHR expert’s  assertion  that  the  state 
artificially  inflated  the  demand  for  these  centers  at  one  point  to  justify  its 
signature initiative in the battle against “destructive sects.”
Conclusion
Throughout the first decade of the new millennium, religious policy was fixated 
with both identifying and curtailing the threats that destructive sects represented 
to the state and population. The discourses and methods that I have identified in 
this chapter represent a high point for this focus on destructive sects, at a time 
when the  enthusiasm for  liberal  democracy  began  to  give  way to  a  popular 
desire for national solidarity and belonging. After the turbulence and criminality 
of the nineties, the new millennium marked a breaking point across much of the 
54 Interview with an expert at the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the 
Rule of Law, July 17, 2014.
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society, when the promises of economic and democratic liberalism had failed to 
produce  sufficient  dividends  for  much  of  the  population.  The  result  was  a 
crackdown on many forms of  dissent  and pluralism,  including actions  taken 
against “destructive sects.”
But this focus on destructive sects would itself not hold the popular attention 
long before it was replaced by another religious “threat.” The same desire for 
popular unity and belonging that gave rise to the policies I have discussed in this 
chapter also contributed to overtly public and populist Islamic movements. The 
rise of populist Islam provided a collective voice to many citizens of Kyrgyzstan 
and Kazakhstan who felt excluded by the political establishment, but also created 
anxiety within the establishment and the polity as a whole. Again, the battle to 
regulate  religion  has  less  to  do  with  finding  effective  ways  to  control  the 
population, and more to do with the regime picking a fight with the most visible 
symbolic challenges to its monopoly on public authority. 
Already when I conducted my fieldwork in 2014, this fervor over destructive 
sects was in decline, and the official discourse on religious threats was shifting 
toward concerns with the rise of Islamic populism. As late as 2012, state officials 
calling for increased emphasis on the fight against terrorism argued in a report 
that the state is still too focused on “relatively harmless” Christian sects. They 
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proposed instead that the state focus on monitoring and even penetrating the 
“Wahhabi underground.”
It  should  be  noted  that  law  enforcement  agencies  are  currently 
unprepared for war with the Wahhabi underground [not meaning a literal 
armed conflict in this context, but war in the same sense that a state may 
wage a “war” on poverty or drugs]. There is no political will to engage the 
many cells, that is, to pursue an approach of mass detention. The fact is 
that  most  members  of  the  Wahhabi  underground  are  not  involved  in 
direct  military  actions;  for  that  reason,  there  are  no  open  criminal 
investigations that might lead to criminal proceedings against them.
The focus [instead remains on] the fight against Christian churches and 
non-traditional teachings, although they are rather harmless.55
These religious policies are themselves a negotiation of the priorities of the state 
in terms of what tendencies among the population represent a threat to regime 
authority and what tendencies support the state’s authority. They are negotiating 
the very character of  the regime’s public  mandate.  Some elements within the 
state view the rise of Islamic populism as a force that can be controlled and used 
to bolster the state’s authority to speak for the people. Other officials view the 
rise of Islamic populism as an alternate center of power over which they have 
insufficient  control,  shifting  too  much  authority  to  the  unruly  masses  and  a 
kaleidoscope of independent religious figures who are all trying to harness this 
55 Shibutov, Marat and Vyacheslav Abramov. 2012. “Report on Terrorism in Kazakhstan: Wahhabi 
Communities  Will  Only  Grow  Larger.”  Regnum,  November  28.  Retrieved  December  2,  2017 
(https://regnum.ru/news/1598478.html).
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popular  zeal  —  whose  individual  careers  rise  and  fall  with  fickle  popular 
sentiment.
The  distinction  between  destructive  sects  and  extremist  groups  thus 
represents a battle for resources between different state apparatuses, as much as 
it does a negotiation over the nature of heterodoxy as a “threat” to the regime’s 
mandate. The SCRA and SARA contend with the security apparatus of the state 
to define which threats are greatest, and which methods of enforcement to utilize 
against them. Through this struggle, the public face of the state is itself defined, 
as well as images of precisely which wills among the public become elevated to 
this sacrosanct level. In the next chapter, I will address those policies focused on 
Islam and security threats.
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CHAPTER 8
Radical Islam and Discourses on Threat
In the post-Soviet space, we are confronted with a wave of 
"new Islamization," in which part of the Muslim community 
actively absorbs radical religious ideas brought in from outside.
Kairat Lama Sharif, Director of Kazakhstan's
State Agency for Religious Affairs
As the previous chapter demonstrated, religious sects present an object of great 
concern  to  the  religious  and  political  establishments  of  Kazakhstan  and 
Kyrgyzstan. Of equal if not greater concern, however, is the increase in Islamic 
practice  among  the  countries’  nominally  Muslim  populations,  especially  the 
titular ethnicities for whom both regimes jealously guard the authority to speak. 
If “destructive sects” subvert the essential link between nation and ”traditional” 
religion propagated by the regimes, Islamic movements challenge the regimes’ 
capacity to maintain control over this identity politics and the populist energy it 
feeds into public life. 
Some  Islamic  movements  embrace  the  link  between  Islam  and  ethno-
nationalism, but reject the authority of Muftiate and secular officials to speak for 
traditional Islam. Others reject the salience of ethnicity and nationality as vessels 
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for transmitting Islamic traditions, and promote fundamentalist or global brands 
of  Islamic identity.  After the 70-year efforts of  the Soviet  Union to either ban 
Islam  or  appropriate  the  faith  to  its  ends,  the  religious  and  political 
establishments  of  Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan  often  must  fight  against  a 
common  perception  that  local  Islam  is  less  authoritative  and  authentic  than 
brands of Islam coming from Arabic nations or Southern Asia. 
Both  regimes  have  responded  to  these  developments  by  propagating  a 
distinction between the “traditional” Islam promoted by their  own Muftiates, 
and  the  “radical”  Islam  propagated  by  unaffiliated  groups  and  movements. 
Kazakhstan in particular emphasizes radical Islam as a threat to the country’s 
efforts to be seen as a modern nation with global aspirations:
Our primary tasks today are the consolidation of the spiritual structures of 
Kazakhstani  Muslims;  Countering  the  spread  of  extremist  ideas; 
Depoliticization  of  religion,  counteracting  the  spread  of  Islamophobia; 
Modernization of spiritual structures of Kazakh Muslims.1
The regime makes extensive use of discourses on “radical” and “extremist” Islam 
to prop up the authority of the Muftiate. Officials assert that the “state has the 
right and is simply obliged to protect our traditional Muslim field, represented 
1 Derbisali, Absattar. 2012. “Without Spirituality and Moral Foundations No Education Will Be 
Complete.” Zakon, May 29. Retrieved January 6, 2018 (https://www.zakon.kz/4493412-4493412-
bez-dukhovnosti-i-nravstvennykh-osnov.html).
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by  Sunni  Islam  of  the  Hanafi  type.”2  Authorities  in  Kyrgyzstan,  note,  for 
example:
Of  particular  concern  today  are  the  intensifying  activities  of  religious 
extremist organizations,  whose main tasks are the promotion of radical 
Islam and the establishment of an Islamic state - the Caliphate. There is a 
trend of large-scale distribution of printed, audio and video that promotes 
violence and causing racial, religious and national hatred.3
The  authorities  are  particularly  concerned  by  the  possibility  of  grassroots 
fundamentalism growing directly in the midst of the mainstream establishment. 
Imams in Almaty, for example, have expressed anxiety about the unregulated 
distribution of religious books and pamphlets, declaring to the media that “just 
right  behind the  mosque  gates  there  is  continually  a  brisk  trade  in  religious 
literature, which, according to clergymen, is extremist.”4
Inevitably,  such  discourses  on  Islamic  extremism  engage  the  issue  of 
terrorism.  Daunted  by  the  task  of  regulating  such  covert  challenges  to  their 
authority, and often at pains to substantiate the distinction between “traditional” 
2 Kuandykova, Dariya. 2011. “What is the State of the Religious Sphere and What Should It Be?” 
Zakon, October 4. Retrieved January 6, 2018 (https://www.zakon.kz/4451588-chto-predstavljaet-
sobojj-religioznaja.html).
3 Yuldasheva, Nargiza. 2009. “In Kyrgyzstan in 2008 the Court Declared Religious Organizations 
“People’s  Congress  of  Kurdistan”  and  “Jihad  Group”  Terrorist  and  Their  Activities.”  24.kg, 
February  3.  Retrieved  January  9,  2018  (https://24.kg/archive/ru/parlament/
45766-2009/02/03/105193.html/).
4  Kuan,  Tatiana.  2011.  “Jihadists  Need  Merely  Strap  Up,  and  They’re  Ready.”  Moskovskiy 
Komsomolets  –  Kazakhstan,  August  31.  Retrieved  January  9,  2018  (http://mk-kz.kz/articles/
2011/08/31/618967-shahidu-sobratsya-tolko-podpoyasatsya.html).
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and “radical”  Islam,  the  regimes  have  come to  rely  heavily  on  tying  Islamic 
heterodoxy to vague security threats.  A resolution of the local  government of 
Issyk-Kul  province  in  Kyrgyzstan  from  2003,  for  example,  lists  a  number  of 
heterodox Islamic movements that ostensibly advocate for the establishment of a 
Caliphate — a single Muslim state — by violence if necessary. 
A special  danger  for  socio-political  stability  supporters  of  the  newly 
emerged  Islamic  extremist  movements  "Hizbut-Tahrir",  "Wahhabits", 
"Davatchi" [missionaries from Tablighi Jamaat] and others are present in 
the region.  Under cover of  "Islam" they pursue a  policy of  disunity of 
citizens and integrity on the basis  of  religion,  proclaiming the ideas of 
nationalism  and  radical  Islamic  fundamentalism  with  the  aim  of 
overthrowing by force the existing constitutional system in our country, 
under the false slogan of "uniting all Muslims into a single Caliphate."5
As I will demonstrate in this chapter, the religious and political establishments of 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan deploy a wide range of discourses on security and 
authority to address the many Islamic groups and movements that have gained 
traction  in  the  region.  The  regimes  make  distinctions  between moderate  and 
radical  Islam  to  bolster  the  authority  of  the  religious  establishment  against 
grassroots  dissidence,  and invoke terrorism and security  threats  to  legitimate 
unchecked  state  power,  including  mass  surveillance  and  arrest  of  ostensibly 
“extremist” groups. I elaborate this distinction further below.
5  Kyrgyz  Republic.  2003.  Issyk-Kul  Regional  Administration’s  Resolution  on  “The  State  and 
Measures of Further Improvement in Combating Religious Extremism, August 5 No. 181.
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I. State Power at the Margins of Regime Authority
Weber showed us in his theory of legitimate domination that authority is lost the 
moment that those in power use force. Authority that is recognized as legitimate 
need not be enforced through coercion, and authority that is enforced through 
coercion is in danger of losing legitimacy. This principle has long been known to 
those in  power,  of  course,  and they have responded historically  with a  wide 
array of tactics to distinguish the populations against which they use force from 
the loyal subject or citizens whom they ostensibly protected through the use of 
state power and coercion. 
The regimes of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan both employ such distinctions in 
their  efforts  to  maintain  public  authority.  Both  countries  have  experienced 
popular protests and even open revolts that have strained and at times broken 
the  regimes’  carefully  orchestrated  image  of  authority.  Though  these  past 
upheavals have never been directly motivated by religious fervor,  heterodoxy 
within Islam represents a key front in the regimes’  battles  to monopolize the 
authority to speak for “the people.” Both regimes thus draw strict distinctions 
between the “moderate” form of Islam promoted by their respective Muftiates, 
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and “radical” forms of Islam that are often attributed to foreign influences, alien 
to  the  “traditional”  Islamic  values  of  the  Kyrgyz  and  Kazakh  peoples.  In 
particular, both regimes make active use of the discourse on terrorism to convey 
the sense that dissident Islamic groups present a vague but omnipresent security 
threat.
Various statements  by officials  demonstrate  how the regimes make use of 
distinctions  among  heterodox  Islamic  groups.  Justifying  the  government’s 
policies  in  regulating  Islamic  heterodoxy,  one  Kazakh  historian  and  Islamic 
scholar categorized “non-traditional” Islamic groups and movements into three 
different types:
Based on our analysis, the activities of non-traditional Islamic trends can 
be classified into the following types: extreme radicals  (e.g. the extremist 
party Hizbut Takhrir al-Islami); radicals (e.g. jihadists and adherents of "at-
Takfir val-hijra,” the moderate wing of orthodox Salafists, which mainly 
consists of  the groups madhalits,  sururites,  and al-banites);  and groups 
that do not yet resort to political actions but are waiting  or centrist  (e.g. 
numerous  Sufi  brotherhoods,  the  Pakistani  missionary  organization 
Tablighi Jama'at, etc) [emphasis mine].6
This  typology  provides  a  succinct  formalization  of  much  of  the  rhetoric  on 
Islamic  heterodoxy  found  within  my  data.  Implicit  in  the  typology  are 
6  Izbairov,  Asylbek.  2011.  “Activities  of  Non-Traditional  Islamist  Organizations and Trends in 
Kazakhstan.”  Zakon,  November  24.  Retrieved  January  6,  2017  (http://online.zakon.kz/
Document/?doc_id=31085701#pos=0;180).
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distinctions between threats to security and challenges to authority, as well as 
between latent and manifest threats. Hizb ut-Tahrir (often transliterated from the 
Russian spelling as Hizbut Takhrir) is presented as an extreme radical group, in 
keeping with the common perception that  the movement presents  a  manifest 
security threat. Fundamentalist movements such as Salafism and Wahhabism, in 
contrast,  are  presented  as  radical  groups,  indicating  the  manifest  threat  they 
represent  to  the  authority  of  traditional  Islam  and  the  Muftiate.  The  Islamic 
missionary movement Tablighi Jamaat, finally, which primarily encourages men 
to attend mosque regularly and observe basic Muslim rites,  is  presented as a 
latent  or  nascent  threat.  Though  apolitical  and  moderate,  the  movement’s 
autonomy and grassroots support appear to many in the region as presenting 
great potential for radicalism and mobilization in the future. 
As  with  the  discourses  on  "destructive  sects"  examined  in  the  previous 
chapter, however, this typology derives its logic from the politics of the regime 
rather  than from substantive distinctions between the dogmas or  practices  of 
different  groups.  Hizb  ut-Tahrir,  for  example.  is  consistently  held  up  as  the 
primary  example  of  an  extremist  and  even  terrorist  group  operating  in  the 
region, though its members have never engaged in overtly extremist activities. 
Their activity in the region is primarily limited to distributing pamphlets that call 
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for  the  creation of  a  unified Muslim community  or  ummah  ruled by a  single 
Islamic state or Caliphate. This factor alone has earned Hizb ut-Tahrir a reputation 
as a terrorist organization. The movement directly challenges the authority of the 
secular state and national leaders, and is thus portrayed as an extreme radical 
terrorist group. 
In  many  respects,  however,  Hizb  ut-Tahrir  is  more  moderate  than  the 
fundamentalist ideals of Salafism.7 Where Salafism devotes itself to preserving 
rigid interpretations and practices of Islamic doctrine, Hizb ut-Tahrir primarily 
envisions civic integration of Muslim peoples, and is driven by a pan-Islamic zeal 
that is only loosely codified. Nevertheless, Hizb ut-Tahrir has gained a reputation 
across the region as a violent jihadist group due to its overt calls for replacing 
autonomous  nation-states  with  a  single  Islamic  state.  Salafism,  in  contrast,  is 
viewed primarily as a puritanical threat to the authority of the Muftiates and to 
national Islamic traditions, and not a direct security threat.
But  the problem with distinguishing degrees  of  radicalism is  just  part  of  a 
much broader problem with this typology, namely that the memberships of these 
7  Montgomery,  David  W.  and  John  Heathershaw.  2012.  “Islam,  Secularism  and  Danger:  A 
Reconsideration of  the  Link Between Religiosity,  Radicalism,  and Rebellion in  Central  Asia.” 
Religion, State & Society, Vol. 44, No. 3. Pp 192-218. Also see Alexander Wolters (2014) “The State 
and  Islam  in  Central  Asia:  Administering  the  Religious  Threat  or  Engaging  Muslim 
Communities?” Forschngspapiere Research Papers, No. 3.
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groups are less distinct than the typology would suggest. All of these movements 
spread through covert networks of cells, whose memberships frequently overlap. 
The same supporters of Hizb ut-Tahrir might also spread Salafi literature and 
participate in proselytizing activities with Tablighi Jamaat. Finally, many of the 
radical  groups  mentioned  have  no  known  presence  in  the  region,  and  are 
mentioned  nowhere  else  in  documents  that  deal  with  practical  issues  of 
enforcing religious policy.
The authorities are aware of such discrepancies between their rhetoric and the 
actual  religious  landscape  that  confronts  them.  In  particular,  officials  have 
directly  warned  of  the  threat  of  Islamic  groups  cross-pollinating  through 
overlapping membership, or even unifying their efforts to subvert the secular 
state through Islamic revivalism. Expert testimony in a court case in Kazakhstan 
spoke to this effect: 
Presently,  information comes from operative  sources  that  when talking 
about the relationship with the Salafis and the Tablighs, the ideologists of 
the religious extremist party Hizb-ut-Tahrir recently began to [invoke] the 
founder of Hizbut-Tahrir, Tahuddin Nabahoni, who said the following: "If 
there is such a jamagat [alternate spelling of jamaat or community], which 
by its activity, scale, and scope will exceed the party of Hizb ut-Tahrir in 
the  construction  of  a  single  Caliphate,  then  we  must  give  them  the 
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necessary support and join with them together."8
According  to  the  expert,  such  calls  for  mutual  support  do  not  foretell  of 
“organizational  merger”  per  se,  but  rather  speak  to  “the  danger  of  merging 
strategy and tactics” among “religious extremist movements as Salafism, Hizb 
ut-Tahrir  and  Tablighi  Jamagat.”9  Thus,  even  as  the  political  and  religious 
establishments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan propagate precise typologies of 
dissident  Islamic  groups,  they  demonstrate  awareness  of  the  far  messier  and 
more complex reality of Islamic heterodoxy in their countries.
In this chapter and the chapter that follows, I will structure the discussion of 
Islamic heterodoxy around this distinction between immanent security threat to 
the population and threats to the authority of traditional Islam — both latent and 
manifest.  My intention is  not  to  argue that  the  state  employs  the  rhetoric  of 
security and terrorism against one distinct set of heterodox Islamic groups, and 
the rhetoric of fundamentalism and radicalism against another. Rather, the state 
often deploys these discourses against  the same groups (or generally projects 
them  into  the  public  sphere  with  no  particular  object).  The  discourses  have 
different and complimentary goals, however — to dispel challenges to regime 
8  Republic  of  Kazakhstan.  2013.  Court  Ruling  of  the  Saryarka  District  Court  of  Astana  City, 
February  26,  No.  2-1154.  Presiding judge:  Zhaksybergenov K.  Zh.,  the  secretary  of  the  court 
session: Jahine N.Zh. and representative of the applicant, Dzhanakhmetov A.U.
9 Ibid.
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authority and to justify the use of  state  coercion and suspension of  rights  — 
which get mapped onto heterodox groups according to the circumstances. Thus, 
the discourses are not directly calibrated to the nature of  the distinct  groups; 
rather  the  discourses  are  calibrated  to  the  different  tools  in  the  regimes' 
discursive  repertoire,  which are  deployed in  a  manner  that  is  only indirectly 
related to the nature of the "threats" posed by heterodox groups.
Heterodoxy among the Disaffected
Heterodox religious movements  often spread most  rapidly among disaffected 
strata (Niebuhr 1968). Those who feel deprived of status within the mainstream 
religious  establishment  provide  a  fertile  ground  for  dissident  movements.  In 
Kyrgyzstan  and  Kazakhstan,  poorer  strata,  ethnic  minorities,  and  other 
marginalized  communities  all  have  reason  to  feel  that  the  Muftiate  and  its 
affiliated  mosques  and  imams  tend  to  affirm  established  political  and  social 
hierarchies. To such disaffected strata, heterodox Islamic movements can provide 
a powerful alternate source of moral authority. International Islamist movements, 
variously, criticize the secular elite as profane or kafir, espouse the virtue of the 
simple and pious believer, and claim to provide their followers with a direct link 
to more “authentic” forms of Islam.
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The appeal of such subversive teachings has not been lost on the authorities 
of  either country.  In interviews,  officials from both states articulated concerns 
precisely over the radicalization of  the poor,  ethnic  minorities,  prisoners,  and 
other  marginalized  groups.  This  concern  is  particularly  pronounced  in 
Kazakhstan,  however,  where  the  regime  has  more  effectively  coopted 
“traditional”  Islam  to  support  the  prevailing  political  and  economic  order. 
Speaking of recent trials to ban various Islamic groups, one judge from Almaty, 
Kazakhstan spoke of the efforts of such heterodox groups to “divide the Kazakh 
Muslim community” by exploiting such disaffection: 
Dissatisfied  with  their  material  and  social  position,  people  easily  fall 
under the influence of  representatives of  such associations,  which offer 
supposedly  simple  and  understandable  prescriptions  for  establishing 
justice.10
Authorities  in  Kazakhstan  have  reacted  to  such  “subversive”  ministries  by 
seeking  to  police  these  disaffected  strata  where  heterodoxy  often  takes  root. 
Testifying  for  the  state  in  a  case  against  the  Islamic  missionary  movement 
Tablighi Jamaat, one expert witness specifically outlined the “destructive” nature 
of this movement in terms of its appeal to alienated citizens:
The destructive nature of Tablighi Jamaat's activity consists in the wide 
10 Emir, Dias. 2013. “The Danger of Extremist Views.” Interview with the Judge of Almaly District 
Court  No.  2  of  Almaty  Mukhtar  Amirov.  Zakon,  May 2.  Retrieved January  9,  2018  (https://
www.zakon.kz/4554872-opasnost-krajjnikh-vzgljadov.-problema.html).
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involvement of young and middle-aged citizens, mainly from the poor, 
who  often  do  not  have  basic  knowledge  of  Islam,  in  the  ranks  of 
"daugatichkas" — preachers who carry out missionary activities.11
As this statement also notes,  such disaffection finds a willing audience in the 
youth as well, but not only those coming from marginalized backgrounds, as the 
expert implies. One member of Parliament in Kazakhstan sees youth disaffection 
as a much broader issue, lamenting that “we see how deeply such sentiments [in 
support  of  religious  dissidence]  penetrate,  and  the  first  victims  are  young 
people.”12
In Kyrgyzstan the relationship between orthodox Islam, heterodox Islam, and 
the  status  hierarchy  is  more  complicated.  The  Muftiate  retains  greater 
independence from the political establishment, and it seeks to demonstrate its 
autonomy  by  occasionally  admonishing  that  establishment.  The  Muftiate  of 
Kyrgyzstan frequently  plays  the  role  of  populist  scion,  denouncing a  corrupt 
political elite for abandoning both Islamic doctrine and the values of the common 
people.  At other times,  however,  the Muftiate seeks to elevate the prestige of 
Islam and its own leadership, and thus aligns with the the political and economic 
11  Republic  of  Kazakhstan.  2013.  Court  Ruling of  the Saryarka District  Court  of  Astana City, 
February  26,  No.  2-1154.  Presiding judge:  Zhaksybergenov K.  Zh.,  the  secretary  of  the  court 
session: Jahine N.Zh. and representative of the applicant, Dzhanakhmetov A.U.
12  Peruashev,  Azat.  2012.  “Social  Modernization  Should  Guarantee  the  Strengthening  of  the 
Secular Nature of the State.” Zakon, July 23. Retrieved January 6, 2018 (https://www.zakon.kz/
4503635-socialnaja-modernizacija-dolzhna.html).
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elite. The Muftiate of Kyrgyzstan thus plays a far more complex and contested 
role  in  the  status  politics  of  Kyrgyzstan  than  does  the  politically-controlled 
Muftiate of Kazakhstan. 
As a result, the political and religious establishment in Kyrgyzstan focuses 
more  on  confronting  a  common  foe  —  heterodoxy  among  ethnic  minorities, 
especially the sizable Uzbek population in the south of the country that is feared 
to harbor secessionist aspirations. A government declaration from 1995 speaks to 
this focus on the Uzbek community:
The  most  vulnerable  to  Wahhabism  is  the  population  of  territories 
adjacent to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, in particular, Suzak, Ala-Bukin, Bazar-
Korgon,  Nooken,  Naukat,  Lyallak,  Kara-Suu districts  of  Jalal-Abad and 
Osh provinces. Zakirov, a Wahhabist and spiritual leader from the Suzak 
district, and his supporters have advocated for the idea of creating Uzbek 
autonomy in the south of Kyrgyzstan under the guise of religion. Another 
group  of  Muslim  confessors  from  Suzak  district  organized  two  illegal 
schools to teach the principles of Islamic fundamentalism, where students 
were taught the ideas of "jihad,” and the creation of an Islamic party.13
This sentiment was repeated by another government declaration in 2001, which 
speaks of the insufficient outcomes of government efforts to reign in “religious 
extremism” among the “more religious” population in the south:
Despite  the measures taken,  the religious situation remains complex in 
Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken oblasts, where there is high level of religiosity 
13 Kyrgyz Republic. 1995. Government Decree “On the Religious Situation in the Kyrgyz Republic 
and the Tasks of the Authorities to Formulate State Policy in the Religious Sphere.” Signed by 
Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic A. Djumagulov, August 1995 No. 345.
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of  the population.  Extremists  in  the person of  the Islamic  Party of  the 
Renaissance of Uzbekistan (IWPU) and the religious extremist party Hizb 
ut-Tahrir  (Liberation  Party)  have  begun  to  actively  implement  their 
strategic  plans.  They  act  among  the  population  with  inflammatory 
appeals, actively involve young people in their ranks.14
Similar concerns with ethnic minorities have arisen in Kazakhstan, but are 
often  muted  by  comparison.  In  a  report  on  Kazakhstan’s  Department  of 
Migration,  a  number  of  Uzbek migrants  complained that  the  authorities  had 
”insulted  their  religious  feelings,  refused  to  register  them,  calling  them 
Wahhabis,  terrorists,  and  radical  extremists.”15  The  authorities  also  expressed 
concern that Tablighi Jamaat was gaining a strong following among the small 
Dungan community — a long-existing community of Han Chinese who practice 
Islam:
It should be noted that one of the active centers for the dissemination of 
the  ideology  of  [Tablighi  Jamaat]  is  Masanchi  of  Kordai  district  in 
Zhambyl  Province,  where  the  majority  of  local  residents,  Dungan  by 
nationality, are followers of this trend. These "Tablighs" hold the opinion 
that the village is actually an autonomous territorial unit… Involving a 
large number of representatives of this ethnic group in the ranks of an 
unconventional religious trend can lead to complications in the religious 
situation in the future, as well as propagation of extremist and separatist 
14 Kyrgyz Republic. 2011. Government Decree On the Work of the State Commission Under the 
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on Religious Affairs for the Implementation of Decree of the 
President of Kyrgyz Republic “On Measures of Reinforcing the Rights of Citizens of the Kyrgyz 
Republic in Freedom of Conscience and Religion.” April 5, 2001 No. 155.
15 Mavloiniy, Dil’begim. 2010. “Department of Migration: If You Have Complaints About Torture 
–  Bring A Doctor’s  Note.”  Interview with  Gulsara  Altynbekova,  Head of  the  Department  of 
Migration.  Azattyq,  August  19.  Retrieved  January  9,  2018  (https://rus.azattyq.org/a/
refugees_asylum_almaty/2131181.html).
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ideologies, threatening the national security of the country.16
Generally,  however,  authorities in Kazakhstan articulate fewer concerns about 
ethnic minorities than they do about other disaffected groups.
The authorities have focused extensively, for example, on the spread of Islam 
among prisoner populations. Reports have noted that many people convicted of 
terrorism are  “just  followers  of  Wahhabism and Salafism” who may only  be 
engaged in “peaceful preaching and talking about the kingdom of God.”17 Once 
imprisoned, however, they may embrace more radical ideologies:
Such measures as criminal prosecution and punishment, even in the form 
of long periods of imprisonment, not only do not have a deterrent effect 
on the spread of the ideology of religious extremism, but in some cases 
help fanatics acquire new supporters in isolation and imprisonment. In a 
number  of  penal  colonies  in  the  Aktobe  region,  there  are  constantly 
growing cells  of  extremist  movements;  the process began several  years 
ago after the arrival of the first representatives of movements such as Al 
Vahhabiya and Hizbut Tahrir to serve their sentences.18
This high density of prisoners of conscience is true of other penal colonies, such 
as  Akmola,  where a  rights  watchdog found that  “members of  Hizb-ut-Tahrir, 
pro-Wahhabist movements, the separatist organization of East Turkestan, and the 
16  Anonymous.  2010.  “An  Unregistered  Madrasah  Revealed  in  the  Zhambyl  Region”  Zakon, 
Feburary 9. Retrieved January 6, 2018 (http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=30565168).
17  Anonymous.  2013.  “On the  Territory  of  Kazakhstan  There  Are  Nearly  500  Participants  of 
Radical Religious Groups.” KTK, February 21. Retrieved January 9, 2018 (http://www.ktk.kz/
ru/news/video/2013/02/21/21411).
18  Republic  of  Kazakhstan.  2000.  Government  Decree  on  “the  State  Protection  of  Persons 
Participating in Criminal Proceedings.” July 5, No. 72.
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‘Jamaat Mujahideen of Central Asia’ are serving their sentences.”19 Officials from 
the  National  Security  Committee  (the  KNB,  successor  to  the  KGB)  have 
expressed concern that “Persons convicted for extremist activity” even “try to 
take the place of the imams in the [penal] colonies.”20 Kyrgyzstani authorities 
have expressed similar concerns that people convicted of participating in banned 
Islamic extremist groups are “sent to serve their sentence in colony-settlements 
where they continue their recruiting activities.”21
Thus,  Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan  both  grapple  with  the  popularity  of 
Islamic heterodoxy among disaffected strata of their citizenry, but often differ in 
their  approaches.  The distinctive position of  the Muftiates of  Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan typify the different approaches of the two regimes in policing these 
marginalized populations. The former faithfully articulates regime talking points 
intended to legitimate the status quo and raise Kazakhstan’s international profile 
as  a  modern  nation  with  global  aspirations.  The  latter,  in  contrast  seeks  to 
navigate an autonomous path between two social factions — as champion of the 
19 Anonymous. 2012. Monitoring of Violations of Freedom of Speech. International Fund Adil Soz. 
Retrieved January 9, 2018 (http://geum.ru/next/art-374810.php).
20 Anonymous. 2006. “Individuals Convicted of Extremist Activity Try to Take the Place of Imams 
in Mosques of the Colonies.” Kazakhstan Today, February 2. Retrieved January 9, 2018 (http://
nomad.su/?a=13-200602030218).
21  Kyrgyz Republic.  2009.  Decree  of  the  Issyk-Kul  Regional  Administration on “The State  of 
Religious Affairs in the Territory of the Issyk-Kul Region.” March 13, No. 61.
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simple  people  (who are  often  the  most  receptive  and faithful  to  the  ideal  of 
religious  submission),  and  as  a  revered  institution  that  is  elevated  above 
mundane life and profane politics. This disparity represents one factor among 
numerous  others  that  distinguish  the  relationship  between  the  political  and 
Islamic  establishment  in  Kyrgyzstan  in  comparison  to  that  of  Kazakhstan.  I 
address further discrepancies below.
II. Different Approaches to Islamic Heterodoxy in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
Though the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan pursue broadly similar 
goals in their  regulation of Islam, the scale and scope of regime responses to 
heterodox  Islamic  groups  and  movements  differ  dramatically.  Authorities  in 
Kazakhstan  have  engaged  in  a  proactive  campaign  to  propagate  consistent 
narratives  about  Islamic  heterodoxy,  whereas  authorities  in  Kyrgyzstan  have 
pursued a more piecemeal and reactive approach. This difference extends in part 
from the markedly greater resources wielded by the political establishment of 
Kazakhstan in comparison to that of Kyrgyzstan.
Kyrgyzstani officials have long complained that they lack central control over 
the  teachings  of  imams  across  the  country.  The  political  establishment  has 
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struggled  to  establish  greater  control  over  the  Muftiate  structure,  and  the 
Muftiate, in turn, has struggled to exert central authority over the mosques and 
madrassas. This is especially true in the south of the country:
A large number of mosques and madrassas are based in the south of the 
republic,  where  the  purposeful  missionary  activity  of  [foreign]  Islamic 
centers creates real conditions for the introduction of a split among the 
Muslims of the republic. The construction of many mosques was financed 
from abroad, which puts religious communities in a dependent position.22
Officials express particular concern over their continued lack of control in the 
sphere  of  religious  education.  The  initial  legislation  that  established  greater 
government intervention in the religious sphere in the late 1990s noted that:
Almost all religious educational institutions (the Islamic Institute under 
the  Spiritual  Directorate  of  Muslims  of  Kyrgyzstan,  madrassas  under 
mosques, parochial schools in churches) operate without control by state 
bodies. Many of them do not have elementary sanitary conditions; their 
training programs are not worked out; as a rule, teachers are self-taught, 
and teaching basically comes down to a simple memorization of canons of 
sacred books.23
More than a decade later, in spite of subsequent efforts taken by the government 
to establish more control over the religious sphere, local observers still expressed 
22 Kyrgyz Republic. 2011. Government Decree On the Work of the State Commission Under the 
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on Religious Affairs for the Implementation of Decree of the 
President of Kyrgyz Republic “On Measures of Reinforcing the Rights of Citizens of the Kyrgyz 
Republic in Freedom of Conscience and Religion.” April 5, 2001 No. 155.
23 Kyrgyz Republic. 1995. Government Decree “On the Religious Situation in the Kyrgyz Republic 
and the Tasks of the Authorities to Formulate State Policy in the Religious Sphere.” Signed by 
Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic A. Djumagulov, August 1995 No. 345.
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great concern that Muftiate-aligned imams in Kyrgyzstan “cannot ideologically 
resist the propaganda of Salafis, Wahhabis, and Hizbutites [followers of Hizb ut-
Tahrir].”24 
Such concerns dovetail  with growing public religiosity among the Muslim 
population  of  the  country.  In  this  same  period,  religious  participation  has 
increased significantly among Muslims in Kyrgyzstan,  especially among men, 
and it has became increasingly common for religious leaders to call men to public 
prayer  on  the  main  squares  in  Bishkek  and  Osh.  As  figure  14  below 
demonstrates, mosque attendance has increased overall between 2003 and 2011, 
but the percentage of men who report attending mosque once a week more than 
doubled.25  This  dramatic  increase  likely  indicates  wider  participation in  Juma 
Namaz — the Friday afternoon prayer that, for many Central Asian Muslim men, 
represents the primary form of participation in their local mosques and Muslim 
community.  Thus,  Islamic  practices  have  proliferated  in  Kyrgyzstan,  and  the 
authorities have struggled to retain control over this growing public religiosity.
24  Malikova,  Bermet.  2009.  “Inner  Peace  or  a  War  for  Hearts  and  Souls?”  Interview  with 
Taalaybek Osmonov,  a  PhD candidate  at  the  Institute  of  Philosophy and Political  and Legal 
Studies of the National Academy of Sciences; General Secretary of the World Ahmady Muslim 
Community.  Vecherniy  Bishkek,  May  22.  Retrieved  January  9,  2018  (http://members.vb.kg/
2009/05/22/dux/1_print.html).
25 Relationship between gender and attendance significant at the .001 level for both waves of the 
WVS; wave 4 in 2003: X2 (12, 775) = 72.3, p < .001; wave 6 in 201: X2 (6, 1334) = 137.6, p < .001.
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In  contrast,  Kazakhstan  has  a  well-financed  operation  for  monitoring 
activities within the Muslim community. While much of this mission is devoted 
to combating the influence of  heterodox Islamic groups,  the government also 
actively monitors the Muftiate and the mosques under its supervision. The U.S. 
Department  of  State  reported  of  these  efforts  in  2010  that,  “security  officials 
informally monitor certain areas of religious activity, in particular, the preaching 
of  Muslim  imams.”26  This  monitoring  covers  all  aspects  of  Islamic  teaching, 
proselytizing, prayer and public gathering. The government regularly discovers 
and investigates unregistered missionaries, madrassas, and even mosques. 
26 Report on the Situation with Human Rights in Kazakhstan for 2009. 2010. Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor.
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In 2010, for example, the Department for Combating Extremism, Separatism 
and  Terrorism  within  the  Ministry  of  Internal  Affairs  reported  that  it  had 
uncovered  an  unregistered  mosque  in  Zhambyl  province  in  southern 
Kazakhstan.27 The department similarly uncovered an unregistered madrassa on 
the  territory  of  a  neighboring  mosque,  “in  the  course  of  operational  search 
activities.”28 The following year, the authorities of neighboring Almaty Province 
reported  that  they  had  detained  183  members  of  Tablighi  Jamaat,  who  were 
accused of organizing five “agitational meetings.” The media reported that all 
members  ”were  held  accountable,  and  a  similar  campaign  was  prevented  in 
Talgar district thanks to the law enforcement officers of the region.”29 These few 
examples  speak  to  an  extensive  and  coordinated  enforcement  strategy,  made 
possible  by  the  greater  capacity  of  Kazakhstan’s  regime compared to  that  of 
Kyrgyzstan. 
This disparity has had a clear impact on the amount of data available from 
each country. Sources from Kazakhstan consistently repeat regime talking points, 
27 Demidov, Vladimir. 2009. “Register, and Believe in Whoever You Want.” Zakon, January 15. 
Retrieved  January  6,  2018  (https://www.zakon.kz/150190-ocherednojj-
svjashhennosluzhitel.html).
28  Anonymous.  2010.  “An  Unregistered  Madrasah  Revealed  in  the  Zhambyl  Region”  Zakon, 
Feburary 9. Retrieved January 6, 2018 (http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=30565168).
29 Republic of Kazakhstan. 2010. Court Ruling of the Military Court of the Shymkent Garrison. 
March 26, No. 1-3/10. Presiding judge Kaipov B., secretary of the session Turlieva A., and the 
state prosecutors Musaev M. and Sharipov B.
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resulting in more extensive data from Kazakhstan than from Kyrgyzstan. Though 
this pattern was true to a lesser degree for data on Protestant groups and other 
“destructive sects” in previous chapters,  the data were not as skewed toward 
Kazakhstan as they are in relation to Islamic groups. For example, references to 
Salafism and Wahhabism occur 374 and 302 times, respectively, in sources from 
Kazakhstan, and generally present these movements as a serious threat to public 
stability and security.  In contrast  the terms Wahhabism and Salafism together 
occur less than 50 times in roughly 2,500 documents from Kyrgyzstan. Where 
they do occur, the terms are often used to denigrate the ethnic Uzbek minority as 
more prone to fundamentalism and radicalism. I  have therefore relied on my 
interviews and additional data from Kyrgyzstan to make up for these disparities 
in the dataset.
III. Extremism, Security, and State Power
As Agamben argued in The State of Exception, the state is a unique entity because 
of its capacity to suspend its own rules when “the public interest” requires it. 
Agamben  was  writing  of  situations  in  which  otherwise  democratic  states 
suspend the rule of law “in the public interest,” especially during emergencies 
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and  other  exceptional  circumstances.  Authoritarian  regimes  similarly  invoke 
external threats and national crises, seeking to justify a more or less permanent 
suspension of certain rules that hinder their use of state power.
Discourses  on  security  and  terrorism  serve  precisely  this  function  in  the 
religious policy of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The authorities of Kazakhstan in 
particular have propagated a forceful narrative of Islamic heterodoxy as a source 
of security threats, justifying their pervasive use of state surveillance and security 
forces. As I mentioned in my methodology, the terms extremism,  terrorism,  and 
security collectively account for roughly half of the 100,000 coded segments in the 
dataset. These terms frequently occur in isolation from other codes, meaning that 
the security discourse is often invoked without naming specific groups as threats. 
This  strategy  provides  clear  utility  to  the  regime:  invoking  a  vague  but 
omnipresent security threat justifies expansive state power unhindered by the 
rule of law. Although the label extremism does get applied to “destructive sects,” 
the  security  discourse  overwhelmingly  targets  Islamic  heterodoxy.  I  can  only 
cover a fraction of the thousands of statements in my data, but I provide a few 
examples below that capture the overall trend of how extremism, terrorism, and 
security are invoked in official discourses.
Officials in both countries frequently offer rote lists of suspected extremist 
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and  terrorist  organizations.  The  other  organizations  that  have  been  deemed 
security threats in Kazakhstan, for example, include the following:
From  October  2004  to  November  2006,  13  foreign  organizations  were 
deemed terrorist for the first time in Kazakhstan (Al-Qaida, The Islamic 
Party of East Turkestan, the Kurdish People's Congress and the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan, Asbat al-Ansar, the Muslim Brotherhood, Bos 
Gurd,  Jamaat  of  the  Mujahyet  of  Central  Asia,  Lashkar-i-Taiba,  The 
Taliban,  "Social  Reforms  Society",  "Aum  Sensrique",  "SHAT")  and  the 
extremist party "Hizb-ut-Tahrir."30 
I must emphasize again that the majority of these groups have no presence in 
Kazakhstan (or Kyrgyzstan). The composition of the list does not reflect genuine 
security threats so much as nods to other regimes and the local authorities’ own 
need to construct a discourse on threat. In this section, I will address the national 
and regional agendas that drive these security discourses.
National Security
Authorities in Kazakhstan in particular invoke Islamic extremism both as a threat 
to security and as a hindrance to the President’s vision for modernization and 
democracy. Policy briefs that expound the administration’s developmental vision 
— “Kazakhstan 2030” — note that ”the fight against international terrorism is 
30 Republic of Kazakhstan. 2008. Government Decree on “The Approval of the Fourth and Fifth 
Consolidated Periodic  Report  on  the  Implementation of  the  International  Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.” July 17, No. 701.
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seen as a priority in the work to strengthen statehood and the national security 
system.“31 And in a speech to the OSCE32 in 2010, President Nazarbayev asserted 
that terrorism is like “a metastasizing cancer, which step-by-step affects modern 
civilization across  the world.”33  Another source quotes  Nazarbayev as  stating 
that:
In the current situation, with terrorist and extremist activities expanding, 
law enforcement bodies should be engaged in effective work to maintain 
the  constitutional  order  and  stability  of  Kazakh  society,  including 
protecting the security of Kazakhstani people.34
Kazakhstani authorities frequently invoke counter-terrorism efforts, but seldom 
give specifics of these efforts. The deputy head of Kazakhstan’s Secretariat of the 
Republican  Security  Council  stated  in  a  2011  interview  that  Kazakhstan  is 
working to "detect and limit the dissemination of materials containing signs of 
31 Anonymous. 2012. “In Kazakhstan, It Was Decided to Create a Working Group on Religion.” 
Kazakhstan  Today,  June  30.  Retrieved  January  9,  2018  (https://www.kt.kz/rus/society/
v_kazahstane_resheno_sozdatj_rabochuju_gruppu_po_voprosam_religij_1153558272.html).
32  The  Organization  for  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe,  an  international  organization 
created after the Second World War to prevent further conflict specifically in the context of post-
War Europe. The OSCE has since taken on a broader mission across Eurasia to prevent conflict 
and promote democratization and government reforms. As a member state, Kazakhstan exercised 
its right to chair the OSCE in 2010, but was widely criticized during its chairmanship for its less-
than-stellar record on human rights and curtailing corruption.
33  Anonymous.  2010.  “The Fate  and Prospects  of  the OSCE” Interview with the President  of 
Kazakhstan  Nursultan  Nazarbayev.  Interfax,  January  28.  Retrieved  January  9,  2018  (http://
www.interfax.ru/interview/120866).
34  (Ayazbekov,  Kuanysh.  2012.  “Additional  Attestation  Will  Boost  People’s  Trust  in  Law 
Enforcement Agencies.”Zakon, July 17, 2018. Retrieved January 6, 2018 http://online.zakon.kz/
Document/?doc_id=31223394#pos=1;-145).
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extremism, terrorist propaganda, and appeals via internet resources for help in 
committing  acts  of  terrorism."35  Similarly  opaque,  the  Kazakhstan  2030 
development  plan mentioned above notes  few specifics  of  how this  “priority 
issue” will  be  approached,  aside from general  comments  such as  assigning a 
”special role to the expert scientific community, which must urgently develop a 
new,  systematic  approach  to  the  analysis  of  the  religious  situation  in  the 
country.”36
Sources from Kyrgyzstan differ in the quantity of appeals to security, if not 
the quality. Kyrgyzstani officials invoke extremism and terrorism less frequently 
than their Kazakhstani counterparts, but generally call for similar expansions of 
state power to address unspecified extremist threats. A 2012 Presidential decree, 
for example, states that:
Particular attention should be paid to the reform of special services and 
law enforcement agencies, aimed primarily at preventing and suppressing 
threats  and  security  challenges,  especially  from  terrorist  and  religious 
extremist organizations.37
The Ministry of Justice has also called for legal reforms such that the judiciary 
35 (No Author. 2012. Monitoring Violations of Freedom of Speech In Kazakhstan. International 
Foundation for Freedom of Speech “Adil Soz."  Zakon, Feburary 25. Retrieved January 6,  2018 
(https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31130721&mode=p#pos=1;-117).
36 Ibid.
37 Kyrgyz Repblic. 2009. Government Decree on the “Work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
the  Kyrgyz  Republic,  Local  Government  Administrations  and Local  Self-Government  for  the 
Prevention of Religious Extremism and Inter-Ethnic Conflict.” Febrary 18, No. 115.
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can fight terrorism more effectively (meaning less hampered by due process in 
many cases):
Special attention of the courts is drawn to the need for strict compliance 
with the requirements of the law providing for criminal liability for crimes 
against  public  safety  and  public  order  in  cases  of  terrorism  and 
extremism.38
To this end, the SCRA has been authorized to work directly with the Ministry of 
Justice to “prohibit or suspend the activities of religious organizations engaged in 
the  dissemination  of  religious  extremism,  fundamentalism  that  violate  the 
legislation  of  the  Kyrgyz  Republic,  which  threaten  the  rights  and  legitimate 
interests of citizens and the security of the state.”39
As in Kazakhstan, these policies frequently invoke the threat of extremism 
and terrorism without specifying objects or criteria.  As such, they feed into a 
broader tendency to see Islam itself is through the framework of security. Even as 
the government and Muftiate seek to bolster ”traditional Islam,” this security 
discourse  contributes  to  public  and  media  narratives  that  equate  Islam  with 
extremism, and subsequently with terrorism. As one public figure in Kyrgyzstan 
complained:  “Look  at  the  content  of  state  television  programs:  as  soon  as  it 
38 Kyrgyz Republic. 2011. Decision of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Kyrgyz Republic 
on the “Work of the Judicial Board of Criminal Cases and Cases on Administrative Violations of 
the Supreme Court of the Kyrgyz Republic.” February 24, No. 5.
39  Kyrgyz  Republic.  2012.  Decree  of  the  President  of  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  about  the  State 
Commission for Religious Affairs. March 23, No. 601.
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comes  to  extremism  and  terrorism,  the  Bishkek  central  mosque  is  shown  as 
Muslims pray there; an unsightly image of Islam is being planted.”40
Although  both  regimes  often  invoke  security  threats  without  pointing  to 
particular  incidents,  they  do  quantify  the  threat  of  extremism  in  ways  that 
contribute  to  the  narrative  of  omnipresent  threat.  For  example,  President 
Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan asserted in 2012 that:
Radical extremist elements are exerting full-scale pressure on the state and 
society as a whole ... So, just between 2011 and 2012, there were over a 
hundred crimes related to terrorism and extremism. Dozens of  citizens 
and law enforcement officers became their victims.41
Due to the regime’s lack of transparency, it is impossible to verify how many of 
these crimes actually had to do with Islamic radicalism or terrorism. This opacity 
leaves open the possibility that the numbers are inflated for political  reasons, 
possibly even labelling other popular actions as terrorist threats. During this time 
period  mentioned  above,  for  example,  Kazakhstan’s  regime  was  quelling 
numerous popular protests across the country due to economic unrest.
In 2011, the regime violently put down a major, coordinated strike in Aktau 
40  Tuzov,  Alexander  and  Bermet  Malikova.  2009.  “How  Can  We  Save  Secular  Kyrgyzstan?” 
Vecherniy Bishkek, November 4. Retrieved December 2, 2017 (http://members.vb.kg/2009/11/04/
polit/1.html).
41  Peruashev,  Azat.  2012.  “Social  Modernization  Should  Guarantee  the  Strengthening  of  the 
Secular Nature of the State.” Zakon, July 23. Retrieved January 6, 2018 (https://www.zakon.kz/
4503635-socialnaja-modernizacija-dolzhna.html).
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(in the far east of the country) by workers in the country’s booming energy sector 
— the major source of the regime’s wealth.42 That very same year, state-aligned 
media openly speculated that another clash between authorities and locals near 
Aktobe city had its origins in Islamic extremism: 
As it is known, in the beginning of June in Aktyubinsk region there was an 
armed conflict between the police and an outlawed group consisting of 
local residents. As a result, two policemen, one special forces officer, and 
two others  were  wounded.  Nine  members  of  the  criminal  group were 
killed  in  detention,  and  two  survivors  were  sentenced  to  life 
imprisonment. Local media did not rule out the possibility that supporters 
of the Islamic radical movement "Salafia" could have been involved in the 
killing  of  the  policemen.  However,  the  Ministry  of  Internal  Affairs  of 
Kazakhstan denied this version. After these events, the Spiritual Board of 
Muslims of Kazakhstan (SAMK) stated that the Salafi current is dangerous 
and called on the authorities to ban it.43
In this quote, the pubic speculations of the media helped to drive the regime’s 
broader warnings of Islamic extremism. Though the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
denied the involvement of religious extremists, the state-aligned media reported 
that it could not rule out the possibility of an extremist element, prompting the 
Muftiate to call for a ban on Salafism. 
Thus, while it  is possible that the above-cited events did indeed involve a 
42  Anonymous.  2012.  “Kazakhstan:  Abusive  Response  to  Oil  Worker  Strikes.”  Human  Rights 
Watch,  September  10.  Retrieved  January  6,  2018  (https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/09/10/
striking-oil-striking-workers/violations-labor-rights-kazakhstans-oil-sector).
43 Porokhova, Valeriya. 2011. “Salafis Must Be Evicted.” Zakon, October 20. Retrieved January 6, 
2018 (https://www.zakon.kz/4454265-valerija-porokhova-Salafistov-nado.html).
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local religious group that sought autonomy from the establishment, it is equally 
possible  that  the state  is  simply allowing state-aligned media to attribute the 
conflict  to  a  scapegoat  that  has  already been well  established in  the  public’s 
mind. This incident, along with the broader rhetoric of extremism and terrorism 
discussed above, demonstrate how the regimes of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
use the security discourse to justify the use of  state power against  their  own 
populations. The states have devised even further means of circumventing the 
rule of law, however, including by entering into regional security agreements that 
supersede national legislation. As I discuss below, these transnational security 
agreements  also  make  active  use  of  discourses  on  Islamic  extremism  and 
terrorism to justify their policies and activities.
Regional Security
Kyrgyzstan  and  Kazakhstan  are  both  parties  to  numerous  bilateral  and 
multilateral  agreements  on  combatting  religious  extremism  and  terrorism. 
Bilateral  agreements  and  multilateral  organizations  have  proliferated  in  the 
region since the 1990s, creating a web of overlapping policy commitments and 
initiatives,  including  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  (CIS),  the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Shanghai Cooperation 
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Organization (SCO). And while such agreements often lack effective institutions 
for  enforcement  or  transnational  governance,  they  signal  global  alignments 
among their member states. Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs affirmed in 
2012 that,  “Kyrgyzstan fruitfully cooperates in the fight against terrorism and 
extremism within the CIS, CSTO and the SCO.”44 Toward this ultimate goal — 
projecting  sovereignty  over  the  Eurasian  landmass  —  invocations  of  Islamic 
extremism and terrorism contribute significantly. 
This  emphasis  on  counter-terrorism  began  even  before  the  attack  on  the 
World Trade Center  in  2001 and the  subsequent  U.S.  military engagement  in 
Afghanistan. The SCO, for example, issued a statement in 2000 expressing “deep 
concern  over  the  growing  manifestations  of  international  terrorism,  religious 
extremism and national separatism,” and declaring that “these forces constitute 
the main threat to security and stability in the region.”45 The CIS similarly issued 
a statement in May of 2001 calling for “the development of cooperation by CIS 
member  states  in  the  fight  against  international  terrorism  and  other 
44 Kyrgyz Republic. 2009. Government Decree on the “Work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
the  Kyrgyz  Republic,  Local  Government  Administrations  and Local  Self-Government  for  the 
Prevention of Religious Extremism and Inter-Ethnic Conflict.” Febrary 18, No. 115.
45 Joint Public Statement Following the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan, the People's Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and 
the Republic of Tajikistan. 2000, July 4. Retrieved January 6, 2018 (http://russian.china.org.cn/
russian/43607.htm).
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manifestations of extremism.”46 
Since  2001,  however,  terrorism  and  religious  extremism  have  served  as  a 
constant  refrain  for  these  organizations,  bolstering  their  claims  to  a  strong 
mandate  to  project  regional  sovereignty.  The  SCO  calls  for  an  approach  to 
counter-terrorism based on ”regional, sub-regional and national structures” that 
enact security policies based on “mutual trust, mutual benefit, and equality of 
interaction”  aimed  to  ”eradicate  the  sources  of  terrorism.”47  The  situation  in 
Afghanistan in particular is frequently invoked:
The  complex  military-political  situation  in  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan, 
which have become the main training camps for the al-Qaida, the Taliban, 
the  Islamic  Movement  of  Uzbekistan,  the  Islamic  Movement  of  East 
Turkestan, the “Groups of Jihad" or "Union of Islamic Jihad,” and others, 
poses a serious threat to security throughout the region.48
And  while  such  extremist  and  terrorist  networks  are  undoubtedly  active  to 
varying  degrees,  these  organizations  drastically  overstate  the  threat  of  cross-
border terrorism in order to justify their primary goal: projecting transnational 
sovereignty over the Eurasian space. 
46 Plenipotentiary Representatives of the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States under the Antiterrorist Center of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 2001, May 31. 
Retrieved January 6, 2018 (http://russian.china.org.cn/russian/43607.htm).
47  Joint  Public  Statement  of  the  Foreign Ministers  of  the  Shanghai  Cooperation Organization 
Member States. 2002, January 7. Retrieved January 6, 2018 (eng.sectsco.org/load/193506/).
48 Anonymous. 2012. Monitoring of Violations of Freedom of Speech. International Fund Adil Soz. 
Retrieved January 9, 2018 (http://geum.ru/next/art-374810.php).
331
The CSTO and CIS both emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union to 
reconstitute military and economic (respectively) cooperation among all  but a 
few Soviet  successor states.  The organizations collectively assert  transnational 
sovereignty over what was perceived as Moscow’s sphere of influence. The SCO 
integrates  many  CIS  and  CSTO  member  states  into  a  larger  economic  and 
military block with China.49 The SCO projects power over 60% of the Eurasian 
landmass,  even  as  the  economies  of  China  and  Russia  remain  more  deeply 
entangled with those of Europe and the US than they are engaged with each 
other.
These  organizations  facilitate  the  efforts  of  the  larger  powers  to  exert 
influence over smaller member states. Kyrgyzstan, for example, has sought to 
pursue a more multipolar foreign policy by hosting a U.S. airbase that supported 
the war in Afghanistan, but is increasingly aligned with this Eurasian bloc. The 
country’s  foreign  policy  statements  speak  to  these  efforts  to  navigate  a  path 
between  national  autonomy  and  regional  cooperation  in  the  fight  against 
religious extremism and terrorism:
The Kyrgyz Republic, realizing that terrorism and extremism pose a threat 
to international peace and security, the development of friendly relations 
49 India joined the SCO in 2017. The inclusion of a large,  western-aligned member state may 
change the dynamic of the organization, but it remain too early to tell.
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between states, as well as the exercise of fundamental human rights and 
freedoms, and to effectively combat such threats, has joined the various 
conventions on combating terrorism and extremism within the framework 
of  international  organizations  such  as  the  CIS,  the  SCO,  the  United 
Nations, and others.50
Although Kyrgyzstan  has  occasionally  chaffed  at  its  relatively  weak  position 
within these organizations, officials generally see the goals of such multinational 
organizations as falling largely in line with their own interests. 
As  a  larger  and  wealthier  state,  Kazakhstan  has  managed  to  pursue 
multilateral  foreign  policy  more  effectively,  participating  in  numerous 
multinational organizations with ties beyond the post-Soviet space. Kazakhstan 
chaired the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 2010, and the 
Organization  for  Islamic  Cooperation  in  2012,  exerting  a  leadership  position 
(albeit a small one) in two distinct poles of global governance. In these capacities 
too, Kazakhstani officials placed a central emphasis in their mandate on fighting 
transnational forms of Islamic extremism and terrorism. Kazakhstan’s Foreign 
Minister at the time noted: “Kazakhstan considers its main task of chairing the 
Organization  of  Islamic  Cooperation  (OIC)  the  elimination  of  fertile  soil  for 
50  Kyrgyz  Republic.  2012.  The  Second  National  Report  of  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  on  the 
Implementation of  the  Convention Against  Torture  and Other  Cruel,  Inhuman or  Degrading 
Treatment and Punishment for the period from 1999 to 2011. Retrieved January 6, 2018 (http://
t b i n t e r n e t . o h c h r . o r g / T r e a t i e s / C A T / S h a r e d % 2 0 D o c u m e n t s / K G Z /
INT_CAT_NGO_KGZ_15547_E.pdf).
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extremism and terrorism.”51
Despite the religious and ideological diversity encompassed by these blocs — 
representing  both  Christian  majority  and  Muslim  majority  countries  (not  to 
mention formally Communist China with its Maoist civic cult) — any differences 
that  might  result  from  such  diversity  are  overshadowed  by  common  regime 
goals in all member states: The political establishments of each state share the 
objective  of  propagating  a  sacrosanct  popular  will  that  allows  them  to 
appropriate the voices of their citizens. A security official in the Bishkek office of 
the  CSTO  confirmed  in  an  interview  that  Russian  dominance  in  the  region 
presented no threat to Kyrgyz sovereignty, or even the “spiritual sovereignty” of 
traditional Islam. He rather saw Russia, with its large Muslim population, as a 
leading force for moderate Islam, producing “high quality” Islamic literature and 
actively  contributing  to  a  dialogue  between  Christianity  and  Islam.52  The 
coherence  of  these  multinational  organizations  is  thus  a  testament  to  how 
successfully  a  similar  authoritarian  mode  of  governance  can  transcend  very 
different cultural contexts, claiming a unique and privileged mandate to speak 
51 Kazyhanov, Erzhan. 2011. “Kazakhstan Considers its Task in the OIC to Eliminate the Fertile 
Soil for Extremism.” Zakon, September 10. Retrieved January 6, 2018 (https://www.zakon.kz/
4448228-kazakhstan-schitaet-svoejj-zadachejj-v.html).
52 Interview with Bakyt Sadyrbekovich, expert on counter-terrorism and counter-extremism in 
the Bishkek branch of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, July 18, 2014.
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for “the people” no matter what principles they draw on in building a national 
cult.
IV. Hizb ut-Tahrir: Poster Child for Local Extremism.
As I argued above, the regimes of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan regularly deploy 
discourses on extremism, terrorism, and security without any particular object, 
merely invoking a vague, undefined and omnipresent threat in order to justify 
the  use  of  state  power.  Nevertheless,  the  rhetoric  of  security  is  frequently 
deployed against specific groups that serve as exemplars of local extremism. The 
regimes of both countries hold up a few such groups to substantiate their claims 
that the region is beset with extremist, even terrorist organizations and activities. 
Governments throughout the region have long held up one particular movement 
as a poster child of local Islamic extremism: Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami.
Hizb ut-Tahrir is a pan-Islamic movement consisting of a loose network of 
supporters and sympathizers who call for the establishment of a single Islamic 
state — a Caliphate — to rule the global Muslim community or umma.  In the 
words  of  one  Kazakh expert,  the  organization  calls  for  “the  concentration  of 
secular  and  spiritual  power  over  the  Muslim  community  and  society  in  the 
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hands of the theocratic ruler — the Khalif.”53 Though the movement has never 
directly orchestrated or called for terrorist acts, it does reject the legitimacy of 
autonomous nation-states for Muslim peoples, earning the ire of local authorities. 
Kyrgyzstan’s  2012  law  on  State  Policy  in  the  Religious  Sphere,  for  example, 
expresses  alarm  over  the  “activation  of  religious  extremist  manifestations, 
especially Hizbut-Tahrir al Islami.”54 In the following section, I examine a court 
case  against  Hizb  ut-Tahrir  in  Kazakhstan,  while  in  this  section  I  primarily 
address statements and policies against the movement in Kyrgyzstan.
Whether Hizb ut-Tahrir’s call for a Caliphate constitutes advocacy for violent 
insurgency  remains  a  point  of  open  and  intense  debate.  Nevertheless,  the 
movement  has  earned  a  reputation  as  “the  most  dangerous  security  threat“ 
operating  in  Central  Asia  (outside  of  Afghanistan),  possessing  “significant 
financial  capacity”  and  “actively  pursuing  agitation  and  propaganda  work 
among  the  population,  as  well  as  the  recruitment  and  training  of  new 
candidates.”55  This  reputation  in  part  also  results  from  the  movement’s  self-
53 Republic of Kazakhstan. 2004. Court Ruling of the Shymkent City Court Following the Open 
Trial.  March  29,  No.  1-170.  Presiding  judge  Isabaeva  Sh.A.,  secretary  Kabylbekova  A.  with 
participation of the prosecutor Srazhdinov K. and lawyer Yavorsky E.
54 Kyrgyz Republic: Government Decree on State Regulation of Religious Sphere. May 6, 2006 No. 
324.
55 Kyrgyz Republic. 2004. Government Decree on the Work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
the  Kyrgyz  Republic,  Local  government  Administrations  and  Local  Self-Government  for  the 
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stylings as a revolutionary front or party. As one Kazakh expert noted:
Hizb-ut-Tahrir" proclaims itself "a political party whose ideology is Islam." 
The party's goal is to promote the return of Muslims to the Islamic way of 
life ("all aspects of life should be based on the norms of the Shariah") and 
the spread of Islamic faith in the world. At the same time, it is declared 
that the realization of this goal is possible only by re-creating a unified 
theocratic state — a Caliphate that would unite the entire Islamic world. 
In the documents of Hizb-ut-Tahrir the governments of Muslim countries 
are characterized as non-Islamic, and all  contemporary problems of the 
Muslim Ummah are attributed to the "absence of Islam in its daily life," 
including "the absence of an Islamic system of government."56
While there is no doubt that Hizb ut-Tahrir envisions itself as a revolutionary 
movement that seeks to subvert the existing inter-state system of governance, 
there  are  legitimate  questions  as  to  whether  the  group  advocates  for  armed 
insurgency. In general local supporters have engaged in little agitation aside from 
spreading pamphlets that propagate the movement’s agenda. The government of 
Kyrgyzstan, for example, released a statement declaring that:
Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir openly declare in their leaflets the need for 
mass Islamization of  the population,  the violent  change of  the existing 
constitutional  order,  and  the  establishment  of  an  Islamic  state  —  the 
Caliphate.57 
Prevention of Religious Extremism and Ethnic Hatred, Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic. July 20, 2004 
No. 543.
56  Smagulov,  Amanzhol.  2011.  “To Save Spiritual  Sovereignty.” Liter,  September 14.  Retrieved 
January 6, 2018: (http://abai.kz/post/10492).
57 Kyrgyz Republic. 2011. Government Decree On the Work of the State Commission Under the 
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on Religious Affairs for the Implementation of Decree of the 
President of Kyrgyz Republic “On Measures of Reinforcing the Rights of Citizens of the Kyrgyz 
Republic in Freedom of Conscience and Religion.” April 5, 2001 No. 155.
337
The content of such leaflets range from passages “about the meaning of the holy 
month of Ramadan with the call to fulfill the Muslim duty” to criticism of the 
politics of various Western and Muslim-majority states, to “advocating for the 
establishment of the Caliphate” and “ appeals to the military forces of Muslim 
countries.”58
In  statement  after  statement,  the  authorities  invoke  Hizb  ut-Tahrir  as  an 
immanent threat to security. But they seldom point to particular activities aside 
from the spreading of illicit pamphlets and other materials. In 2003, for example, 
Kyrgyzstani  authorities  noted  with  alarm  that  they  had  detained  men 
distributing leaflets from Hizb ut-Tahrir in a market in the Tyup district, among 
whom were “imams of the Muslim clergy who preach the ideas of reactionary 
Islam.”59 The report concluded that this revelation “gives grounds to believe that 
the first underground cells ‘Hizbut-Tahrir’ have been created, and have started 
operating on the territory of the region, which are ready for any manifestations of 
religious extremism to achieve their own goals.”60 A 2009 report on human rights 
58 Republic of Kazakhstan. 2005. Court Hearing at the Pavlodar Regional Court. Presiding Officer 
Abnasirova  S.K.,  the  judges  of  the  collegium  Suleimenov  R.K.  and  Tarasenko  I.V.,  with  the 
participation of the Prosecutor of the Judicial Department of the Pavlodar Oblast Prosecutor's 
Office Makasheva Zh.A.
59  Kyrgyz Republic.  2003.  Issyk-Kul  Regional  Administration’s  Resolution on “The State  and 
Measures of Further Improvement in Combating Religious Extremism, August 5 No. 181.
60 Ibid.
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in  Kazakhstan  from  the  U.S.  State  Department  noted  that,  “The  authorities 
continued  to  consider  the  distribution  of  leaflets  by  members  of  the  banned 
extremist political organization Hizb ut-Tahrir as incitement, pursuing political 
and terrorist  goals,  and being beyond constitutionally  guaranteed freedom of 
speech.”61
Despite this lack of extremist or terrorist activity, both governments regularly 
invoke  Hizb  ut-Tahrir  as  a  justification  for  security  initiatives.  In  2003,  the 
administration  of  Kyrgyzstan  decreed  the  creation  of  regional  councils  “to 
coordinate the activities of law enforcement bodies, state and other structures in 
the  fight  against  religious  extremism.”62  These  councils  were  intended  to 
generate  ”concerted  and  thoughtful  actions  on  the  part  of  state  bodies  with 
religious organizations of the traditional conventions (Islam and Orthodoxy) in 
the prevention of religious extremism spread by supporters of newly emerged 
Islamic  movements,  in  particular,  Hizb-ut-Tahrir.”63  Local  governments  have 
taken  the  initiative  to  participate  in  such  coordinated  activity,  vowing  to 
“increase the population's knowledge about the negative influence of the ideas 
61 Report on the Situation with Human Rights in Kazakhstan for 2008. 2009. Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor.
62  Kyrgyz Republic.  2003.  Issyk-Kul  Regional  Administration’s  Resolution on “The State  and 
Measures of Further Improvement in Combating Religious Extremism, August 5 No. 181.
63 Ibid.
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disseminated by the religious extremist party "Hizb-ut-Tahrir.”64 
Hizb ut-Tahrir was even invoked as justification for an uncharacteristically 
heavy-handed  2002  moratorium in  Kyrgyzstan  “on  holding  meetings,  rallies, 
pickets,  street  processions  and  other  public  events  in  the  Kyrgyz  Republic,” 
ostensibly in the public’s own interest:
This Law is aimed at ensuring the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
citizens,  protecting  public  order  and  ensuring  internal  security  in  the 
Kyrgyz Republic, in connection with the illegal actions of certain extremist 
elements with the activities of the religious extremist party Hizb ut-Tahrir, 
which pursue the goal of destabilizing the situation in the republic.65
Thus, Hizb ut-Tahrir provides the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
with  a  highly  serviceable  justification  for  exerting  state  power  and  even 
suspending core civil rights when necessary. At the same time, the movement has 
also  served  as  a  key  case  for  introducing  strong  legal  precedents  abolishing 
religious dissidence, as I discuss in the following section.
Prosecuting Representatives of Hizb-ut-Tahrir
64  Kyrgyz Republic.  2009.  Decree  of  the  Issyk-Kul  Regional  Administration on “The State  of 
Religious Affairs in the Territory of the Issyk-Kul Region.” March 13, No. 61.
65 Kyrgyz Republic. 2002. Government Decree on the “Moratorium on Holding Meetings, Rallies, 
Pickets, Street Processions and Other Public Events in the Kyrgyz Republic.” September 7, No. 
615.
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Just  as  the Soviet  Union found it  difficult  to  eradicate  the many home-based 
churches that violated the state’s rigidly secular politics, so too have its successor 
states  found  it  difficult  to  enforce  their  laws  against  mercurial,  cell-based 
movements  such  as  Hizb  ut-Tahrir.  If  the  Protestant  and  other  organizations 
investigated in the previous chapter operate largely in the open, seeking legal 
status,  Hizb  ut-Tahrir,  Tablighi  Jamaat,  and  a  handful  of  other  Islamic 
movements  have largely eschewed legal  status,  either  because they reject  the 
authority of the secular state or because they simply lack a formal leadership and 
organizational structure. 
This  informal  structure  has  led  governments  in  the  region  to  view  any 
sympathizers  of  banned  groups  as  potential  members  (especially  if  they  are 
found  to  possess  banned  literature).  In  terms  of  law  enforcement  strategies, 
governments  tend  to  pursue  groups  such  as  Hizb  ut-Tahrir  through  sting 
operations.  The  governments  bring  charges  against  multiple  plaintiffs 
simultaneously, similar to taking down a mafia or protection racket (Tilly 1985). 
One court case in Kazakhstan in 2009 goes into particular detail on the structure 
and activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir . 
All activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir had been prohibited by the earlier ruling of an 
Astana court in 2005, after the Ministry of Internal Affair’s Pavlodar Regional 
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Department  for  Combatting  Extremism  discovered  during  “joint  operational-
search  activities”  with  the  KNB  (the  successor  institution  to  the  KGB)  that 
“supporters of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami planned through leaflets to hold mass 
protests in Kazakhstan in educational institutions, mosques, and other places of 
gathering.”66 Multiple individuals were charged with crimes related to inciting 
riots, including the defendant in the 2009 case, a man by the name of Gunatulin: 
“Ginatulin  AG  was  detained  while  distributing  leaflets  with  extremist 
information published by the Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami publishing house.”67
Ginatullin was prosecuted, but later released as part of a general amnesty in 
2006. The official notes that as a part of this amnesty, Gunatullin ”wrote a formal 
refusal to participate in Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami, but without effective repentance 
on his part, as he did not identify any leaders of the extremist party.”68 In 2008, 
Gunatullin  was  detained  again  for  distributing  literature  ”aimed  at  inciting 
interreligious hostility,”69 prompting the 2009 court case.
66 Republic of Kazakhstan. 2009. Court Ruling of the Court No. 2 of the City of Pavlodar from 
May 27, No. 1-492. Presiding judge Akhmetova A.S. with the participation of the secretary of the 
court  session Shushaeva G.S.,  state prosecutors of  the judicial  department of  the prosecutor's 
office  Baimagambetova  L.A.,  Aushakhmetova  M.,  defender  of  the  lawyer  Moldabayev  B.K., 
defendant Ginatullin A.G.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
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The trial is most revealing because of the prosecution’s exhaustive recounting 
of the cell-based structure and work of Hizb ut-Tahrir.  A government witness 
describes  local  cells  of  the  movement  as  designed  to  preserve  secrecy  and 
accountable to higher ups for the volume of their activities: 
Each group (khalaka) consists of 5-6 students (Doris) and obeys the eldest 
(mushrifu),  which  organizes  training  and  initiates  the  best  prepared 
adherents  after  passing  two  stages  of  training.  The  mushrif  can 
simultaneously manage up to five khalaka groups. Doris communicate only 
by their names; their mushriff is only known by a pseudonym, and, for the 
sake of conspiracy, they are not aware of the members of other groups. 
Mushrif, engaged in training 1-5 khalaka, report to an amir for the quality 
and quantity of activities conducted, and the amir controls the activities of 
up to five mushrifs.70
Above this local level, the witness describes an extensive hierarchy, in which up 
to five amirs constitute a jihaz run by a jihaz azosi, and several azosi report to a 
nakib who is in charge of a district or mahalli. At the national level, several nakibs 
report to a musoid, who in turn reports to mintah masul, who finally report to the 
bas  masul  or  head  of  an  entire  country  branch  of  Hizb  ut-Tahrir.  At  the 
international level, country heads report to regional leaders or mubamada (one of 
which ostensibly runs Hizb ut-Tahrir  in all  of  Central  Asia,  though he is  not 
identified in the proceedings),  who finally report to the Amir-ul-Azam  — “the 
leader  of  the  entire  international  extremist  organization  Hizb-ut-Tahrir-al-
70 Ibid.
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Islami.”71  The prosecution ostensibly  derived this  organization structure  from 
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s own literature, and names a number of figures who supposedly 
occupied these higher echelon leadership positions. Nevertheless, this structure 
might represent Hizb ut-Tahrir’s aspirations more than its actual practices of self-
governance.
The charges brought against Ginatullin detail his activities as a subordinate 
(doris)  in  Hizb  ut-Tahrir.  These  include,  “fomenting  religious  and  national 
enmity,” “encroaching on the current constitutional order and territorial integrity 
of  [Kazakhstan]”  and  “propagating  the  superiority  of  one  religion  over 
another.”72  The  last  of  these  charges  is  a  favorite  formulation  of  the  regime, 
which contorts belief in one’s own religion into an act of discrimination against 
other religions. The prosecution exhaustively recounted its methods of observing 
Ginatullin in performance of the many (mostly mundane) activities he engaged 
in as a doris in the movement. These include tracking his movements to and from 
internet cafes, monitoring his posts to message boards, monitoring his mail, and 
eventually searching his apartment as part of his arrest. All of these monitoring 
activities were initiated based on Ginatullin’s earlier history of engagement with 
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
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Hizb ut-Tahrir.
After the prosecution presented its case, Ginatullin offered a verbal defense 
(without  the  assistance  of  neutral  legal  representation),  in  which  he 
acknowledged  his  guilt  and  expressed  remorse  for  his  actions.  The  court 
sentenced him to three years imprisonment in a penal colony, “in order to correct 
the defendant and prevent him from committing new crimes.”73 Ginatullin was 
not convicted in isolation, however. The case proceedings make direct reference 
to charges pending against his “accomplices.” The law enforcement strategy that 
authorities often pursue in relation to movements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir thus 
focuses  on  rooting  out  networks  of  supporters  and  keeping  them  under 
observation. It is precisely in relation to such uses of state power that discourses 
on security provide such a powerful justification. In the next chapter, I discuss 
the  complimentary  discourse  on  radical  Islam  that  helps  to  differentiate 
“legitimate” forms of Islam from “illegitimate“ forms of the religion.
Conclusion
The  political  philosopher  Will  Kymlicka,  best  known  for  his  work  on 
73 Ibid.
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multicultural  citizenship,  once wrote that  states  in Eastern Europe often treat 
minority  rights  as  a  security  issue  because  they  make  three  interrelated 
assumptions:  that  minorities  are  disloyal,  that  a  strong  nation  requires  weak 
minorities, and that the security framework provides the most effective means of 
dealing with  minority  claims (Kymlicka  2002).  In  Kymlicka’s  analysis,  Ethnic 
divisions thus come to designate boundaries where rights end and the security 
apparatus of the state begins. The case of Islamic heterodoxy in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan shows that  the state can make the same assumptions not only of 
ethnic minorities and religious minorities, but also of heterodox movements that 
have gained traction among the titular populations. 
Whereas ethnic minorities represent distinct populations that are entitled to 
rights, religious movements represent diffuse affiliations. If the officials perceives 
such a movement as subversive, they may feel even stronger incentives to engage 
the  movement  through  the  security  apparatus  of  the  state.  The  murky 
boundaries of the Islamic movements discussed in this chapter translate, in the 
eyes  of  state  officials,  into  a  similarly  vague  boundaries  between  rights  and 
security. For this reason, the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan often 
deploy discourses on security and threat in conjunction with discourses intended 
to bolster the authority of the regime and traditional Islam. In the next chapter, I 
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examine  these  latter  discourses  intended to  combat  the  legitimacy  of  Islamic 
heterodoxy and bolster the authority of the local religious establishment.
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CHAPTER 9 
Islamic Dissidence and Regime Authority
Today, Wahhabis also declare the [secular] authorities in Islamic states 
to be takfir [unfaithful], as well as the law enforcement and security 
agencies that these states protect and support, and those Muslims who, 
by the very act of refusing to support Wahhabis, put themselves 
in league with their leaders — a league of “apostates.”
Erjan Malgajuli Mayamerov
Head Mufti of Kazakhstan
The  typology  that  I  introduced  in  the  previous  chapter  makes  a  distinction 
between  forms  of  Islamic  hetorodoxy  —  groups  that  present  an  immanent 
security  threat,  groups  that  present  a  manifest  threat  to  the  authority  of 
“moderate” and “traditional” Islam, and groups that seem to present neither of 
these threats, but still have “hidden potential” to do harm. In keeping with this 
approach, I will structure this chapter around the distinction between latent and 
manifest  threats  to  the  authority  of  the  secular  regimes  and  of  “traditional” 
Islam.  I  will  focus  in  particular  on  three  movements  that  exemplify  this 
distinction  between  latent  and  manifest  threats:  Wahhabism,  Salafism,  and 
Tablighi Jamaat. 
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The fundamentalist  movements Wahhabism and Salafism are both seen as 
overt  threats  to  the  authority  of  the  local  religious  establishment.  Their 
conservative doctrines ground Islamic authority in Arabic civilization and the 
practices  of  the  first  generations  of  Muslims.  These  movements  thus  overtly 
dispute the legitimacy of distinct national traditions of Islam such as the Hanafi 
traditions promoted by the Muftiates of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. The Islamic 
missionary movement Tablighi Jamaat, in contrast, is seen as a latent or covert 
threat  to  the  Muftiate.  The  practices  of  the  movement  are  grounded  less  in 
doctrine than in an ideal of service and community. Participants of the movement 
go door-to-door encouraging men to attend their local mosque (often Muftiate-
affiliated) regularly. Most of the movement’s requirements of its members focus 
on missionary activity and similar forms of devotion through service. Thus, the 
movement  presents  no  direct  challenges  to  the  doctrinal  authority  of  the 
Muftiates, but still creates an autonomous structure of authority and governance 
that competes with the local religious establishment.
Whether  latent  or  manifest,  however,  religious  and  state  authorities  have 
monitored the gains made by these movements in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
with significant anxiety. The authorities see their task as an effort to prevent the 
formation of fissures in their civic and spiritual constituencies. A declaration by 
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the government of Kyrgyzstan attests to this approach:
Together  with  the  Spiritual  Directorate  of  Muslims  of  the  Kyrgyz 
Republic, we will continue to work to consolidate the Islamic faith, and to 
seek unification through our efforts  with the servants of  Islam [i.e.  the 
Muftiate] in preventing and counteracting religious extremism.1
And while the “traditional” Islam promoted by the Muftiates of Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan enjoy significant popular support, they do face significant challenges 
in curtailing the activities of heterodox Islamic movements. As previously noted, 
the  national  religious  establishments  must  contend with  a  widespread public 
perception that Islamic movements from the Middle East and Southern Asia are 
more “authentic” and “authoritative” than local Islam. 
In this chapter, I will examine the discourses propagated by the religious and 
secular establishments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan about latent and manifest 
threats to traditional Islam. In the sections that follow, I will first examine the 
cases  of  Salafism  and  Wahhabism,  and  then  turn  to  that  of  Tablighi  Jamaat. 
Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan  have  employed  relatively  similar  approaches 
toward Salafism and Wahhabism,  but  differ  significantly  in  their  response  to 
Tablighi  Jamaat.  For  reasons I  will  address  below,  the latter  group is  banned 
outright  in  Kazakhstan,  but  has  flourished  in  Kyrgyzstan  (although  under 
1  Kyrgyz  Republic.  2009.  Government  Decree  to  Introduce  Amendments  to  the  Law  on 
Countering Financial Support of Terrorism and Money Laundering. June 2, 2009 No 179.
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scrutiny), and has even penetrated the leadership structure of the Muftiate.
I. ”Manifest Threats” to Authority: Global Fundamentalist Movements
In  contrast  to  the  discourse  on  terrorism  and  security,  which  is  often  used 
without any clear object to justify state power,  a complimentary discourse on 
fundamentalism is deployed to defend the authority of the religious and political 
establishment  —  including  the  regime’s  authority  to  suspend  its  own  rules. 
Discourses on various forms of radical and fundamentalist Islam are deployed 
against  groups  that  specifically  challenge  the  authenticity  and  authority  of 
“traditional”  Islam  in  Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan,  including  the  symbiotic 
relationship between traditional Islam and the secular nation-state.
Two movements in particular have come to dominate regime discourses on 
fundamentalist Islam: Wahhabism and Salafism. Both movements have become 
euphemisms  for  foreign,  radical,  and  reactionary  Islamists  that  threaten  to 
undermine  the  authority  of  local,  traditional  Islam.  Wahhabism  is  often 
presented as the official religious ideology of Saudi Arabia, an ultra-conservative 
dogma  which  the  regime  promotes  globally  as  a  form  of  soft  power.  Salafi, 
meanwhile,  looks  back to  several  19th-century Islamic  figures  who called for 
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strict adherence to the way of life practiced by the first generations of Muslims or 
the salaf. According to one Kazakh expert:
Salafism  is  a  religious  trend  that  calls  for  the  orientation  towards  the 
lifestyle and faith of the early Muslim community, the so-called "righteous 
ancestors"… a return to the original "purity of Islam" that existed under 
the  prophet  and  the  first  generations  of  Muslims.  That  is,  the  actual 
ideological  basis  of  this  religious teaching is  classic  utopianism and an 
unrealistic idealization of the past.2
Kazakhstani  authorities  maintain  that  Salafism  has  grown  with  remarkable 
speed, reporting in 2013 that ”according to the KNB, there are 24 radical Salafi 
jamaats numbering 495 people.”3 Authorities in Kyrgyzstan have voiced similar 
concerns.  The  Head  Mufti  of  Kazakhstan  offered  the  following  definition  of 
Salafism: 
Islamologists define Salafi as a fundamentalist  trend, whose supporters 
call for the renunciation of "alien,” untrue Muslim rites — including from 
Hanifite Islam, which is practiced in Central Asia, Turkey and a number of 
other countries — and return to the way of life of righteous ancestors, 
which is directly determined by the norms of the Koran and Sura.4
He went on to state that ”Salafism in this interpretation is not much different 
2  Smagulov,  Amanzhol.  2011.  “To  Save  Spiritual  Sovereignty.”  Liter,  September  14.  Retrieved 
January 6, 2018: (http://abai.kz/post/10492).
3  Korolev,  Andrey.  2013.  “The  Work  Carried  Out  by  Competent  Authorities  is  Designed  to 
Preserve  Stability  in  the  Country.”  Zakon,  February  27.  Retrieved  January  6,  2018  (http://
online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31338549#pos=1;-145).
4 No Author. 2011. “Salafi Became a Dangerous Religious Movement in Kazakhstan.” Interview 
with the Press-Secretary of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Kazakhstan. Bnews, July 
13.  Retrieved  January  6,  2018  (https://bnews.kz/ru/news/obshchestvo/
salafiya_stala_opasnim_religioznim_techeniem_v_kazahstane__dumk).
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from Wahhabism, which has become a symbol of militant Islam in the West and 
in Central Asia.“5 
Other  experts,  however,  have  questioned  how  deep  the  fundamentalist 
dogma of the Salafism goes, and have asserted that calls for “a return to the times 
of the prophet, so-called ‘pure’ Islam, is nothing more than an advertising ploy.”6 
Authorities frequently point to the similarities between Wahhabism and Salafism 
rather than dissect their differences. Officials from Kazakhstan’s Muftiate have 
stated, for example, that Salafism “differs little from Wahhabism” in this desire 
for a return to a “way of life determined directly by the rules of the Koran and 
the Sura.”7 Other Kazakhstani officials have directly conflated the two, stating 
that ”Wahhabism is one manifestation of Salafism,”8 or that “radical Salafis are 
Wahhabis in their fanatical striving for the pristine sources of Islam.”9
Debates between Salafism and Wahhabism go beyond Central Asia, and I will 
5 Ibid.
6  Smagulov,  Amanzhol.  2011.  “To  Save  Spiritual  Sovereignty.”  Liter,  September  14.  Retrieved 
January 6, 2018: (http://abai.kz/post/10492).
7 No Author. 2011. “Salafi Became a Dangerous Religious Movement in Kazakhstan.” Interview 
with the Press-Secretary of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Kazakhstan. Bnews, July 
13.  Retrieved  January  6,  2018  (https://bnews.kz/ru/news/obshchestvo/
salafiya_stala_opasnim_religioznim_techeniem_v_kazahstane__dumk).
8 Kuandykova, Dariya. 2011. “What is the State of the Religious Sphere and What Should It Be?” 
Zakon, October 4. Retrieved January 6, 2018 (https://www.zakon.kz/4451588-chto-predstavljaet-
sobojj-religioznaja.html).
9  Amrebaev,  Aidar.  2011.  “The  State  Has  Initiated  a  Frontal  Attack."  Zakon,  November  14. 
Retrieved January 6, 2018 (http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31080933#pos=1;-145).
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not pursue distinctions between the two movements further here. The important 
point  is  that  both  Wahhabism  and  Salafism  are  seen  as  an  assault  on  local 
traditions,  and as  a  more  radical  form of  Islam prone to  extremist  and even 
terrorist  activities.  The  director  of  Kazakhstan’s  SARA,  Kairat  Lama  Sharif, 
addressed this issue specifically with reference to the principle of takfir:
Takfir is an accusation of kufr (unbelief) against all those who do not share 
the ideas of Wahhabi followers, who are in general fundamentalists. The 
main object of takfir is, first of all, those Muslims who disagree with their 
interpretation  of  Islam…  In  this  case,  Muslims  who  are  accused  of 
unfaithfulness  —  kufr,  are  given  the  status  of  apostates  (in  Arabic  - 
murtadd, that is, those who have departed from Islam).10
Authorities have not hesitated to draw a direct connection between this criticism 
of  local  Islam  and  the  potential  for  terrorism.  In  the  words  of  Sharif,  this 
challenge to the authority of local Islamic traditions awakens feelings of national 
shame that provide fertile ground for extremism:
All of the foregoing allows us to assert that takfirism can deal a serious 
blow  to  the  psychology  and  mentality  of  young  Kazakhs  as 
representatives  of  the  state-forming  ethnos  [i.e.  the  titular  ethnicity], 
awakening among current generations of Kazakhs a sense of "shame" for 
their history and for the path of their ancestors… This guilt provides at 
least  an ideological  basis  for  the  possibility  of  conducting armed jihad 
against their fellow citizens.11
10 Lama Sharif, Kairat. 2013. “Takfirism is a Betrayal of One’s Religion and One’s Own People.” 
Islam in CIS, June 10. Retrieved January 6, 2018 (http://www.islamsng.com/kaz/opinion/6954).
11 Ibid.
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Officials and experts have been quick to point out that “a number of extremist 
organizations  adhere  to  Salafi  ideas  in  one  form  or  another,  including  those 
banned in Kazakhstan,”12 putting Salafis at odds with the ostensibly moderate 
and civic-minded form of Islam promoted by the Muftiate. The same is regularly 
said of Wahhabism:
Wahhabism  is  the  ideological  platform  of  such  known  terrorist  and 
extremist  organizations  and  movements  as  Al  Qaeda,  the  Taliban,  the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb ut Tahrir,  Salafi, Tablighi 
Jamaat, Jamaat of the Mujahideen of Central Asia, th e”AlAksi Martyrs 
Brigade,” Hamas, etc.13
Wahhabism is thus seen as a potential security threat both because it challenges 
the authority of local Islamic traditions,  and also because it  has been used to 
justify  terrorism.  Kazakhstani  authorities,  for  example,  asserted  that  in  2013 
“more than 100 people were convicted on charges of terrorist activities, most of 
whom were followers of Wahhabism and Salafism.”14 Below I discuss a court 
case  that  reveals  some  of  the  state’s  approaches  to  enforcing  laws  against 
propagating Salafi and Wahhabi ideas.
12  Amrebaev,  Aidar.  2011.  “The  State  Has  Initiated  a  Frontal  Attack."  Zakon,  November  14. 
Retrieved January 6, 2018 (http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31080933#pos=1;-145).
13  Republic  of  Kazakhstan.  2000.  Government  Decree  on  “the  State  Protection  of  Persons 
Participating in Criminal Proceedings.” July 5, No. 72.
14  Anonymous.  2013.  “On the  Territory  of  Kazakhstan  There  Are  Nearly  500  Participants  of 
Radical Religious Groups.” KTK, February 21. Retrieved January 9, 2018 (http://www.ktk.kz/
ru/news/video/2013/02/21/21411).
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The  Muftiate  of  Kazakhstan  asserts  that  at  present  the  “overwhelming 
majority of Muslims in Kazakhstan remain immune to the preaching of Wahhabi 
missionaries,”15 but authorities nevertheless emphasize the need to remain ever 
vigilant.  At  a  round  table  on  “Terrorism  in  the  Modern  World,”  one  official 
attributed “the growing influence of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia” to 
a  “crisis  in  the  public  consciousness.“16  The  answer  offered  to  this  crisis 
invariably involves consolidating the authority of “traditional” Islam under the 
stewardship of the Muftiate. One expert asserted that the Muftiate is the only 
structure  that  can  keep  followers  of  Wahhabism  and  Salafism  grounded  in 
“normal life, in harmony with the world around them,” stating:
In Kazakhstan today, even takfiristy, as a rule, regularly visit the mosque 
and line up behind the imam during the prayer. Thus, today's mosque is 
the  last  thread  connecting  these  people  with  the  rest  of  society,  not 
allowing them to cross the final line, at which they already stand.17
Religious scholars  in Kazakhstan have called for  the creation of  “enlightened 
15  Anonymous.  2011.  “The Goals  of  the  Wahhabis  Are  Absolutely  Inconsistent  with  National 
Interests and Pose Threat to Kazakhstan's Independence.” Zakon, August 17. Retrieved January 6, 
2018 (https://www.zakon.kz/4444902-celi-vakhkhabitov-absoljutno-ne.html).
16 Anonymous. 2011. “Kazakhstan Intends to Protect Itself Legally From Religious Extremism.” 
Zakon,  September  1.  Retrieved  January  6,  2018  (https://www.zakon.kz/4446898-kazakhstan-
nameren-zakonodatelno.html).
17 Nurseitova, Torgyn. 2013. “In the Islamic Field of Kazakhstan There is a Serious Ideological 
Struggle.” Interview with Timur Kozyrev, deputy director of the research and analytical center of 
the Agency of Religious Affairs in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Zakon, February 26. Retrieved 
January 6, 2018 (https://www.zakon.kz/4543537-timur-kozyrev-na-islamskom-pole.html).
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Islam and mosques” to fill the nation’s “ideological vacuum,” lest it be filled by 
“radical  and  fundamentalist  interpretations.”18  A  government  report  in 
Kyrgyzstan, similarly, notes that cooperation between the state and the Muftiate 
is vital to “prevent the split of the Muslim community [due to] the penetration of 
"new" directions such as Wahhabism, Akramia, etc.19 
As I detail below, the religious establishments in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
face significant challenges in this battle for authority. The popularity of Salafisim 
and Wahhabism is bolstered by the perceived authenticity of these forms of Islam 
relative  to  local  traditions.  Furthermore,  the  Muftiates  in  both  countries 
frequently  come  under  fire  for  being  too  politically  controlled  and  pliant, 
undermining their authority. These and other factors have drawn the regimes of 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan into extended battles to monopolize the authority to 
speak for the sacrosanct values and interests that ostensibly define the popular 
will.
18 Anonymous. 2011. “Kazakhstan Needs Enlightened Islam, Mosques Should Have the Status of 
Cultural  Institutions.”  Fragments  from  the  meeting  of  experts  representing  the  Club  of  the 
Institute  of  Political  Decisions.  Zakon,  April  28.  Retrieved  January  6,  2018  (https://
www.zakon.kz/212154-kazakhstanu-nuzhen-prosveshhennyjj.html).
19  Kyrgyz  Republic.  1998.  State  Policy  on  the  Activities  of  the  State  Commission  under  the 
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on Religious Affairs. July 7, 1998 No. 441.
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Hanafi and the Authority of Local Islamic Traditions
The major theological argument against Salafism and Wahhabism in Central Asia 
is their rejection of Hanafi Islam, the dominant form of Sunni Islam among the 
Turkic peoples of Central Asia. The Hanafi school gained popularity in Central 
Asia under the influence of Ottoman emissaries to the Muslim peoples of the 
Russian Empire. The Ottoman Empire officially embraced Hanafi Islam because 
it was the only school that accepted the legitimacy of a non-Arabic Caliph as the 
figure head of global Islam. Based largely on Turkish rule, the Ottomans had an 
obvious incentive to propagate Hanafi Islam within their territories and beyond, 
and  the  school  gained  popularity  among  the  Turkic  peoples  of  the  North 
Caucasus and Central Asia for reason of both regional and cultural proximity to 
Ottoman Empire (Brower 1997; Deringil 1994; Landau 1981; Stone et al 2004). An 
official from Kazakhstan’s Muftiate summarized this history succinctly:
Kazakhstan, like other countries of Central Asia, since the first centuries of 
spreading Islam in our territories, took the path of the Hanafi madkhab 
[school], to which belong more than half of all Muslims around the world. 
In turn, the Hanafi madkhab is one of the trends in Sunnism, to which 
more  than  90  percent  of  Muslims  profess,  including  almost  all  Turkic 
peoples.20
20  Anonymous.  2011.  “The Goals  of  the  Wahhabis  Are  Absolutely  Inconsistent  with  National 
Interests and Pose Threat to Kazakhstan's Independence.” Zakon, August 17. Retrieved January 6, 
2018 (https://www.zakon.kz/4444902-celi-vakhkhabitov-absoljutno-ne.html).
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As  puritanical  movements,  Salafism  and  Wahhabism  reject  such  perceived 
improvisations  on  Islamic  legal  doctrine.  Many  authorities  see  Wahhabism 
merely as “a nationalist ideology of the Arabs (designed as a religious doctrine),” 
which emerged as a part of ”the national liberation struggle of the Arabs against 
the Turks.”21
The battle over Hanafi Sunnism is thus no less than a battle over the authority 
of the national traditions of Islam propagated by the Muftiates of Central Asia. In 
the words of  one Kyrgyz expert,  for example,  Salafis “deny other currents in 
Islam, and consider the followers of the Hanafi order (to which the majority of 
the population of Central Asia belongs, by the way) to be incorrect Muslims.”22 
The Muftiate of Kazakhstan has asserted that Salafism ”has become one of the 
most dangerous religious trends in the country,” because it “contributed to the 
weakness of Kazakhstan's legislation in the sphere of religion, as well as active 
propaganda  carried  out  by  missionaries  from  Arab  countries.”23  Similarly, 
religious  authorities  assert  that  Wahhabis  “criticize  the  Kazakhs,  questioning 
21  Smagulov,  Amanzhol.  2011.  “To Save Spiritual  Sovereignty.” Liter,  September 14.  Retrieved 
January 6, 2018 (http://abai.kz/post/10492).
22  Malikova,  Bermet.  2009.  “Salafism: Latent or Real  Threat?” Vecherniy Bishkek,  December 11. 
Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://members.vb.kg/2009/12/11/svyat/1.html).
23 No Author. 2011. “Salafi Became a Dangerous Religious Movement in Kazakhstan.” Interview 
with the Press-Secretary of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Kazakhstan. Bnews, July 
13.  Retrieved  January  6,  2018  (https://bnews.kz/ru/news/obshchestvo/
salafiya_stala_opasnim_religioznim_techeniem_v_kazahstane__dumk).
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their historical religious affiliation with Islam.”24
In this battle, local religious authorities face a number of challenges. Despite 
the common desire for national distinctiveness,  many locals still  view Islamic 
teachings and practices from Arabic countries as more “original,” “authentic,” or 
“pure.”25 There is particular concern that such popular perceptions are driving 
both the success of Islamic missionary movements in Central Asia, and recent 
trends of locals seeking religious education abroad: 
A number of citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic have travelled abroad on 
tourist  visas  and  by  private  invitation,  and  enter  religious  schools  in 
violation  of  existing  rules  [governing  religious  education  for  imams]. 
According to operational data,  their number exceeds 300 people.  These 
citizens often find themselves in educational institutions of an extremist 
nature.26
Religious authorities have expressed concern that “Takfirites in Kazakhstan are 
very critical  of  the madkhab of Imam Abu Hanifa [from whom the school of 
Hanafi derives its name] and his followers,” and ”do not recognize the authority 
24  Lama Sharif,  Kairat.  2013.  “The Transitional  Processes  in  Our  Republic  Predetermined the 
Complexity of the Formation of the Islamic field in Kazakhstan.” Zakon, June 8. Retrieved January 
6, 2018 (https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31402597#pos=1;-105).
25  In  the  pilot  survey  on  religious  attitudes  in  Kyrgyzstan,  nearly  half  of  the  respondents 
answered yes to the question “Should the way that Islam is practiced in other Muslim countries 
have more influence on the way Islam is practiced in our country?” When asked to elaborate, 
most  respondents  who answered yes  listed  Turkey and Arabic  countries  as  sources  of  more 
“authentic” Islam, in comparison to the perceived lapses in local traditions due to the Soviet 
period.
26  Kyrgyz  Republic:  Decree  of  the  President  of  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  "On  Measures  of  the 
Implementation of the Rights of Citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic and Freedom of Faith.” Prime 
Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic K. Bakiev, April 5, 2001 No 155.
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of  local  imams.”27  One  Kyrgyz  religious  expert  argued  that  such  ideological 
struggles  represent  the primary threat  of  Salafism, which he felt  is  otherwise 
politically benign:
Politically, Salafism does not represent a threat to Kyrgyzstan. Why? In its 
ideology there are no calls for power or for a change in the structure of the 
state and its secular foundations. But if we take into account the fact that 
Islam of the Hanafi madkhab and mathuridism is traditional for us, the 
threat  of  this  theological  school  can be expressed in the form of  intra-
confessional  conflicts  among practicing Muslims.  That  is,  Salafism as a 
movement for the purity of Islam represents a danger to the integrity of 
the [Muslim] community itself.28
 Other officials do not share this benign view of Salafism, however. Many local 
authorities have not hesitated to associate Salafism and Wahhabism with known 
extremist  and  terrorist  organizations.  In  the  rhetoric  of  these  officials,  these 
movements come from countries with traditions of  more political  and radical 
Islam — primarily in the Middle East and Southern Asia:
A number of extremist organizations adhere to Salafi ideas in one form or 
another,  including  those  banned  in  Kazakhstan.  Among  them  are  Al-
Qaeda, Asbat al-Ansar, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The listed organizations, preaching the Salafi ideas, oppose 
the secular principles of the state, as well as the historically established 
traditions  of  the  Hanafi  madhhab  of  Sunnism,  spread  not  only  in 
27  Lama Sharif,  Kairat.  2013.  “The Transitional  Processes  in  Our  Republic  Predetermined the 
Complexity of the Formation of the Islamic field in Kazakhstan.” Zakon, June 8. Retrieved January 
6, 2018 (https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31402597#pos=1;-105).
28  Malikova,  Bermet.  2009.  “Salafism: Latent or Real  Threat?” Vecherniy Bishkek,  December 11. 
Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://members.vb.kg/2009/12/11/svyat/1.html).
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Kazakhstan, but throughout Central Asia.29
By associating Salafism and Wahhabism with groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, the 
regimes draw a direct link between challenges to Hanafi Islam and challenges to 
national  sovereignty.  Officials  assert  that  “Modern  extremism,  in  particular 
Islamic in the form of Wahhabism, has set as a key goal the creation of a state that 
does not recognize the borders between Muslim countries.”30
The  authorities  have  responded to  this  challenge  by  trying  to  elevate  the 
Islamic  credentials  of  their  imams,  as  well  as  by  attacking  Salafism  and 
Wahhabism as foreign imports that have no traditional roots in Central Asia. In 
contrast to the supposed extremism of Wahhabism and Salafism, both regimes 
promote ideals of national Islam as modern, moderate, civic, and authentic for 
the people of Central Asia:
Thus, Sunnism, characteristic of Kazakhstan, was originally a moderate 
ideological trend, condemning religious radicalism and extremism, it was 
within the framework of moderate Sunnism that the traditional  Hanafi 
madhhab developed for the Kazakhs.31
But local authorities are concerned with the capacity of local Islam to retain its 
29  Amrebaev,  Aidar.  2011.  “The  State  Has  Initiated  a  Frontal  Attack."  Zakon,  November  14. 
Retrieved January 6, 2018 (http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31080933#pos=1;-145).
30  Ahmetova,  Albina.  2012.  “Over  20  Percent  of  Kazakhstanis  are  Convinced  of  the  High 
Probability of Spreading Religious Extremism in the Country.” Zakon, November 29. Retrieved 
January 6, 2018 (https://www.zakon.kz/4527713-bolee-20-procentov-kazakhstancev.html).
31  Smagulov,  Amanzhol.  2011.  “To Save Spiritual  Sovereignty.” Liter,  September 14.  Retrieved 
January 6, 2018 (http://abai.kz/post/10492).
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position of authority in the eyes of their co-nationals. In Kyrgyztan in particular, 
the establishment is  concerned that the nation lacks the financial  resources to 
compete with well-funded fundamentalist  groups from abroad.  Officials  have 
voiced concern that poor “spiritual education of local Muslim clergy” and the 
financial dependence of many mosques on “foreign sponsors and benefactors” 
create  “a  fertile  ground  for  the  spread  of  ideas  of  Islamic  extremism  and 
fundamentalism.”32
Outward Piety as a Symbolic Battleground
One particular point of dispute in this debate involves outward expressions of 
piety. This issue inevitably involves debates over the hijab or headscarf worn by 
women, as I discuss below, but generally the more contentious debate in both 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan has involved men’s manner of dress and personal 
grooming.  Establishment  religious  officials  —  imams  and  muftis  —  have 
carefully  cultivated  a  distinctively  national  form of  ceremonial  dress,  pairing 
skull caps and head wraps that evoke solidarity with perceived global Islamic 
convention, with ceremonial robes in the local tradition — highly ornamented 
32 Kyrgyz Republic. 1995. Government Decree “On the Religious Situation in the Kyrgyz Republic 
and the Tasks of the Authorities to Formulate State Policy in the Religious Sphere.” Signed by 
Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic A. Djumagulov, August 1995 No. 345.
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versions of the thick felt chapan worn by shepherds and associated with Kyrgyz 
and Kazakh nomadic and pastoral traditions.
Recently, however, many locals Muslims have taken to demonstrating their 
“piety” by embracing styles of dress and grooming from the Middle East and 
Southern Asia, which they perceive to be sources of more “authentic” Islam. This 
tendency  has  sparked  a  vigorous  public  debate  on  the  proper  expression  of 
religious  piety  and national  pride.  In  support  of  a  broader  bill  on  “religious 
activities  and  religious  associations”  being  considered  by  Kazakhstan’s 
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parliament, one official asserted:
Yes, Kazakhs belong to the peoples of Muslim religious beliefs and, being 
the bearers of Islamic religious spirituality, we continue to be Kazakhs — 
with our material and spiritual culture, with our traditions of decorative 
and  fitting  art,  with  our  customs  and  rituals,  among  which  national 
clothes play an important role. Kazakh clothes; not Arabic. In the pursuit 
of Islam... we cannot change the culture of our ancestors; we do not need 
to rush between Kazakh culture and the culture of the Arabs.33
In keeping with the discussion above about heterodoxy and disaffection, I have 
observed anecdotally that this “foreign” manner of dress tends to be relatively 
more popular among lower classes and ethnic minorities. Although I lack robust 
data  to  corroborate  this  tendency,  officials  themselves  have  noted  that  such 
disaffected strata disproportionately embrace these outward expressions of piety 
as  a  means  to  subvert  the  authority  and status  hierarchy  propagated  by  the 
Muftiates. One Kazakh expert compared such styles among men to “teenage and 
youth movements, which in this way try to assert their shaky identity.”34
Clothing and grooming provide disaffected groups with a cheap and effective 
means  of  challenging  the  Muftiate’s  authority  by  affecting  a  style  that  is 
commonly associated with the lands where more “authentic” Islam is practiced. 
33  Press  Service  of  the Parliament  of  the Republic  of  Kazakhstan.  2011.  “A Bill  On Religious 
Activities and Religious Associations was Considered by the Public  Chamber of  the Majilis.” 
Zakon,  September  15.  Retrieved  January  6,  2018  (http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?
doc_id=31053921#pos=1;-108).
34  Smagulov,  Amanzhol.  2011.  “To Save Spiritual  Sovereignty.” Liter,  September 14.  Retrieved 
January 6, 2018 (http://abai.kz/post/10492).
365
The religious establishment has indicated that it fully recognizes this symbolic 
challenge to its authority:
The most vivid manifestation of the global struggle for the souls of our 
fellow citizens is the discussion that has developed in our society around 
the external attributes of faith, in particular, the form and style of clothing. 
It is known that radical Salafis — Wahhabis in their fanatical striving for 
pristine sources of Islam — not only literally interpret the Koran and the 
Sunnah, but also try to follow the medieval way of life characteristic of the 
era of the first Muslims. They diligently copy the style of clothing and 
hairstyles of that time. So, in particular, they shave their heads, wear long 
unkempt  beards,  narrow  and  short  trousers.  But  you  will  agree  that 
people who decide to wear glasses to give themselves a more intelligent 
look  do  not  become  more  intelligent  and  educated.  The  superficial 
attributes of faith can not add spiritual depth to a man.35
Once  again,  authorities  have  not  hesitated  to  associate  such  outward 
expressions of piety with radical Islam. One Kazakh expert, for example, stated 
that “short pants and beards are a kind of ideological manifestation of radical 
Salafism, a symbolic challenge to traditional, moderate Islam.”36 However, other 
public  figures  have  warned  against  trying  to  associate  radicalism  with  any 
particular outward appearance. One religious expert warned that “adherents of 
traditional Islam in Kazakhstan, belonging to the Hanafi madkhab, may also be 
suspected of propagating Salafism, since by their  appearance they can not be 
35 Ibid.
36 Brusilovskaya, Elena. No date. “Our People Have Their Own Path in Religion.” Interview with 
Kamal Burhanov, doctor of political science and member of the Parliament in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan. Kazakhstanskaya Pravda. Retrieved January 6, 2018 (http://yk.kz/news/show/11509?
print).
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distinguished.” He emphasized that “Among these bearded men there are both 
Wahhabis and ordinary Sunnis.”37
These debates took an interesting turn in Kyrgyzstan, with the ascent of the 
Pakistan-based  missionary  movement  Tablighi  Jamaat.  Members  of  this 
movement commonly embraced Pakistani styles of dress to indicate their piety as 
they proselytized door-to-door.  The growth of  the organization led to similar 
concerns as those stated above in Kazakhstan. An official of Kyrgyzstan’s SCRA 
asserted  in  an  interview that  the  looser  clothing  frequently  worn  by  men in 
Pakistan and some Arabic countries makes no sense in Central Asia — neither in 
terms of  the  region’s  climate  nor  in  the  cultural  context,  and should thus be 
viewed as a foreign expression of Islam.38 
As the movement gained mainstream support within the Muftiate, however, 
they made a conscious decision to abandon Pakistani garb and embrace a more 
Malaysian form of dress. One respondent in Kyrgyzstan, an anthropologist and a 
participant in Tablighi Jamaat, noted that the leadership made this change as part 
37  Sokolov,  Andrey.  2011.  “Religion  Should  Unite  and Not  Disconnec.”  Interview with  Eldar 
Zhumagaziev, Atyrau political scientist.  Inform, August 16. Retrieved January 6, 2018 (http://
www.inform.kz/kz/religiya-dolzhna-ob-edinyat-a-ne-raz-edinyat-obschestvo-atyrauskiy-
politolog-el-dar-zhumagaziev_a2398772).
38 Interview with Janybek Tolonovich, Head Legal Expert at the State Commission for Religious 
Affairs, March 29, 2013.
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of  a  conscious  effort  to  change  the  group’s  public  image  as  it  became more 
mainstream. 
This  selective  borrowing  from  different  Islamic  traditions  demonstrates  how 
“spiritual sovereignty” gets constructed in a global religious field. On the surface, 
it would seem absurd to “defend” the Kyrgyz tradition of Islam from cultural 
assimilation by Middle Eastern or South Asian traditions by adopting Malaysian 
practices. These efforts make perfect sense, however, if we consider what these 
different regions represent to local actors in Kyrgyzstan. Malaysia is commonly 
associated with moderate and progressive Islam. Malaysia has become a hub in 
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the global expansion of Islamic finance and Halal certification agencies, and is 
thus  seen as  bridging progressive  and global  Islamic  aspirations  to  authentic 
Muslim traditions.39 Local Muslims thus see Malaysia as a Muslim nation that 
has become a global actor, but has also remained true to its national traditions. 
Thus, adopting Malaysian dress is construed not as a loss of spiritual sovereignty, 
but as a symbol of Kyrgyz Muslims’ national aspirations.
Of no less significance, the issue of Islamic dress has brought up debates on 
the hijab for women. Here too, many locals have argued that the hijab is a foreign 
form of Islam, authentic only within Arabic traditions. Many have argued that 
the  hijab  is  neither  essential  to  Islam  as  a  whole,  nor  compatible  with  local 
traditions:
Encouraging young women, girls to wear a hijab, one should remember 
that never did a Kazakh woman wear a hijab! How could she wear one in 
such a spartan nomadic life? She wore trousers,  she deftly rode atop a 
horse. Women were engaged in life, with children, sharing with men all 
the hardships of nomadic life.40
In both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, the hijab has become a subject of spirited 
39 Botoeva, Aisalkyn. 2017. “Transnational Islamic Banks & Local Markets in Central Asia.” Islam, 
Society and Politics in Central Asia, ed. by Pauline Jones Luong. Pittsburgh, PA: Univ. of Pittsburgh 
Press.
40  Press  Service  of  the Parliament  of  the Republic  of  Kazakhstan.  2011.  “A Bill  On Religious 
Activities and Religious Associations was Considered by the Public  Chamber of  the Majilis.” 
Zakon,  September  15.  Retrieved  January  6,  2018  (http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?
doc_id=31053921#pos=1;-108).
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debate,  but the only real  battleground for this  debate thus far  has been legal 
battles over the right of girls and young women to wear hijabs in public schools 
and universities. In Kyrgyzstan, the Ministry of Education and Science issued an 
order "On the religious situation in the educational organizations of the Kyrgyz 
Republic," according to which “girls and young women are forbidden to wear 
headscarves  and  hijabs  in  schools.”41  The  debate  took  a  similar  course  in 
Kazakhstan, where a number of parental groups protested the informal ban on 
the hijab in public schools:
The Commissioner received a collective appeal of Muslim women from 
the  city  of  Taraz  (No.  842/03  of  02.09.07)  with  a  complaint  that  the 
directors  of  secondary  schools  where  the  applicants'  daughters  are 
studying prevent Muslim girls from wearing hijabs; they also intentionally 
produce an artificial decline in their academic performance, in fulfillment 
of a directive from the head of the Department of Internal Policy of the 
Akimat [city council] of the city of Taraz.42
The public  debate that  ensued led to an official  statement by the Ministry of 
Justice,  siding with the informal  ban on hijabs.  In the words of  the Ministry, 
“although the constitution guarantees everyone the right to profess any religion, 
students of state educational institutions must comply with established rules of 
41 Pavlovich, Lyudmila. 2009. “Separate the Wheat From the Chaff.” Interview with the Director 
of the State Agency for Religious Affairs Kanybek Osmonaliev. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, March 20, No. 
29.
42 Report on the Activities of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Republic of Kazakhstan 
in 2007. 2008. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.
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the school  uniform.”43  Thus,  both men’s  and women’s  manner  of  dress  have 
served as  key  sites  in  the  struggle  to  establish  the  authority  of  local  Islamic 
traditions  and  practices  in  the  face  of  easily  accessible  alternate  sources  of 
authority. 
Banning Salafism in Court
Though Salafism is banned in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, enforcing such 
bans is difficult in practice. The Salafi and Wahhabi movements are nebulous in 
nature,  and  have  gained  influence  within  mainstream  Islam  even  as  the 
authorities have sought to crack down on individuals and groups that actively 
propagate such puritanical beliefs. As one Kazakh expert put it:
It is impossible to prohibit literally, as the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims 
of Kazakhstan suggests, since the Salafis do not have a clearly delineated, 
visible  organizational  structure.  This  is  not  a  public  organization  or  a 
political  party that has a charter,  some constituent documents,  or open 
membership rolls. And in a crowd of believers, on the street, in any other 
public place, it is impossible to identify a Salafite, since he does not carry a 
party card with him.44
43 Report on the Situation with Human Rights in Kazakhstan for 2009. 2010. Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor.
44  Sokolov,  Andrey.  2011.  “Religion  Should  Unite  and Not  Disconnec.”  Interview with  Eldar 
Zhumagaziev, Atyrau political scientist.  Inform, August 16. Retrieved January 6, 2018 (http://
www.inform.kz/kz/religiya-dolzhna-ob-edinyat-a-ne-raz-edinyat-obschestvo-atyrauskiy-
politolog-el-dar-zhumagaziev_a2398772).
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Nevertheless,  authorities  have  actively  monitored  and  prosecuted  those 
suspected of propagating Salafi and Wahhabi ideas.
As I argued in previous chapters, terms such as Salafi often lack a precise 
definition, but rather serve to police the boundaries of accepted behavior simply 
through their public application. As with the term “destructive sect,” authorities 
use  ”Salafism”  often  without  reference  to  a  precise  or  consistent  doctrinal 
lineage. Rather, the meaning of the term is negotiated as it gets hurled around 
publicly. Unlike the discourses on destructive sects, however, terms such as Salafi 
engage discourses on terrorism, which bring state security services into play. The 
messy public negotiation of Islamic heterodoxy can thus lead to criminal charges, 
based merely on the association of individuals and groups with alleged extremist 
organizations.
The gravity of such labels is exemplified by a court case against a group of 
men accused of spreading radical Salafi ideas in the city of Taraz in southern 
Kazakhstan.  The  prosecution  alleged  that  Abdrakhmanov,  a  taxi  driver  who 
frequented a local mosque and had many regular clients in the area,  was the 
leader of a radical cell that promoted armed jihad in Kazakhstan and sought to 
join jihadi groups fighting abroad. The accused included two military officers, 
prompting  the  trial  to  be  held  in  a  military  court.  According  to  the  court 
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transcript:
In early February 2009, Abdrakhmanov, in pursuit of criminal intent to 
disseminate  materials  promoting  terrorism,  entered  into  a  preliminary 
conspiracy  with  the  deputy  commander  Eraliev  of  a  communications 
platoon and sergeant Elubaev of military unit 63563, and handed the latter 
4 DVDs for distribution in the mosques of the city of Taraz, containing 
video and audio materials, propagandizing terrorism.45
Based on these four DVDs, twelve men were charged with criminal conspiracy 
and  terrorist  activity.  Abdrakhmanov  was  allegedly  apprehended  while 
attempting to acquire firearms in order to join jihadist groups in Afghanistan or 
the North Caucasus (implying Chechnya or Dagestan from whence hailed the 
Tsarnaev brothers who were responsible for the Boston Marathon bombing in 
2013).
The  investigation  began  when  a  bag  containing  informational  DVDs  was 
discovered at a mosque in the city of Taraz. The bag was brought to the imam, 
who watched the DVDs and determined that they contained “religious content,” 
in which “sheikhs talked about jihad, about the war in Palestine, Chechnya and 
Afghanistan against infidels, namely Americans, Jews and Russians.”46 The imam 
reported the find to the Committee for  National  Security (the KGB successor 
45 Republic of Kazakhstan. 2010. Court Ruling of the Military Court of the Shymkent Garrison. 
March 26, No. 1-3/10. Presiding judge Kaipov B., secretary of the session Turlieva A., and the 
state prosecutors Musaev M. and Sharipov B.
46 Ibid.
373
institution),  and  volunteered  the  name  of  Elubaev  when  agents  arrived  to 
confiscate the disks.  Security services later asserted that “operational  research 
activities” had confirmed that the accused “adhere to the unconventional Jihadist 
Salafi trend in Sunni Islam.”47 
According to the court transcript,  Abdrakhmanov became acquainted with 
Eraliev, Elubaev and the other accused through their local mosque, where they 
participated in the juma namaz together — the Friday afternoon prayer that, for 
many Central Asian Muslim men, represents the primary form of participation in 
their  local  mosques.  He  then  encouraged  them  to  participate  in  private 
discussion groups, where he introduced them to internet sources that promoted 
“Salafist” ideals, which ostensibly include calling for armed jihad domestically 
and  as  part  of  a  global  battle  against  secular  authorities.  According  to  the 
testimony of Kurshkin, one of Abdrakhmanov’s acquaintances: 
Together with [Ramazan] Mashanlo, [Kurshkin] began attending religious 
studies at home with Abdrakhmanov, who could explain certain Islamic 
concepts  in  the  Russian  language,  since  he  could  not  understand  the 
imams of  mosques  due  to  poor  knowledge  of  the  Kazakh  language… 
Abdrakhmanov  told  them  that  they  need  to  visit  the  Internet  sites 
“Kavkaz [Caucasus] Center,” "Hunafah.com,” “Imam TV," "Islam Media,” 
and ”Ummah Islam" in  order  to  gain in-depth knowledge.  From these 
sites, he downloaded a variety of videos with lectures by Muslim sheikhs 
on  the  themes  of  jihad,  hijrat,  and  shahid.  In  class,  Abdrakhmanov 
47 Ibid.
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propagandized terrorism and religious extremism, saying that the imams 
of mosques do not generally adhere to the rules that are binding for true 
Muslims,  but  live  according  to  the  "Tagut"  laws,  and  obey  the  tyrant 
"kafirs,” that is, the government of the country. Abdrakhmanov also said 
that  to  obtain  the  position  of  Supreme  Mufti  in  the  Republic  of 
Kazakhstan,  bribes should be given to officials,  and that Imams are all 
corrupt and are not true Muslims.48
The  main  evidence  presented  against  Abdrakhmanov  was  simply  the 
propagation of “radical” ideas via these web resources and the DVDs, and yet 
the entire group of men was convicted of attempting to propagate armed jihad — 
primarily  based  on  defendants  testifying  against  one  another.  Kurshkin,  for 
example, testified that Abdrakhmanov encouraged his acquaintances to travel to 
the north Caucasus to join the militant groups there that are hostile to Russian 
federal rule. 
One  expert  witness  provided  a  direct  rationale  for  treating  the  mere 
possession of dissident information as a criminal assault on the security of the 
state.  The  expert,  a  professor  of  Political  Science  Department  of  the  Modern 
Kazakh-Russian Humanitarian University, summarized the threat posed by such 
activities in the following manner:
Considering that a significant part of the population of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan is  Muslim and,  taking into  account  their  growing pseudo-
religiosity, using DVDs it is possible to create a certain threat in the sphere 
of information security of our society, namely, to violate the established 
48 Ibid.
375
inter-confessional  consent  of  the  people  of  Kazakhstan  and  provoke 
extremist  moods  that  affect  the  formation  of  deviant  types  of  political 
behavior and agitational propaganda work, like extremism and terrorism, 
which  contradicts  the  norms  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Republic  of 
Kazakhstan.49
The expert  witness further recounted the use of  such DVDs to recruit  young 
Muslims to the cause of jihad in Afghanistan and Chechnya, solidifying the guilt 
of  the  accused  by  associating  them  with  militant  activities  in  neighboring 
countries.
This case reveals some of the approaches that security and law enforcement 
officials  have  taken  to  monitoring  and  prosecuting  individuals  suspected  of 
propagating  dissident  Islamic  ideas.  As  the  accounts  from  the  court  case 
demonstrate,  officials  treat  these informal  networks of  dissidents  as  part  of  a 
coordinated  effort  to  subvert  the  authority  of  the  political  and  religious 
establishment.  I  now turn to the final discourse on Islamic heterodoxy — the 
concern that a “hidden insurgency” is taking place from within the mainstream 
Muslim community of the region.
II. ”Latent Threats” to Authority: Tablighi Jamaat as a Hidden Insurgency
The sum of all these various movements and their activities is often seen as a 
49 Ibid.
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“covert  insurgency”  that  threatens  to  undermine  national  sovereignty  and 
stability  from  within  traditional  Islam.  Although  movements  such  as 
Wahhabism, Salafism, and Hizbut Tahrir are presented as alien forms of Islam 
that  are  incompatible  with  local  traditions,  they  are  simultaneously  seen  as 
making great gains in establishing themselves among the mainstream Muslim 
population,  subverting  the  authority  of  traditional  Hanafi  Islam  and  local 
customs  of  practice.  Even  groups  that  seem  docile  and  benign  currently  are 
feared  as  hiding  great  potential  to  pursue  more  aggressive  and  subversive 
activities once they have amassed a sufficiently strong base of support.
The discourse of a hidden insurgency gets applied to many groups that have 
already  been  discussed.  One  religious  scholar  and  expert  in  Kyrgyzstan,  for 
example,  stated  that  Salafi  ideas  represent  a  “hidden,  slowly  manifested 
threat.”50  Even  Hizb  ut-Tahrir,  which  is  frequently  invoked  as  an  immanent 
security threat, is also frequently discussed as a covert threat due to its cell-based 
structure and as-yet unrealized aspirations to mobilize Muslims in the erection of 
a Caliphate. Officials in Kyrgyzstan have warned of the capacity of such groups 
to expand their cells using the official infrastructure of the Muftiate:
50  Malikova,  Bermet.  2009.  “Salafism: Latent or Real  Threat?” Vecherniy Bishkek,  December 11. 
Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://members.vb.kg/2009/12/11/svyat/1.html).
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Recently, “Hizbutists” have been actively using many mosques and their 
imams to spread their ideas, as have the daavatists [Islamic missionaries, 
likely referring to Tablighi Jamaat]  expanded their missionary activities 
[using mosques], which provide good cover for them.51
Officials have also warned of the potential for these groups to serve as gateways 
to  further  radicalization,  and even as  a  recruiting ground by known terrorist 
groups.  For example a government official  asserted in one 2013 court  case in 
Kazakhstan  stated  that  al-Qaida  and  the  Taliban  view  Tablighi  Jamaat  as  a 
“potential  base  for  replenishing  their  militants  because  of  the  similarity  and 
proximity of the radical religious views advocated by the adherents of Tablighi 
Jamaat.”52
Possibly no group exemplifies these fears of a covert insurgency more than 
the Islamic missionary movement Tablighi  Jamaat.  This  movement,  started in 
northern India in the 1920s, formally declares its mission to engage in a holy war 
for Islam, but one that is to be fought not through armed insurgency, but rather 
“over the hearts of Muslims.” The movement strictly prohibits engagement with 
politics,  which it  proclaims to be something worldly,  profane,  and in need of 
insulation from its divine mission (Balci 2012; Epkinhans 2011; Montgomery and 
51  Kyrgyz Republic.  2009.  Decree  of  the  Issyk-Kul  Regional  Administration on “The State  of 
Religious Affairs in the Territory of the Issyk-Kul Region.” March 13, No. 61.
52  Republic  of  Kazakhstan.  2013.  Court  Ruling of  the Saryarka District  Court  of  Astana City, 
February  26,  No.  2-1154.  Presiding judge:  Zhaksybergenov K.  Zh.,  the  secretary  of  the  court 
session: Jahine N.Zh. and representative of the applicant, Dzhanakhmetov A.U.
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Heathershaw 2012; Wolters 2014). This open advocacy for “jihad,” but a form of 
spiritual  warfare  that  is  non-violent  and  apolitical,  has  made  the  regimes  of 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan deeply suspicious of Tablighi Jamaat, all the more so 
because  of  the  group’s  success  at  cultivating  a  following.  Officials  fear  that 
Tablighi  Jamaat’s  independence  and  cell-based  structure  give  the  movement 
great  “hidden  potential”53  to  serve  as  a  source  of  radicalism  and  political 
mobilization in the future. 
I  will  demonstrate how the regimes present the pan-Islamic and revivalist 
program  of  Tabligh  Jamaat  as  a  covert  insurgency  and  potential  gateway  to 
radicalism and terrorist activities. The position of Tablighi Jamaat also presents 
one major point of distinction between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Whereas the 
government of Kazakhstan treats Tablighi Jamaat as a cell-based extremist group 
essentially  identical  to  Hizb  ut-Tahrir,  the  movement  has  gained  mainstream 
recognition in Kyrgyzstan, and has even succeeded in incorporating itself into 
the Muftiate structure.
Tablighi Jamaat in Kazakhstan
53 From my fieldwork notes of statements by administration and security officials at a conference 
on Religious  Groups  and their  Activities  in  Kyrgyzstan,  organized by Turkish Manas University, 
Bishkek, KG, June 26, 2014.
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Tablighi Jamaat is a missionary movement that promotes Islamic revivalism and 
pan-Islamism  across  Central  and  Southern  Asia.  In  Kyrgyzstan,  where  the 
movement  operates  openly,  followers  devote  themselves  to  regular,  faithful 
practice of Islam, primarily through davaat or proselytizing activities. In Bishkek, 
I  regularly  encountered  adherents  of  the  movement  going  door  to  door 
encouraging men to attend their local (often Muftiate-controlled) mosque. This 
goal would seem innocuous -- even symbiotic with the Muftiate’s own goal of 
expanding its authority. And yet, despite having no greater social agenda than 
encouraging men to attend prayer at their local mosques, the movement remains 
banned in Kazakhstan, and has only recently gained mainstream acceptance in 
Kyrgyzstan. I will first address Kazakhstan’s response to Tablighi Jamaat, and 
then discuss the position of the group in Kyrgyzstan below.
President Nazarbayev warned in 2005 that, "A certain part of the religious 
community is falling under the influence of missionaries from foreign Islamic 
centers that carry the idea of religious intolerance,” noting in particular the threat 
posed by “the foreign radical movement Tablighi Jamaat, which has created an 
underground network of cells,”54 Despite the movement’s focus on patronizing 
54  Republic  of  Kazakhstan.  2000.  Government  Decree  on  “the  State  Protection  of  Persons 
Participating in Criminal Proceedings.” July 5, No. 72.
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establishment  mosques,  the  authorities  regard  its  autonomous,  grassroots 
activism as a threat to established religious and civic traditions:
Although Tablighi Jamagat corresponds to the Sunni orientation in Islam 
in  the  theological  sense,  according to  experts  its  ideology is  similar  to 
radical Wahhabism, in that it does not accept innovation or dissent in the 
faith…  Formally,  Tablighi  Jamagat  only  calls  adherents  to  devotion  to 
Allah, observance of proper forms of prayer, respect for fellow believers 
and  propagating  Islamic  values.  At  the  same  time,  the  doctrines  of 
Tablighi  Jamagat  [incite  followers  to  reject]  a  tolerant  attitude  towards 
representatives  of  other  religions,  and,  most  importantly,  toward 
observance  of  secular  laws  and  customs,  including  the  traditions  of 
[Kazakh] society.55
As with the other movements discussed, Tablighi Jamaat is a diffuse network 
structured  around  outreach  more  than  doctrinal  rigidity.  Thus  the  statement 
above to the effect that Tablighi Jamaat dismisses the authority of secular laws is 
at  best  drawn  from  marginal  figures  within  the  movement,  and  does  not 
constitute an official doctrine. Though Tablighi Jamaat emphasizes that Allah is 
the sole object of legitimate worship, the main principles of the movement do not 
mention  secular  authority,  either  in  support  or  opposition  (Siddiqi  2018). 
Nevertheless,  the  movement’s  open support  of  a  “holy  war  for  the  hearts  of 
Muslims” has drawn swift condemnation from the establishment.
55 Anonymous. 2013. “Throughout All the Years of Existence in Kazakhstan, the Communities of 
Tablighi Jamaat Have Never Officially Registered.” Zakon, March 29. Retrieved January 6, 2018 
(https://www.zakon.kz/4548940-za-vse-gody-sushhestvovanija-v.html).
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Though leaders of Tablighi Jamaat stress that they call for an apolitical and 
non-violent  form  of  jihad,  the  authorities  of  Kazakhstan  recognize  that  this 
“inward  jihad”  is  meant  to  be  waged  against  the  authority  of  secular  and 
national  leaders  such  as  themselves.  Local  experts  express  the  regime’s 
opposition to the groups precisely along the following lines: 
The movement is apolitical only in the sense that it does not pursue or 
attach much importance to short-term political goals, such as mobilizing 
the  Muslim  community  for  establishing  Islamic  rule  in  individual 
countries. This [political detachment] is explained by the fact that Tablighi 
Jamaat does not recognize the state as a legitimate entity. Instead, it deals 
with  the  entire  Muslim community  -  the  ummah.  The  purpose  of  the 
movement, according to Mark Gaborio, a French specialist in this matter, 
is nothing more than the "systematic capture of the world" by means of 
jihad. In practice, this thousand-year-old dream is pursued by a two-fold 
way  —  strengthening  fundamentalist  zeal  among  Muslims,  and 
converting non-Muslims to Islam.56
At times,  officials  link this  “fundamentalist  zeal”  with extremist  and terrorist 
activities, depicting Tablighi Jamaat as “a driving force of religious radicalism, 
extremism  and  even  terrorism  in  the  world.”  Nevertheless,  the  prevailing 
approach  in  Kazakhstan  is  to  treat  Tablighi  Jamaat  as  a  nascent  threat, 
qualitatively different from Hizb ut-Tahrir’s consciously malicious intent:
In fact,  members of Tablighi Jamagat,  consciously or unconsciously, are 
preaching  a  version  of  Islam that  is  almost  indistinguishable  from the 
56  Smagulov,  Amanzhol.  2011.  “To Save Spiritual  Sovereignty.” Liter,  September 14.  Retrieved 
January 6, 2018 (http://abai.kz/post/10492).
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ideology of jihad practiced by all terrorists. For most young Muslims, the 
first step towards radicalizing their religious consciousness is joining the 
Tablighi Jamaat.57
The authorities also stress the Southern Asian origins of Tablighi Jamaat. As one 
news article notes the movement’s major centers ”are located abroad — in India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh,” and its  “installations are known only to a  narrow 
circle  of  leaders  of  the  movement.”58  And  in  the  words  of  one  expert,  the 
movement  places  great  emphasis  on  convincing  adherents  to  travel  to  these 
centers for re-education: 
The most promising of the new adepts and converts undergo additional 
training at the Tablighi Jamaat headquarters in Ravinda. Usually, they are 
recruited  into  the  ranks  of  terrorist  groups  after  arrival  in  Pakistan… 
Indeed,  for  the  majority  of  young  Muslims,  joining  Tablighi  Jamaat 
becomes the first step towards radicalizing their religious consciousness.59
This  last  statement  in  particular,  that  Tablighi  Jamaat  is  the  leading gateway 
toward radicalism, is backed up by no evidence.
Thus,  although the movement  openly promotes  a  moderate  and apolitical 
form of Islamic revivalism, Kazakh authorities have actively associated it with a 
region notorious for both its religious conservatism and the informal sovereignty 
57 Anonymous. 2013. “Throughout All the Years of Existence in Kazakhstan, the Communities of 
Tablighi Jamaat Have Never Officially Registered.” Zakon, March 29. Retrieved January 6, 2018 
(https://www.zakon.kz/4548940-za-vse-gody-sushhestvovanija-v.html).
58 Ibid.
59  Smagulov,  Amanzhol.  2011.  “To Save Spiritual  Sovereignty.” Liter,  September 14.  Retrieved 
January 6, 2018 (http://abai.kz/post/10492).
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asserted by groups such as the Taliban in the absence of strong states. The regime 
portrays  local  cells  and  networks  of  Tablighi  Jamaat  as  deeply  integrated  in 
South Asia, and, similar to the official stance toward Hizb ut-Tahrir, the regime 
has sought to enforce its ban on Tablighi Jamaat on rooting out these networks 
through active monitoring and criminal prosecution.
Banning Tablighi Jamaat in Court
Tablighi  Jamaat  was  outlawed  in  Kazakhstan  in  2013,  when  agents  of  the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Security Committee, and the Agency for 
Religious Affairs appealed to the Astana District Court to declare the movement 
illegal. The state prosecution brought no charges against any persons in the case, 
nor  were  any  representatives  of  Tablighi  Jamaat  allowed  (or  inclined)  to 
represent the group in court. Rather, the prosecution called on assistance from 
the  relevant  government  agencies  to  meet  the  conditions  mandated  by 
”Procedural  Code  of  the  Republic  of  Kazakhstan…  for  recognition  of  an 
extremist or foreign organization carrying out extremism in the territory of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan.“60
60  Republic  of  Kazakhstan.  2013.  Court  Ruling of  the Saryarka District  Court  of  Astana City, 
February  26,  No.  2-1154.  Presiding judge:  Zhaksybergenov K.  Zh.,  the  secretary  of  the  court 
session: Jahine N.Zh. and representative of the applicant, Dzhanakhmetov A.U.
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The  District  Attorney  in  the  case  charged  that  Tablighi  Jamaat  is  only 
moderate in outward appearance, but in fact is aimed at the forcible overthrow of 
the civic and secular government of Kazakhstan:
Officially,  the  official  goal  of  the  Organization  is  the  spiritual 
transformation in Islam by preaching among adherents and among the 
broad  masses  of  people  and  appealing  to  Muslims  regardless  of  their 
social  and  economic  status  in  order  to  bring  them  closer  to  religious 
practice. However, the true goal of the Organization is to create a single 
“caliphate"  that  would  include  in  the  territory  of  Kazakhstan,  which 
involves the forcible change of the constitutional system, violation of the 
sovereignty of the Republic of Kazakhstan — of the integrity, inviolability 
and  inalienability  of  its  territory.  Followers  of  the  movement  do  not 
recognize the state as a legitimate entity.61 
To corroborate this claim, the prosecution cited a decision by the Supreme Court 
of the Russian Federation to ban Tablighi Jamaat as ”an extremist organization” 
aimed at “the establishment of world domination by spreading radical religious 
views and creating a single Islamic state, the ’World Caliphate,’ based in regions 
with traditionally Muslim populations.”62 
Typical of coordinated efforts to ban a religious group, agents of the State 
Agency  for  Religious  Affairs  reiterated  many  of  the  points  made  by  the 
prosecution. An official from the SARA stated that although the formal mission 
of Tablighi Jamaat is ”the spiritual revival of the Islamic world through "daavat" 
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
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of proselytizing,” the organization is “inspired by an extreme interpretation of 
the  Sunni  trend  of  Islam;  over  the  past  three  decades,  this  propensity  has 
escalated  to  such  an  extent  that  it  has  become the  driving  force  of  religious 
radicalism,  and  the  main  organizer  of  the  training  of  violent  extremists  and 
terrorist  acts  around the  world.”63  This  fantastic  claim is  left  uncorroborated, 
however, and the SARA official went on to discuss the doctrine and structure of 
Tablighi Jamaat.
The official noted that Tablighi is “not just an organization in the usual sense 
of  the  word,  but  rather  a  community  of  Muslims” that  is  committed to  ”the 
fulfillment  of  the  Islamic  call.”  In  the  words  of  the  official,  this  community 
follows a “Wahhabi-Deobandian doctrine, which does not accept innovations or 
dissent in faith.”
Everywhere the followers of Tablighi Jamaat preach a version of Islam, 
almost  indistinguishable  from  the  theology  of  Wahhabi  jihadists, 
professed by all terrorists. For most young Muslims, the first step toward 
radicalizing their religious consciousness is joining the Tablighi Jamaat.64
The  near  identical  formulation  of  this  official’s  statement  to  that  of  the 
government-aligned expert quoted above is no coincidence. Such repetition of 
key  talking  points  is  central  to  the  strategy  the  regime  of  Kazakhstan  has 
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
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pursued to consolidate authority over the religious sphere.  The SARA official 
concluded that “the activity of the international religious missionary movement 
Tablighi Jamaat creates a real threat to the national security of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan,”65 because of its doctrinal rigidity and supposed calls for a global 
Caliphate.
An  agent  from the  Committee  for  National  Security  further  asserted  that 
“adherents of Tablighi Jamaat categorically deny the right to exist not only of 
other religions, but also of other Muslim movements,” leading to ”an inevitable 
clash”  with  [other]  religious  groups.66  The  official  further  asserted  that 
“adherents of Tablighi Jamaat maintain contact with terrorist organizations, and 
in some cases… propagandize the ideology of international organizations that 
are recognized in Kazakhstan as terrorist.“67 
Predictably,  the  judge  ruled  in  favor  of  the  government’s  position  to  ban 
Tablighi  Jamaat  on  the  territory  of  Kazakhstan.  The  determination  and 
expedience with which the regime of Kazakhstan has banned Tablighi Jamaat 
makes  the  movement’s  different  trajectory  in  neighboring  Kyrgyzstan  all  the 
more striking.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
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Tablighi Jamaat and the Muftiate of Kyrgyzstan
Although Kyrgyzstan also sought to ban Tablighi Jamaat initially, the movement 
has experienced a very different trajectory there. Tablighi Jamaat operates under 
perpetual suspicion and scrutiny from the state in Kyrgyzstan, but has yet to be 
officially  banned.68  The  movement  continues  to  grow  in  popularity  precisely 
because of its inclusive, grassroots nature, and has even established itself within 
the Muftiate of Kyrgyzstan, garnering more mainstream recognition. 
As  early  as  1995,  a  government  report  noted  that  supporters  of  Tablighi 
Jamaat  were  working  to  insert  their  figures  into  the  Muftiate  structure  in 
Kyrgyzstan: 
In recent years, the movement of the so-called "davatists" — small groups 
of  Islamic  preachers  from  Uzbekistan  and  Tajikistan  that  are  widely 
circulating in the cities of Kyrgyzstan — have urged believers to remove 
from  their  posts  the  imams  of  mosques  loyal  to  the  authorities,  and 
appoint in their place the true fighters of Islam.69
Despite efforts to reign in the movement, however, Tablighi Jamaat continued to 
68 An SCRA official informed me on March 29, 2013 that he had been questioned by security 
officials as to why Tablighi Jamaat had not been banned in Kyrgyzstan when it was banned in all 
neighboring  states.  In  response,  he  replied  that  if  these  agencies  could  find  evidence  of 
wrongdoing, the SCRA would be able to ban them.
69 Kyrgyz Republic. 1995. Government Decree “On the Religious Situation in the Kyrgyz Republic 
and the Tasks of the Authorities to Formulate State Policy in the Religious Sphere.” Signed by 
Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic A. Djumagulov, August 1995 No. 345.
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grow in Kyrgyzstan through the early 2000s, while to the majority of practicing 
Muslims in Kyrgyzstan, Tablighi Jamaat remained a movement “which competes 
with  SAMK  [the  Spiritual  Administration  of  Muslims  in  Kyrgyzstan,  or  the 
Muftiate] in certain respects.”70
These  circumstances  changed  dramatically  in  2012,  however,  when 
supporters  of  Tablighi  Jamaat  managed  to  get  one  of  their  leading  figures, 
Maksat haji Toktomushev, elected as Head Mufti of Kyrgyzstan.71 This upset was 
made possible in part by the greater autonomy that the Muftiate and Kurultai 
elections enjoy in Kyrgyzstan compared to their counterparts in Kazakhstan. But 
supporters of  Tablighi  Jamaat were only able to capitalize on this  democratic 
structure  because  of  their  growing  mainstream  status  in  the  country.  This 
increased profile for Tablighi Jamaat also coincided with a series of scandals that 
discredited  both  the  Muftiate  and  the  incumbent  head  Mufti,  Rahmatulla 
Egamberdiev. The Muftiate was criticized for distributing visas for the hajj (of 
which Saudi  Arabia  issues  a  limited number  to  each nation)  in  exchange for 
70  Malikova,  Bermet.  2009.  “Salafism: Latent or Real  Threat?” Vecherniy Bishkek,  December 11. 
Retrieved May 9, 2017 (http://members.vb.kg/2009/12/11/svyat/1.html).
71  I  was able to observe part of the Kurultai summit in December 2012, at which Mackat ajii 
Toktomushev was elected Heat Mufti.
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bribes.72 The Head Mufti, meanwhile was undone by the release of a damaging 
sex tape with a young woman. Not only did the tape undermine the Mufti’s 
reputation, but his line of defense — claiming that the woman was his second 
wife and that polygamy is an Islamic value — placed him outside the purview of 
mainstream Islamic values in Kyrgyzstan. 
These  two  scandals  sealed  the  victory  for  Maksat  haji  Toktomushev,  and 
consequently for Tablighi Jamaat. This transfer of power has had an impact both 
on  the  Muftiate  and  on  Tablighi  Jamaat.  In  an  interview  Emil  Nasritdinov, 
professor of anthropology at the American University of Central Asia and a vocal 
supporter  of  Tablighi  Jamaat,  stated that  the  government  has  come to  see  in 
Toktomushev a figure who can wield authority both in the Muftiate structure, 
and among the ranks of Tablighi Jamaat. On the side of the Muftiate, Nasritdinov 
spoke of a move toward greater transparency and constriction of the Muftiate 
bureaucracy,  whereas  the  norm had  previously  been  continuous  bureaucratic 
expansion. On the side of Tablighi Jamaat, Nasritdinov noted that the movement 
had generally embraced its increasingly mainstream status (of which the shift to 
Malaysian manners of dress constituted a major indicator, in his opinion). He 
72 Interview with Emil Nasritdinov, Professor of Anthropology at American University of Central 
Asia, June 19th, 2014.
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also noted that the movement has inevitably become more engaged in politics, 
working informally to consolidate its position against other movements such as 
Salafism.73
Nevertheless,  popular  suspicion  and  critique  of  Tablighi  Jamaat  has 
continued even beyond the movement’s establishment within the Muftiate. One 
of  the  major  criticisms  is  the  degree  of  devotion  to  missionary  activities 
demanded of members. One expert summarized the conventional understanding 
of the group’s activities: 
Their proselytizing activity is carried out in small groups of adepts… in a 
door-to-door manner known as haruj... Once attracted to Tablighi Jamaat, 
new  members  subordinate  their  lives  to  the  movement  and  become 
professional missionaries. The organization requires that they be engaged 
in the activities of the movement for forty days a year, three days a month, 
two half-days a week, and two hours every day.74
Note that these numbers are not cumulative. Davaatists are ostensibly required 
to engage in full-time missionary activity three days per month plus one 40-day 
period per year, in addition to proselytizing door-to-door for two hours daily 
and  two  half-days  per  week.  Compliance  with  these  requirements  assuredly 
varies, but this hypothetical regimen has nevertheless provided a common point 
73 Ibid.
74  Smagulov,  Amanzhol.  2011.  “To Save Spiritual  Sovereignty.” Liter,  September 14.  Retrieved 
January 6, 2018 (http://abai.kz/post/10492).
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of criticism. Stories circulate about members of Tablighi Jamaat that abandoned 
their families and jobs to pursue missionary activities. One witness at a court 
case in Kazakhstan asserted that, “the visits of such groups to various regions of 
the country are financed by the ‘Tablighs’ own contributions, and most of them 
leave their families without means of subsistence.”75
Many of these stories have the feel of an urban legend, recounting the plight 
of impoverished wives and children neglected while their husbands are away 
doing  “God’s  work.”  I  heard  numerous,  similar  stories  to  this  effect  while 
attending  various  conferences  organized  by  local  universities  and  policy 
organizations to discuss the religious situation in Kyrgyzstan. These cautionary 
tales seem to have become part of the local mythology about Tablighi Jamaat, 
even if they cannot be verified.
Thus, Tablighi Jamaat remains an object of both popular support and popular 
mistrust in Kyrgyzstan. Though the movement has grown in both profile and 
mainstream  legitimacy,  many  still  regard  it  as  a  foreign  entity  that  seeks  to 
subvert the authority of traditional Islam from within the mainstream Muslim 
community. Despite the movement’s formally moderate and apolitical doctrine 
75  Republic  of  Kazakhstan.  2013.  Court  Ruling of  the Saryarka District  Court  of  Astana City, 
February  26,  No.  2-1154.  Presiding judge:  Zhaksybergenov K.  Zh.,  the  secretary  of  the  court 
session: Jahine N.Zh. and representative of the applicant, Dzhanakhmetov A.U.
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and practices, Tablighi Jamaat is still regarded by many in both Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan as a covert insurgency.
Conclusion
In these final chapters,  I  have examined the regimes’  motivations for treating 
certain  heterodox  Islamic  groups  primarily  as  security  threats,  and  others 
primarily as threats to authority. As I argued in my discussion of “destructive 
sects,”  such  distinctions  aid  the  regimes  in  establishing  boundaries  of 
permissibility in the public negotiation of orthodoxy as opposed to heterodoxy. 
They  also  imbue  often  arbitrary  religious  policies  and enforcement  strategies 
with a more consistent narrative. In the case of “destructive sects,” the regimes 
seek  to  legitimize  their  restrictive  policies  primarily  by  emphasizing  the 
“otherness” of heterodox groups. In relation to Islamic heterodoxy, however, the 
regimes  of  Kazakhstan  and Kyrgyzstan  must  justify  the  policing  of  religious 
beliefs  and  practices  that  many  see  as  central  to  their  ethnic  and  national 
identities. 
I  have  sought  to  show  how  these  factors  motivate  regime  distinctions 
between threats to security and threats to authority, as well as between latent and 
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manifest threats. Salafism and Wahhabism in particular present overt challenges 
to the authority of local traditions of Islam. Both movements assert the authority 
of  a  more  “authentic”  and “pure”  Islam rooted in  the  time and place  of  the 
religion’s  origins  —  the  first  generations  of  Muslims  living  in  Arab-majority 
lands.  The regimes actively deploys the discourse of  radicalism against  these 
movements  in  an effort  to  undermine the  authority  of  these  movements  and 
bolster that of the Muftiates of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.
As I discussed in the previous chapter, Hizb ut-Tahrir actively challenges the 
legitimacy  of  sovereign  nation-states.  The  regimes  interpret  this  desire  for  a 
global  Caliphate  as  an  immanent  security  threat,  and  call  for  cooperation 
between religious and secular authorities to combat this ostensible extremism. 
Tablighi Jamaat, finally, seeks to promote general Islamic revivalism, which in 
principle  should  be  compatible  with  the  goals  of  Muftiate  in  each  country. 
However, the movement also represents an autonomous source of authority and 
popular mobilization, which the regimes see as a source of “hidden potential” for 
radicalization. 
Thus,  in  the  rhetoric  of  the  regimes,  Hizb  ut-Tahrir  is  depicted  as  an 
immanent security threat, whereas fundamentalist movements such as Salafi and 
Wahhabis  are  presented  as  manifest  threats  to  “spiritual  sovereignty,”  and 
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Tablighi Jamaat is viewed as nascent threat. In the effort to combat these different 
challenges to the authority of the secular and religious establishment, the regimes 
derive significant utility from discourses on security and radicalism. The latter 
allow the regimes to  introduce distinctions within Islam between proper  and 
improper beliefs, practices, and affiliations. The former invoke a vague threat of 
extremist  and  terrorist  activity  to  justify  the  pervasive  use  of  the  state’s 
surveillance and security apparatus. Together, these two discourses assist both 
regimes  in  policing  and  critiquing  various  forms  of  Islamic  heterodoxy  that 
ostensibly  threaten  to  introduce  division  and  instability  into  the  Muslim 
community.
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CONCLUSION
Orthodoxy and the Political Field
In this dissertation, I have argued that authoritarianism should be modeled as a 
distinct  claim  to  authority,  rather  than  a  mere  concentration  of  power  by  a 
political elite. Authoritarian regimes claim to represent essential and sacrosanct 
values  that  define the  will  of  their  presumed constituents,  but  for  which the 
regime  has  exclusive  authority  to  speak.  Authoritarian  figures  can  and  do 
propagate such claims even without the power to enforce them, but to the degree 
that such claims take on the form of a regime, they do so through a system of 
political ordination. Using Bourdieu’s model of the power of nomination, I showed 
that  authoritarian  regimes  confer  public  authority  only  on  those  who 
demonstrate their loyalty to and utility for established elites.
I further argued that religious pluralism threatens this monopoly of public 
authority by subverting the regime’s exclusive claims to represent an essential 
and  sacrosanct  popular  will.  This  approach  to  authoritarian  politics  further 
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allows  us  to  account  for  why  official  discourses  on  “traditional”  and  “non-
traditional” religions differ so greatly from the historical record in Central Asia. 
To the political and religious establishments of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, it 
matters not whether a given religious ministry is local or foreign, apolitical or 
overtly political. The major factor that distinguishes orthodoxy from heterodoxy 
in the eyes of these regimes is whether a given ministry reproduces or subverts 
the regime’s claim to speak for an essential and sacrosanct national will.
Finally,  I  argued  that  authoritarian  regimes  are  often  popular  among  a 
particular political base because they consecrate the interests and values of that 
base. Authoritarian leaders — and the policies the promote — render the values 
of their core constituents sacred, elevating them above the realm of mundane 
politics and deliberation, at which their constituents are often at a disadvantage. 
Drawing from Bourdieu’s theory of public politics as a 'mystery of ministry,' I 
showed  that  democratic  and  authoritarian  politics  alike  serve  to  redistribute 
symbolic capital — propagating the interests and values of some constituents at 
the expense of others.
Citizens do not face a tradeoff between freedom and unfreedom, as much of 
the literature on post-socialist democratization asserts, but rather a competition 
among  opposing  constituencies  for  authority  and  legitimacy.  By  modifying 
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Bourdieu’s  theory  of  the  'mystery  of  ministry,'  I  argued  that  the  politics  of 
pluralism and the politics of essentialism represent opposing political strategies 
that distribute symbolic capital to competing strata within the polity. 
Restating the Puzzle
Popular  authoritarian  regimes  present  a  conundrum  for  social  scientists. 
Common citizens would seem to have little  reason to support  autocrats  who 
restrict  public  input into governance,  and yet  such leaders often garner wide 
support  with claims to embody and champion the will  of  the people.  People 
defend  the  symbolism  of  a  united  nation,  and  frequently  join  the  regime  in 
denouncing opposition and dissent. The very citizens who might benefit from 
checks  on power  often  view pluralism as  a  treasonous  attack  on the  people, 
rather than a constituent part of the popular will. The utility of such rhetoric for 
authoritarian leaders themselves is no mystery, but scholars have struggled to 
explain why reasonable citizens would endorse figures that claim such sweeping 
mandates to rule,  while often displaying dubious interest  in the the will  and 
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welfare of their actual constituents.
The  dominant  answer  offered  by  political  theory  is  that  supporters  of 
authoritarian  politics  are  acting  against  their  own  interests.  Conventional 
political  thought  puts  a  premium  on  the  individual  freedom  to  articulate 
autonomous political programs and to mobilize according to common interests 
— even against the ruling party. To the apparent detriment of their own liberty, 
therefore,  people  rally  to  leaders  who reject  such freedoms,  and who instead 
claim intrinsic and total authority to speak for national values, religious beliefs, 
revolutionary culture, or other presumptive traits of their public. Many scholars 
see  this  shift  toward  hard-line  leadership  as  part  of  an  inexorable  rise  of 
reactionary identity politics — immutable feelings of ethnic, national, or religious 
solidarity — in the aftermath of 20th century political paradigm. Such observers, 
however, who argue that identity politics goes against instrumental politics, fail 
to consider the role that essentialist identities can play in redistributing power 
among the citizenry. 
Deliberative democracy favors those strata with relatively greater means to 
participate  in  deliberation,  including  greater  volumes  of  cultural  capital  and 
access to consequential arenas of deliberation. In former socialist states across 
Eurasia, for example, wide bands of citizens have little access to civic institutions 
399
or avenues of public engagement -  aside from the hierarchical apparatuses of 
political parties. For those strata who are relatively less equipped to pursue their 
political interests through deliberative democracy, populist rhetoric and identity 
politics  can  provide  a  means  to  elevate  their  interests  above  politics  -  to 
consecrate their values as sacrosanct and essential to the very constitution of “the 
people.”
In this dissertation, I suggested that public politics should be understood as a 
battle over the means of consecration. I argued that authoritarian leaders maintain 
popular  support  by  accumulating  sufficient  symbolic  power  to  render  the 
interests of their political base sacrosanct, thereby placing those interests beyond 
the  jurisdiction  of  mundane  politics.  Their  very  mandate  is  to  “defend”  the 
presumptive will of the people from the realm of deliberation, negotiation and 
compromise, in which their constituents are at a distinct disadvantage. Strong 
discourses of identity result when such public figures obtain a near monopoly 
over the means of consecration. 
 I  developed this model by drawing off Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of public 
politics as a “mystery of ministry,” a competitive process whereby public figures 
—  those  with  relatively  greater  capacity  to  articulate  political  programs  — 
dispossess their constituents of their voices. Bourdieu theorized public politics 
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primarily in consolidated, liberal democracies such as his native France, where 
even  disaffected  classes  often  have  greater  access  to  institutions  of  civic 
engagement.  I  extended  his  observations  to  “illiberal  democracies”1  and 
authoritarian states, however, where many have suggested Bourdieu’s theories 
do not translate. It is in these contexts that Bourdieu’s theories can shed light on 
the  appeal  of  authoritarianism  —  where  politics  is  often  dominated  by 
hegemonic parties propagating religious and national ideologies. I wish to show 
that  identity politics,  like other forms of  disposition that  Bourdieu examined, 
extends from strategies of competition for power within stratified social fields.
I elaborated this model of popular politics as a struggle over the means of 
consecration through an investigation of one of the former Soviet republics in 
Central  Asia  — Kyrgyzstan.  Kyrgyzstan’s  neighbors  such as  Kazakhstan  and 
Uzbekistan  fit  the  conventional  mold  of  an  authoritarian  state,  in  which  a 
consolidated regime has a both the motive and the means to maintain power by 
manipulating the masses with nationalist and religious symbolism. The politics 
of Kyrgyzstan, in contrast, features far more infighting and disarray among its 
fragmented cadres of elite. There is no single ruling figure or party in Kyrgyzstan 
that has consistently monopolize discourses of patriotism and national values in 
1 Fareed Zakaria
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order to retain power. Despite the greater freedom that has resulted from this 
fragmented  cadre  politics,  there  is  a  pronounced  desire  in  many  sectors  of 
Kyrgyzstan’s  politics  for  greater  national  unity  under  a  strong  leader  like 
President Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan. 
The politics of Kyrgyzstan thus clash with models of authoritarian identity 
politics that postulate a strong role for elite manipulation. By examining popular 
politics as a battle over the means of consecration, we will be able to understand 
how these  authoritarian tendencies  emerge from within  stratified relations  of 
power. Even without a strongman at the helm, Kyrgyzstan has retained a Soviet-
style hierarchy of power, wherein established elite control access to positions of 
power, and only confer public authority on functionaries who first demonstrate 
their loyalty and utility to the establishment. As I will demonstrate, this structure 
was able to reproduce itself through the period of democratic transition, and is 
heavily responsible for the current expansion of identity politics in ostensibly 
democratic Kyrgyzstan.
I  see  authoritarian  governance  not  just  as  a  series  of  outcomes,  i.e.  the 
concentration of power, but also as an ideal type of claim to public authority. 
Rather than derive their mandate from a self-selecting constituency, authoritarian 
leaders claim a priori to represent the interests of a presumed constituency — e.g. 
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an ethnic or religious group, or even a class such as “the proletariat.” 
Authoritarian  regimes  therefore  rely  on  identity  politics  to  claim  the 
unilateral authority to speak for their presumed constituency. Identity politics, in 
turn, requires a degree of authoritarianism in order to be politically viable. As 
ideal types, these two concepts obtain to varying degrees in real cases. We can 
thus speak of authoritarian leaders even in cases where civic institutions prevent 
such leaders from realizing their political ambitions. Similarly, identity politics 
may appeal to a wider or narrower proportion of the population from case to 
case, but it  shares certain ideal-typical features in all  cases irrespective of this 
variation in popular support.  Though the efficacy of such politics varies from 
case to case, I argue that this elective affinity between authoritarian and identity 
politics transcends any particular political context. 
Key Findings
In the present cases, we can acknowledge that the regimes of Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan claim public authority through similar discourses on national and 
religious tradition, but vary greatly in terms of regime consolidation. Tensions do 
occur  between  the  state  and  the  orthodox  religious  establishments  —  the 
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Muftiate and Patriarchate. The relative strength of the two regimes has played a 
definitive role in shaping the disparate outcome of these tensions in Kyrgyzstan 
and Kazakhstan. The long-serving and popular supreme Mufti  of Kazakhstan 
resigned in  2013  after  a  series  of  clashes  with  the  SARA,  including over  the 
dispersement of zakat, the tithes that mosques receive from the faithful, as one 
well-connected expert related to me in an interview.2 The election that followed 
installed  a  supreme Mufti  that  is  more  deferential  to  the  state’s  policies  and 
rhetoric. It is not uncommon, these days, for the current Supreme Mufti to call for 
prayer to the health of President Nazarbeyev.3
Similar  jockeying  in  Kyrgyzstan  resulted  in  greater  rather  than  less 
independence for the Muftiate.  The two most  recent elections of  the Kurultai 
assembly of imams have brought to power increasingly independent Supreme 
Muftis. Relations between the SCRA and Muftiate suffered after the former failed 
to aid their chosen delegate secure a victory in the 2012 Kurultai.4 The current 
Supreme  Mufti,  Maksat-haji  Toktomushev,  emerged  from  within  the  Tablighi 
Jamaat  movement,  which  is  officially  banned  in  Kazakhstan  and  is  still 
considered threatening by many in Kyrgyzstan. And yet, relations between the 
2 Interview with professor of religious studies in Almaty, KZ, May 2013.
3 Ibid.
4 Interview with official from the SCRA, Bishkek, KG, December 2012
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Muftiate  and  SCRA  have  eased  considerably  under  Toktomushev’s  tenure, 
helping  to  move  Tablighi  Jamaat  further  into  the  mainstream  of  Islam  in 
Kyrgyzstan, despite being banned in all neighboring states.5
Contribution and Implications
This  dissertation  makes  several  contributions  to  the  literature  on 
authoritarianism  and  identity  politics.  Conceptualizing  public  politics  as  a 
struggle over the means of consecration allows us to rehabilitate the concept of 
identity  politics,  by  treating  essentialist  identities  instrumentally.  Rather  than 
treating identity politics as a product of parochial fetishism, elite manipulation, 
or  other  form  of  non-instrumental  reasoning  that  overrides  instrumental 
interests, we are able to treat identity as a tool in struggles over relative power 
among citizens. By modeling public politics as a transfer of symbolic capital, we 
can  treat  collective  identities  —  religious,  ethnic,  partisan  —  as  important 
political  investments,  and  key  factors  of  individual  and  collective  self-
determination.  Support  for  any  given  identity  is  an  instrumental  calculation 
based on anticipated returns, and treat supporters of identity politics as rational 
5  Interview on  with  local  scholar  of  religion  and member  of  the  Tabligh  Jamaat  movement, 
Bishkek, KG, June 2014
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political actors.Essentialist identities elevate the values and interests of presumed 
constituencies above the realms of democratic deliberation. This is particularly 
appealing  for  those  constituencies  that  feel  poorly  served  by  deliberative 
democracy and civil society, with their urban and cosmopolitan orientations.
This framework also allows us to conduct better comparative analyses across 
the  Global  North  and  South.  Conventional  theories  of  authoritarianism  and 
identity  politics  perpetuate  the  divide  between  the  civil  politics  of  liberal 
democracies  and  the  supposedly  banal  and  intolerant  politics  of  “illiberal 
democracies.” The framework I have developed in this dissertation allows us to 
compare the struggle over the means of consecration across cases. All political 
communities  with  sufficiently  regularized  public  politics  feature  struggles  to 
consecrate certain ideals of “the people” that confer a mandate on the state — a 
struggle between a camp that wants to constrict this definition, and a camp that 
wants to expand it. Comparative politics can gain from new analytical tools that 
help us to understanding the instrumental logic behind these struggles across 
cases.
The relational model of authoritarian and identity politics I have developed in 
this dissertation thus extends further than religious politics in post-Soviet states. 
It  speaks to similar misconceptions of  illiberal  governance in cases across the 
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globe. Discussions of perennial issues such as the popularity of Shariah law in 
certain Muslim countries come into greater clarity if we relinquish dichotomies 
between secular and religious governance, and instead investigate how ideals of 
autocthony contribute to a popular sense of self-determination and popular rule. 
An explanatory theory of identity politics cannot treat those who feel threatened 
by pluralism as inherently mistaken about their own interests. Instead, scholars 
should acknowledge that public negotiation of religious and national categories 
is a form of civic politics, in which public figures and institutions play a key role, 
though not an inherently manipulative one. 
This relational  perspective helps separate normative arguments for greater 
liberalism from analytical discussions of the means by which common citizens 
overcome individual atomization and marginality and figures leverage this sense 
of individual powerlessness into public authority. Pluralism is not simply a social 
value or a measurable degree of religious diversity, but rather an obstacle to any 
form of essentialist claims — secular or religious, civic or ethnic — establishing a 
monopoly over the power to speak for the people. All political communities with 
sufficiently  institutionalized  rule  and  regularized  politics  feature  a  band  of 
society  that  could  increase  their  public  voice  and  representation  though  a 
strategy of essentialism. These tendencies exist in plural democracies as well as 
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under nationalist, socialist, or fundamentalist regimes. A monopoly of ministry 
appeals to those whose interests and values it would amplify, but also works to 
prevent  citizens  from  freely  charting  courses  to  greater  individual  self-
determination.
Finally, this framework allows us to give Bourdieu’s theory of public politics 
a greater comparative scope. By treating the 'mystery of ministry' as a process 
that  redistributes  symbolic  capital  among  constituents,  rather  than  one  that 
dispossesses constituents, we can create a Bourdieusian model of public politics 
that  has  greater  explanatory  and  comparative  power.  The  reformulation  fo 
Bourdieu’s  discussion of  the  mystery  of  ministry  that  I  have  presented in  this 
dissertation allows us to understand how representation serves as a system of 
investment and return, in which people invest in public figures in the hopes of 
receiving dividends of  social  capital.  This  model  of  the  ‘political  economy of 
symbolic power’ (Swartz 1997; 2013) gives Bourdieu’s work greater explanatory 
power  in  cases  beyond bourgeois  democracies  such  as  France  at  the  time of 
Bourdieu’s writing. It allows us to take into account collective political projects 
that drive, to quote Chatterjee (2006), 'popular politics in most of the world.' It 
also  helps  us  to  account  for  the  populist  backlash  to  neoliberalism  and 
globalization that have wracked western democracies as of late.
408
This modification allows us to link Bourdieu’s theory of public politics to his 
more  well  known  theories  of  class  domination,  creating  a  unified  model  of 
individual  and  collective  self-determination.  Modeling  public  politics  as  a 
struggle  over  the  means  of  consecration  has  potential  to  situate  Bourdieu’s 
theory of public politics more strongly within his broader writings that dissect 
stratified  power  relations.  Tying  this  model  to  a  theory  of  the  means  of 
consecration gives us the capacity to have a truly comparative model of private 
and public power.
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